V. N. KONYSHEV

Doctor of Political Science

A. A. SERGUNIN

Doctor of Political Science

Saint Petersburg State University

Keywords: missile defense, USA, Middle East, security

The article analyzes the US policy in the Middle East on the creation of missile defense systems (ABM). The authors find out the motives that push Washington to create and / or support the efforts of its allies to deploy such systems, assess the current state of missile defense programs in the region, as well as possible consequences for the regional security system.

The creation of regional missile defense systems with the active participation or under the control of the United States began almost immediately after Washington's unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, which occurred in 2002. These actions were far from accidental, since the United States never stopped scientific research in this area-just remember Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative". And after the end of the Cold War, the view gradually prevailed in American military and political circles that the 1972 Treaty was outdated and bound the US initiative to consolidate global leadership. As a result, the missile defense issue is now virtually out of legal control, and the spread of such systems in various regions of the world can seriously change the military balance of power.

CREATED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

In technical terms, the basis of the missile defense systems that the United States proposes to create in various regions of the world are mobile and transportable elements, which allows them to quickly move them to crisis regions of the world.

In particular, these are batteries of THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) mobile anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), used to intercept ballistic missiles in the final part of the trajectory (when entering the atmosphere). The complex is designed to combat short-and medium-range missiles, operates at altitudes of 30-150 km and at

ranges up to 200 km. The capabilities of the THAAD air defense system allow you to protect large objects - airfields, military bases, seaports, etc.

The Patriot-3 air-borne air defense system is designed to fight short-range missiles and cover up pinpoints. It is capable of interception at an altitude of up to 20 km and at a range of up to 45 km.

Mobile missile defense systems include sea-based SM-3 (Standard Missile) family of anti-missiles, which are installed on ships equipped with the Aegis combat information management system. Some modifications of these anti-missiles are designed to fight short-and medium-range missiles at a distance of up to 1500 km and at altitudes of 240-250 km. SM-3 targets can be not only rockets, but also low-orbit satellites. Ships equipped with Aegis have their own radar, so they can detect and destroy targets both independently and in cooperation with other missile defense systems.

The United States has developed specialized sea-based AN/TPY-2 radars with a detection range of 1,800-2,000 km, which are designed to move to threatened regions (forward-based radars). Not only do they detect missile launches, but they can also better recognize false targets that occur after warheads are separated. Radars of this type are located in Turkey and Israel.

All types of radars are complemented by the American space launch early detection system, consisting of satellites in low and geostationary orbits (STSS and SBIRS). Data obtained from satellites and radars are used to ensure maximum accurate targeting at any part of the missile's flight path and its subsequent destruction with the help of anti-missiles of various ranges.

Various elements of missile defense are controlled as a single unit using an automated combat control system that provides communication between all satellites, radars and various means of destruction, as well as interaction and information exchange not only at the regional level, but also at the national missile defense system located in the United States. Thus, any regional missile defense system is created with the possibility of full integration into the global missile defense system under the command of the United States.

However, not all allies are focused on the purchase of ready-made missile defense elements in the United States, and seek to develop their own developments in this area, including an automated combat control system. Therefore, the specific configuration, composition and functions of the missile defense systems being created depend on the geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the United States, on the political situation in the region, as well as on the level of military-technical and military-political cooperation of the United States with the states of the region. But in any case, the systems being created assume full compatibility with American missile defense, communications and control systems.

The Middle East region, like the Asia-Pacific region, is part of the so-called "strategic arch" over which the United States seeks to establish firm control.¹ Washington's closest allied ties remain with Israel and with the Arab states that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), where Saudi Arabia has the strongest influence. This creates certain difficulties for the United States, since Israel has always opposed US military cooperation with Arab countries.

Based on this specificity, the interaction of the United States and partners in the field of missile defense is built in different ways. The United States has been cooperating with Israel for a long time, including the joint production of Arrow family anti-missile systems and some other projects. With the Arab countries, negotiations are mainly conducted through the GCC on the prospects for creating a single regional missile defense system ², or we are talking about selling American THAAD and Patriot-3 air defense/missile defense systems to individual states.

AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF REGIONAL MISSILE THREATS

The United States believes that the need to create regional missile defense systems is growing all over the world due to the proliferation of missile weapons and nuclear technologies. Risks are growing both for the states that are allies and partners of the United States, as well as for the American armed forces stationed abroad, infrastructure facilities, and transport communications. Nuclear-missile weapons are particularly attractive to States that cannot count on a military confrontation between conventional armed forces and great Powers, primarily the United States. For them, the possession of missile weapons becomes a means of an asymmetric response to a superior enemy at the expense of the potential for unacceptable damage. Even in non-nuclear equipment, modern missile weapons can cause unacceptable damage to any State.

Powerful missile systems in the near future will be able to acquire not only many states that do not belong to the great or highly developed powers, but also non-state actors in international politics. In the Middle East, the greatest threat of this kind comes from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant( ISIL), whose militants, according to media reports, managed to capture a SCUD³-type ballistic missile. The ISIS leadership announced its intention to use this missile against Israel, which caused serious concern not only in Tel Aviv,but also in Washington.

The international regime of control over the proliferation of missile technologies actually only coordinates the export operations of states that are united by the desire to prevent weapons from falling into the "wrong hands". Particularly dangerous in this regard are non-State actors of politics, who use shell companies and intermediaries for their own purposes in order to circumvent restrictive measures. For the US, it is important that such events are particularly fast.

Processes are taking place in the Middle East, creating growing threats to Israel.

According to the US Department of Defense Missile Defense Agency, the total number of ballistic missiles in the world today has reached 5,900-excluding the arsenals of the United States, Russia, China, and NATO. Of this number, only in the last 5 years, the increase was 1200 units ⁴. At the same time, missile systems are developing quite rapidly: their survivability, reliability, mobility and accuracy are improving. The United States claims that Iran is allegedly capable of creating an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015, which will reach the United States in range.

Since the United States associates most of the risks of this kind with rogue states or non-state military formations operating in poorly managed conflicts, the creation of an anti-missile "shield" in the immediate vicinity of the conflict region is considered as a means to increase the security of the United States and its allies. At the same time, the system strengthens the strike capabilities of the United States and its allies, since potential opponents do not have not only missile defense and missile warning systems, but often even modern air defense systems. Thus, the United States and its allies are tempted to launch a preemptive strike with impunity. This largely explains the active campaign waged by the United States to create regional missile defense systems.

Directly in the Persian Gulf, the United States maintains a military presence, including fighter aircraft, fleet, technical intelligence, missile defense elements and ground forces. The number of personnel of the US Armed Forces in this region is 35 thousand people, which can be significantly increased in the event of an aggravation of the situation.⁵

Some Western experts believe that Washington's participation in direct military actions against Syria and Iran can only take place under strong pressure from US allies (France, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the case of Syria; Israel and Saudi Arabia in the case of Iran).⁶. Be that as it may, the United States will try to refrain from ground operations and limit itself only to air support for internal opposition, objectionable to the regime, and allied forces. In this situation, cooperation in the field of missile defense will also be in demand.

Threats of a missile attack are linked not only to the United States, but also to European states with Iran and Syria. Against the backdrop of the worsening situation in Yemen and the potential involvement of Iran in the conflict (Tehran supports the Shiite Houthi rebels, seeking to strengthen its influence in opposition to Saudi Arabia), Saudi Arabia and its allies began to show concern and began intervening in Yemen. Establishing Houthi control over southern Yemen would threaten further destabilization within Saudi Arabia.

Syria has only short-range mobile SCUD systems (700 km) with no more than 100 launchers. As for Iran, the United States does not have data on the latest Iranian missiles, but it believes that it is developing its own intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (see Table 1).

Table 1

Iran's ballistic missiles

Source: Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Wright-Patterson Air force Base: NASIC Public Affairs Office, 2013 - http://www.andrewerickson.com/2013/07/national-air-and-space-intelligence-center-nasic-issues-2013-ballistic-and-cruise-missile-threat-report/

According to American data, Iran has established partially independent production of missiles in two directions - based on Soviet technologies of liquid-fuel SCUD missiles and Chinese solid-fuel CSS-10 Mod 1, 2. According to American intelligence, in the 1990s. Iran has purchased several dozen CSS-7 short-range missile launchers and technologies for their production, as well as equipment and instruments for conducting missile tests from China, although official Beijing denies this.⁷ In addition, Iran purchased a batch of SCUD-C and SCUD-B missiles from North Korea, which then formed the basis of its own Shahab 1 and Shahab 2 missiles. According to the characteristics of the Shahab 3 missiles, there is no unambiguous data. If the United States believes that this is a renamed Korean No Dong, then, according to Russian experts, the rocket has an Iranian engine.-

It was designed to increase the payload from 1000 kg to 1300 kg at a range of 1500 km ⁸.

Iran is making major efforts to further increase the accuracy and range of its missiles.⁹ Apparently, Iran is actively cooperating in this area with experts from North Korea, China and Syria. In the United States, special attention is paid to Iran due to the fact that this state does not recognize the international missile technology control regime.

In developing solid-fuel missiles, Iran focuses on building its own scientific and production base, relying on the help of Chinese advisers and military facilities built by China. Iran's first Fateh-110 solid-fuel missile was not very accurate, but its deliveries continue to Syria. At the next stage, the design of the two-stage Sejjil 2 began, but the low intensity of testing conducted since 2007 indicates that the developers faced serious technical difficulties that cannot be overcome. Like liquid-fueled missiles, the Sejjil 2 has low accuracy and cannot be an effective weapon when equipped with non-nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is believed that this missile is well suited for placing a nuclear charge, and can also serve as a prototype for creating a three-stage rocket with an estimated range of 3,700 km in the future. It will take at least 10 years to build an ICBM capable of reaching the United States, given Iran's technological level and sanctions that make it difficult to acquire the necessary ingredients abroad.¹⁰

However, there are other assessments on the prospects for Iran's development of an ICBM. A competent Russian specialist, V. Dvorkin11, with reference to joint research conducted by Russian and foreign experts on the projects of the East-West Institute (New York-Brussels-Moscow-Washington) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), believes that there are no serious obstacles to the creation of a three-stage ICBM based on Sejjil 2 it exists. Moreover, Iran is capable of developing a nuclear warhead within a year. This requires only a political solution. But such a step is extremely difficult due to the tough position of the United States on preventing the creation of nuclear weapons by Iran, as well as the lack of Tehran not only its own missile defense system, but even effective air defense systems.

In addition to ballistic missiles, Iran has air -, sea-and land-based Meshkat cruise missiles with a conventional warhead, but the United States does not have accurate data on their range and number.

The main targets for Iran are Israel, Iraq and the Persian Gulf zone. Iranian missiles, with a sufficiently large number of them, have a serious drawback - low accuracy of hitting, to be used in non-nuclear equipment for attacking military targets. According to experts, even if we assume the use of chemical weapons, for example, against the forces of the United States or Israel, it is unlikely that serious damage will be caused, especially if we take into account the superiority of the latter in aviation and missile defense systems.

According to experts, Iran will continue to produce short - and medium-range ballistic missiles, even if a sufficiently effective missile defense system is created in Israel or, in the longer term, in the Persian Gulf zone. In this case, Iran can follow the path of multiple rocket launches and try to disable the control infrastructure and missile defense command posts.

Iran will be able to achieve effective deterrence of the United States only if it creates an ICBM and manages to ensure the survivability of missile launchers with nuclear warheads. If at least a few missiles of this class can survive the intended preemptive strike, Tehran will receive not only a deterrent tool, but also additional levers of influence in the region. However, it is still unclear whether Iran really intends to develop a nuclear weapon or only wants to reach the threshold potential (the ability to quickly develop a nuclear weapon).¹³.

US ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING ISRAEL'S MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

The political situation in the Middle East is far from stable, but in addition to this, the United States is also forced to balance between Israel, its main ally in the region, and Arab countries, with which there is also intensive cooperation in the military and political sphere. But especially close ties have developed with Israel, with which the United States has a rich experience of military-technical cooperation, including joint development of various types of weapons and equipment. ¹⁴ In 2014, a decision of both houses of the US Congress confirmed Israel's status as the main strategic partner in the region.

Israel's interest in creating a missile defense system is linked to the need to protect against missile attacks with both nuclear and conventional warheads. The Israeli mobile air defense system Arrow-2 was one of the results of cooperation with the United States, which began in 1986 with the signing of a memorandum on co-financing the project. On the American side, Boeing, Lockheed and Raytheon participated in the project under the auspices of the ABM Agency. Israel traditionally receives significant financial support from the United States. It is noteworthy that the US Congress, as a rule, is even more generous than the president. So, in 2011 he allocated $422 million for this project, which is $96 million more than President Barack Obama requested. The total cost of the Arrow-2 project was about $2.4 billion, more than half of which was provided by the United States15.

The United States and Israel have achieved compatibility of missile defense elements and can conduct joint operations to intercept missiles. According to its characteristics, the Israeli system even surpasses the American Patriot-3, operating effectively at a range of up to 90 km and at an altitude of up to 50 km. The Israeli missile is also distinguished by its operating principle. If American anti-missiles are designed for direct hits, then the Israeli Arrow-2 destroys the target by detonating the warhead.

Although the Arrow-2 complex is combined with-

steam with American control systems, radars and can interact with Patriot-3, Israel has created its own long-range radar Green Pine and combat control system Citron Tree. The Israeli missile defense system, first tested in combat conditions in 2012, was called the" Iron Dome " (Iron Dome), its range is from 4 to 70 km, but in the future it can be increased to 250 km.

The Iron Dome is intended only to protect populated areas, not large areas of the territory. By September 2013, 6 such batteries had been deployed, and in total Israel considers it sufficient to have 10-15 batteries. Due to their mobility, SAMs can move quickly enough to threatened areas and avoid a preemptive strike by the enemy.¹⁶

Test tests have shown that Arrow-2 is capable of destroying Qassam missiles of the Palestinian type, Scud of the Lebanese type, Shahab-Z of the Iranian production ¹⁷, as well as rockets fired from Grad installations. However, data on the effectiveness of the Iron Dome missile defense system in real combat conditions remain contradictory. First, the missile defense system was used against obsolete missiles created on the basis of Soviet prototypes. Secondly, there are doubts about the effectiveness of the "Iron Dome". According to the manufacturer, the SAM is capable of intercepting 85% of targets (these indicators cause distrust of experts), but in cases of combat use they even dropped to 27%. The latter circumstance is partly due to the fact that only residential blocks ¹⁸ were covered, and not the entire territory. In March 2014, the United States and Israel signed an agreement on the joint production of components for the Iron Dome.¹⁹

Another modification of the Arrow-3 missile, developed with the participation of the United States as part of the Upper Tier Interceptor missile defense system, is designed for trans-atmospheric interception and is highly maneuverable due to the use of an engine on the combat unit. In fact, this system is similar in characteristics to the American THAAD, and at first the US Department of Defense and the Lockheed developer firm persistently offered Israel to buy a ready-made complex. However, in the future, an agreement was reached on the production of Israeli Arrow-3 in the United States. It was expected that the first Intercept Upper Layer missile defense system would be deployed in 2015, however, according to Israeli media, several Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 tests in 2014 failed ²⁰.

The latest missile defense system "David's Sling System" (David's Sling System) was the product of a joint development with the United States, which began in 2008. It is equipped with a joint US-Israeli Stunner anti-missile system and is designed to intercept Qassam missiles, Grad rockets, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles at a longer range - from 40 to 300 km, complementing the capabilities of the Iron Dome. But, first of all, the David Sling is designed to intercept the latest Iskander-type ballistic missiles. This system passed the first successful tests in 2012-2013 and in April 2015, and it is planned to be put on combat duty in 2016.

The capabilities of Israel's missile defense systems are significantly enhanced due to the fact that the United States handed over to its ally a powerful AN/TPY-2 long-range radar, which is connected to the network of American satellites and the global missile defense control system. The radar is located in the southern part of the Negev Desert and is serviced by US military personnel. It remains the property of the United States and is effectively part of the American armed forces stationed in Israel.²¹

Israel's ultimate goal is to create a four-tier missile defense system that reliably protects the territory (without taking into account the desert) from any missile attacks. The first level will be based on Arrow-2 anti-missile systems capable of destroying Iran's Shehab-3 missiles at transatmospheric altitudes, the second-on Arrow-3 missiles for interception at lower altitudes (up to 100 km), and the third and fourth levels will be provided by the David's Sling system (an alternative is the Magic Wand system) and Iron Dome-for destroying cruise missiles and long-range artillery rockets. In fact, the third and fourth levels of defense will simultaneously perform air defense tasks. All these elements are planned to be combined into a single missile defense system, connected not only with American and Israeli radars, but also with the US ²² satellite constellation.

The development of Israel's missile defense systems largely depends on continued financial and technological assistance from the United States (see Table 2).

Table 2

US assistance to Israel for the development and production of missile defense systems, $ million

Source: Sharp J. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. RL33222. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2014, p. 12.

In 2014, Israel received $3.1 billion in military aid from the United States alone. In addition, $235 million was allocated for the research, development and production of the Iron Dome, $149 million for the David's Sling program, and for the development of anti-missile systems.

Arrow-2 and 3 - about $119 million. However, the real volume of financial injections is even greater due to the actions of the pro-Israel lobby in the US Congress. In 2014 alone, the total amount received by Israel directly for missile defense development was brought by lobbyists to $620 million.

The US military budget for 2015 assumes continued close cooperation with Israel, although due to the economic crisis, the amount of funding is decreasing. Even so, Israel will be the recipient of approximately 55% of all US military assistance to all countries of the world. This aid provides 23-25% of Israel's annual military budget. Pro-Israel lobbyists want to" push through " an additional $317 million increase in funding to the $168 million planned by the US Congress for missile defense development.²³

There is some tension between the US and Israel over Israel's attempts to sell weapons and technology to third countries. It is known that Israeli-made missile defense systems are offered to India. China is even more interested: Over time, it begins to circumvent restrictions related to the export of technology or weapons systems. It is for this reason that in 2005, the United States suspended Israel from the project to develop a promising multi-purpose fighter JSF.

PROSPECTS FOR CREATING A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE PERSIAN GULF

In addition to Israel, the United States is negotiating missile defense cooperation with Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are concerned about the development of Iran's missile and nuclear programs. In addition to Iran itself, the growing influence of Shiite groups in the region poses a security threat to their allies, according to the United States. Among the Arab allies of the United States, the prevailing view is that Iran, despite reaching a compromise on curtailing its nuclear programs in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, may in the future abandon its obligations. In the field of Arab-American missile defense cooperation, the matter is still mainly reduced to the purchase of THAAD and Patriot-3 complexes. Specifically, two THAAD batteries will be deployed in the UAE on ²⁴.

In May 2015, at a meeting with representatives of Arab states at Camp David, Barack Obama announced his intention to increase not only arms sales in the future, but also the number of joint exercises. At the political level, the United States is discussing opportunities for missile defense cooperation mainly through the most authoritative regional organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council. ²⁵ President Barack Obama calls on its members to overcome serious internal differences in order to create a unified missile defense shield with the help of the United States, including not only air defense systems, but also early warning systems for missile attacks. Such an initiative was put forward back in 2013 by Charles Hagel, then the US Secretary of Defense.

But at the same time, Barack Obama finds himself in a difficult situation when increasing military supplies and further deepening cooperation with Arab allies in the field of missile defense run into resistance from the Republican majority in Congress, the pro-Israel lobby and ^the State of Israel26. Arab leaders, in turn, are waiting for Barack Obama to take concrete steps in the form of a binding security agreement on follow the example of the US-Japan agreements, not just the promises of protection.

The recent success of Western countries in resolving the Iranian nuclear program also creates a contradictory situation for Barack Obama. If the United States and Western Europe see Iran's "pacification" as a chance to stop the escalation of tension in the region, then, from the point of view of Saudi Arabia and other GCC members, the lifting of economic sanctions against Iran will strengthen the position of Shiites led by Iran and only destabilize the region. ²⁷ Moreover, under Shiite pressure, the integrity of Saudi Arabia itself will be threatened Saudi Arabia, which is trying to maintain its role as a regional leader as opposed to Iran. Thus, specific political agreements between the United States and Arab countries, which are required for deeper cooperation in the field of missile defense, have not yet been reached.

what's next?

The missile defense issue is becoming an important factor that threatens not only regional, but also global stability. The policy of the United States, which showed an initiative to withdraw from the ABM Treaty of 1972, which was not motivated by anything from the point of view of ensuring security, actually gave rise to a new arms race. It covers, on the one hand, an increasingly wide range of States, and on the other, it provokes competition in the quantity and quality of States ' nuclear missile capabilities, in the means of overcoming missile defense, in the creation of medium - and long-range ballistic missiles, high-precision weapons, as well as radar, optical surveillance and anti-satellite weapons.

The escalation of tension in the Middle East caused by the proliferation of missile defense systems is of little concern to the United States, since they are geographically far away. The creation and deployment of missile defense elements with their direct participation serves to strengthen their military-political cooperation with their allies. The US military-industrial complex is extremely interested in sales of missile defense systems, which receives long-term contracts for huge sums.

However, from the point of view of ensuring military security, it should be borne in mind that quite successful examples of using missile defense elements to protect against missile attacks, as can be observed in Israel, are not achievements that can "accumulate", increasing the security of this state. As in any competition between offensive and defensive weapons, the advantage is on different sides. And if we take into account the destructive potential of missile weapons, even in non-nuclear equipment, then the consequence of a further race will be large casualties of the population in the event of military conflicts.-

conflicts not only in the Middle East, but also in other regions of the world where missile defense systems are being created.

The creation of missile defense systems in the Middle East region, in which the United States is directly involved, changes the regional balance of power, directly undermines the existing nuclear nonproliferation regimes, the missile technology control regime, and the international code for preventing the proliferation of BR (which is already non-binding). Conversely, nonproliferation and verification regimes alone cannot be effective in creating missile defense systems in the Middle East, where wars are already raging. In any case, in the context of increasing the capabilities of missile defense systems, potential adversaries will strive to increase the effectiveness of missile weapons, which will lead to a decrease not only in regional, but also in international stability in general.

Apparently, a certain imbalance in the creation of missile defense systems in the Middle East will only grow in the future. Israel will rapidly continue to develop a layered missile defense system, and the Arab allies will clearly not receive comparable assistance from the United States, which will only aggravate, on the one hand, Arab-Israeli contradictions, and on the other, will lead to a deterioration in relations between the United States and its Arab allies led by Saudi Arabia. Intra-Arab relations will also become more complicated as sanctions are lifted against Iran, which is Saudi Arabia's main rival for influence in the region. This tangle of contradictions will be further confused by the planned delivery of Russian S-300 air defense systems to Iran.

* * *

Further proliferation of missile defense systems, which is actually taken out of the scope of international legal regulation, will contribute to the destabilization of the Middle East, as well as other regions of the world where the United States will offer "services" of this kind. In the interests of strengthening international and regional security, it is necessary sooner or later to return first to the bilateral negotiation process between the United States and Russia, which should then be transformed into a multilateral one. The ultimate goal of the negotiation process is to link the issue of missile defense to a more general set of issues, including the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, restrictions on the export of missile technologies and components, as well as means of aerospace attack.

^{Konyshev V. N.} 1, Sergunin A. A. [The New doctrine of Barack Obama and the National Interests of Russia]. 2012. N 14 (155), pp. 2-9. (Konyshev V. N., Sergunin A. A. 2012. Novaya doktrina Baraka Obamy i natsionalnye interesy Rossii // Natsionalnye interesy: prioritety i bezopasnost. N 14 (155) (in Russian)

² Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. Washington: Missile Defense Agency. 2011, p. 25.

³ ISIS fighters captured R-17 ballistic missiles (Scud) - http://milnews.ru/novosti/item/634-boeviki-igil-zahvatili-ballisticheskie-raketyi-r-17-scud.html

⁴ The threat - http://www.mda.mil/system/threat.html

⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Washington: Department of Defense. 2014, p. 35.

^{Friedman G.} 6 War and Bluff: Iran, Israel and the United States // Geopolitical Weekly. September 11, 2012.

^{Hildreth S.} 7 Iran's Ballistic Missile Program: An Overview. Report RS22758. Washington: Congressional Research Service. 2009, p. 4.

⁸ Nuclear proliferation: new technologies, weapons and treaties / Edited by A. Arbatov and V. Dvorkin, Moscow, 2009, p. 176. (2009. Yadernoye rasprostranenie: novye tehnologii, vooruzheniya i dogovory. M.) (in Russian)

^{Fitzpatrick M.} 9, Elleman M. Rocket threats of third countries / / Anti-missile defense: confrontation or cooperation / Edited by A. Arbatov and V. Dvorkin, Moscow, 2012, pp. 91-92.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 94-95.

^{Dvorkin V.} 11 Prospects of US missile defense cooperation/NATO and Russia / / Anti-missile Defense.., pp. 193-194. (Dvorkin V. 2012. Perspectivy protivoraketnogo sotrudnichestva // Protivoraketnaya oborona ... M.) (in Russian)

^{Fitzpatrick M.} 12, Elleman M. Edict op., p. 93.

^{Reedy E.} 13 The impact of missile defense on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons // Anti-missile Defense.., p. 253-254. (Ridi E. Vliyaniye PRO na nerasprostraneniye yadernogo oruzhiya // Protivoraketnaya oborona.., p. 253-254) (in Russian)

^{Kornilov A. A.} 14 Safety above all else. Concepts of Foreign policy and National security of the State of Israel. Nizhny Novgorod, NSU Publishing House, 2005 (Kornilov A. A. 2005. Bezopasnost prevyshe vsego. Kontseptsii vneshney politiki i bezopasnosti Izrailya. Nizhny Novgorod); Kornilov A. A. Debaty politikov i ekspertov gosudarstva Izrailya po voprosam natsional'noi bezopasnosti [Debates of politicians and experts of the State of Israel on national Security issues]. Series: International Relations. 2014, N 2, с. 64-74. (Kornilov A.A. 2014. Debaty politikov i ekspertov gosudarstva Izrail po voprosam natsionalnoy bezopasnosti // Vestnik RUDN. Seriya: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. N 2) (in Russian)

¹⁵ Israel's strategic defense program - http://www.defense-update.com/features/du-2-06/feature-ILmissiledefense.htm

¹⁶ See also: Degterev D. A., Stepkin E. A. Dynamic equilibrium. The role of the United States in Ensuring Israel's military superiority in the Middle East / / Asia and Africa Today. 2013. N 10, pp. 19-25. (Degterev D.A., Stepkin E.A. 2013. Dinamicheskoye ravnovesie. Rol SShA v obespechenii voennogo prevoskhodstva Izrailya na Blizhnem Vostoke // Aziya i Afrika Segodnya. N 10) (in Russian)

¹⁷ Israel's Arrow Theater Missile Defense - http://www.defen.seindustrydaily.com/israel-successfully-tests-arrow-theater-missile-defense-01571

¹⁸ Israel's mobile missile defense system: What is the Iron Dome? - http://globalnews.ca/news/1203882/israels-mobile-missile-defence-system-what-is-the-iron-dome

¹⁹ Vice-admiral J.Syring, USN Director, Missile Defense Agency, Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee. Wednesday, June 11, 2014, p. 23-24.

^{Sharp J.} 20 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. RL33222. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2014, p. 11; DoD admits failure of Hetz missile test - http://news.israelinfo.co.il/technology/55644

^{Sharp J.} 21 Op. cit.

²² Israel has developed a plan for a four-tier missile defense system - http://topwar.ru/print:page,1,5624-izrail-razrabotal-plan-sozdaniya-chetyrehurovnevoy-sistemy-protivoraketnoy-oborony.html

^{Sharp J.} 23 Op. cit., p. 5; Israel asks the US Congress for another $317 million for missile defense - http://news.israelinfo.co.il/technology/55699

²⁴ Vice-admiral J.Syring.., p. 24.

²⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.., 2014, p. 18.

^{Spetalnick M.} 26, Shalal A. Obama expected to push for Gulf missile defense at U.S. summit - http://news.yahoo.com/obama-expected-push-gulf-missile-defense-u-summit-051149657-finance.html

^{Mikhin V.} 27 The Persian Gulf region may be on the threshold of global change - http://ru.journal-neo.org/2015/05/23/region-persidskogo-zaliva-vozmozhno-na-poroge-global-ny-h-peremen

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