September 3, 1943 Italy, having broken with Hitler, concluded an armistice with the allied command, and soon declared war on Nazi Germany. During the armistice negotiations, it was decided that allied landings would be landed at several points in Italy, including near Rome, simultaneously with the announcement of the armistice. However, at the very last moment, under circumstances that remained unclear for a long time, the already prepared operation near Rome was canceled, which had tragic consequences for the Italian capital and for Italy as a whole.

As you know, the signing of the truce was preceded by events of great historical significance. The crushing defeats inflicted by the Red Army on the German - fascist troops at Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge created a radical change in the course of World War II. When the overwhelming majority of Hitler's armed forces were engaged in fighting on the Soviet-German front, Anglo-American troops defeated and drove the Italo-German armies out of Africa, and on July 10 landed in Sicily. The military defeat of Italy was accompanied by the collapse of the Italian economy, a sharp deterioration in the material situation of workers. Italy was on the verge of a national catastrophe. A revolutionary movement was growing in the country, with the Communists in the vanguard.

Under these circumstances, the ruling circles of Italy were forced to remove Mussolini from power in order to lead the country out of the war and prevent a revolutionary explosion. In Italy, the government of P. Badoglio was established. In the course of negotiations with the Allies on the conclusion of an armistice, which it began with great delay, led sluggishly and indecisively, a very acute and important question arose about how, after the conclusion of the armistice, to prevent the capture of Rome by German troops. The issue of defending the Italian capital had military, political and economic aspects. Here was the government, the state administration bodies, the centers of political parties, and finally the king and his family. In Rome, the high command, the general staff and large military formations were concentrated. This city was a developed industrial center and the largest junction of railway communications in Italy. Keeping the capital in Italian hands would have accelerated and facilitated the advance of the Allied forces to the north and would have had an important impact on the course of subsequent military operations in Italy.

However, defending Rome was not an easy task, since after the armistice it would be at a considerable distance from the Allies and in close proximity to large formations of Hitler's troops. A radical measure that would ensure a successful defense of Rome would be the landing of an allied air assault near it,

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which, together with the Italian troops, would be able to repel the German offensive and hold the capital until the Allied forces arrived. As you know, during the armistice negotiations, the issue of such an operation was agreed upon. However, in the very last hours, it was canceled.

Quite a lot has been written about the failed amphibious operation near Rome and other closely related issues (about the flight of the king and Badoglio from Rome, about the surrender of the Italian capital to the Nazis). At the same time, almost every political party that existed in Italy after the war expressed its attitude to this issue. The authors, who belonged to the monarchist camp 1, admitted that the cancellation of the amphibious operation was a mistake. But when they talk about the people responsible for it, they are silent about D. Eisenhower, Italian King Victor Emmanuel III and Badoglio, and put all the blame on General J. R. R. Tolkien. Carboni, the commander of the motorized mechanized corps, who was assigned to lead the defense of Rome. Thus, the monarchist Malacola, criticizing the decision to cancel the amphibious operation, stressed that the Allies, having been drawn into this operation, for reasons of prestige would have borne the brunt of the battle for the Italian capital and the city would not have been surrendered to the Germans. He accused Carboni of making a grave mistake by advising him to cancel the planned amphibious landing. 2 According to the former Italian monarchist diplomat A. Tamaro, the proposed amphibious operation would have been difficult, but possible, and there were no sufficient grounds for canceling it .3 The monarchist authors are joined by General J. R. R. Tolkien. Castellano, known for his friendly ties to Eisenhower and other American military leaders. He also called the refusal to accept the help of the American air force a mistake and argued that the operation had a chance of success .4
The question of canceling the amphibious operation near Rome also attracted the attention of representatives of the left-wing democratic circles. They blamed the king, Badoglio, the Italian generals, and above all Carboni for the failure of this operation. These authors, who published their books shortly after the war, did not have classified materials and could not raise the question of Eisenhower's responsibility for the cancellation of the operation. C. Silvestri, a veteran of the Italian Socialist Party (ISP), who was repeatedly arrested and imprisoned during the fascist dictatorship, called Carboni's words bluff on September 8, 1943 in an interview with with the American General M. Taylor, that it is necessary to abandon the landing of air paratroopers due to the superiority of German troops. The refusal to launch an air assault, Silvestri believed, cost the Allies tens of thousands of soldiers killed and wounded at Cassino and in Romagna, and delayed the end of the war .5 A. Corona, a member of the ISP leadership in the post-war years, noted Carboni's guilt, which consisted in drawing a gloomy picture of the military situation in the aforementioned conversation with Taylor and stating that an American division that landed would be doomed to destruction, intimidated the American general .6
J. Carboni engaged in a fierce debate with his "opponents". At the beginning of this discussion, which lasted several years, he categorically claimed that the cancellation of the amphibious operation was "an act of loyal, generous Italian military comradeship,

1 Malacola. Il popolo, fascismo e monarchia. R. 1945; P. Monelli. Roma 1943. R. 1946; G. Zanussi. Guerra e catastrofe dell Italia. R. 1946; Q. Armelini. Diario di guerra. Milano. 1946; A. Tamaro. Due anni di storia 1943 - 1945. R. 1948.

2 Malacola. Op. cit., pp. 156 - 157.

3 A. Tamaro. Op. cit., p. 350.

4 G. Castellano. La guerra continua. Milano. 1963, p. 140.

5 C. Silvestri. I responsabili della catastrofe italiana. Milano. 1946, p. 46.

6 A. Corona. La verita sul 9 settembra. R. 1945, p. 27.

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thanks to which America avoided the absolutely futile destruction of the entire American reinforced parachute division and the moral damage caused by a loud and bloody failure. " 7 However, in the following years, Carboni, under the influence of indisputable facts, noticeably changed his point of view, already agreeing that under certain conditions the landing of American troops near Rome could have been successful and would have had a positive value .8
Among the memoirs concerning the historical period under consideration and written by statesmen, the memoirs of W. Churchill are of the greatest interest9 . They show, in particular, how much military and political importance the Allies attached to the landing near Rome. But Churchill also did not name the main culprit for the failure of this operation. A completely unsatisfactory impression is also left by the section of Eisenhower's own memoirs that deals with the failed landing. Resorting to general, meaningless phrases, and sometimes even to direct falsification of facts, Eisenhower is silent about the fact that the landing of the American troops was canceled on his direct orders. He's writing: "At the last moment, either the fear of the Italian government or, as the Italians claim, the movement of German military reserves, I do not know which, forced the cancellation of this plan." 10
Books and articles written by leading figures of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and Communist historians also contain statements about the failed amphibious operation. Of particular importance is the conclusion formulated by Luigi Longo, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PCI, that "Rome could have been liberated by the combined efforts of the army, the people and the allied forces, who intended to drop an air assault in the area of Rome"11 . This statement is the key to a correct understanding of the issue under study.

Nowadays, a historian who wants to delve into the study of this topic already has quite a sufficient amount of materials and documents. The main sources are the mentioned books by Castellano and Carboni. Especially important are Castellano's memoirs, since they first published a number of documents from the American and Italian military archives: a reference from the US Military Historical Archive on the preparation of an amphibious operation; Castellano's report on the landing plan sent to the Italian General Staff; telegrams from Eisenhower and Badoglio; recordings of conversations between Castellano and representatives of the allied command, and others.

The authors of these books took a very active and direct part in the events described. Castellano, as head of the Planning Department of the Italian General Staff, was a confidant of the Chief of the General Staff, V. Ambrosio. On behalf of the King and Badoglio, he conducted secret negotiations with the Allies in Lisbon and then in Sicily for Italy's withdrawal from the war and signed an armistice. Carboni, who enjoyed the confidence of the king and Badoglio, soon after Mussolini's removal from power, was appointed chief of Italian military intelligence and commander of the motorized mechanized corps formed to defend Rome from German attack and to fight the growing revolutionary movement. Carboni had a lot of power, had access to classified information, including about the upcoming amphibious operation, and was Badoglio's first adviser.

7 G. Carboni. L'Italia tradita dall'armistizio alia pace. R. 1947, p. 8.

8 Ibid., p. 107.

9 W. Churchill. The Second World War. Closing the Ring. Cambridge. 1951.

10 D. Eisenhower. Crusade in Europe. L. 1948, p. 202.

11 l. Longo. The people of Italy in the Struggle, Moscow, 1952, p. 83.

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When studying the literature on the preparation of an air force near Rome, one can meet with completely opposite judgments about who and when first put forward this idea. A. Corona writes that the question of a parachute landing was raised by Castellano on August 19, 1943 during negotiations in Lisbon .12 Churchill puts forward a completely different version, claiming that Eisenhower had his own plan for landing troops near Rome and that he informed Castellano about it .13 As for Eisenhower himself, who was one of the main actors in this historical episode, he does not give any information in his memoirs about when such a plan first appeared and who initiated it.

The most reliable source on this issue is the recordings of Castellano's conversations with representatives of the Allied command. From them it is clear that on August 19, during negotiations with the allies, the question of landing an air force near Rome was not raised. Instructions prepared for Castellano before he left for Sicily to continue negotiations directed him to accept an armistice only if at least 15 allied divisions landed on the coast between Civitavecchia and La Spezia. [14] In the document mentioned, there was no indication that Castellano had asked the Allies to land an air force near Rome. However, when Castellano understood from the statements of the American General B. Smith that the Allied troops would be landed on the coast not north, but south of Rome and the Italian capital would be threatened with capture by the Nazis, he first raised the question of landing American troops near Rome on the day of the armistice declaration on August 31 during negotiations in the village of Cassibile.

A recording of the second conversation, also held on August 31, said: "Then Gen. Castellano asked if it was possible for the Allies to land a parachute division near Rome on the night after the armistice was declared, and at the same time land troops in Ostia. General Smith stated that this would have been possible if the Italian government had allocated two airfields and provided assistance. " 15 It is unlikely that Castellano suddenly came up with this idea during the negotiations and put it forward without having the appropriate authority to do so. Apparently, before leaving for Sicily, it was discussed in the Italian general staff, although Castellano himself does not report this.

As you know, on August 31 in Cassibil, Smith and Castellano outlined a plan of action in case the Italian government agrees to an unconditional surrender. This plan, as appears from the recording of Castellano's conversation, was to be carried out in the following stages: "A secondary landing (5 or 6 allied divisions)... After a short period of time (one or two weeks), the main allied forces land south of Rome. The actions of the parachute division near Rome and at the same time the declaration of a truce " 16 . It is interesting to note that due to Castellano's concern for the king and his family, Smith suggested that the king might leave Rome and move to Palermo. [17] Thus, it turns out that the idea of the king's flight from the Italian capital, which followed on the night of September 8-9, was suggested by the Americans.

Giving details of how the further discussion of the question of the Allied landing near Rome proceeded, which was given the right to:-

12 A. Corona. Op. cit., p. 22.

13 W. Churchill. Op. cit., p. 109.

14 G. Castellano. Op. cit., p. 78.

15 Ibid., p. 218.

16 Ibid., pp. 218 - 219.

17 Ibid., p. 218.

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code-named "Giant-2", Castellano writes in his memoirs that he made a proposal to participate in the amphibious operation near Rome of two divisions (airborne and tank). The Allied Command paid great attention to this idea. "Eisenhower and his general staff," noted Castellano, "were convinced of the need not to leave Rome in German hands." 18 The landing near the Italian capital was approved as part of the overall operational plan developed by the Allied forces command, and the 82nd American Airborne Division and 100 anti-tank guns were allocated for its implementation, the lack of which was acutely felt in the Italian troops. Castellano called the 82nd Airborne Division the best and most efficient among those at Eisenhower's disposal. [19 ] As for the panzer division, Eisenhower promised to study the question of its involvement in Operation Giant-2.

The Allied command immediately reported the plan for an amphibious operation near Rome to their respective governments, which fully approved it. F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, who was also in Washington at the time, sent Eisenhower a telegram stating: "We fully approve your decision to carry out Operation Avalanche and land an airborne division near Rome under the specified conditions"20 . The leaders of the US and British governments attached great importance to Operation Giant-2 and even considered it necessary to inform the head of the USSR Government about it. On September 3, in a telegram sent to J. V. Stalin, they wrote:: "The acceptance of conditions by the Italians is greatly facilitated by the fact that we will send a parachute division to Rome to help them contain the Germans, who have assembled an armored force near Rome and who can replace the Badoglio government with some Quislingian administration, possibly headed by Farinacci." 21
On the night of September 1-2, the Allied command sent a telegram to the high Command of the Italian armed forces, informing them that it had begun to develop a parachute landing operation near Rome. In a reply telegram, the Italian side, at the request of the Allied command, indicated Italian airfields that could be used for landing troops: Centochelle, Urbe and Guidonia 22 .

On the morning of September 1, immediately after Castellano's return from Sicily, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of Badoglio, at which Castellano reported on the results of the negotiations in Cassibil and announced the text of the armistice agreement developed by the Allies. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Guarilla, Chief of the General Staff Ambrosio, the Minister of the Royal Court P. Aquarone and General J. McCarthy. Carboni. According to Castellano's report, only Carboni spoke out against this plan, noting that his motorized mechanized corps would not be able to withstand a battle with German troops due to the lack of gasoline and ammunition. Subsequently, Carboni wrote that in his speech at the meeting, he made a proposal to postpone the date of the armistice announcement by 4 to 5 days, because the plan of the allies had changed, who, having reversed their initial decision to land troops north of Rome, began to plan the implementation of this operation south of Rome. All those present, according to Kar-

18 Ibid., p. 83.

19 Ibid.

20 W. Churchill. Op. cit, p. 109.

21 "Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, p. 152.

22 G. Castellano. Op. cit., p. 108.

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Bony agreed to this proposal, and Badoglio and Ambrosio assured that an extension of the deadline for declaring a truce is absolutely necessary and it will certainly be requested.

However, Carboni's speech at the meeting was controversial. If from the above statement it was possible to understand that in principle he agreed with the conduct of the amphibious operation, then he began to say that the landing of the American parachute division would be of little use, since the Italian command needs not light, but heavy weapons, ammunition, gasoline, tanks and anti-tank artillery, that is just what skydivers don't have. Carboni further stated that a parachute landing would not create any advantages for the Italians, but would lead to a very dangerous deterioration of the situation, since it would tie Italian troops to airfields .23
There is reason to believe that General Carboni, who was directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Italian army, General M. Roatta, and owed his promotion to him (under Roatta's patronage, he was appointed commander of the motorized mechanized corps and head of Italian military intelligence in August 1943), in this case followed the line of his boss, who was against the landing. Roatta believed that if the American parachute division had been destroyed in the landing, they would have been charged with having betrayed the Americans and lured them into a trap. [24 ]

An analysis of Carboni's speech shows that his estimates and suggestions are completely unfounded. First, Carboni's statement that an American landing would not only bring no advantages to the Italians, but, on the contrary, would complicate the situation of the Italian divisions, was absolutely erroneous. It is clear to any open-minded person, even if they are not an expert in the military field, that the introduction of American paratroopers into battle would lead to a further change in the balance of forces in favor of the Italian armed forces and would have a huge impact on the morale of the Italian army and people, increasing the strength of their resistance to the Germans. Allied aircraft, which at that time already dominated the air, would have been able to cover the airfields where American paratroopers landed, from German both ground and air attacks. It should also not be overlooked that the Allied command planned to deliver 100 anti-tank guns together with the parachute division, and the question of landing an American armored division near Rome (at the mouth of the Tiber) was also under consideration. Given the current situation, it was erroneous and even harmful to raise the question of postponing the date of the landing, since already on September 7, the Hitler command sent out an order to disarm all Italian troops, and the execution of this order did not begin only because of the appearance of reports about the departure of Allied ships with amphibious troops .25 It is quite obvious that if the armistice and the landing had been delayed, as Carboni had suggested, Hitler's troops would have disarmed the Italian divisions by surprise and taken Rome without resistance. Carboni's calculation that delaying the landing date would create the most favorable conditions for the operation was wrong from the very beginning. He testified that Carboni, the head of Italian military intelligence, was unaware of Hitler's plan to disarm the Italian troops.

23 G. Carboni. Op. cit., p. 63.

24 A. Tamaro. Op. cit., pp. 350 - 351.

25 F. Deakin. Storia della republica di Salo. Torino. 1963, pp. 521 - 523.

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In addition, due to the change in the landing site of the Allied forces (not to the north, but to the south of Rome), it is unlikely that any significant regrouping of the Italian troops located around Rome was required, since the location of the German divisions, the fight against which was the task of these Italian troops, remained the same. In addition, the threatening situation with the provision of fuel and ammunition to the motorized mechanized corps was largely eliminated in the following days. According to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Italian Army F. Rossi, by the morning of September 7, the missing amount of fuel and ammunition was largely filled 26 . At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the Italian divisions that occupied a circular defense near Rome would hardly need to carry out such maneuvers that would require a significant amount of gasoline.

Unfortunately, it is not known exactly what the reaction of the participants of the Badoglio meeting on September 1 was to Carboni's speech. The King, to whom Badoglio reported the results of the negotiations and the conference he had held, decided to accept the Allies ' demand for unconditional surrender. The armistice entrusted to Castellano was signed in Cassibil on September 3, 1943.

The Italian Communists, foreseeing that the implementation of the armistice and the withdrawal of Italy from the war would be possible only as a result of a difficult armed struggle against Hitler's troops, came up with a broad program of action designed to prepare in advance for repelling the upcoming German attack. In the last days of August, L. Longo prepared a " Memorandum on the urgent need to organize national defense against the invaders and the threat of unexpected attacks from the Germans." In this document, handed over by the Committee of the Opposition Anti-fascist Parties to the Italian government, in particular, it was proposed to immediately break with Germany and conclude a truce with the allies, order armed resistance to aggressive actions on the part of German troops and Italian fascists, establish combat cooperation between the army and the civilian population, start organizing armed popular detachments, give joint military operations "the nature of the war of liberation and national independence" 27 .

However, the Badoglio government feared that the armed people, having repulsed the attack of the Nazis, would take up arms for the establishment of a democratic system in the country and overthrow the monarchy, which had hopelessly compromised itself by many years of cooperation with fascism. Therefore, it did not dare to defiantly reject the plan of action proposed by the Communists, but actually sabotaged it.

On the night of September 3-4, just a few hours after the armistice was signed, a meeting was held in Kassibil to develop a plan for Operation Giant 2 .28 The meeting was attended by the Chief of the General Staff of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, American General B. Smith, Chief of Staff of the American 82nd Airborne Division, General M. Taylor, Chief of Military Intelligence, British General K. Strong, Commander of US aviation in the Mediterranean, American General Cannan, J. Castellano and representatives of the Italian branches of the Armed Forces, Major L. Marchesi (Army) and Major J. R. R. Tolkien. Vassallo (aviation), as well as the Italian Consul Montanari as an interpreter. At this meeting, which lasted until the morning of September 4, issues of interaction between American and Italian companies were developed.

26 G. Castellano. Op. cit, p. 87.

27 "Thirty years of the Life and struggle of the Italian Communist Party", Moscow, 1953, p. 428.

28 G. Castellano. Op. cit., pp. 108, 112 - 116.

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troops. It was decided that the advanced units of the 82nd Division would be dropped by parachute, and the remaining units and units would be transported by transport aircraft to Italian airfields not occupied by the Germans. The transfer of the division to Rome was supposed to be completed within three to four days. At the same time, on the advice of Castellano, instead of the previously planned airfields, the Americans were named as the most suitable ones: Cerveteri, Furbara and Guidonia, since they were outside the range of German anti-aircraft artillery, were occupied only by Italian troops and were located at the nearest distance from the sea coast.

During the meeting, the area of the upcoming military operation was studied and the interaction of the Italian troops with the American airborne troops was coordinated. On 5 September, Marchesi delivered the amphibious operation plan to Rome .29 It should be noted that the American command, developing this plan together with Italian officers, nevertheless did not consider it possible to report the date of the landing, as well as the forces and funds allocated for its implementation.

Comprehensive information on these issues can be found in the reference of the US Military History Department, published in the memoirs of Castellano 30 . This document indicates that, according to the plan of the American command, 130 aircraft were to land at night at the airfields of Cerveteri and Furbara two battalions and part of the command staff of the 500th Parachute Regiment, an anti-aircraft battery and auxiliary troops. 90 planes allocated for the operation were to drop the paratroopers, and the rest were to land and disembark the troops. It was also envisaged that separate units of the US 82nd Division would be loaded onto landing barges and amphibious tanks and land at the mouth of the Tiber. According to the plan, American planes were supposed to take off from Sicilian airfields, fly over the sea to the mouth of the Tiber and make a turn over a British submarine giving light signals.

On the night of September 6-7, General M. Taylor and the deputy commander of the 51st American Transport Aviation Group, Colonel Gardiner, secretly left Sicily for Rome. Their goal was to get acquainted with the situation on the ground and establish communication with the Italian military command. The measures taken by the Italian counterintelligence service to keep this trip secret are somewhat similar to the descriptions found in adventure novels. Taylor and Gardiner sailed from Palermo on a British torpedo boat to the island of Ustica, located north of Sicily. In one of the bays of this island, where the Italian garrison was still stationed, under the cover of night darkness, the officers transferred to the waiting Italian military corvette, which headed at full speed towards Italy. Taylor and Gardiner were taken aboard this ship as two captured Allied pilots whose plane was shot down. Accompanied by Admiral Maugeri, who was the Italian Navy's chief of intelligence (who had recently ferried Mussolini to a place of detention), Taylor and Gardiner arrived at the Italian naval base of Gaeta, where they were put in an ambulance and sent to Rome. Upon their arrival there on September 7, they were taken to the Caprara Palace, where the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Roatt, and his subordinate General Carboni were located. Here Taylor and Gardiner had a brief conversation with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the army, General Rossi, and then with Carboni, who, as reported by A. Corona, outlined the situation in black colors.-

29 Ibid., pp. 107 - 108.

30 Ibid., pp. 115 - 116.

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it turned out that German reinforcements were approaching Rome, that the Italian troops did not have enough ammunition and fuel, since the German command stopped supplying. Carboni said that under these conditions, an airborne division landed near Rome would inevitably be doomed to death. He stressed the need to delay the announcement of a truce, and with it-and the landing of air paratroopers near Rome 31 .

This information completely coincides with the information contained in the reference of the US Military History Department. Carboni reported, the document notes ,that " the Nazis deprived the Italian army of ammunition and fuel supplies, deprived it of its means of transportation. At the same time, the German garrison stationed along the Tiber was increased from three to twelve thousand people with 100 heavy artillery pieces."32 . Taylor, for his part, not believing in the success of the amphibious operation, arrived in Rome with a preconceived opinion about it and was looking for an excuse to abandon it. According to Carboni's memoirs, in a conversation with him on the night of September 7-8, Taylor stated that this operation was conceived hastily and recklessly. 33
Like Carboni, Badoglio, whom Taylor and Gardiner met, insisted on postponing the date of the armistice announcement and the landing of troops. The Italian prime minister said that if a truce is declared, Rome will not last more than 12 hours, even in the event of an allied landing. He asked Taylor and Gardiner to persuade Eisenhower to reverse the planned decision .34 After talking to Badoglio and Carboni, Taylor sent Eisenhower a coded telegram advising him to cancel Operation Giant 2. At 2 a.m. on September 8, Badoglio also sent a telegram to Eisenhower, in which he wrote:: "Given the rapid changes in the situation and the presence of German forces in the Rome area, it is no longer possible to immediately announce a truce, as this would lead to the capital being occupied by the Germans and the government destroyed... Operation Giant 2 is no longer possible, as I do not have sufficient forces to guarantee the airfields."35 Shortly thereafter, Taylor and Gardiner returned to Tunis, where Eisenhower's headquarters were located. Rossi rode with them, charged with persuading Eisenhower to agree to delay the armistice announcement at any cost.

The message that Badoglio was asking to postpone the announcement of the armistice and at the same time the landing of troops near Rome, first arrived at the main headquarters of the allied command, located in Algeria. After reading this telegram, the headquarters officers radioed its contents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Eisenhower, who was at his command post near Cartagena. Eisenhower read the text of the Italian Prime Minister's telegram at 12 p.m. on September 8. Eisenhower himself described how the subsequent events unfolded in his memoir "Crusade to Europe". "Having decided to act on my own discretion,"he wrote," I ordered headquarters to cancel the message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Group or, if this could not be done, to explain that I had taken up the matter myself. " 36 Having decided not to delay the announcement of the armistice and land two troops on the coast of Italy, Eisenhower at the same time showed indecision and short-sightedness, first postponing the landing of the airborne group.-

31 A. Corona. Op. cit., pp. 25 - 27.

32 G. Castellano. Op. cit., p. 107.

33 G. Carboni. Op. cit., p. 107.

34 G. Castellano. Op. cit., p. 130; A. Corona. Op. cit., p. 27.

35 G. Castellano. Op. cit., pp. 117 - 118.

36 D. Eisenhower. Op. cit., p. 205.

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visia near Rome, and then, on September 9, completely canceling it. It should be noted that when Eisenhower's order to delay the planned operation was received by the 82nd Parachute Division, the planes intended for this operation were already ready for departure, and one of the groups was even heading to launch pad 37 . In a reply telegram sent on September 8 to the Italian Prime Minister, Eisenhower wrote: "I intend to broadcast a message about the armistice at the scheduled hour... I do not accept your message this morning about the postponement of the truce... At your request, the air operation planned for the near future has been temporarily suspended. You have enough troops near Rome to provide temporary security for the city. " 38
Eisenhower single-handedly decided to cancel the plan for the Allied landing near Rome, previously approved by the heads of government of the United States and England. Thus, the main responsibility for the failure of the operation and the consequences caused by this falls on him.

Eisenhower had all the objective prerequisites for confirming the previously given order to conduct the planned amphibious operation near Rome, despite Badoglio's request, dictated by cowardice and double-dealing. He, of all people, was aware of the great military and political significance attached to this operation. In addition to the extensive information that constantly flowed to him, he received from Castellano the most reliable information about the number and deployment of Italian and German troops in the Rome area, which led to an indisputable conclusion about the numerical superiority of the Italians and the strength of their positions, about the conditions for the successful conduct of Operation Giant-2 and the successful defense of Rome interaction of American and Italian troops. Eisenhower had a real opportunity, based on the right derived from the fact of the unconditional surrender of Italy, to force Badoglio, through Taylor, who was in Rome, to order the Italian armed forces to attack the German-Fascist troops and provide the necessary conditions for the Allied landing.

Most of the blame for the failed operation is borne by the king and Badoglio. After all, it was Badoglio who, with the king's consent, asked Eisenhower to cancel the operation. The request to postpone the date of the armistice announcement and to cancel the amphibious operation near Rome was a logical continuation of the line of the king and Badoglio, who in every possible way delayed the start of negotiations with the Allies. Fearing reprisals from Hitler's troops, fearing a popular uprising in Rome, the King and Badoglio cherished the hope that by delaying time, they would be able to wait for the day when the situation would be favorable for them and the implementation of the armistice would take place without upheaval. Badoglio and his ministers were very vague about the outcome of a favorable situation: whether the American-British troops would appear at lightning speed under the walls of Rome, or whether the German-Fascist troops, without waiting for the Allies to arrive, would retreat to Northern Italy. As for the king, according to Castellano, he even secretly hoped that the course of hostilities would change and Hitler would win .39
Italian reactionary and especially monarchist circles, seeking to whitewash Eisenhower, the king and Badoglio, tried to turn Carboni into a "scapegoat", to prove that he was the only and main culprit for the cancellation of the amphibious operation "Giant-2".?

37 G. Castellano. Op. cit., p. 124.

38 Ibid., p. 122.

39 Ibid., p. 40.

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The American General Smith also tried to carry out this idea, saying that the landing near Rome could have been carried out if the Italian general commanding the troops in the Rome zone had been "brave, energetic, determined and convinced of the possibility of success."40 However, although General Carboni bears some responsibility for the cancellation of the amphibious operation, he cannot be found equally guilty as Badoglio. After all, it was Badoglio, with the approval of the king, who decided to appeal to Eisenhower with a request for its cancellation. And whatever information Carboni might have provided to Taylor, whatever arguments he might have made to Badoglio for canceling the operation, the latter would not have taken the aforementioned step if this step did not correspond to the king's political line.

A considerable share of the blame is borne by the American General Taylor, who, not understanding the situation in the Rome area by September 8, turned to Eisenhower with a proposal to cancel the landing plan. Italian generals Rossi and Castellano, who were Badoglio's representatives under Eisenhower, also bear some responsibility. Although they were supporters of the operation and believed in its success, they did not do everything in their power to implement it. They did not strongly protest to Eisenhower and Badoglio about the cancellation of the amphibious operation, nor did they make any urgent attempts to persuade them to return to the original plan. As you know, Castellano only sent a telegram to Rome, urging the government to keep faith that the operation will still take place. Rossi contented himself with telling Eisenhower that the armistice announcement had created a more difficult situation for the Italian government than ever before. 41
One of the factors on which the outcome of the planned amphibious operation largely depended was the balance of forces between Italian and German troops in this zone that had developed by September 8. As you know, on the Italian side, the main force intended to defend Rome was the motorized mechanized corps under the command of General Carboni. The four divisions of this corps were located in the immediate vicinity of Rome. After surrounding it, they blocked off all roads leading to the capital. In its vicinity were two other military formations: the Roman Army Territorial Corps and the 18th Army Corps. In the Italian formations that blocked the path of the two German divisions, there were 55 thousand people, including the maneuver group (Carboni corps) - 45 thousand people and 200 tanks.

The total number of the German-Fascist group aimed at Rome (two divisions, training and units in the process of forming) reached approximately 45 thousand people, of which the maneuver group included 40 thousand people and 500 tanks. Thus, the Italian troops, inferior to the German in tanks, had a clear numerical superiority. It should be added that there were two more Italian divisions on the way to Rome - "King" and "Tuscan Wolves", and to the north of the 3rd panzer division in the area of Grosseto was the Italian division"Ravenna".

This data shows that Italian divisions could have prevented German troops from attacking the landing of an American landing force, ensured the successful conduct of this operation, and then jointly organized the defense of Rome. The Germans ' advantage in equipment was practically negated by a number of negative factors arising from their deployment. They were located from-

40 G. Carboni. Op. cit., p. 17.

41 G. Castellano. Op. cit., pp. 121, 125.

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isolated and surrounded by Italian divisions. If American troops landed, they would immediately be forced to fight on two fronts: against American paratroopers and Italian troops. If they tried to move on Rome, they would have to break through two echelons of Italian divisions, and their rear would be under attack by Italian troops. Sharply rugged terrain with a large number of ravines, high hills, narrow defiles on the far and near approaches to Rome would make it difficult for the Germans to actively use tanks.

The German military command, taking into account all the above-mentioned factors, of course, discussed its plans for the event of an allied landing near Rome more than once and at different levels, as a result of which a very definite line was developed. In this case, Hitler and the German high command did not set their troops the task of capturing and holding Rome. The German divisions were instructed to withdraw to the north of Italy and gain a foothold in the Apennine Line. The commander of the German forces in Italy, Field Marshal A. Kesselring, during an interrogation conducted in 1945 by the American General B. Smith, stated that "if he had received a message about the American landing near Rome, he would have ordered all his troops to retreat to the north." Kesselring's Chief of Staff, General Z. Westphal reports in his memoirs that Kesselring accepted with a sigh of relief the news that no Allied troops had landed near Rome. Westphal explains that "in accordance with Hitler's original idea, Kesselring's divisions should have retreated as quickly as possible behind the Apennines and formed a single defensive line with Rommel's troops, but seeing that the catastrophe he feared had not occurred, Hitler found it advisable to defend the territory south of Rome." 42 Famous English historian Ch. Wilmot, on the basis of unpublished classified documents, also concluded that Hitler was ready to give up Southern Italy, including Rome, after July 25, 1943, and considered it important to establish a front in Northern Italy from Pisa to Rimini via the Apennines .43
Hitler's command, being sure of the inevitability of the Allied landing near Rome and the need for its troops to retreat to the north in connection with this, already in the evening of September 8, instructed all German institutions in Rome to burn the archives and immediately leave Rome. In preparation for their retreat, the Germans destroyed the naval base at Fiumicino 44 . The head of the Gestapo in Rome, Colonel Dolman, wrote in his memoirs that the commander of the German 2nd Parachute Division, Student, on September 8, after the armistice was declared, said:: "All would have been lost if American paratroopers had landed at night." 45 Of course, it is hardly possible to justify the Italian and Allied military intelligence, which promptly did not disclose Hitler's plans in the event of an amphibious landing near Rome. Subsequently, B. Smith admitted that the operation "Giant-2" would have been successful and its cancellation was a mistake. However, not wanting to compromise Eisenhower, he put all the blame on Taylor. "The American side," Smith wrote, "made the mistake of sending General Taylor, who did not understand anything and was a man incapable of insisting on Badoglio." 46
On September 8, 1943, Eisenhower announced the signing of an armistice with Italy in a radio speech. Further events developed rapidly. Large Allied landings landed at Salerno during the night

42 Ibid., pp. 138, 222.

43 C. Wilmot. The Struggle for Europe. L. 1952, pp. 133 - 134.

44 G. Castellano. Op. cit., p. 138.

45 Ibid., p. 138.

46 Ibid., p. 222 - 223.

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(south of Naples) and in Taranto (Southern Italy): At 7.30 pm on September 8, Badoglio's armistice speech was broadcast on the radio, and soon after the King, the Prime Minister, and the high military command fled Rome, leaving the city, army, and civilian population to their fate. A few hours after Badoglio's speech, German divisions stationed near Rome began fighting Italian troops (the first reports of this came around 11 pm on September 8). Italian divisions, supported by the civilian population, repulsed the German troops. The Sardinian Grenadiers division put up a fierce resistance to the German 2nd Airborne Division, which, after initially pushing back Italian posts on the coast, tried to approach Rome from the west along the Ostiensee road. During the ensuing fighting, the enemy was stopped. Units of the Piave division on the morning of September 9 surrounded and attacked a German landing force (1 thousand people), dropped in the small town of Monterotondo, where, as the German command assumed, the Italian general staff was located. During the skilful battle, the landing party was neutralized (400 people). killed and 600 surrendered)47 . On the morning of September 9, the Ariete Division, having already received orders to relocate to Tivoli, engaged the German 3rd Panzer Division, which had moved from the north to attack Rome. During the battle of Monterosi, the Germans lost 40 tanks, 100 trucks, two batteries and 50 soldiers. Near the town of Bracciano, located in the same sector, the Nazis lost 30 out of 40 tanks thrown into the attack. The Italian attacks were so severe that German forces did not risk resuming their offensive in this sector until mid-afternoon on September 11. [48]

The above facts convincingly confirm the validity of the assessment given above when analyzing the ratio of Italian and German armed forces in the Rome zone. The Italian divisions stationed near Rome were generally quite efficient. Despite the treacherous order given by General Roatta to retreat to Tivoli to cover the fleeing king, the Italian army fought for almost two days against the Germans, who never managed to break the resistance of the Italian divisions.

As soon as word spread of the German offensive on Rome, volunteers organized and led by Italian communists rushed to the aid of the fighting soldiers. L. Longo, who directly directed the activities of the Roman Communists, recalls: "The veterans of the Resistance movement, together with the new freedom fighters, everywhere began to make attempts to unite the army and citizens to fight against the Germans." 49 Detachments of people's volunteers, who managed to create and arm, shoulder to shoulder with the army took part in the defense of Rome. In the western part of the capital, at the Pyramid of Chastia, at Testaccio, on Marmorata Street, Italian soldiers and volunteers who joined them fought bravely for several hours on September 10, forming a single rifle chain. In the same area, two barricades were built by volunteers. In the city center on the same day, a long and persistent firefight broke out with the Germans holed up in separate buildings on Cinquecento Square, Cavour and Paolina streets. Communist historian R. Battaglia highly appreciated the joint actions of soldiers and armed citizens. He stressed: "Rome did not fall without resistance: thanks to the solidarity between the army and the people and their readiness for the sa-

47 Battaglia river. History of the Italian Resistance Movement, Moscow, 1954, pp. 106-108.

48 Ibid., p. 108.

49 L. Longo. Op. ed., p. 81.

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by self-sacrifice, the capital escaped the deepest humiliation that could have befallen it. " 50
On September 9, representatives of six anti-fascist parties formed the Committee of National Liberation in Rome, which called on Italians to resolutely fight the German fascist troops. The newspaper of the Italian Communists "Unita" on its pages took up the call contained in this document. On September 10, she wrote: "To drive the Germans out of Italy and finally defeat fascism is our immediate task. We must cooperate with all forces working towards this goal. These forces are united by the National Liberation Committee. " 51 On the same day, Unita issued an appeal to the soldiers and officers, outlining their program of action: attacking the Nazis and disarming them, seizing their transport and warehouses, refusing to disarm the Italian soldiers and joining the people's volunteers, destroying everything that the Germans could use in the occupied areas, and so on. etc.

As the Italian army and volunteers battled the German forces, confusion and confusion grew by the hour in the center of Rome. The remaining ministers in the capital stopped working and disappeared from their departments. General Carboni, who was assigned to lead the defense of Rome, was not in the city for the entire first half of the day on September 9, and no one directed the fighting of the Italian troops. It should be noted that when he returned to Rome, he took a number of measures to strengthen the defense, which, however, were clearly too late.

Taking advantage of the situation in Rome, the "fifth column" raised its head. A group of reactionary monarchist generals entered into negotiations with the German command and signed an agreement on the surrender of Rome on September 10, 1943. After that, the Italian units and volunteers stopped resisting. The Italian divisions were disarmed. The Nazis captured Rome without hindrance. The bloody regime of Hitler's dictatorship reigned in the city. The Italian capital was liberated by Allied forces only nine months later. This is the tragic result of Eisenhower's rejection of the planned Operation Giant 2 and the subsequent flight from the Italian capital of the king and Badoglio.

50 P. Battaglia. Op. ed., pp. 112-113.

51 "Thirty Years of the Life and Struggle of the Italian Communist Party", p. 429.

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