The Russian public is taking a closer look at the civilizational approach, which promises seemingly new horizons of research after the collapse of the formation paradigm 1. The civilizational approach has become the banner of everything new and progressive. But there are hidden pitfalls in it, sometimes not recognized by its adherents, and sometimes carefully hidden by them. I. N. Ionov revealed this background back in 1992: "The theory of civilizations in its cultural version... It was born out of a nationally oriented critique of these ideas (the ideas of Enlightenment - L. A.) with a strong irrational component" [Civilizatsii..., 1992, p. 21]. I have already written about one of the variants of the civilizational approach and its "super-task" (Alaev, 2008). But the ninth wave is coming. "The history of civilizations" began to be taught in universities as an independent discipline [Istoriya..., 2012].

The textbook on this course was prepared by a team of teachers of the Southern Federal (Rostov) University. From the textbook, students will learn, for example, that " Great Britain is an island state located in Western Europe." "The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is located in Western Europe". "Spain is located in the extreme south-west of the European continent "[Istoriya..., 2012, p. 159]. "Russia is ...the world's largest state, located in the eastern part of Europe and in the northern part of Asia" [Istoriya..., 2012, p. 56, 130, 159, 288]. "Republic of India... It is located in South Asia." "Japan... - a state located on the islands of the Pacific Ocean, near the coast of East Asia "[Istoriya..., 2012, p. 383, 414]. And a lot of other facts that are relevant in the encyclopedia for children. It remains to be regretted that the student will not receive the same in-depth and comprehensive information about the location of the United States and Canada.

In addition, the authors succinctly and aphoristically report on the" national character and mentality " (these are the names of individual paragraphs in the corresponding chapters) of the inhabitants of different civilizations. "The English still adhere to such customs as, for example, left-hand traffic or playing cricket." "It is believed that the British people are vain. They are sure that everything is going better in their homeland than in others, so the British look at a foreigner arrogantly, with regret, and often with complete contempt" [Istoriya..., 2012, p. 67, 69].

"The French sense of humor, despite its greater sarcasm in comparison with German and English, is primarily intellectual in nature." "The French love their country, but often dislike each other" [Istoriya..., 2012, p. 105].

1 See, for example: [Civilizatsii..., 1992; Civilizatsii..., 2009]. B. S. Erasov prepared a very informative summary of materials on different directions of "civilizational thought": [Comparative study..., 1998].

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"It is well known that punctuality is a national trait of the Germans." "Germans are distinguished by their desire for cleanliness and order." "Pedestrians cross the street only at a green light at any time of the day or night." "Germans highly value seriousness and professionalism." "Germans attach great importance to appearance" [Istoriya..., 2012, p. 137, 138].

"There were such character traits of Spaniards as personal independence, individualism, militancy, expansionism, fanaticism. The other side of the Spaniards is represented by an exalted spirituality, religiosity, mysticism." "Following the principle of honor, which expresses the unity of the church, monarchy, and nobility, has become an integral part of the Spanish national character" [Istoriya..., 2012, p.172].

In the United States, the main symbols "linking the nation into a single 'project' are the Statue of Liberty and Disneyland "[Istoriya..., 2012, p.214].

"The Chinese character can be attributed to modesty and asceticism, diligence and perseverance, frugality and moderation, unassuming and patience, sincerity, loyalty, courtesy and respect for traditions, reliability, self-sacrifice, a sense of duty and self-esteem" [Istoriya..., 2012, p.360].

"Indians recognize a hierarchical system with its responsibilities and obligations... Other significant values of Indians are material success and creativity. It is important for them to succeed in business, as this will "automatically" lead to an increase in status... At the same time, honesty as a value does not play a big role - it is situational" [Istoriya..., 2012, p.395].

This is not found in any children's encyclopedia.

As for the "national character" of the Russian people, the textbook collects all sorts of enthusiastic characteristics expressed by well-known and unknown well-wishers. The authors rely on the authority of N. O. Lossky. who celebrated the "religiosity of the Russian people", "outstanding kindness" and "ability for higher forms of experience" (God knows what that would mean!). He also claimed that "the Russian people, especially the Great Russian part of them, are extremely masculine", but their masculinity is combined "with feminine softness". How to measure "feminine softness", I still have some idea, but in what units is masculinity measured? S. Y. Lesnoy-Paramonov, apparently also a great thinker, was able to measure the "extraordinary diligence, love for the motherland and talent" of the same unrequited object - the Russian people.

The authors themselves have something to add to this list of virtues: "high national self-criticism", "kindness of the Russian people", "lack of rancor", "national patience" (what would this mean?) [Istoriya..., 2012, pp. 305-307].

The textbook does not contain a clear operable definition of civilization, so the criteria for dividing humanity into civilizations are not clear. Civilisations are units of different orders (for example, groups of States and individual countries). It is argued, for example, that Russia "has a full set of features of an independent civilization" ([Istoriya..., 2012, p. 303], italics by N. I. Stopchenko). What is this set? This is not explained anywhere in the book.

This is a contribution to "civilizationology" on the part of cultural scientists. Cultural studies knows a lot of gitics, so let's leave it aside for now.

But political economists have also decided to approach the problems of world development from the "civilizational" side [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012]. The authors claim that they used civilizational, resource and scenario analyses of the previous and possible future development of the world system [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 9]. Resource-this is understandable. They assess development opportunities when the Earth's resources are limited. Scenario-is also clear. These are speculations about what might happen. This is how modern futurologists work. They describe several development options, and then you can't find fault with them, because one of the scenarios is being implemented. But what is "civilizational analysis"? On the next page, those

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the authors call their approach "complex", namely economic, sociological and civilizational [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 10]. Below, the civilizational approach is called "socio-spiritual" (Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 18). In the future, it turns out that the civilizational approach consists in grouping demographic and resource data by groups of countries assigned by the authors to a particular civilization. As it turns out later, the criterion of division into civilizations is the confessional affiliation of the majority of the population of a particular country.

"Accepting the religious principle as a criterion" (without justification, just "accepting"? But the relationship between civilization and religion is one of the controversial issues in civilizational concepts), the authors distinguish the following civilizations: - European: European countries (with the exception of Albania, Bosnia and Orthodox countries), USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; - Orthodox (Russia, Orthodox former republics of the USSR, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Montenegro, Greece); - Chinese (PRC); - Japanese (Japan); - Indian (India); - Islamic (Arab countries, Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Albania, Bosnia); - African (sub-Saharan Africa); - Latin American [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 24-25].

Questions arise. If the criterion is religious affiliation, why should Orthodox and Catholic Europe be divided? If these are different religions, then why not separate the Catholic and Protestant civilizations? Why not join the Catholic civilization of the countries of South and Central America? Where did the Philippines go? Why not single out a Buddhist civilization, or a Buddhist Confucian one, as many people do?

Because the authors actually work not on "civilizations", but on regions, they often use these two concepts as synonyms (see: [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 10, etc.]). Once they mention that there is a "European civilization (with a division into Western European, Atlantic and Eastern European, Orthodox)" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 118]. So still - one or three? In the table showing the scope of immigration by region, the column " Europe "stands for:" includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova " [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.62]. As for the "Islamic civilization", "there is no common scenario for all its member countries, as they are very different" (Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 140). Truly so! The question arises: do they "enter" it? Or is "Islamic civilization" just a mental construct?

When it comes to specific energy consumption, resource availability, and similar indicators of different civilizations, the question arises: why join the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, which in total can "suppress" all the data for Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Serbia combined? On the other hand, why combine Western Europe and the United States with Canada in one conglomerate, if energy consumption in Europe is 6 tons of fuel equivalent per year, and in the United States and Canada - 10 tons of fuel equivalent? [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, pp. 76-77]. It seems to me that the authors ' proposed breakdown into civilizations even hinders them in their work.

And, finally, if the concept of civilization is based on religion, then it is illogical to refer to it as "the whole country", "the whole set of countries" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 24], if this country or set of countries is multi-confessional. This is generally one of the built-in "holes "in civilizational concepts: people of the same culture (we reduce it, if we want, to religion) live not only in" their "country, but in" their " country not only they live. Where does Islamic civilization end? At the border checkpoint? Or in those neighborhoods of Paris, Berlin and hundreds of other European cities where people from Muslim countries live? What is the civilisation in Tatarstan or Bashkortostan? And what civilization does the Republic of South Africa belong to, where half of the population is Christian?

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And this is not only a hole in the theory, but also a headache for practitioners. The refusal of European politicians to include in the draft European Convention a provision on Christianity as the spiritual and historical basis of European society (which the authors note twice with disapproval, see: [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, pp. 21, 116-117]) is caused precisely by the fact that a significant part of the modern population of Europe is not Christians. The inclusion of such a clause in the Convention would make this part of the population second-class. And this is something that every sensible politician tries to avoid.

The authors pay some attention to this issue, but, as in most other cases, their position is not clear. The example of Indians who emigrated to the United States seems to them to be an example of" convergence of civilizations "[Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.120-121], while Eastern migrants in Europe are" unwilling and not ready to give up their system of values " [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 116]. About values later, but for now the simple question already asked above: where are the borders of Islamic, as well as Indian civilization?

Let me clarify my position. The role of religion in shaping the spiritual image of a population is huge, but it is influenced by many other factors (geographical environment, cults that existed before the adoption of a particular world religion, etc.). People accept a particular religion not by chance, but guided by some feelings that have not yet been explored, and "adjust" it to themselves. It seems that many people have recognized that the "Russian faith" is not quite the same Orthodoxy that was borrowed from Byzantium.

Yes, Orthodoxy colors the mentality of the people in certain tones. Orthodox countries that have joined the EU pose a serious problem for this Union, because they have different concepts of human rights, a market economy, a secular state, religious pluralism, etc.Scientists and politicians in Europe are seriously engaged in the adaptation of "Eastern Christians" [Orthodox Christian Tradition..., 2011]. But if the Western and southern Slavs are somewhat alien in Western Europe, this does not mean that they are included in "our" civilization. However, these arguments of mine are also purely gustatory and have no scientific basis. But this is the whole point of this review: all civilizational reflections are purely subjective and approximate. This problem does not lend itself to simple solutions such as, they say, let's divide all of humanity into denominations, and everything will become clear.

It would be possible to give lists of civilizations proposed by Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882), N. Ya.Danilevsky (1822-1885), O. Spengler (1880-1922), P. Sorokin (1889-1968), A. Toynbee (1889-1975) at various stages of his rich creative career, S. Eisenstadt (1923-2009), F. Bagby, W. A. McCarthy (1889-1975), and others. McNeil and others. These lists are extremely interesting, original, and thought-provoking, but completely different and not scientifically based. Familiarity with the literature of "civilizationists" convinces that there are no criteria for distinguishing civilizations.

The book repeatedly states that there are "absolute values common to all of humanity" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 23, 202]. In my opinion, the authors even unnecessarily pedal the one-linearity of historical development, causing damage to their concept. For example: "In their catch-up development, developing countries and countries with economies in transition will go through the evolution that developed countries have gone through"; "The entire path of world history is precisely the path to achieving justice as an absolute value" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 71, 199]. It would seem that, in accordance with their research orientation, they should have set themselves the task of revealing the different reactions to world challenges demonstrated by different countries depending on their civilizational affiliation. But no, the authors do not set such a task, on the contrary, they make considerable efforts to prove (by developing detailed tables) that culturally different countries responded to the challenges of the XIX-XX centuries quite uniformly. Their conclusions from the material on reforms are as follows:"There is a global pattern of the historical process during the transition from one social system to another." Their analysis "allows you to identify

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the main typical features repeated in different countries in different historical epochs" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 166, 167].

What are these universal values? The authors present the results of a study by the Association of American Psychologists. They revealed that such common values are: wisdom and knowledge; courage; love and humanism; justice; moderation; spirituality and transcendence [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, pp. 119-120]. This is some kind of fiction. I don't understand how "love" is used here; I think that "humanism" is inserted here "to the pile" (it is known that this value appeared in Western Europe only during the Renaissance and is not shared at all outside of Europe); I don't understand in what sense "spirituality" is mentioned here"and what is 'transcendence'? But if the Americans found out, then it must be true. It is customary for us to take the Americans at their word, as long as they do not scold Russia. In the latter case, whatever they say is a blatant lie.

The authors do not seem to object to such a list, but they also put forward other "general unconditional values" - "respect for life, human rights and freedoms" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.24]. But it is here that they fall under the "corrupting influence" of "human rights imperialism", because this is precisely a feature of the Western European understanding of values that Europeans are trying, sometimes forcibly, to introduce, and the ruling circles of some countries (China, Russia, further enumeration will take too much space) actively resist this. The authors are convinced that some "Western values" were "imposed" on the East "under the guise of universal values", but do not specify what they are talking about.

But what are the values of Eastern civilizations that differ from Western and universal ones? They are constantly looming somewhere in the background, but they are not called in any way. It is once said that Eastern cultures (it is specified: "non-Western", i.e. for all at once) are characterized by the "principle of introversion", while European culture is "extroverted" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 204]. God knows what that means.

But let's go back to immigrants in Europe. They are, as we already know, "unwilling to compromise their value system." What can they not give up? Do they lead a more spiritual life than their neighbors-the local population, which, according to the authors, has already turned into "elementary consumers"? Do immigrants reject the "consumer economy"? No, they are going there for this "consumer economy".

From time to time, "Tradition" with a capital letter appears in the authors ' arguments. Here it is necessary to love and cherish, although it is not explained what it is. The whole point, the main goal of future transformations is to "preserve civilizational identity" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 209].

The authors rightly write about the difficulties of modernization or reform in the countries of the East, but these difficulties are fully explained by the delayed development model, the fact that these countries have become the "third echelon" of capitalism2, and precisely because medieval values stubbornly resist modernization. And the authors understand this perfectly well: civilizational characteristics "sometimes (? - L. A.) complicated and slowed down the processes of economic and social development," but these are trifles. The main thing is that thanks to these "characteristics", the laggard countries "kept their own balance"... the potential possibility of developing a different development path" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 6]. First, let us recall that the authors have already condemned non-Western countries to "go through the evolution that developed countries have gone through." And secondly: what other way? The way to where? Show me who found it."

2 The concept of "three echelons" of capitalism is mentioned on page 175, but without reference to N. A. Simonia and V. G. Khoros, who introduced this concept into Russian literature, and also without mentioning the original author of the idea, A. Gsrshenkron.

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The authors incorrectly identify spirituality with religion. On the one hand, "civilization is not reduced to religion" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 18] (as is clear from the previous one, I agree with this), and on the other hand, "the religious principle serves as the basis for any civilization" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 22], " namely religion remains a true "label" of any civilization " [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 24]. As I have already shown with the example of at least Latin America and the Philippines, nothing like this, religion does not serve as a" label". No one will argue that in any social transformation, a revolution in the system of values, attitudes, and orientations plays a major role (I would even say the main one, but this is a matter of concept, not fact). And V. I. Pantin is right when he states this [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 180]. But what does religion have to do with it? Absolutely correct statement: "A person has a need to satisfy not only physical needs and various desires, but also to understand the meaning of what he does, the need for self-justification" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p.204]. And this has nothing to do with religion. Or do the authors believe that the ability to think is the prerogative of a religious person?

The authors argue that "the spiritual factor in the form of religion played a certain role in the formation and development of the modern capitalist system in Western Europe" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 180]. No one will argue with this either. But there were other spiritual factors that played a role. The Renaissance and Enlightenment were not religious movements (like the Reformation), but they played a role no less. They often refer to Max Weber, who allegedly claimed that Protestantism and its ethics played a decisive role in the emergence of capitalism in Europe. Recall that Weber objected to this interpretation of his conclusions: "... we are in no way inclined to defend such an absurd doctrinaire thesis, as if the 'capitalist spirit' (in the sense in which we temporarily use this term) is not the same as the 'capitalist spirit' (in the sense in which we temporarily use this term). It could have emerged only as a result of the influence of certain aspects of the Reformation, as if capitalism as an economic system is a product of the Reformation " (Weber, 1990, p. 106).

You can guess that the authors are most concerned with the fate of Russian (Orthodox, as they call it) civilization. References to it are constantly made, and advice is given to preserve its spiritual foundations, its "Tradition". Don't know what to save? Orthodoxy, but in what form? In the form of the pre-Petrine patriarchate or in the form of a post-Petrine synodal structure? Or in the form of the Soviet patriarchy - as a "driving belt" from the authorities to the people? It will be objected that I am not talking about Orthodoxy, but about the organization of the church. But Orthodoxy is unthinkable without the Church.

To feel the gravity of the problem, let's return to the textbook "History of World Civilizations", the authors of which, as you can understand, stand on this issue in positions similar to those of A.V. Akimov and A. I. Yakovlev, but present them somewhat more openly, which leads to new inconsistencies.

In their opinion, the culture of Russia "has its roots in Orthodoxy"; Orthodox Christianity became "the national religion of the Russian people"; the influence of the church was "extremely important and fruitful" [Istoriya..., 2012,, pp. 303, 316-317].

And suddenly, a few pages later: "a certain weakening of the undivided domination of religious ideology" in the XV century had a beneficial effect on a number of branches of artistic culture. "A characteristic feature of Russian spiritual development in the first quarter of the XVIII century. the secular nature of culture and the weakening of the church's rule have appeared." In the same XVIII and early XIX centuries, "history turned into a science, freeing itself from the religious worldview "[Istoriya..., 2012, p. 320, 321, 334]. Under Peter I, " Russian culture became increasingly secular and developed successfully, freeing itself from the spiritual domination of the church." "However, serfdom, autocracy, religion, and the church remained among the factors that hindered the development of culture in the first half of the 19th century" [Istoriya..., 2012, pp. 297, 298-299]. And after 1825, the "re" was held.-

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promotional policy", which was expressed in the fact that "the influence of the church increased through the introduction of reading the holy Scriptures, and departments of theology were established in universities" [Istoriya..., 2012, p. 299].

So what role did the Orthodox Church play in Russia? "Fruitful" or"reactionary"? When, after all these statements, the author of the chapter formulates "the primary task of the spiritual revival of Russia", it is not clear what he is talking about. It proclaims "the need to protect the true values of national culture based on centuries-old spiritual and moral principles, to collect and restore all the true values created by the Russian people during their history" [Istoriya..., 2012, p.307]. What is "protect", what is "collect" and what is "restore"? It should be noted that the advice of the author of the textbook and the authors of the scientific work are essentially the same. But to follow their advice, you need to rewrite the entire Russian history.

But is it worth "restoring" something if "After the Reformation and a series of brutal religious wars, the West came to a spiritual compromise, replacing the main question of being (? - L. A.) with the problem of living comfort, while Russia continued to painfully reflect on the meaning of life" ([Istoriya..., 2012, p.303]. Emphasis added by me — L. A.). Are we really destined to continue to "painfully reflect" instead of working?

Let us consider the socio-economic program of the authors of the monograph on civilizations in the XXI century, as they see the formation of the West and its role in the modern world. They pay tribute to the common maxims that the West is mired in the material, in materialism, in the pursuit of profit and pleasure. But this is not the case. Western culture dominates the world and is gaining a stronger position. The ideas of democracy, social equality of all people regardless of nationality and skin color, the principles of religious tolerance, respect for the individual, human rights, and the right of nations to self - determination are the fruits of Western civilization. Which-it is true - are adopted by Eastern intellectuals and regimes to fight the same West.

The authors argue that the concept of "civilization "was introduced by the enlighteners of the XVIII century"to denote a culturally highly developed society that emerged in the West, based on reasonable and fair principles, where public life proceeds within the state-legal framework." So far, everything is correct, but they are in a hurry to add: "and the level of material security and comfort is sufficient for sustainable development." This allows them to conclude: "Thus, the main criterion of 'civility' was quantitative and material indicators" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 12-13]. But this is not the case. The enlighteners of the eighteenth century could not have developed such an understanding, because at that time the East was not inferior in material terms to the West. And the main criteria for them were the rule of law and freedom.

The authors believe that since the French Revolution, " the foundations of liberal democracy have steadily weakened." "A particular manifestation of the crisis of liberalism was the weakening of the social state model in the West, its rejection of the functions of a social arbiter and the transition to a self-supporting existence (archi-statism)" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p.187]. "Western society has actually ceded its rights to regulate public life to the state" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 209]. What is it about? Maybe about modern Russia?

In the fight against liberalism, the authors even call upon P. J. Buchanan, a well-known racist and anti-Semite, as an ally, whom they call "a tireless fighter for the traditional values of American society" (Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 184). What you can't deny him is his indefatigability. But what about the liberalism Buchanan opposes, which is precisely the traditional value of American society?

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It is time to move away from looking at the history of Europe "through the" curved glass of Capital "by Karl Marx. The authors remain at the frontiers that all of us have occupied in studying Marxist political economy. They argue, for example, that "the system-forming factor of capitalist society was the economic factor", "the principle of economic determinism began to dominate the public consciousness" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 179], technology and technology were "the system-forming elements of Modern and Modern times", and the role of culture "began to increase "" already at the end of the XX century" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 201].

There are three overlays here. First, "economic determinism" is a term from the field of economic theory, in this case Marxism, and not from economic practice. Secondly, do the authors really believe that Marxism "dominated the public consciousness" in the 19th century? Third, culture has never lost its most important place in the life of society. All these "yellow devil cities", "golden calf societies", "pure dog kingdoms" are nothing more than propaganda cliches or artistic devices.

At the same time, it is necessary to mention the inadequate perception of the evolution of historical concepts. The authors write that "historical thought in Modern times used a unitary-stadium approach", and "by the beginning of the XX century, the denial of the history of mankind as a single whole prevailed, and the pluralistic-cyclical view (O. Spengler) came to the fore" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p.11]. One could write a whole treatise on various theories of the historical process and prove that the stadium approach has always prevailed. But this is not the place for such a treatise. Let's just ask the authors: are they sure that Spengler's views "prevailed" at the beginning of the 20th century?

It is interesting that the same aberration of consciousness struck the authors of the textbook to which we have already referred. They also believe that the one-line approach prevailed in the XVIII-early XIX centuries, and in the XIX century, they say, there was a "turning point" and "a transition from a uniquely evolutionary-monistic understanding of history to a pluralistic one" [Istoriya..., 2012, p. 2]. Apparently, the authors of both books had common sources.

Finally, the main question of our time: what is happening in the world and where are we going?

Here again, there is considerable confusion in the statements. It would seem that everything is clear to the authors: "if in relation to the majority of Eastern countries we can talk about the transition to an industrial formation, then in relation to the countries of the "golden billion" and especially the vanguard of this group of countries - the United States-we should discuss the transition to a new, post-capitalist, post-industrial quality " [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 188]. However, in other places they call the" modern model of development "" industrial "[Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.10], and some eastern countries - "post-industrial" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 206-207].

They even attribute a "post-industrial state" to Russia [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.177]. If this statement is based on some economic indicators, then, therefore, these indicators are false. "The incompleteness of the industrial revolution" - this expression can be applied not only to many countries of the East, but also to Russia. In Russia, there is no normal competitive industry, there are no goods for export, except for oil, gas and metals (except for weapons). Maybe the authors believe that Russia is included in the"golden billion"?

So, the fact that the developing countries, led by China, are in a different orbit than the countries of the West, is recognized, but further considerations are ignored. For example, it is argued that the "eastern world" has appeared, "with good reason claiming equality as a leader and locomotive of development", that China, India and Brazil are "contenders for the role of leading world powers"; Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore have already "reached the level of developed Western countries" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 186, 196, 207]. But how can they be "leading", "locomotives"

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and so on, if they are at the previous stage of development, at the industrial stage? These countries do not show or develop any new, special "model of development" (this is stated on p. 177, 206). The model is still the same, however, they successfully use the conditions of the world market that were not created by them. I quote our authors: "All the " economic miracles" from the post-war Japanese to the growth of China in recent years have followed the path of maximizing exports to the countries of the "golden billion" "[Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 123]. Not to mention the patents they bought and the equipment they imported. Such a model of development, which is based on the achievements of others, cannot lead the country forward in relation to donors.

And the authors are well aware of this: "If China manages to move from imitating scientific and technological progress to independent scientific and technological development, from copying equipment and technologies to creating them, then another modernization center will appear in the world" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.197]. Exactly-if. On the other hand, "If today's economically developed countries retain leadership in the field of research and development, then moving the world's workshops to the East will not deprive them of leadership due to the technological perfection and novelty of their products" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p.123]. This is a completely different "if". This is a very real scenario. Based on the data of V. A. Melyantsev, the authors state: "At least at present, no other civilization threatens the leadership of European civilization as a whole in spending on research and development" [Ibid.].

However, it suddenly turns out that the technological gap means nothing compared to the mass of the population. "A country with a larger population can become a leader in labor-intensive areas of the economy, including the knowledge-intensive sphere "[Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 74]. Since when did knowledge-intensive industries become part of labor-intensive ones?

Economists once pictured the world as a combination of a" world factory "and a"world village." Now the situation has changed. A three-part division emerged: world laboratory-world factory - world village. In the XVIII century. agricultural and raw materials appendages of industrial economies appeared. Now this division is: 1) agricultural and raw materials appendages of industrial economies; 2) industrial appendages of post-industrial economies; 3) post-industrial economies.

The authors, reflecting on the scenarios of further development of relations "West-East", deliberately combine the technological and financial power of the West, "financial and intellectual capital" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 122]. Those funds that the West earns with its intelligence, constantly creating new technologies and new industries, they call "intellectual rent". Such usage is intended to detract from the efforts of Western scientists and inventors to revolutionize all types of production. In our view, "rent" is something received by a certain idle person, a rentier. Meanwhile, this is a payment for intellectual labor.

The degree of misunderstanding of this problem is shown by the authors ' notes on what innovations can preserve the technological leadership of the West. These will be, the authors write, "fundamentally new products, for example, a car with an electric or hydrogen engine, a portable computer on the wrist or in a helmet, new types of synthesized food, etc." [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 123].

Everything is completely different. All these curiosities can be made by the Japanese and even in the near future by the Chinese, but they will not be "fundamentally new goods", they will be the development and improvement of ideas that have long been put forward. And what will preserve the technological leadership of the West-we can't even imagine now. Let us recall how at the end of the nineteenth century it was proposed to abolish the patent system, because all the discoveries had already been made.

According to A.V. Akimov and A. I. Yakovlev, the crisis of 2008 "called into question the sustainability of this model of "intellectual rent" in the long term.

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The crisis showed the ephemeral nature of economic leadership based on manipulating financial instruments, and also shook confidence in the consumer market as the basis of the national economy" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p.124]. The point is that the West's economic leadership is not based on "manipulating financial instruments", but on non-stop technological progress. And financial strength is only a consequence of this progress.

To challenge the West, to claim the role of the "locomotive" of the world economy, the countries of the East only need to educate a different person, comparable to the Western person in the sense of freedom from any dictate, including the state, in initiative, independence, audacity of thinking.

Instead, our authors rely on the initiative of the state: "The subject of modernization is the state" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 191, 194]. "A crucial condition for the success of [future] modernization is the timely readiness of the authorities to make radical changes for the benefit of society" [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p.210]. These good wishes do not fit in with what is said on the previous page: the state acts "based on its own goals, i.e., the goals of the elite... the state is quite capable of carrying out an intensive campaign to spread a system of values and ideology that is desirable for the elite, and to support behavioral norms and fashion that are useful for the elite" (Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 209). Moreover, the authors suggest resistance from opponents of change, which will have to be suppressed "by means of violence" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 192]. This whole line of thought-the implantation of goodness through State violence-seems to me completely counterproductive. Not dangerous, though. The Shah of Iran has already been overthrown, and there don't seem to be any more violent modernizers left.

However, we are encouraged to be guided not by the "interests of producers and consumers", i.e. all people, but by "social ideals" [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 183]. No, God forbid that we should be guided in our economic policy by " ideals." We, the former Soviet people, know what this leads to.

Such a lengthy analysis of the concepts put forward in the two books was required because it was necessary to show the contradictory positions of the authors, the weakness of the construction of the civilizational approach, and the controversial nature of the initial postulates of the proposed theoretical constructions. The civilizational approach has not yet found its own methodology and requires further development. We also need a serious discussion about how the world works today.

list of literature

Akimov A.V., Yakovlev A. I. Civilizatsii v XXI veke: problemy i perspektivy razvitiya [Civilizations in the XXI century: Problems and Prospects of Development]. Moscow: MSU Publishing House, 2012.

Alaev L. B. Smutnaya teoriya i disputnaya praktika: o novykh tsivilizatsionnykh podkhodakh v Vostoka i k Rossii [Vague Theory and Controversial Practice: on the latest civilizational approaches to the East and to Russia]. Scientific and theoretical journal. 2008. № 2.

Alaev L. B. Obshchevaya istoriya ot Leonida Sergeevicha [General History from Leonid Sergeevich]. 2009. № 2.

Vsbsr M. Izbrannye sozdaniya [Selected Works], Moscow, 1990.
Istoriya mirovykh tsivilizatsiy: uchebnoe posobie [History of World Civilizations: a textbook]. Kollektiv avtorov; under the scientific editorship of G. V. Dracha and T. S. Paniotova.

Comparative study of civilizations. Khrestomatiya: Ucheb. posobie dlya studentov vuzov [Textbook for university students]. B. S. Erasov, Moscow: Aspect Press, 1998.

Civilizations in the " third world "(Round table) / / Orient (Oriens). 1992. № 3, № 4.

Civilizations in a globalizing world. Preliminary results of the interdisciplinary project. Based on the materials of the scientific conference, Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 2009.

Orthodox Christian Tradition and the Integration of Europe. 9 Mar 2011 // www.ru.nl/ivoc

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