The revolutionary events that have taken place and are taking place today in a number of countries in the Arab world have for some time pushed the Palestinian issue, which has existed for several decades, into the background. However, the subsequent round of Arab-Israeli confrontation in March and then in June 2011 once again showed the importance and severity of this problem. At the same time, if almost all Arab countries have historically had a similar position on the issues of the Palestinian settlement, the policy of the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in relation to this problem has always had some specifics.

Keywords: Turkey, Iran, Palestinian problem, Arab-Israeli relations.

This specificity was determined, on the one hand, by the peculiarities of relations between Turkey and Iran with Israel and Arab countries, and, on the other hand, by the peculiarities of Turkish - Iranian relations in a particular historical period. It is also necessary to note the importance of the political situation and conditions under which the Palestinian settlement became particularly important for Ankara and Tehran. So, if the position of Iran on the conflict has always been pro-Palestinian( pro-Arab), which was due to the hostile attitude towards Israel, then the opinions of some authors regarding Ankara's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict differ. Some believe that Turkey holds an equidistant position towards both sides of the conflict, while others believe that since the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party came to power in November 2002, Ankara's position has become more pro-Palestinian in the conflict, and criticism of Israel's policies has become systematic [Sandrin].

It should be noted that both opinions describe only the component that is relevant to the policy of senior management. The Turkish public has always expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people. After the beginning of the first intifada, the Turkish Parliament officially condemned Israel's violent actions against the Palestinian people and violation of their humanitarian rights.

Back in 1994, Prime Minister T. Chiller caused quite a stir in Israeli circles when she visited the Palestinian headquarters in East Jerusalem (Orient House)without consulting Israel And I met with the Palestinian delegation. At that time, Israeli political leaders, including Prime Minister Rabin, expressed their concern in this regard [Ivanova, 2005, p. 134]. Later in one of her articles, Chiller wrote:: "Today, Turkey regards the Middle East peace process as the most important concept. We aim to eliminate all the obstacles blocking it. We know that the road ahead is filled with pitfalls, and resolving the conflict will not be easy" [Ciller, 1996, p. 23].

Turkish sympathies for the Palestinians were particularly pronounced in late 2000, when the second intifada began. Demonstrators across Turkey denounce Israeli invasion

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The Palestinian-controlled West Bank, Gaza, and Turkish public figures have called for a campaign of solidarity with the Palestinian people. In October 2000, Turkey supported a UN resolution condemning Israel's use of force against the Palestinians, and later that month, at an Islamic economic conference in Istanbul, Turkish President A. Sezer criticized Israel's policies. The official visit of A. Sharon to Ankara in 2001 was accompanied by mass demonstrations on the streets of the city with slogans such as: "Murderers of Palestine, go back to your homeland!" [Ivanova, 2005, p. 135].

Former Turkish President S. Demirel detailed Ankara's position on the Middle East peace process in his 2002 article, he wrote: "From the very beginning, Turkey was an ardent supporter of the Middle East settlement and today, in this context, actively contributes to the search for peace in the region. Turkey, along with five other countries, has been present in Hebron since 1997 to ensure the security of the Palestinians living there. Turkey believes that lasting peace and stability in the region can only be achieved through a peaceful settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and No. 338, which presuppose the principle of "territorial concessions in exchange for the establishment of peaceful relations". In this regard, Ankara welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council Decision No. 1397 (2002), which for the first time outlined the vision of a Palestinian State living side by side with Israel. However, the main tool in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is the continuous policy of the quartet formed by the United States, Russia, the EU and the UN" [Demirel, 2002, p. 12].

It should be noted that the Palestinian issue is a sensitive topic for most strata of Turkish society. A survey conducted in October 2000 showed that 71% of Turkish citizens are interested in the Palestinian issue, while 60% demand a more active policy in the Palestinian direction. Another survey conducted in November 2003, which included 2,183 people from various parts of Turkey, assessed the attitude of Turks towards the Palestinians. Of the respondents, 66% support the Palestinians in their struggle [Aras, 2009, p. 7].

However, it cannot be said that Turkish politicians did not make harsh statements and criticize Israel's policy. Back in 2002, former Prime Minister B. Ecevit described Operation Jenin 1 as nothing less than genocide. In 2004. Erdogan criticized the killing of Sheikh A. Yassin, and the Turkish Prime Minister called the large victims among refugees in the Rafah camp "state terror" [Aras, 2009, p. 3].

An important step of the Turkish state in the Middle East settlement process was the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister to Israel in January 2005. According to Israeli political analysts, Ankara's goal was to improve Israel's relations with its neighbors and create a "new atmosphere" in the region. And the prerequisites for such an "atmosphere" began to form after the death of Ya. Arafat [Ivanova, 2005, pp. 135-136]. In January 2006, Turkey expressed its desire to mediate between Hamas and Israel.

However, Ankara's position on the Middle East settlement began to shift towards the Palestinians after the Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip in late 2008. At that time, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed a kind of support for the Palestinian people. In early 2009, a scandal broke out at the International Economic Forum in Davos after a lengthy emotional speech by Israeli President Sh. Peres at a seminar on the situation in the Gaza Strip. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded no less emotionally to the Israeli leader, blaming Israel for the mass death of civilians. Peres interrupted Erdogan, citing lack of time. Then the Turkish Prime Minister defiantly left the audience, for-

1 Battle of Jenin (capture of Jenin) part of the anti-terrorist operation Protective Wall, conducted by the Israel Defense Forces in the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002.

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showing that Davos is over for him. Erdogan's action caused a wide public response and support in Iran. And on February 2, 2009, the mayor of the Iranian capital, M. B. Qalibaf, awarded Erdogan the title of honorary resident of Tehran for his action at the Davos Economic Forum. In an interview with the Al Jazeera Arabic TV channel, R. T. Erdogan said: "The Gaza Strip is a prison where people live in isolation from the world. Israel has imposed a blockade there. What is happening is a humanitarian tragedy "[Yusuf al-Sharif, 2009].

After Erdogan's visit to Iran, President A. Gul visited on February 5, 2009. Saudi Arabia. Answering journalists 'questions, the Turkish president noted that:" Not only the Palestinians living in Gaza, but also the entire Palestinian people are indirectly under our protection." Later, during the visit of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on February 7, 2009, Gul stated:: "In this case, and in possible subsequent aggressions (by Israel), Turkey will be close to fraternal Palestine "[GUI, 2009].

Ankara's pro-Palestinian position in the conflict was further strengthened after the events of May 31, 2010, when Israeli special forces attacked the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, carrying humanitarian aid for Palestinians. As a result of the assault on the ship, 9 people were killed. Turkey responded by withdrawing its ambassador from Israel and canceling previously planned joint military exercises. Addressing the Turkish Parliament on June 1, 2010, R. T. Erdogan stated that: "This action is a clear violation of international law... We demand that Israel immediately lift the humanitarian blockade on the Gaza Strip... " [Erdogan, 2010].

The next stage of Turkish-Israeli relations was characterized by mutual reproaches, the initiation of their own investigations into what happened, and criticism by high-ranking Turkish officials of Israel's ruling elite. Against this background, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas visited Turkey in December 2010. After meeting with Abbas, Turkish President A. Gul stated that: "Turkey will continue to support the independence of the Palestinian Authority "[GUI, 2010].

In January 2011, Turkey continued to make harsh statements against Israel. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, Erdogan called on Israelis to get rid of Israeli Foreign Minister A. Lieberman: "Lieberman brings trouble to Israelis. The citizens of Israel should get rid of it. If Tel Aviv continues to make such statements and pursue such a policy, then Turkey may abandon its intention to negotiate with Israel and cancel previous agreements." The Turkish Prime Minister also said that: "Israel should apologize for its actions against the Mavi Marmara ship and pay compensation for the killings of Turkish activists."

In his statement, Erdogan also praised the Hamas movement, pointing out that " Hamas is not a terrorist organization, but a resistance movement. As long as this organization defends its just cause, Turkey will always support it" (Guryev, 2011).

Sharpness and tension in relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv remain to this day, which strengthened Ankara's pro-Palestinian position in the conflict. Nevertheless, in July 2011, after a series of statements by senior Turkish politicians about the need to improve relations with Israel, there was a tendency to normalize them. In particular, the adviser to the Turkish Prime Minister, I. Kalin, in an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, said: "We want to return the ambassador to Tel Aviv, we want to resume joint military maneuvers, as well as cooperation in the military and civilian fields, we want a complete return to the situation that existed before 2010" [Guryev, july 2011].

Unlike Turkey, Iran has historically provided stronger support to the Palestinians. During a visit in May 1998 by Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said: "We support the just cause of the Palestinians. Iran is proud to contribute as much as it can to the armed struggle of the Palestinians."

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He also stressed that " Iran's policy should not be regarded as supporting terrorism. Terrorism is what the Israeli government used to do-tear people away from their homes and lands and eliminate their enemies who lived in other countries" [Aras, 2000, p. 157]. A. Khamenei also offered his own solution to the Palestinian problem. In one of his speeches in 2010, he stated that: "There is only one solution to the Palestinian problem. A referendum should be held with the participation of all indigenous Palestinians, including Muslims, Jews and Christians, as well as those living in the occupied territories and beyond. The government that comes to power as a result of the referendum, regardless of whether it is Muslim, Christian, Jewish or coalition, will be based on the will of the Palestinian people. Such a Government would be acceptable, and it would solve the problem of Palestine. Without this, it is impossible to resolve the Palestinian problem" [Sajjadpur, 2009, p. 33]. In essence, this project provides for the destruction of the State of Israel by absorbing it and transferring its citizens to the status of a religious minority in a large Palestine under the rule of Muslim Arabs. It is quite clear that this utopian plan is unrealistic. It contradicts both the position of the absolute majority of countries in the world and the decisions of the UN [Sazhin, 2005, p. 212].

The Iranian leadership sees this conflict as a continuing expansion of Muslim territories by the West. This position has led to the formation of a special attitude towards the State of Israel, which is perceived as a protege and defender of the interests of the West, primarily the United States, in the Middle East region. A characteristic feature of Iran's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in particular the State of Israel, is the non-obvious and parallel application of the principles of dogmatism and pragmatism.

The dogmatism of the Iranian policy lies in the unwillingness to recognize Israel's right to exist, as well as the perception of the struggle for the freedom of Palestine as the duty of any true Muslim society and state.

The pragmatism of Iran's policy in this direction is manifested in Tehran's desire to act as a defender of the interests of Muslims in the region, based on the realization that in fact Iran has no real allies in the Middle East region. Such seemingly close relations as with Syria, post-war Iraq, the Hamas movement, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Lebanese Hezbollah are in fact "marriages of convenience" that can break up under unfavorable circumstances. As a result, Iran, on the one hand, actively supports the struggle of the Palestinians, as well as other Muslims in the region, seeks to compensate for its loneliness in the region and create a positive attitude towards itself among all Muslims. On the other hand, by inciting hatred of Muslims towards Israel and the United States, it tries to significantly weaken the positions of the latter in the region and prevent them from focusing on problems directly related to Iran, including the "nuclear dossier" and the issue of changing the regime in the country that is not controlled by the West, etc. [Manukyan, 2010, p. 23].

Therefore, the position of Iran on the Middle East settlement has always remained unchanged, moreover, it has become noticeably tougher towards Israel during the presidency of M. Ahmadinejad. In this regard, one of the main priorities of the current Iranian president's foreign policy is to support Hamas, create an anti-American axis in the Middle East together with Syria, and develop relations with Lebanese Hezbollah and similar organizations [Aras, 2006, p. 81].

So, having analyzed the strategy of Turkey and Iran in relation to the Middle East peace process, it should be noted that for a long time both countries implemented their own policies, i.e. they had different views on the process of resolving this conflict. However, since the end of 2008, the parties have begun to express similar views and take concerted action on the Palestinian issue. It was

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This is primarily due to the beginning of the Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip, which began at the end of December 2008, as well as the attack on the Mavi Marmara ship carrying humanitarian aid for Palestinians on May 31, 2010.

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Ivanova I. I. [Turkey's position on the issues of the Middle East settlement]. Collection of articles (issue twenty-sixth), Moscow, 2005.

Manukyan D. A. [Iran's policy in the Middle East in the context of globalization]. Candidate of Political Science, St. Petersburg, 2010.

Sajjadpour K. Reading Khamenei: Views on the World of the most influential figure in Iran. Moscow, 2009.

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Gul A. Turkiye Bagimsiz Filistin Devleti Icin Destek Vermeye Devam Edecektir. 06.12.20101 http://www.tccb.gov. tr/habcrlcr/170/78259/turkiye-bagimsiz-nlistin-dcvlcti-icin-destek-vcrmeye-devam-cdccektir. html

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Sandrin P. Turkish Foreign Policy after the End of Cold War: From Securitising to Desecuritising Actor / http:// www2.lsc.ac.uk/europcanInstitutc/rcscarch/ContemporaryTurkishStudics/Paper%20PS.pdf

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