If Marshal I. S. Konev was called a "genius of surprise" by his colleagues, and Marshal L. A. Govorov was known as a master of artillery offensive, then Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov was respectfully called "marshal of the northern directions". Svir and Volkhov. Sinyavino and Novgorod, Petrozavodsk and Kirkenes-these geographical names have forever entered the military history of the Fatherland thanks to the victories of its fronts. It was here that the marshal experienced the moments of the supreme triumph of the winner. However, he was the only commander to receive the Order of Victory for his skill in commanding troops during the war with Japan.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Meretskov had already fought his share of battles. Few people had such a remarkable experience. After returning from Spain with the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner, he was immediately appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. He later commanded the troops of the Volga and Leningrad Military Districts. During the Finnish War of 1939-1940, Meretskov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, promoted to the rank of General of the Army, and eventually became the Chief of the General Staff.

And then his fate took a turn that would haunt him for the rest of his life: just ten days after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Army General was arrested on a false charge of participating in a "military-fascist conspiracy." As Meretskov later recalled, he was "beat up" in the NKVD's dungeons to the point where he "felt like I was losing my mind." According to some reports, he was saved only by the intercession of the former People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, before the Supreme Commander.

Since the Soviet-Finnish War, Meretskov had been known as a master of offensive operations in wooded and swampy terrain. This was the reason for his selection as commander of the Northern Front. From December 1941 to February 1944, he commanded the Volkhov Front, and later took over the Karelian Front.

"In the summer of 1942, during the extremely difficult combat situation on the Volkhov Front, I had the opportunity to observe K.A. Meretskov's work as the commander of this front directly in the troops and on the battlefield," wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. "I was always convinced that his decisions were well-thought-out, serious, and fully in line with the requirements of the current frontline situation. His bold and original plans for operations always involved a thorough examination of the enemy's strengths and capabilities, careful calculation and discretion, a comprehensive analysis of all the pros and cons, and a determination to achieve the desired outcome with minimal casualties.

In January 1943, Meretskov's troops, together with the troops of the Leningrad Front, participated in the successful breakthrough of the Siege of Leningrad. In January-February 1944, again in cooperation with the Leningrad Front, the Novgorod-Luga Operation was carried out, during which the enemy's deeply echeloned defenses were breached, the cities of Novgorod and Luga were liberated, and the Nazi Army Group North was dismembered.

When the question of liberating Karelia and the Soviet Arctic came up, the Stavka once again chose Meretskov as the commander of the Karelian Front, which stretched from Lake Ladoga to the polar seas. During his command, the front's troops conducted two offensive operations: the Svir-Petrozavodsk Offensive (June-August 1944), which resulted in the liberation of southern Karelia, and the Petsamo-Kirkenes Offensive (October 1944), which led to the expulsion of the Nazis from the Arctic region and northern Norway. Both operations were considered outstanding achievements of Soviet military art, and their commander, General Meretskov, was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

He once again confirmed his reputation as a commander of the northern fronts, who was able to use the harsh terrain to his advantage. Here is just one example from the history of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation. Intelligence revealed that the Germans, who were facing the right flank of the 14th Army, which was launching the main attack, did not have any means of combating heavy tanks. They simply did not consider that such tanks could operate in the rugged terrain of the Arctic. It was indeed difficult for heavy combat vehicles to move around. But it was possible! And the element of surprise was worth a lot. On the front commander's orders, heavy KB tanks were brought to this sector, and they went into battle, using their powerful guns to destroy the enemy's defensive structures and clear a path for the infantry. The experience of using these tanks in the specific conditions of the Arctic was truly unique.

... From Europe, Meretskov and his staff traveled to Manchuria. The day before, when Stalin was considering who to appoint as commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front, he mentioned Meretskov's name. According to the memoirs of General of the Army S.M. Shtemenko, Stalin said:

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- The cunning Yaroslavets will find a way to defeat the Japanese. He's no stranger to fighting in the forest and breaking through fortified areas.

We don't know where Yaroslavl came from, where the marshal only passed through, but we must admit that there were reasons to consider Meretskov cunning. And he proved it many times in battles against the Germans. Here's just one example. At the beginning of the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation to liberate southern Karelia, the main striking force of the front had to cross the Svir River, which was 350 meters wide. To identify as many enemy firing points as possible, Kirill Afanasyevich ordered a false crossing. We had prepared rafts and boats in advance, with dummy soldiers tied to them, which were launched into the water after a powerful barrage of our artillery. Special volunteers, swimming behind the rafts and boats, pushed them towards the opposite bank, while artillery scouts were monitoring the enemy's firepower that had not been suppressed during the artillery preparation. The Soviet artillery then struck again. Meanwhile, our infantry, mounted on two hundred amphibious vehicles, crossed the river at another location...

In Primorye, as in Karelia, the Soviet troops had to break through the enemy's fortifications, which had been built over many years, in mountainous and forested terrain. This was a familiar situation for Meretskov. However, the situation was completely different in other aspects. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, which had been in effect since April 1941, prevented the use of aerial reconnaissance and combat reconnaissance. The lack of reliable information about the enemy minimized the effectiveness of artillery and air preparation. At the same time, in order to maintain secrecy, it was necessary to keep Soviet units away from the border area, while the breakthrough of Japanese fortified areas required both a powerful artillery preparation and an offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy. This was something to think about.

At first, the commander planned to solve the problem by conducting three days of artillery and air force preparation, followed by massive artillery attacks on the Japanese defenses just before crossing the state border. However, after careful consideration and consultation with his staff, he decided against this plan. A strike against poorly identified targets, no matter how powerful it might be, would not be effective. Moreover, the element of surprise would be lost.

The algorithm of action was born during a visit by Meretskov and Marshal Vasilevsky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces in the Far East, to the 5th Army. In order to ensure both surprise when crossing the border and the power of the attack, its commander, General N.I. Krylov, proposed launching an offensive without artillery preparation using reinforced forward battalions.

Meretskov immediately appreciated the subordinate's ingenuity and personally led the training of the battalions. According to his instructions, the order of the secret advance of the advanced units, the methods of overcoming obstacles, and the sudden capture of defensive structures were practiced on maps and terrain models. Subsequently, the units engaged in practical exercises. The terrain was equipped with strongholds that resembled enemy fortifications. Each stage was personally supervised by the front commander, who was seen not only in the headquarters but also in the bunker, on the training field, and in the smoking room. "The soldiers and officers loved their commander," Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky recalled, "loved him for his humanity and constant care for them, for his bravery, for his firmness in implementing decisions, and for his straightforwardness and simplicity in communication."

On August 9, the day the 1st Far Eastern Front was supposed to launch its offensive, the weather intervened: a tropical downpour broke out over Primorye. In such conditions, aviation was out of the question, and the conditions for artillery were unfavorable. However, Marshal Meretskov believed that the Japanese were unlikely to expect an offensive by our troops. Despite the odds, he ordered the operation to begin without artillery preparation.

"The breakthrough of the Japanese fortified areas by the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front at night without artillery or air support is noteworthy," wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov. "The unexpected appearance of our advance detachments in the Japanese fortified areas caught their garrisons by surprise, and our swift actions prevented the enemy from offering organized resistance."

The first echelon units rushed into the gaps left by the advance detachments. In six days, the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front advanced up to 150 km, capturing the ports of Yuki and Rasin and cutting off the Kwantung Army's retreat to Korea. Eventually, our units entered Harbin, Jilin, and Changchun.

... On the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Great Victory, Meretskov veterans gathered to raise a mournful glass in memory of their comrades who had fallen in the war. During the conversations, someone would inevitably sing the famous "Volkhov Drinking Song" by the poet Pavel Shubin:

Let's drink to those who have been gone for weeks

In the frozen dugouts,

He fought on Lake Ladoga and on the Volkhov River.

He didn't back down.

Everyone was pulling together. And in the minds of the veterans, they saw those "who commanded the companies, who died in the snow," and their glorious front commander, Marshal Kirill Meretskov.

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