The world of books about the Great Patriotic War was replenished with a unique publication: the famous historian V. V. Pokhlebkin compiled a military and foreign policy reference book "The Great War and the Failed Peace 1941 - 1945 - 1994", which is published by the publishing house Art-Business Center. This handbook is undoubtedly of great interest to both professional historians and war veterans, as well as to the modern generation of Russians.It will serve as a good help to anyone who is interested in Russian history.

But it is very annoying that it contains omissions, inaccuracies and even gross distortions of the historical truth along with valuable and often unique factual material.

In order not to be unfounded, I would like to give a number of examples. Speaking, for example, about the events of the Battle of Stalingrad, V. V. Pokhlebkin never mentioned the date of the beginning of this grandiose battle - July 17, 1942.

Covering the question of the creation by the Supreme Command Headquarters of two shock groups of Soviet troops-one (the first) to the north-west of Stalingrad, and the other (the second) to the south of it-the author did not indicate that the first group included the South-Western Front in addition to the Don (p.46).

The author described the transition of the Red Army to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad as follows :" At 8: 50 a.m. on November 19, after a powerful... After artillery preparation, both shock groups of Soviet troops quickly broke through the defenses of the Romanian armies (operating on the flanks of the 6th German Army - F. T.) and, heading for the city of Kalach, by November 22 they had completely closed the ring" (p. 47). There are a number of inaccuracies in this passage. On the specified day, only the first shock group of Soviet troops - the Don and South-Western Fronts-went on the offensive, and consequently, artillery preparation on that day was carried out only by the artillery of these fronts. As for the second shock group of Soviet troops (Stalingrad Front), it went on the offensive in the morning of the next day, that is, on November 20. The encirclement ring around the German-fascist troops was closed not by November 22, but in the afternoon of November 23, 1942, when mobile detachments of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts joined in the area of Kalach and the village of Sovetsky.?

Describing the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, V.V. Pokhlebkin allowed, in my opinion, a gross distortion of the historical truth. According to him, on January 30, 1943, Field Marshal Paulus signed the act of surrender (p. 48). But this is not true, because Paulus did not sign such an act either before or after his capture on January 31, 1943 by the troops of the 64th army of the Stalingrad Front! Instead, on January 30, he sent two radio messages to Hitler on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the latter's rise to power. The first of them said: "The 6th Army, loyal to the oath of Germany, aware of its high and important task, holds its position for the Fuhrer and the fatherland to the last man and to the last patron." The text of the second radio message read: "On the occasion of the anniversary of your assumption of power, the 6th Army welcomes its Fuhrer. The swastika flag is still flying over Stalingrad. Let our struggle be an example to present and future generations that we should not capitulate even in a hopeless situation. Then Germany will win" (W. Adam, "The Difficult Decision", pp. 347-348). Even in captivity, Paulus refused to sign an order for the surrender of those parts of his army that still resisted the Soviet troops. It was because of this that the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, was forced to tell him that by refusing to sign the surrender order, he was taking on great responsibility for the lives of many thousands of his subordinates...

The wording of some points in the directory does not reflect the truth. Thus, item 4 (paragraph 4, Chapter 2, part 1) is entitled "Completion of the liberation of Soviet territory on all fronts of the Great Patriotic War in the summer of 1944 and transfer of all military operations to the territory of foreign states in the autumn of 1944" (p.85). And in the next, fifth paragraph, paragraph 2 is formulated as follows:" The offensive in the Baltic States is the last operation of July - October 1944 to clear the territory of the USSR of German troops " (p.96). After reading the first wording, an unsophisticated reader may come to the conclusion that the liberation of the territory of the Soviet Union from the Nazi invaders was completed in the summer of 1944. In fact, the complete liberation of the Soviet land from the Nazi invaders took place in May 1945, when, after the signing of the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Hitler's Germany, the Wehrmacht group blocked in October 1944 on the Kurland Peninsula (Latvia) laid down its arms and surrendered to the Soviet troops.

The author of the handbook made a mistake when he listed Finland as one of the countries that the Red Army entered in pursuit of the enemy (p. 216). In support of his conclusion, he writes that on June 20, 1944, the city of Vyborg was taken (and not liberated) by Soviet troops, thereby making it clear to the reader that the latter belonged to Finland before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Meanwhile, according to the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of March 12, 1940, the Karelian Isthmus, including the city of Vyborg, went to the USSR. It follows that on June 20, 1944, the Soviet troops did not take, but liberated the city of Vyborg, captured by Finnish troops in 1941. V. V. Pokhlebkin does not have a clear idea of the city of Vyborg's state affiliation. Elsewhere in his handbook, he no longer speaks of the capture, but of the liberation of Vyborg by Soviet troops (p.215). The Red Army did not enter the territory of Finland in any sector of the Finnish front, but limited itself only to reaching its border established by the aforementioned peace treaty.

Revealing the course of the Soviet offensive in the Baltic States in July-October 1944, the author mistakenly attributed the 43rd Army to the number of shock troops (p.99, 100). On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, five shock armies operated: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th, created by the transformation of the 19th, 26th, 60th, 27th and 10th (reserve) armies, respectively. The first four armies were formed in late 1941, and the last one in December 1942.

On page 89 of the handbook, the reader will read that the Northern Front, which had been active since June 1941, ceased to exist only in the autumn of 1944. Paradoxically, this statement is refuted by the author himself. In Table No. 1, devoted to the Northern Theater of Military Operations (p. 193), he gives data according to which the mentioned front lasted only two months - from June 24 to August 23, 1941, when it was divided into the Karelian and Leningrad fronts.

Further, the reference book twice contains the statement that the birthday of the Soviet Guard is considered to be September 19, 1941 (p. 149). But this is not entirely accurate, because the date of birth of the latter is considered to be September 18, when, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the 100, 127, 153 and 161st Rifle divisions were renamed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards Rifle divisions, respectively.

And more. In the alphabetical list of front commanders in 1941-1945, it is stated that the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov (in the initial of the patronymic, the letter "K" is mistakenly indicated instead of "G". - F. T.), was shot by the verdict of the Supreme Military Tribunal (p. 201), while the verdict was passed by the Military Board Supreme Court of the USSR. And he was shot not on October 16, but on July 22, 1941.

There are other errors in the reference book. These errors, inaccuracies and facts of gross distortion of historical truth undoubtedly reduce the value of a very interesting and capacious work in general, which, of course, is a significant contribution to the study of the history of the Great Patriotic War and its international legal consequences.

I would like to express my hope that the reissue of the handbook will eliminate both the errors that I have identified and those that I have not mentioned.

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