Ya. V. LEKSYUTINA

Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor of St. Petersburg State University

US-China relations Keywords:, USA. China, Southeast Asia. ASEAN, the new US military strategy

The strengthening of China's integrated power over the past decade has been accompanied by an intensification of its foreign policy. Beijing's foreign policy and foreign economic activities in various regions are based on the task of expanding its presence. Beijing's active, offensive line of behavior often leads to open or latent competition for regional spheres of influence with other world powers. First of all, this concerns rivalry with the United States, which has extensive interests around the globe and does not want to give up its position not only on a global but also on a regional scale.

It seems that the most acute US-Chinese rivalry is manifested in Southeast Asia (SE). This is due to the growing contradiction between the special position of the United States, which has been established since the end of the Cold War, as a state that claims to be the dominant force in all of East Asia, and China's desire to establish itself as a regional leader. At the same time, the southern part of this region - Southeast Asia, around which almost all the integration processes currently taking place in East Asia-can play a key role in such a confrontation.

Washington's characteristic distancing from Southeast Asia in the 1990s, which followed the disappearance of the only serious regional competitor, the Soviet Union, after the end of the Cold War, allowed China to temporarily freely build up its foreign policy and foreign economic positions in the region. But Washington's anti-terrorist campaign, which was launched after the events of September 11, 2001, intensified US ties with a number of Southeast Asian countries where Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organizations operated.

During the Obama administration, it was replaced by the characteristic of the period of the presidency of J. R. R. Tolkien.Bush's relatively limited American involvement in Southeast Asia was followed by a full-scale return of the United States to the region.

The first two years of Washington's "return to Asia" policy (2009 - the first half of 2011) were rather preparatory in nature. The White House, with a certain degree of caution, not wanting to cause unnecessary fears on the part of Beijing, has begun to deepen bilateral relations with the Southeast Asian countries and multilateral dialogue within the framework of ASEAN.

And in the fall of 2011, new accents appeared in US policy in the Asian direction.

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN and East Asia Summit meetings in November 2011. Washington has announced a number of statements and initiatives that indicate significant adjustments in its foreign policy strategy. The most important of them were the strengthening of the Pacific vector of US foreign policy, plans to significantly expand their presence in the Asia-Pacific region in general and in Southeast Asia in particular, and most importantly, their readiness to openly challenge Beijing in the region. "The twenty-first century will be America's Pacific Century," Secretary of State X said in a statement. Clinton spoke on November 10, 2011 in Honolulu ahead of the APEC ¹ summit.

And a few days later, it became known about the agreement reached between Washington and Canberra on the deployment of American Marines and an increase in the number of US Air Force aircraft in Australia, which is located in close proximity to Southeast Asia (it is separated from Indonesia by just over 200 km).². This is especially significant: Washington has used its main trump card in East Asia and the Pacific-superiority in "hard power",

that is, military power. This scenario was previously tested in Northeast Asia*.

Negotiations are also underway with Manila to strengthen military cooperation with the United States based on the temporary periodic presence of the US Navy and its ground forces in the Philippines and the expansion of joint exercises.³

In presenting the new US military strategy, President Obama said :" We will strengthen our presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and budget cuts will not be made at the expense of this critical region. " ⁴

The intense rivalry between the United States and China for a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, which only a few years ago was often described as a hypothetical scenario for the future development of the situation in the region, has now become a reality. It manifests itself both in the military-political sphere, as well as in the sphere of trade, investment, assistance to the development of regional states, etc.

ASEAN AS A BRIDGE TO CHINA'S REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

Since the late 1970s, the priority of China's foreign policy has been to ensure favorable peaceful external conditions for economic reform in the country. As China grew in power, this task was supplemented in the 1990s by the goal of strengthening its position as a regional leader in East Asia. Due to the special role of ASEAN in this region, Beijing has taken a course to strengthen ties with it, seeking, first of all, to lead the integration processes taking place in East Asia.

China established its first official contacts with ASEAN in the early 1990s. Starting with the development of trade and economic ties, Beijing soon moved to actively participate in various multilateral mechanisms within the Association. In 1994, China joined the Security Dialogue-the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), and in 1997 - the bilateral partnership in the ASEAN+1 (PRC) and multilateral - ASEAN+3 (PRC, Japan, South Korea) formats.

The 1997-1998 financial and economic crisis, which severely damaged the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, was a turning point in ASEAN-China relations. Beijing has significantly increased its credibility among the Association's member countries by making a crucial decision to prevent the devaluation of the yuan and providing substantial assistance to a number of Asian countries in overcoming the consequences of this crisis. In 2003, China and ASEAN agreed to establish "strategic partnership relations".

In recent years, Beijing has increasingly resorted to public diplomacy, aimed in the spirit of "soft power" to study and inform foreign audiences, as well as to establish broad contacts. Measures are being taken to expand the geography and number of Confucius Institutes-specialized centers for studying Chinese language and culture* * in Southeast Asia. The creation of favorable conditions for studying students from Southeast Asia, in particular, the simplification of the procedure for obtaining Chinese entry visas and the provision of state scholarships, contributed to a significant increase in their number in China. As early as 2009, more Thai and Indonesian students were enrolled in Chinese universities than, for example, in the United States5.

China has the strongest ties with the poorest countries in the region - Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. The Beijing leadership attaches particular importance to developing ties with Myanmar, which provides China with access to the Indian Ocean and the creation of alternative routes for transporting energy resources to China through the troubled Strait of Malacca. The reason for concern not only for the United States, but also for India is the military assistance provided by China to Myanmar, including the modernization of the Navy. In particular, China participated in the construction of naval bases on the island of Hiangik and the Greater Cocos Islands, as well as the modernization of the naval base on the Mergui archipelago.

In recent years, China has developed constructive relations with such an ally of the United States as Thailand. Bangkok, unlike other Southeast Asian countries, which is not burdened with territorial disputes with China, generally manages to actively develop diverse cooperation with Beijing and at the same time maintain allied relations with the United States.

At the same time, Indonesia and Malaysia do not show much interest in political rapprochement with China. Singapore and Vietnam, while developing ties with China, are also focused on broad cooperation with Washington.

The rapid development of trade and economic ties over the past decade has become an important tool for China's development as a regional leader.

From 2000 to 2009, the trade turnover between China and ASEAN increased 5.5 times-from $32.3 billion 6 to $178.2 billion, while the share of China in ASEAN's trade with other countries increased from 3.5% in 1999 to 8.3% in 2004 and 11.6% in 2009.7 (later figures). data from the ASEAN secretariat are not available). In 2009, China became the Association's largest trading partner for the first time. It should be noted that, according to Chinese estimates, the volume of trade turnover between China and the Association countries is even greater: by official ci-

* For more information, see: Rusakov E. M. "... holding a big club in your hands " / / Asia and Africa Today, 2011, No. 3 (editor's note).

** For more information, see: Beijing's version of "soft power". Mishina SI. "Speak softly..." ed.).

According to Thai data, this figure reached $213 billion in 2009 and $292.8 billion in 2010.8

China's largest trading partners in Southeast Asia are Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines, which accounted for 97.6% of China's total trade with ASEAN countries in 2009. China's trade relations with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos are the least developed, and China's trade turnover with each of these countries does not even reach $1 billion.⁹

In November 2001, at the initiative of China, the process of creating a free trade area (FTA)was launched China - ASEAN, which, according to Chinese estimates, can become the third largest regional common market in the world after the European Union and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). At the same time, Beijing pursued not only economic, but also political goals, hoping to consolidate China's status as a regional leader.

The China - ASEAN Free Trade Area Agreement covers 11 countries with a population of about 1.9 billion. It entered into force on January 1, 2010 and has produced tangible results. As noted above, in 2010 the volume of mutual trade turnover between China and ASEAN reached $292.8 billion, an increase of 37.5%. At the same time, China's exports to the ASEAN countries amounted to $138.2 billion, and imports - $154.6 billion (i.e., the Association managed to reduce the trade balance in relations with China with a surplus of $16.4 billion). The volume of accumulated gross investment coming to China from the ASEAN countries increased by 50% in 2010, to $11.8 billion. ¹"

The creation of a free trade zone causes some damage to US economic interests in Southeast Asia.

Having achieved such remarkable results in trade with the Association countries, China is still significantly inferior to the United States in the field of investment activity. According to ASEAN data, in 2010, China ranked only fourth after the United States, Japan, and South Korea in the list of major countries that invest in the Association's economies. China's Foreign Direct investment (FDI) in 2010 They made up $2.7 billion, which is 3.2 and 3.1 times less than US and Japanese investments, respectively ¹¹. However, they are growing rapidly: while in 2003 all of China's accumulated direct investment in ASEAN totaled only $0.6 billion, which accounted for 1.8% of all Chinese capital investment abroad, according to Chinese official statistics, at the end of 2010, the total amount of direct investment in ASEAN was only $ 0.6 billion. they reached $14.4 billion, or 4.5% of all foreign investment.¹²

China's direct investment in Southeast Asia is mainly concentrated in Singapore (about half of them), Myanmar, Indonesia and Vietnam.

THE UNITED STATES: OLD ALLIES AND NEW PARTNERS

In line with the implementation of the foreign policy course of "return to Asia" in order to contain the growing influence of Beijing, Washington attaches great importance to strengthening the system of military and political alliances, primarily relations with two official US allies-Thailand and the Philippines.

The US-Thailand alliance has a long history and is marked by joint participation in the wars in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf. Without having its own military bases in Thailand, Washington has enjoyed full access to Thailand's Utapao Air Base and Sattahip Naval Base since 2004. Such an agreement fits seamlessly into the US strategy for Southeast Asia and a number of other regions - "a springboard instead of a base". It involves the periodic use of foreign bases for operations and exercises without the presence of a permanent military contingent. However, political instability in Thailand and the progressive strengthening of Bangkok's ties with Beijing are fraught with a weakening of the US-Thai alliance in the future.

Some instability is characteristic of the allied relations between the United States and the Philippines. This is primarily due to the presence in the Philippines of a relatively large group of opponents of a military alliance with Washington. So, in 1992, due to the decision of the Philippine government not to renew the agreement on the deployment of American troops in the country, Washington was forced to curtail its military bases Subic Bay and Clark Field. After a pause, Manila nevertheless initiated the signing of a bilateral agreement on the temporary presence of US armed forces in the Philippines in 1998, which provides for joint military exercises on the territory of the country and regular visits of American warships to Philippine ports.

A new round of cooling in US-Philippine relations followed the Philippines ' decision in July 2004 to withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from Iraq ahead of schedule. Moreover, the Philippines ' political and economic rapprochement with China at the beginning of this century has begun to threaten the strength of the US-Philippine alliance.

However, Washington managed to give a new breath to the alliance thanks to a clever diplomatic game on the contradictions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea. Since mid-2010 Washington began to make attempts to internationalize the territorial disputes in the South China Sea that exist between China and a number of Southeast Asian countries, namely: the Philippines, Vietnam-

iom, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei*.

Washington's intervention led to a tightening of the positions of the parties involved and an escalation of tension in this area, which, in turn, contributed to the growth of the Philippines ' interest in deepening military cooperation with the United States, in particular, in modernizing the Philippine Navy. In January 2011, the first US-Philippine strategic dialogue was held, which was marked by the signing of an agreement on the establishment of working groups on enhancing cooperation in ensuring territorial defense and maritime security. Joint exercises have also become more frequent. Thus, in the South China Sea in 2011, the 27th annual US-Philippine military exercise Balikatan (April), the 11-day US-Philippine military exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (June) and joint naval exercises (October) were held.

Special mention should be made of US relations with Singapore, a long-standing informal ally of Washington. In addition to trade, the two countries share extensive security interests. In accordance with the agreement on mutual supply and technical services concluded in 2000, the Americans were able to use the Changi Naval Base for resupply, routine repairs and maintenance of American ships and the Paya-Lebar Air Force Base for landing American aircraft. American warships make regular calls at the port of Singapore.

In July 2005, the United States and Singapore signed a strategic framework agreement that formalized bilateral security and defense cooperation in such areas as counterterrorism, WMD nonproliferation, joint military exercises, political dialogue, and defense technology.

As part of the "return to Asia" strategy, the Obama administration has also significantly stepped up engagement with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

The intensification of U.S. contacts with Indonesia, which initially focused on coordinating efforts to combat international terrorism, led to the conclusion of a comprehensive cooperation agreement between the two countries on November 9, 2010. The parties intend to increase cooperation in strengthening security, economy, education and science, as well as in the military sphere. Indonesia's importance to the United States is determined by its close geographical proximity to the strategically important Strait of Malacca, its position as the largest member of ASEAN and the most populous Muslim state that pursues a moderate policy and enjoys authority in the Islamic world.

Vietnam is also being considered as a promising regional partner, which can turn into a "medium-sized power" capable of exerting significant influence in Southeast Asia. Washington is seeking to take advantage of Hanoi's growing concerns about China's active strengthening of its position in the region. During a State visit to Vietnam in July 2010, Secretary of State H. Clinton described the development of relations with Vietnam as an integral part of the US strategy aimed at expanding its presence in the Asia-Pacific region and, in particular, in Southeast Asia. ¹³

In 2005, the United States and Vietnam signed a military cooperation agreement that provided, among other things, for the training of Vietnamese officers in American courses. Since 2008, annual forums have been held within the framework of the policy, security and defense dialogue, and in 2010, the defense dialogue was initiated, providing for regular meetings between the military departments of the two states. US Navy ships make regular calls at Vietnamese ports.

Washington's involvement in the South China Sea gave a strong impetus to the development of US-Vietnamese relations in the military-political sphere. In August 2010, in the wake of escalating US-Chinese disagreements on the issue of freedom of navigation on the-

Asia and Africa Today, 2010, No. 8; Leksyutina Ya. V. Aggravation of tension in the South China Sea: a View from Southeast Asia, China and the USA / / Problems of the Far East, 2011, No. 5 (editor's note).

The first-ever US-Vietnamese joint naval exercise in the South China Sea took place in Vietnam.

TRADE: AMERICA IS STARTING TO LAG BEHIND

Over the past two decades, the United States has remained one of ASEAN's largest trading partners. In the period from 1997 to 2003, the United States was the largest trading partner of the region's countries, and from 2004 to 2007, the United States only periodically lost the palm to Japan.

However, despite the steady growth of US trade with the ASEAN countries over the past two decades, as the world economic relations of the Southeast Asian countries expanded, the share of the United States in the region's trade turnover decreased. So, if in 1999 this indicator was 18.6%, then by 2004 it decreased to 12.7%¹⁴, and in 2009 it completely fell to 9.7%¹⁵. At the same time, the share of China is growing: if in 1999 it was only 3.5%, but in 2004 it increased to 8.3%, and in 2009, when China first took the position of the largest trading partner of ASEAN, it reached 11.6%.

In 2010, the US trade turnover with the ASEAN countries totaled $178 billion, thus restoring the pre-crisis level of development of trade relations between these economic entities. At the same time, 98.5% of the US trade turnover with ASEAN was accounted for by trade with six Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore (26.2%), Malaysia (22.4%), Thailand (17.8%), and Indonesia (13.1%)¹⁶. The lowest level of development is typical for US trade and economic relations with Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.

The lack of economic cooperation between the United States and these countries (except Brunei) is due both to their poverty and to the serious political differences that existed until recently between Washington and the existing regimes there. For example, until 2004, the US Congress blocked the granting of most-favored-nation treatment to Laos, citing human rights violations and the persecution of the Hmong ethnic minority that sided with the United States during the Indo-Chinese war.

Faced with increased competition with China in the trade and economic sphere, Washington has stepped up its activities in this area since 2002, when George W. Bush officially initiated the establishment of the ASEAN Initiative Institute.

A special role is assigned to the creation of free trade zones (FTA). Potential U.S. partners in free trade agreements must meet two basic criteria:: be a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and enter into a Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment with the United States. The United States has signed framework agreements with Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and ASEAN in general.

However, in reality, the signing of a free trade agreement only came with Singapore. The creation of a free trade zone in 2004 proved effective: bilateral trade turnover increased dramatically, and in 2009 Singapore became the 11th largest foreign trade partner of the United States. It is not the first year that negotiations on the creation of an FTA have been held with Malaysia and Thailand, but the parties have not yet managed to reach a compromise.

Investment in the Southeast Asian economies plays an important role in Washington's regional economic strategy. In 2010, ASEAN countries accounted for 4% of global US FDI, or $157 billion.¹⁷ In 2010, the United States became the largest state donor of investments to the ASEAN countries, its share in the region's investments received in 2010. it was 11.3%¹⁸.

Singapore has been the largest recipient of US investment in Southeast Asia for many years, with its share in the total volume of investment in the region reaching 67.3% in 2010. At the same time, most of the investment goes to the service sector in Singapore and about 11.3% - to the electronic industry and computer manufacturing. US investments in the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are very significant. The Indonesian oil and gas sector, which accounted for a quarter of all U.S. investment in Indonesia in 2010, has become attractive to American capital. Half of U.S. FDI in Malaysia and Thailand comes from manufacturing industries.

A NEW PAGE IN RELATIONS WITH ASEAN

Still under J. R. R. Tolkien.Under President George W. Bush, Washington expressed interest in intensifying contacts with ASEAN, which-

Major General Lio Yuan, a regular Beijing hawk, commented on Washington's claims to strengthen its position in the Asia-Pacific region: "The main priority of the United States is international terrorism, not "returning to Asia". His article was illustrated with a cartoon depicting "Uncle Sam" trapped in various parts of the world.

Some American and Asian experts frighten themselves and the whole world with the threat of geopolitical expansion of the zone of influence of "greater China" if it becomes a regional hegemon (solid line) and a world power (dotted line).

Источник: http://wanderingchina.org/2010/02/09/map-129-%E2%80%93-china-as-a-world-power-h ow-big/

roi has previously been given a very modest place in US foreign policy.

Prior to this, relations with the Southeast Asian countries developed mainly on a bilateral basis, and the Association was considered a disparate group of small passive states that followed in the wake of the great powers and depended on the balance of power between them.¹⁹

The situation has changed due to the rapidly growing role of ASEAN in regional affairs, especially in modern integration processes. In February 2009, the first-ever official visit of the US Secretary of State took place. Clinton to the ASEAN secretariat. In many ways, the signing by the Americans in July 2009 of the founding 1976 ASEAN Bali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which the United States refrained from joining for a long time, was a landmark event. A mechanism for regular summits of the leaders of the US-ASEAN Partnership States*was also launched.

The Obama administration has made some changes to its policy toward Myanmar, the rigidity of which has been a constant source of irritation in US relations with ASEAN since Myanmar became a full member of the Association in 1997. In the spring of 2009, the US State Department unveiled a new policy towards Myanmar, which presupposes dialogue with representatives of the Myanmar military regime while maintaining US sanctions, which is more consistent with the ASEAN policy of "constructive engagement" of Myanmar. In early December 2011, the first visit of a US Secretary of State to Myanmar in more than 56 years took place. Clinton told President Thein that she was trying to understand whether it was time to open a new chapter in relations between the two countries, and that the criterion for the United States would be the willingness of the hosts to continue the barely outlined democratization. She also met with opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner San Suu Kyi, who was released from years of house arrest a year earlier.

However, in general, the US-ASEAN partnership lags far behind the rapid development of integration processes between ASEAN and China on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the ASEAN+3**format. It was only in October 2010 that the United States, like Russia, became full participants in the 2005 East Asia Summit aimed at creating an East Asian community.

At the same time as trying to play a more active role in the regional integration structures that are being created under China's dominant role, Washington is making efforts to create alternative integration projects in which the United States would take a leading place.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which currently includes Brunei, Singapore, New Zealand and Chile, can be considered the most promising integration structure of this kind. The United States, Australia, Malaysia, Peru and Vietnam are in talks to join the agreement, which provides for the creation of a free trade zone. Japan, South Korea, Canada, Mexico and Taiwan also expressed their interest. At the APEC leaders ' meetings held in November 2011, Washington deliberately focused the attention of the parties participating in the summit on the prospects of an FTA created within the framework of TPP ²⁰.

In Beijing, Washington's increased activity in promoting the idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is seen as an attempt to create a counterweight to the initiative of the PRC to create a free trade zone in the ASEAN format+3. Moreover, there are good reasons to assume that China's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership will be conditioned by various requirements, such as revaluation of the national currency of the yuan, protection of intellectual property rights, etc.

* For more information, see: Lokshin G. M. Russia-ASEAN: new projects and formats of cooperation / / Asia and Africa Today, 2011, No. 2 (editor's note).

** For more information, see: Arapova E. Ya. Vostochnaya Aziya: poiskki integratsii [East Asia: Search for Integration].

HELP, BUT NOT DISINTERESTED

The provision of economic assistance is one of the most important instruments of the state's foreign policy. Assistance is intended to promote not only the establishment of relations between the donor State and the recipient state, the formation of a positive image of the donor state in the public consciousness of the citizens of the recipient country, but also to increase the authority of the donor state in the international community*.

Moreover, Washington makes provision of aid to recipient countries conditional on respect for human rights, adherence to democratic values, and good governance.

In Southeast Asia, restrictions on U.S. aid have been imposed over the past decade on Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand, as well as on the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, which has certainly affected the scale of American aid to these countries. At the same time, Washington has provided and continues to provide support to dissident groups, such as in Myanmar.

However, in 2005-2006, a number of restrictions on the provision of State aid were lifted.

The volume of American aid to Southeast Asia has increased significantly over the past decade. From 2000 to 2009, it increased 3-fold: from $170 million to $545 million ²¹. However, its scale is still small compared to other regions of the world.

Thus, in 2009, the share of Southeast Asian countries in US foreign economic assistance ($33.9 billion) was only 1.6%. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Cambodia have remained the largest recipients in Southeast Asia over the past decade, and since 2005, significant US allocations have been made to Vietnam. In 2009, these four countries collectively received 92.5% of all U.S. regional aid.

The events of September 11, 2001 became a milestone in the issue of US assistance to Southeast Asian countries. The main partners of Washington's counterterrorism activities in this region were Indonesia and the Philippines, where, according to US intelligence agencies, there was a wide network of terrorist organizations with close contacts with Al-Qaeda.

Since 2002, US aid to the Philippines has increased dramatically. For example, in 2001, this state received US aid in the amount of $49.6 million, and in 2002 -$131.3 million. In providing assistance to the Philippines, Washington is guided by the tasks of countering terrorism and maintaining peace in the Muslim region of Mindanao, as well as improving governance, promoting economic reforms and stimulating foreign investment, and protecting the environment. One-third of aid goes to health and education ²³.

U.S. aid to Indonesia also increased significantly , from $94.5 million in 2000 to $263.1 million in 2009. Funds are allocated primarily to health and education: in 2009, 56.6% of all American aid to Indonesia was allocated to them .

Since 2005, when military ties between the two countries were normalized, US spending on programs to help Indonesia maintain peace and security has increased significantly. In particular, in 2005, a number of restrictions on military cooperation imposed in 1993 in connection with serious human rights violations in that country were lifted. Educational and training programs for the Indonesian military have been resumed, and it is also possible to provide grants and low-interest loans to Indonesia for the purchase of American weapons and military equipment.

Washington has allocated relatively large amounts of aid to Cambodia, one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia. In 2009, Cambodia received $65.2 million. Aid to this country is also mainly directed to education and health care, which were almost completely destroyed during the Khmer Rouge's rule.

There have been two dramatic increases in aid to Vietnam over the past decade : in 2005, when aid increased from $12.95 million in 2004 to $33.4 million in 2005, and in 2007, when it increased from $39.75 million in 2006 to $61.2 million in 2007. Aid to this country is also directed to health care: in 2009, its share reached 83%. Vietnam has become the largest recipient of funding in Asia under the global US program "Presidential Emergency Plan to Fight AIDS".

For its part, Beijing is also actively using aid as a tool to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia.

For example, in 2003, when Washington imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar, demanding the "restoration of democracy", the PRC provided it with a loan of $200 million.²⁴ And after Washington imposed restrictions on the provision of military assistance to Thailand in response to the September 2006 military transition-

* In official documents and economics, "economic assistance" refers to the provision of loans (loans) to developing countries, technical assistance, student training, etc.A narrower meaning is invested in Official development Assistance (ODA). This refers to the promotion of socio-economic development (improving infrastructure and improving living standards) and the preferential nature of providing monetary loans, goods and services. Military aid is not included in ODA.

* China has allocated $49 million to Bangkok for defense and military training 25.

Like Washington, Beijing associates the provision of aid with conditions of a political nature. In his case, they concern, first of all, such painful problems for the PRC as Taiwan, Tibet and Uyghur.

Thus, in 2006, in response to Vietnam's unwillingness to concede to China's requests and exclude Taiwan from the list of participants of the APEC summit in Hanoi, the Chinese authorities temporarily suspended aid to Vietnam. ²⁶ And, on the contrary, after the Cambodian authorities deported back to China 20 Uighurs who had fled to Cambodia after ethnic clashes in December 2009 In the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China, Beijing announced its intention to invest $1.2 billion. to the infrastructure of Cambodia ²⁷.

China provides assistance to the countries of the region mainly in the implementation of infrastructure and energy projects, which, in addition to creating a favorable image among the ASEAN countries, brings China quite tangible benefits: it opens up access to energy resources and mineral raw materials. In April 2009 Beijing has launched a new initiative aimed at supporting infrastructure projects in Southeast Asian countries. This initiative provides for the creation of a $10 billion China - ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund, as well as the provision of $15 billion in loans to ASEAN, of which $6.7 billion is planned to be allocated in the form of concessional loans.²⁸

* * *

Not so long ago, the expert community often expressed the idea of the possibility of conflict - free coexistence of two world powers-the United States and China. Ignoring the historical experience that showed the inevitable competition between the established world leader and the rapidly growing new center of power, a number of experts referred to the nature of international relations that had changed as a result of globalization and the growing interdependence of States. They assumed that Washington and Beijing would be able to discover in the mutual strengthening of global and regional positions new opportunities for bilateral cooperation in order to achieve mutual benefits and counter the numerous challenges and threats of the modern world.

However, contrary to such theoretical assumptions, the activities of the United States and China to build up their regional positions in Southeast Asia are fraught with an aggravation of rivalry between the two states.

¹ U.S. Department of State. America's Pacific Century. Remarks. H.R.Clinton, Secretary of State. 10.11.2011 - http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176999.htm

² Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard of Australia on Joint Press Conference. 16.11.2011 - http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/16/remarks-president-obama-and-prime- minister-gillard-australia-joint-press

^{Whitlock Craig.} 3 Philippines My Allow Greater U.S. Military Presence in Reaction to China's Rise Washington Post, 26.01.2012.

⁴ Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategy Review. 5.01.2012 - http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/05/remarks-president-defense-strategic-r eview

⁵ Report to Congress of the U.S. -China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2010, November, p. 124 - www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_fulL10.pdf

⁶ ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2008. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, p. 78 - 79.

⁷ ASEAN Trade by Selected Partner Country/Region, 2009, 15.07.2010 - http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Tablel9.pdf

⁸ 2010 nian kuomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao (Statistical Bulletin of National Economy and Society Development, 2010), 28.02.2011 - http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20110228_402705692.htm

⁹ Zhongguo Tongji nianjian-2010 (China Statistical Yearbook-2010) - http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexch.htm

¹⁰ http://www.asean-cn.org/Item/2374.aspx

¹¹ Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows to ASEAN from Selected Partner Countries/Regions, 15.08.2011 - http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Table26.pdf

¹² 2010 niandu zhongguo duiwaizhijie touzi tongzigongbao (Statistical Bulletin of China's Foreign Direct Investment, 2010), pp. 36-37, 42-43 - http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201109/1316069604368.pdf

¹³ Remarks with Vietnam Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, 22.07.2010 - www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145034.htm

¹⁴ ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2008. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, p. 78 - 79.

¹⁵ ASEAN trade by selected partner country/region, 2009, 15.07.2010 - http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Tablel9.pdf

¹⁶ Hereafter, the volume of US trade with ASEAN countries is calculated according to: http://tse.export.gov/TSE/ChartDisplay.aspx

¹⁷ Hereafter, information on U.S. FDI by: U.S. direct investment abroad: balance of payments and direct investment position data. Annual data. Country detail - http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm

¹⁸ Foreign direct investment net inflows to ASEAN...

^{Senin R. A.} 19 ASEAN - United States of America / / ASEAN at the beginning of the 21st century. Aktual'nye problemy i perspektivy [Actual problems and prospects], Moscow, Forum Publishing House, 2010, p. 191.

^{Kurtenbach E.} 20 APEC Nations Pledge Support for TPP // China Post, 15.11.2011 - http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/global-markets/2011/11/15/322959/APEC-nations.htm

²¹ Hereafter, US aid to Southeast Asian countries is calculated using: Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations - http://www.state.gOv/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/index.htm

²² U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook). Foreign Assistance Fast Facts: FY2009 - http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html

^{Lum Th.} 23 U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients. 8.10.2008, p. 23 - http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31362.pdf

²⁴ Report to Congress of the U.S. -China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2010, November, p. 121 - www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_full_10.pdf

^{Lum Th.} 25 Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World. 15.08.2008, p. 86 - www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34620.pdf

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Beijing's Moneyed Advance on Southeast Asia // CBCNews, 8.03.2010 - http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/03/05/f-china-economic-muscle.html

²⁸ Financial cooperation between China and ASEAN is deepening / / People's Daily, 4.01.2010 - http://russian.people.com.cn/31518/6858184.html

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