The Tibet Autonomous Region or Xi'zang is the second largest region in the People's Republic of China. It borders the provinces of Yunnan, Qinghai, Sichuan, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar (Burma). Tibet in the geographical and ethno-cultural sense is not limited only to the autonomous region. The provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan also have Tibetan autonomous entities (districts and counties). This region is of crucial importance both for the geopolitics of the PRC and for ensuring the progressive development of this country. In this context, it is particularly important that Tibet is a kind of "hydrodonor" of South and Southeast Asia. Most of the region's rivers originate in the Tibetan Plateau, including such major rivers as the Indus (flowing through India and Pakistan), the Brahmaputra (India and Bangladesh), the Mekong (Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia), the Hongha (Red River) (Vietnam), and the Salween (Thailand and Myanmar). These rivers play a very important role in the life of the states of the region. The Indus River, which flows for 400 km within Tibet¹, is the main source of water in Pakistan, Brahmaputra-in Bangladesh and in the eastern states of India, Mekong-all of Indochina, Salween-Myanmar and western Thailand, Hongha-north Vietnam. Within the borders of Southern Tibet, there are also sources of rivers that flow into the Ganges. In general, according to some sources, more than 85% of the Asian population, or about half of the world's population, uses water resources originating in Tibet (see [Water War..., 2003, p. 9]).

The use of the water resources of these rivers or the "threat of their use" may become one of the most effective levers in the hands of Beijing in the future, especially since the water needs of the countries of the region will grow quite rapidly. By the way, back in the 50s of the XX century. The use of the resources of such rivers as the Brahmaputra, Mekong, Salween, etc. has already been considered. [Druzhba, 6.05.1956, p. 2]. Using the levers of "hydro-pressure" will help convince the countries of the region of the inexpediency of actions that would threaten the vital interests of the PRC, and in some cases "hydro-policy" may be the only lever to achieve this ².

Keywords: Tibetan Plateau, hydropolitik, hydrodonor, water resources, water security.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TIBET IN ENSURING CHINA'S WATER SECURITY

The problem of ensuring water security is very relevant for the People's Republic of China and is one of the key components in the security system of this state. According to Chinese analysts, the positions of states are determined by-

¹ For more information about the rivers of Tibet, see, for example: [Yusov, 1958].

² See, in particular: [Babayan, 2003; Babayan, 2006 (1); Babayan, 2006(2), pp. 40-58].

They are determined on the basis of "comprehensive national strength"³. A narrow circle of strategic advisers developed this technique for Deng Xiaoping back in the 70s and 80s of the last century. Using this method, Chinese analysts measure the following four subsystems of state power:: 1) material or hard power (natural resources, economy, science and technology, and national defense); 2) moral power or weak power (politics, international relations, culture and education); 3) coordinated power structure coordinated power (organization of leadership, management, management and coordination of national development); 4) environmental power (international, natural/natural and local). At the same time, water security directly affects all these four subsystems. In March 2001, the then head of the Chinese state, Jiang Zemin, during a meeting of the CPC Central Committee in Beijing, said literally the following:: "Population control, resource management, and environmental protection will be the three most important (critical) issues on China's path to becoming a great power in the twenty-first century "[President on Population Control..., 2001].

Meanwhile, the People's Republic of China is experiencing serious water problems. Experts predict that water demand in China itself will increase dramatically by 2015. For example, in China as a whole, 1 - 2 thousand ^m3 of water per inhabitant will fall per year, which, according to world standards, is a very low indicator. Currently, China has a total water shortage of approximately 30 - 40 billion ^m3 per year. To improve the situation, 85,000 reservoirs have been built in China over the past 50 years, which has increased the average volume of water for complex use per capita from less than 200 ^m3 in 1949 to 430 ^m3 at the beginning of the 20th century. XXI century [Lack of water resources..., 2002]. In 2010 alone, the Chinese central government invested $ 11.7 billion in water conservation and accumulation. In general, 6240 reservoirs should be upgraded by 2013, although this figure still does not exceed 2 thousand [China to boost..., 2010].

In countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia, this indicator, according to some data, will be equal to 2-10 thousand, which is an average indicator (see: [Comprehensive Assessment..., 1997]). At the same time, all of northern China, most of India, and all of Pakistan will experience a physical shortage of water, while southern China, along with all of Indochina, will experience an industrial shortage of water. So, by 2015, India and Pakistan will have 1,000 ^m3 of water per person per year, which, by international standards, is considered catastrophically low.

Chinese experts warn that by 2030, when the country's population will reach 1.6 billion. water resources per capita will amount to 1,760 ^m3, while according to international standards, the lower limit of water scarcity is 1,700 ^m3. According to Li Rui, Director of the Institute of Land Resources Protection of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, water consumption in China will reach a peak by 2030, and if effective measures are not taken, the country will face a serious crisis in this area in the future [China Warned..., 2002].

Already, some of the country's largest waterways are experiencing significant problems. For example, near its mouth, the width of one of the largest rivers in China, the Yellow River, decreases to 100 m, and the depth-even to a couple of tens of centimeters. For 10 years now, navigation of large vessels has been impossible in the lower reaches of the river. The main reason is too little water. If in 1980. The Yellow River annually brought to the mouth up to 30-40 billion rubles. ^m3 of water, but now it is only 7 billion cubic meters. m ³ [Volkov, 2001, p. 6]. The same Yellow River dried up several times over 700 km in the early 1990s [Chinese River..., 2000]. And in Hubei Province, known as the Thousand Lakes Province, 850 lakes have already dried up, and the area of Dongting Lake, the second largest freshwater reservoir in China, has shrunk by 2.3 thousand square kilometers over the past half-century.

³ See, for example: Military Power..., 2000 (in particular: I. Objectives of the Great Chinese Strategy, Security Strategy, and Military Strategy; A. The Great Chinese Strategy).

[China's Water Shortage..., 2001]. Acute water problems have a negative impact primarily on agriculture. And this directly violates the policy of self-reliance, especially in such a strategically important component as food security.

Threatening trends are also emerging in other areas. Thus, 51 million people, over 4.3 million hectares of farmland and 11 million head of livestock were affected by the drought that began in autumn 2009 and lasted until spring 2010 [Dought continues..., 2010]. The situation was particularly severe in the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. In Yunnan Province, which ranks third in China in terms of water availability, about one-third of the 45 million population experienced an acute shortage of drinking water (see [Water crisis..., 2010; Drought continues..., 2010]). In Guangxi, 12 out of 14 cities faced a serious shortage of drinking water, while in Guizhou, 86 out of 88 cities and counties were left without drinking water [Dought continues..., 2010]. Overall, droughts in 2009-2010 affected more than 38% of China's territory [Report warns ..., 2010].

The situation is further compounded by the fact that water scarcity and climate change are projected to increase over time. So, a number of experts believe that due to global warming, the area of glaciers in western China will decrease by a third by 2050, which, according to the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, may lead to a drop in crop production by 5-10% by 2030, as a result of which, first of all, rice, wheat and other crops will fall. other cereals [Global warming..., 2010]. The Academy believes that if current trends continue, the situation in general may become even more acute by 2050. In such regions as the Ningxia-Hui, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regions, Gansu and Qinghai provinces, the volume of river flow may decrease by 20-40% [Report warns..., 2010].

At the same time, against the background of all this, the PRC will have to use water resources more intensively on its territory, but at the same time it must do everything possible to improve the water consumption system. Jiang Zemin, as the head of China, explicitly emphasized the importance of improving the regulation of China's scarce water resources and the further implementation of irrigation projects [Jiang stresses..., 2002]. But in addition to the use of water for agricultural purposes and for domestic needs, the production of electricity from hydroelectric power plants will also increase in the People's Republic of China in the coming decades. In 2005, hydroelectric power accounted for about 24% of the total volume of electricity produced in China, and this is despite the fact that today only less than a quarter of the country's total hydropower potential is used. It is planned that by 2015 it will account for up to 35-40% of the electricity produced in China [Socio-economic Geography..., 1998, p. 514].

To a large extent, the increase in water consumption is due to a rather high degree of river pollution in the PRC and a weak water treatment system. So, more than 70% of rivers and 75% of lakes in China are polluted. According to the Environmental Protection Agency of the People's Republic of China, over the past 50 years, about 1,000 lakes have disappeared in the country, i.e. an average of 20 lakes disappear every year [1000 lakes..., 2006]. The situation is aggravated by the low efficiency of the water treatment system in China, which averages 20%. This is also largely responsible for the contamination of arable land. In the PRC, about 10 million hectares of arable land, or more than 10% of all cultivated farmland, are polluted, and the vast majority of polluted farmland is located in economically developed regions of the country [10 mln hectares..., 2006].

Against this background, the words of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao that the lack of water resources threatens the very existence of the Chinese nation become extremely clear [Ramachandran Sudha, 2008]. And former Minister of Water Resources Wang Shucheng said that the challenge that China must meet is to fight for every drop of water-or die (Chellaney Brahma, 2008). In addition, the lack of water resources causes conflicts and unrest within the country, especially in rural areas. Even the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China in the late 1990s classified the riots in rural areas as one of the most serious

threats in the country. For example, from 1970 to the end of the 1990s, the number of environmental disputes in China, including over water, reached 278, of which 47 led to protests, sabotage, and mass riots [Jing Jun, 2000, p. 144]. In 2000, Shandong Province experienced two days of riots and clashes between police and farmers over attempts by the authorities to end illegal water use. As a result, one policeman was killed and more than 100 people were injured. And in Lunin (Guangdong Province), it got to the point that residents used explosives to protect water entering rice fields.

The Chinese authorities are doing everything possible to solve the water problem, putting special emphasis on improving the efficiency of water consumption. Today, more than 200 million rural residents face a shortage of drinking water, more than 15 million hectares of cultivated land, or 13% of all farmland, are affected by drought every year, and the country is experiencing an annual shortage of $ 40 billion. ^m3 of water [ibid.]. The specificity of China's water resources lies in their uneven distribution over the country's territory, in which the northern regions of the country experience an acute shortage of water, while the situation in the south is relatively favorable from this point of view. The territories located south of the Yangtze River, which make up 36.5% of the total territory of the People's Republic of China, account for 80.9% of the country's water resources, while the territories located north of the river, which make up 63.5% of China's territory, account for only 19.1% of the state's water resources [China Warned..., 2002]. The severity of the problem of water scarcity in the northern regions of China is quite clearly shown by statistics.

Thus, the total area of the Yellow River, Haihe and Huaihe River valleys is 13.4% of the total territory of the country. These three valleys account for 39% of China's arable land, 35% of its population, and 32% of its GDP, while water resources there account for only 7.7% of China's total water resources, and the amount of water per capita is 500 ^m3 [ibid.]. This figure is the lowest in China. However, the water imbalance between China's north and south, especially due to global warming and economic activity, is projected to increase over time.

Due to the lack of water, the Chinese government is undertaking a grandiose project to transfer the waters of the southern rivers to the north, where the key role is assigned to Tibet. The cost of this project is estimated at several billion dollars. By the way, back in 2000, the current Premier of the People's Republic of China, Wen Jiabao, stated that in the twenty-first century, the construction of large dams will play a key role in developing and exploiting water resources in China, controlling floods and droughts, and ensuring economic development and modernization of the country (Mcelroy, 2000). Over the next 5-10 years, the Chinese government will invest $ 18.65 billion. only for the first stage of river transfer [China's Massive..., 2002]. In 2009, China invested $ 3.11 billion in the project. [China to pump..., 2009]. The essence of this project is that the three main main channels - east, middle and west - and their numerous branches will connect the Yellow River, Yangtze, Huaihe and Haihe Rivers, and the northern regions of the country will consistently receive the water they need. It will take 40 to 50 years for the project to be fully completed. If it is successfully implemented, the amount of water that will be transferred to the Yellow River will quadruple the flow of the Yellow River.

One of the pioneers and active supporters of the transfer of rivers from Tibet is a former officer of the People's Liberation Army of China, Li Lin. But Guo Kai, an employee of the Ministry of Water Resources Conservation, first voiced the idea of this project, calling it the "Great Western Road". After the construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway was completed, he even offered to use the 230,000 employees employed in this construction project in the construction of canals for the transfer of Tibetan rivers. The idea was supported by the then Head of the People's Republic of China Jiang Zemin, who signed a corresponding memorandum on May 24, 1998. This idea was supported by many couples-

Chinese leaders, including the Patriarch of Chinese Reforms Deng Xiaoping. Army circles expressed particular support for the idea of transferring rivers from Tibet.

The project is indeed of strategic importance for China. According to Li Keqiang, Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China and director of the project for transferring the waters of southern rivers to the north, this project directly affects the prospects for the development of the Chinese nation in the long term [Chinese Vice Premier..., 2010]. It is obvious that Tibet in this context is of strategic importance for the People's Republic of China. Without this region, it will not be able to ensure one of the most important components of its security system - environmental and its key component - water security.

TIBETAN FOOTHOLD OF CHINESE HYDRO POLICY

Tibet is also one of the most effective springboards for implementing hydro policy in South and Southeast Asia. Hydro policy, although it can be very effective, but when resorting to it, Beijing should pursue a fairly well-thought-out policy, given that issues related to the use of water resources, especially in the above-mentioned regions of the Eurasian continent, can lead to destabilization. Often the reason for this is the balance of power between States located in the upper and lower reaches of a particular waterway.

According to the Homer-Dixon hypothesis, for example, the relationship between states located in the upper and lower reaches of a river can be stable if the state located in the upper reaches is politically dominant. The probability of competition and attempts to revise the distribution of water appears when the degree of dependence of the state located in the lower course on the resources of this waterway is too high and it is more powerful than the state in the upper course. This circumstance becomes especially dangerous if the state located in the lower reaches is also confident that it has sufficient military potential to change the situation [Homer-Dixon, 1995, p. 158-159].

Hydro policy in Indochina

The Mekong River can play a key role in China's hydro policy towards Indochina. The Mekong is one of the largest rivers in the world and the largest river in southern China and Indochina. The river flows through the territory of the People's Republic of China for about 2000 km, which is almost half of its length. This is what makes the Mekong a very effective means of hydro policy in the hands of Beijing. However, the Mekong will not only be a lever of influence, but also a kind of link between the PRC and the ASEAN countries. Back in 2001, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, while on a visit to Hanoi, pointed out the development of the Mekong River Basin among the five main areas that China's cooperation with ASEAN countries should focus on [FM Calls..., 2001].

China's hydro-political strategy for the Mekong is, inter alia, to use the waters of the Mekong and its tributaries for irrigation and electricity generation. According to some Chinese estimates, the hydropower potential of the upper Mekong basin is more than 20 MW, with a total reservoir capacity of 35 billion cubic meters. м³ [Hiroshi Hon, 1993, p. 112 - 113]. According to China's plans, 15 dams are projected to be built on the Mekong River within the PRC. Beijing has already begun construction of a number of large hydroelectric power stations in the south of the country. Of particular note is the 4.2 MW Xiaowang HPP, which will be built in the middle reaches of the Lancang River. Two large hydroelectric power plants are also under construction at Manwan and Dachaoshan, with an average annual output of almost 9 GWh. The construction of the Xiaowan hydroelectric power station also provides for the construction of

dams and reservoirs with a volume of 15 billion ^m3. In addition to using the Mekong's water resources to generate electricity, the waters of this river and its tributaries can also be used for irrigation purposes, especially since China is developing grandiose projects to transfer the waters of rivers in the south of the country to the northern regions. One day, the waters of the Mekong may also be used for this, although it is possible to use the river's water resources more intensively to compensate the southern regions for the transfer of rivers to the north. Naturally, all this will affect the countries of the Indochina Peninsula, for which the Mekong is the largest source of water.

For a more visual representation of the importance of the Mekong, it is enough to consider only the following data. So, the share of the north-eastern region of Thailand, located in the Mekong basin, accounts for about half of the country's arable land. However, this region is the poorest region in Thailand, the main reason for which, and the authorities do not hide it, is the lack of water. In early 2009, due to a lack of water in the northern provinces of the country, conflicts broke out between residents of settlements located in the upper and lower reaches of the Mekong and other rivers. At that time, more than 4.6 thousand villages in the northern regions of Thailand were affected by drought [Officials fear clashes..., 2009]. The Mekong Delta is one of Vietnam's most important agricultural regions, home to more than 15 million people and accounting for up to half of the country's gross rice harvest. The Mekong River basin is also Cambodia's most important economic area. 70% of the country's total animal protein needs are met by inland waters, the most important source of which is the Mekong River [ibid., p. 202].

The importance of this river for the countries of the region will steadily grow. For example, Thailand, according to some estimates, will need an additional 1,000 MW of electricity annually, but it has limited hydropower resources, and local reserves of energy raw materials-brown coal and natural gas-will be depleted in the near future. Meanwhile, the Mekong has the potential to meet the needs of countries in the region, in particular for electricity. Every year, on average, more than 475,000 million ^m3 of its water flows almost unused into the sea. If these resources are used for electricity generation, it would be possible to produce 500 thousand GW of electricity annually, which would be enough to meet the needs of all the countries of the river basin for decades to come.⁴

All this once again shows the key role of the Mekong River in China's hydro policy. However, as mentioned above, China alone is not able to maximize the effect of hydro policy on the Mekong. However, although the river flows almost half of its way within the PRC, due to climatic features, ^3/4 of its annual flow is accounted for by monsoons in the lower basin, located in Indochina, and only ^1/4 - in the upper basin, located in China. At the same time, while the Mekong River's runoff is 1,764 ^m3/s in the dry season, it reaches 52,000 ^m3/s in the monsoon season. [Elhance, 1999, p. 194]. It is clear that in this case, Beijing's hydro policy in relation to the Mekong will be seasonally effective. China can maximize the results of hydro-pressing in the Mekong basin countries only during the dry season. During the monsoon rains, this policy will not have the maximum effect. But still, the possibility of manipulating 25% of the annual runoff, especially during several months of the dry season, cannot be underestimated. Even now, when Beijing has not yet begun to make intensive use of the Mekong River, environmental organizations claim that dams already built on the Mekong River within the PRC have significantly reduced the water level in the river (Kanittha Inchukul and Khon Kaen, 1997).

The most tense situation with China's use of Mekong water resources was in the spring of 2010. In March 2010, the Mekong River Commission (MEPC)⁵ implemented-

⁴ For more detailed information, see Preparing For A New Challenge..., 1991].

⁵ For more information about this structure, see: http://www.mrcmekong.org/ (official website of The Mekong River Commission).

It is the first time that the regional program for flood control and its consequences has sent an official letter to China in connection with a sharp drop in the river level and with a proposal to work together to overcome this situation [McCartan, 2010]. The biggest dissatisfaction was expressed by Thailand, which appealed to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to exert diplomatic pressure on Beijing to improve the situation. The Bangkok Post, a Thai newspaper, published an article with the following content: "China fails the neighborhood test by not responding to the demands of its closest neighbors, who have been hit hardest by the Mekong River shallowing crisis. The current shallowing is the worst in the memory of at least a whole generation of people. And this is not a new question. The problem of negative consequences of China's activities on the Mekong River has been discussed in the region for at least ten years - ever since the implementation of the Chinese power plant cascade project began" [Neighboring countries blame..., 2010]. Laos also experienced serious water problems during this period.

The Chinese side expressed its objections, explaining the current situation with the aforementioned drought. A number of scientists and experts, including Chinese ones, although they agreed with the arguments about natural causes, said that the drought itself is the result of human activity and the inefficiency of the environmental protection system. This opinion, in particular, was expressed by Ma Jun, a well-known Chinese expert on environmental issues, director of the Chinese Institute of Society and Environmental Problems [Lam Willy, 2010, p. 3]. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that Beijing always takes a responsible position in the use of Mekong resources and takes into account the concerns of countries located in the lower reaches of the river [China responsible..., 2010].

However, in order to fully "keep the initiative in their hands" in the field of hydro policy on the Mekong, the People's Republic of China must establish very close relations with Laos - a state that can rightly be called the key to the Mekong. The state that will have the strongest influence on Laos, and will be the most influential in all of Indochina. And not only China, but also Vietnam and Thailand will strive for this, especially since Laos is "pinned down" by larger states in terms of population, territory and military potential. Interest in Laos is not accidental. This country is of strategic importance due to the fact that about half of the enormous hydropower potential of the entire Mekong River basin is located either within Laos or on its borders [Elhance, 1999, p. 198].

China's policy towards Laos is very cautious, and military methods are practically excluded here. Perhaps, in this case, a precedent will arise in world politics of a kind of "honey" policy, when large states will try to strengthen their positions in a weaker state solely by offering it relatively better conditions, giving it the right to make its own choice. After all, any careless policy will automatically affect the political orientation of Vientiane. In the mid-1990s, an agreement was reached between Bangkok and Vientiane to build more than 50 dams in Laos over the next 25 years to meet Thailand's growing electricity needs [Seminar on Environment..., 1996]. Relations between Laos and Vietnam are also developing dynamically. In general, Thailand and Vietnam are currently one of the main trading partners of Laos. Suffice it to say that 95% of all necessary goods are imported to Laos through the border with Thailand.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is actively trying to change the current situation in its favor, especially since there are all the prerequisites for this. In particular, the shortest access to the sea for Laos passes through the territory of Vietnam. Taking this fact into account, Vietnam and Laos signed a number of agreements on the construction and reconstruction of transport highways. A special place here is occupied by

Agreement on cooperation in the field of land transport. The ultimate goal of the agreement is to reconstruct the routes leading to ten border crossing points between Laos and Vietnam, so that by 2010 ports in central Vietnam will be accessible to Laos. This will be a major factor in strengthening Vietnam's position in Laos. The Asian Highway, which will connect the two countries ' transport systems, will also play an important role in deepening economic cooperation between China and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. It is likely that the PRC will create a duty-free industrial zone with Laos, similar to the one that Beijing agreed to create with Bangkok in the northern region of Thailand.

Beijing's hydro policy towards the Indochina Peninsula countries will not be limited to the Mekong alone. As already noted, in China, such large rivers as the Yuanjiang or Hongkha (Red River), Salween, Black River, as well as many other medium and small rivers originate. They will also be involved in the hydro policy, if possible. After the Mekong, the Red River, which originates in China and then flows through Vietnam, flowing into the South China Sea, will play a special role in hydro policy. The importance of the Red River lies in the fact that it plays a very important role in the economy of one of the main regional rivals of the PRC. In addition, in this case, Beijing's hydro policy will not depend on any third state, and China will act directly on its own.

The effectiveness of the use of hydro policy in relation to Vietnam is due to the high share of agriculture in the country's economy. 70% of the gross product of the Vietnamese countryside is accounted for by agriculture, of which 80% is accounted for by subsistence farming [Viet Nam steps up..., 2002]. At the same time, the Red River basin is one of the main agricultural regions of the country and the main source of water in the northern regions of Vietnam. The Red River is the main source of water for 28 million people. The river's resource requirements are increasing annually and now amount to 25.8 billion rubles. ^m3 per year [Do Quyen, 2001]. The Red River Delta is the leading agricultural productivity area in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The annual productivity of the Red River Delta is 2.5 t / ha, while the productivity of the Mekong Delta is 1 t / ha. In addition, since 1986, production in the river basin has increased by 5.3% per year, and the gross grain harvest-by 5.4% [ibid.]. Given that ensuring food security is a top priority for Vietnam, as well as for China, the use of China's hydraulic levers in key regions of ensuring food security for Vietnam will be a very effective mechanism.

Hydro policy towards India

The Indian direction of Chinese geopolitics is one of its most key vectors. India is not only a neighbor of China, but also a geopolitical rival of the Middle Kingdom. The relationship between these two Asian giants is developing quite specifically. On the one hand, there is a positive trend in the growth of trade and economic relations. Thus, between 1990 and 1995, the volume of Sino-Indian trade increased 30-fold, and in 2001, the volume of Chinese-Indian trade increased 30-fold. it totaled $2.7 billion. In 2007, the trade turnover reached $ 38.7 billion, which is 33 times higher than in 1995 [China, India vow..., 2008]. In 2008, the trade turnover between the two countries reached almost $52 billion. [India-ChinaTrade..., 2009]. Interesting, but the 20 billion mark. dol. Both countries planned to reach this goal only in 2008. By January 1, 2011, the parties planned to bring the volume of bilateral trade to more than $60 billion. [India aims to double..., 2010]. On the other hand, both China and India are great powers whose interests often overlap, sometimes causing serious friction.

In this context, I would like to cite a number of interesting data contained in the yearbook "Defense of India-2009" [Indian Defense Yearbook 2009, p. 57-58], which was presented on February 11, 2009 by the Minister of Defense of India. According to this document, over the past three years, about 400 incidents have occurred along the entire length of the India-China border.,

related to the violation of the state border. The Indian side claims that China continues to claim the Indian region of Arunachal Pradesh, and also unexpectedly laid claim to a piece of territory in Northern Sikkim, known as the "finger zone". The yearbook also points out that Tibet is a central aspect of the Indo-Chinese rivalry for dominance in Asia. The" occupation of Tibet " by China, as stated in the document, caused an asymmetry between the two countries, enabled China to exert geostrategic influence over a large area in South Asia and was a challenge to Indian dominance in the region. In addition, the loss of Tibet as a buffer zone has had a negative impact on the security of India's northern borders. All these rather harsh formulations, of course, in some sense reflect the real level of relations and strategic perception of China on the part of India.

The issue of Tibet is one of the main factors of tension in relations between the two countries. As you know, it is in India that the Tibetan government in exile is located. Tibetans settled in the city of Dharamsala, often also called little Lhasa, located in the north of the state of Himachal Pradesh. It was from there that the 14th Dalai Lama led the movement for the liberation of Tibet. According to him, thanks to the generosity of the host countries, especially India, Tibetans have the opportunity to live freely and without fear (see [The Statement of..., 2009]). Even the Dalai Lama's statements about the future of Tibet are very sensitive to Beijing. On March 10, 2009, the spiritual leader of Tibet in exile issued a statement calling for all Tibetans to unite under a single autonomous administration. In China, this is understood as a claim not only to the Tibet Autonomous Region, but also to the provinces of Qinghai, part of the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu (Fu Shuangqi, 2009). The above statement certainly caused a storm of indignation in China.

In general, in Tibet and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China has certain claims to, there is an intensive build-up of military capabilities on both sides and numerous cases of border violations. So, in 2008 alone, according to Indian military sources, 270 cases of border violations and 2,300 cases of aggressive patrolling were registered, and a number of Indian analysts even consider the Sino-Indian border more "hot" than the Indian-Pakistani one. Arunachal Pradesh stands out in this context. The Indian authorities intend to deploy an additional two divisions with a total number of 50-60 thousand people in the next few years, bringing the total number of Indian troops in the state to about 120 thousand [Joshi Saurabh, 2009]. Beijing is somewhat irritated by the fact that the Indian Army has special forces consisting of ethnic Tibetans, and in Arunachal Pradesh, the border with China is also patrolled by soldiers of the Indo-Tibetan border Police (Bhardwaj Priyanka, 2009).

However, tensions between the two countries are not limited to security issues. In March 2008, China blocked a $2.9 billion loan from the Asian Development Bank to India, because $60 million of this amount was supposed to be used for flood control projects in Arunachal Pradesh (Wong, 2009). Moreover, in response to India's policy towards Tibet, in May 2009, China began issuing Kashmiri residents Chinese visas that differ from those issued to Indian citizens [Hussain Altaf, 2009]. There is also information that tourists visiting Tibet are issued maps that list Kashmir as a separate entity (Ramachandran Sudha, 2009).

However, Sino-Indian relations do not lie exclusively in the plane of relations between these two countries. They are also of critical geopolitical importance to other countries, particularly the United States. The United States ' interests in creating a strategically stable Asia and its interest in the future-

trade, including through vital sea routes in the Indian Ocean, requires close ties with India. However, in its relations with Delhi, Washington does not intend to limit itself to Asia. In 2002, U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackville stated that the United States would help India meet global challenges [US to Have Sustained..., 2002]. At the same time, special attention will be paid to the fight against terrorism. "The Indian Navy could play a big role in the fight against terrorism, and the US Navy could learn a lot from its Indian counterparts," Vice Admiral and Commander of the US 7th Fleet James Metzger said in the same year [Indo-US Navies..., 2002]. Meanwhile, the scope of the fight against terrorism, especially with the use of the Navy, is very stretched and can mean anything. And during Barack Obama's visit to New Delhi, the head of the United States at a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister said that cooperation between the United States and India is a necessary condition for responding to modern challenges - from the fight against terrorism to the observance of human rights. Without this cooperation, none of these issues can be resolved, according to Obama. And speaking in the country's parliament, the American president called India a global leader [Remarks by the President..., 2010]. It is clear that all this causes a corresponding reaction in Beijing and China should have effective means of counteraction in its reserve. In the arsenal of such tools, a special place can be given to hydro policy.

India's water resources and the most suitable points for hydrodressing

The bulk of India's water resources are concentrated in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river system, which accounts for about 60% of the country's total water potential (see: [Water Resources of India...]). At the same time, as in the case of China, India's water resources are very unevenly distributed throughout the country. For example, if the national average of water resources per capita is 2,208 ^m3, then in the Brahmaputra and Baraka basins, this figure is 16,589 ^m3. Although the Brahmaputra and Barak River basins account for only 7.3% of the country's territory and 4.2% of the population, 31% of the country's water resources are concentrated here [ibid.].

The specific nature of the water resources of the Republic of India is that the main waterways either originate directly outside the country, or they are fed by tributaries originating outside its borders. At the same time, some major rivers, in particular the same Brahmaputra and Indus, originate in the territory of one of India's key rivals - China. The Brahmaputra flows most of its way through the territory of the People's Republic of China. As already noted, its basin accounts for a third of India's water resources. The importance of Brahmaputra for the Indian economy will increase significantly every year. It is no coincidence that the river system of this particular river is recognized in India as the most important water basin in the country in terms of hydro potential.

The water resources of the Brahmaputra are important for both agriculture and electricity generation. Like the PRC, India has plans to transfer water resources from the Brahmaputra River basin to the water-starved Ganges River basin. To do this, Delhi proposes to build a 300-kilometer canal through the territory of Bangladesh. But here there are concerns from Bangladesh, which are based on the fact that the construction of this channel will need to relocate a significant part of the population. This will cause serious social and environmental problems, as well as political ones, as the canal can be used to navigate from one part of India to another [Sustainable Development...]. In response to the Indian proposal, Bangladesh is proposing an alternative project that involves the construction of a series of reservoirs and dams in India and Nepal. This will not only generate electricity, but also enable Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet to reach the sea through shipping channels. However, India is not particularly interested in this project. It seems that Bangladesh will play an important role in China's hydro policy towards India. By strengthening its influence in this country, Beijing will actually be able to create a kind of "hydroprint" around India. At the same time, Bangladesh, being very vulnerable

On the part of India on the issue of water resources (about 94% of Bangladesh's land-based water resources originate outside the country, most of which originate in India [Elhance, 1999, p. 158]), it may even be interested in cooperation with China, primarily in order to create parity with the United States. India, especially since Delhi's policy towards Dhaka on the issue of water resources leaves much to be desired.

Here, the interests of Delhi and Beijing may clash, and for the latter, the Brahmaputra will be of crucial importance not only as a potential tool in hydro policy, but also as a means of meeting their own water needs. The waters of the Brahmaputra can be used for the needs of the north-western parts of the PRC (where, in particular, the Gobi Desert is located), which occupy almost half of the country's territory, having only 7% of water resources. A number of Chinese engineers propose, in particular, to transfer the waters of the Brahmaputra River here as measures to improve the water situation in this region. To do this, you need to break a tunnel 20 km long through mountain ranges. During a meeting at the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics in Beijing in December 1995, Chinese engineers stressed that it would be almost impossible to do this by conventional means, but it is quite feasible through explosive work using nuclear explosions [Horgan, 1996]. If this project is implemented, the countries lying in the lower Brahmaputra basin will experience serious water problems, especially during the dry season.

Brahmaputra also has significant hydropower potential, which is of great interest to meet the growing needs of the Republic of India. Meanwhile, the hydroelectric potential of the Brahmaputra is practically not used: in the early 1990s, for example, India used only 1% of it [Verghese, 1990, p. 180]. But here, too, it may clash with China's hydro policy. The fact is that Tibet is the most suitable place for generating electricity on the Brahmaputra. Here is the so-called U-shaped bend of the Brahmaputra, located near the border with India. This bend has been exciting the imagination of engineers for many years as potentially the largest source of hydroelectric power in the world. Preliminary research by the Japanese firm Electric Power Development Company showed that the construction of 11 large dams in Tibet will allow exporting a huge amount of electricity to India - 70 thousand tons. MWh [Elhance, 1999, p. 164].

Of particular interest is the construction of the colossal 3,260-meter-high Jiangmu Dam in Tibet's Shan'an Prefecture, which will be one of the largest in the world; Beijing unveiled the project in April 2010. In terms of its power, it will surpass the giant dam "Three Gorges"several times. Four other dams will also be built here. Construction of the dam officially started on November 12, 2010, and according to the plan, the first unit will be put into operation in 2014 [China economic news..., 2010].

Plans to build these dams have raised serious concerns in India [China builds world's highest dam..., 2010]. In response to India's concern that the Jiangmu Dam may negatively affect the implementation of the strategically important National River Connection Project for India, which aims to transfer the waters of northern rivers to the southern regions of the country, the Chinese side responds that the implementation of this project will in no way have a negative impact on India (see: [China economic news..., 2010; Malhotra Pia, 2010]). Moreover, the Chinese side claims that this project is beneficial to the whole world. According to Zhang Boting, deputy director of the Chinese Society of Hydroelectric Engineering, since the production of hydroelectric power at this dam will save 200 million tons of coal annually and, consequently, will have a great environmental impact, the Chinese side cannot abandon this project [Watts, 2010].

These arguments do not always satisfy the Indian side. For example, in November 2008, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that during his visit to Beijing, he was under pressure to-

The question of rivers flowing out of Tibet was raised [Beware Of Water Wars, 2008]. Already, water shortages in the Ganges and Brahmaputra are affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people in both India and Bangladesh. Water problems, for example, cause migration of people from Bangladesh to India, which has already changed the demographic situation in some parts of the Indian state of Assam and caused ethnic conflicts there [Ramachandran Sudha, 2008]. Even failures and accidents in irrigation systems directly affect downstream countries and regions. The situation is aggravated by the fact that there are no official agreements between China and India on the use of international rivers.

It is interesting that it is not only India that makes claims to China regarding the use of water resources. Often the opposite is true. Thus, Beijing strongly discourages India from building dams on rivers in the border areas. This is especially true for the Arunachal Pradesh Dam and power plant project in the upper reaches of the Yarlung Zanbo or Siang River, which will generate 11 MWh of electricity. The first phase of this project started in December 2003. Taking into account that the planned reservoir will also cross the border of the PRC, the Chinese authorities have stated that they do not intend to flood farmland in Tibet [Wang Weiluo, 2006, p. 1].

However, not everyone in India believes that China's exploitation of the Brahmaputra's resources is a threat. For example, Indian Home Minister S. Krishna stated in April 2010 that China's construction of the Brahmaputra dam would not have a negative impact on India [Chinese dam will not impact..., 2010]. A similar opinion was expressed by the Minister of Water Resources of India P. Banzal. In his opinion, the Indian side has no right to claim the waters of the Brahmaputra located within the territory of China, and the only thing that concerns India is the preservation of the flow of 79 billion rubles to its borders. ^m3 of water from the river [India downplays..., 2009]. In addition, in April 2010, China and India signed an agreement to provide each other with hydrological data on the Brahmaputra, especially during the monsoon period (Tiwari Ravish, 2010).

Nevertheless, the exploitation of the Brahmaputra's water resources, the transfer of its waters, and the construction of power plants there can be a very effective tool in Beijing's hands, allowing it to influence such a vulnerable place for Delhi as energy security. As indicated in the annual report of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of India, the availability and possibility of using energy resources is of vital importance for this country, since the overall development of the state depends on it [Annual Reports 2000-2001, p. 16].

Achieving the maximum effect of China's hydro policy towards India will not be possible without involving the Kingdom of Nepal in it. In terms of its importance in the PRC's hydro policy towards India, this state is comparable to Laos in Indochina. Nepal is the key to India's water resources. It is no coincidence that in the already mentioned annual report of the Ministry of Defense of India, Nepal is mentioned in the very first paragraph as one of the main sources of energy among the ways to ensure the country's energy security [ibid.]. China's involvement of Nepal in the hydro policy in relation to India will allow first of all to exert a strong influence on the main river of India - the Ganges, which, in addition to its huge economic significance, is also a cult object for India. Many tributaries originating in Nepal and Tibet account for 45% of the Ganges River flow (Elhance, 1999, p. 156). This circumstance deserves that the PRC should make every effort to establish itself in Nepal, especially since most of the unused and suitable for the construction of large water intake structures in the Ganges River basin today are located either within Nepal or on its borders.

Meanwhile, every year the economic importance of the Ganges will increase both for India's agriculture and for the country's energy sector. Even using only 5% of the total river flow

For example, in the dry season, it is possible to meet the water demand of the territories lying in the lower reaches of the river [Sustainable Development...], but, of course, this is possible only if appropriate water barriers are built. As for the energy sector, India has used only 12% of the hydroelectric potential of the Ganges River since the early 1990s [Verghese, 1990, p. 180].

What kind of policy should the PRC follow to strengthen its position in Nepal? Beijing's policy in this direction has undergone drastic changes in recent decades. Previously, China largely relied on the political component. For example, he tried to establish military cooperation with Nepal, which was very successfully blocked by India. Thus, in 1989, in response to Nepal's purchase of weapons from China, India blocked Nepal's access to the sea. However, Beijing understood that with its geographical location and almost complete dependence on India for communications, Kathmandu was unlikely to be ready to take steps that were contrary to Delhi's interests. Therefore, the Chinese have repeatedly offered Nepal access to Pakistan through the territory of Tibet. This would, firstly, deprive India of its monopoly on providing Nepal with access to the sea, and secondly, it would significantly strengthen Beijing's position in Nepal. However, at that time, it was much more profitable for Nepal not only from a political but also from a purely economic point of view to carry out foreign trade activities through the territory of India.

In Tibet, as already noted, the Indus River also originates, which flows within the region for more than 800 km. The use of Indus waters will have a significant impact on both India and Pakistan, especially since there is a serious struggle between the two countries for the waters ^of this river6. In Pakistan, for example, more than 80% of the country's farmland is irrigated by Indus waters [Tibet: A Human Development..., 2007, p. 141]. It is clear that hydro policy in relation to the West is a very, very important aspect in the geopolitics of the entire region.

Socio-economic development of Tibet as one of the most effective elements of hydro policy

The socio-economic development of Tibet is of crucial importance to China, as it strengthens its position both in Nepal and in the region as a whole. In addition, the development of Tibet reduces the importance of India for the development of this region of the PRC, because the shortest way out of Tibet to the outside world passes through the territory of India. An important role here is also played by the fact that the Tibetan political emigration found political asylum in India. Therefore, by developing the economy of Tibet, Beijing is actually transforming a potentially vulnerable region into a springboard for strengthening its influence here. The priority areas of development of the Tibet Autonomous Region are communications and energy. Both of these components will directly affect the effectiveness of Beijing's hydro policy towards India.

It is interesting that from the very beginning of the liberation of Tibet, Beijing paid very close attention to its development. Thus, while spending on economic construction in China increased by 17% in 1956, the figure for Tibet was 27.3%^.7 Even in the initial period after the liberation ^of China, a huge amount of money was allocated to help Tibet at that time (only direct investments).-

⁶ For more information on the hydro-political struggle between India and Pakistan, see, for example: [Khurram Shahzad, 2008; Waqar Ahmed, 2008; The Indus Water Dispute..., 2008; Moin Ansari, 2008; Muhammad Azam Minhas, 2008; Haroon Mirani, 2009].

⁷ For more information on the economic development of Tibet in the mid-1950s, see, for example: [Winnington, 1958, pp. 10-18].

⁸ The official agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was signed between the Central People's Government of China and the local Government of Tibet on May 23, 1951, in Beijing.

RMB 200 million). Special attention was paid to road construction. Three years after liberation, i.e. in 1954, the construction and operation of the Kandin-Tibet and Qinghai-Tibet highways was completed.

The development of Tibet in recent years is simply impressive. The volume of Tibet's foreign trade in 2000 amounted to $110 million and increased 18-fold compared to 1995 [Tibet Looking..., 2002]. And in 2008, this figure exceeded the $ 500 million mark. Today, Tibet carries out trade activities with 55 countries and regions. The region's largest trading partner is Nepal, which accounts for more than 66.6% of Tibet's foreign trade [ibid.]. The region's GDP in 2008 was almost $ 5.8 billion, while in comparable prices in 1959 it was only $ 25.4 million [GDP growth in Tibet, 2009]. From 1994 to 2008, Tibet's gross domestic product increased by an average of 12.8% annually, which exceeded the Chinese average for the same period [Full Text..., 2009], and from 2002 to 2009, GDP growth was 12.3%. The inflow of foreign investment to the region is also increasing. Thus, the volume of foreign investment in 2009 exceeded the same indicator in 2008 by 150% [SW China's Tibet..., 2010].

But neither the Tibetan authorities nor the central authorities of the People's Republic of China intend to stop there, especially since there are all the prerequisites for even more dynamic development of the region. So, in the coming years, it is planned to create free economic zones in Tibet, which will give an additional impetus to the economy in general and foreign trade in particular. Among the priority areas of development of Tibet, of course, is the construction of a communication system. This process is very intensive in the Tibet Autonomous Region. As a result of this policy, more than 95% of counties and more than 85% of villages in Tibet currently have access to highways. This is despite the fact that in 2001 only 70% of the towns and villages of the district had access to them [Tibetan Farmers..., 2001]. This circumstance will have a very positive impact on the economy of the district. Railways are also being built in parallel. Particularly noteworthy is the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, a transport artery with a length of almost 2 thousand km. The construction of this railway was fully completed in 2006. It is often called an engineering miracle, because for almost 960 km the railway is located at an altitude of more than 4 thousand meters above sea level. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway connected the region to the rest of China. It is also planned to extend a railway line from Tibet to Nepal, which will directly affect not only the strengthening of economic ties between Tibet and Nepal, but also the strengthening of China's position in the strategically important Himalayan region.

By the way, the Chinese authorities pay special attention to the construction of railways as an essential component of their transport strategy, as mentioned earlier. In 2009 alone, investment in this area amounted to almost $ 88 billion, which is twice as much as in 2008 [China to almost..., 2008]. By 2012, the length of railways in China will reach 110 thousand km. km [ibid.]. In the development of railway infrastructure, a special place is occupied by the construction of high-speed railways and increasing the speed of railway trains.

The energy sector is of particular importance in the development of Tibet. It accounts for about 30% of China's total hydropower potential, and the region ranks first in China in this indicator.⁹

In the development of Tibet, the Chinese authorities also pay great attention to air transport. Only in 2010, two major airports were put into operation here, and the total number of civil airports in the region reached five. The capacity of the fourth airport, located in the Ngari district, will reach 120 thousand passengers by 2020. passengers. Throughput capacity

⁹ For more information on Tibet's hydropower potential, see, for example, [China's Tibet Facts & Figures, 2008].

the fifth one, located in the city of Shigadze, makes up 230 thousand passengers annually. These airports will naturally play an important role in Tibet's development, while at the same time strengthening China's position in the strategically important Himalayan region.

Nepal is particularly important in this context. This country, as already noted, is also of key importance from the point of view of hydro policy. The Kingdom of Nepal has a very impressive hydropower potential, surpassing the current hydropower potential of Canada, the United States and Mexico combined. But so far, this country uses it only by 0.2%. China has quite serious potential in the field of hydroelectric power station construction, and helping Nepal in this matter is in Beijing's strategic interests. Another area where good prospects may open up for China is agriculture. To date, only 5% of Nepal's arable land is irrigated, and a fairly large percentage of the country's food needs are met by imports. Beijing's strengthening of its role in both of the above-mentioned sectors is somehow related to hydro policy and will directly mean reducing the degree of India's influence on Nepal's policy. Therefore, it can be assumed that in the near future, China will focus on energy and agriculture in economic cooperation with Nepal.

In order to strengthen its position in Nepal, the Chinese authorities are paying special attention to deepening ties between this state and Tibet. Nepal accounted for 95% of Tibet's cross-border trade, and if the volume of trade between them amounted to almost $250 million in 2009, then only in the first eight months of 2010 this figure was 254 million. For comparison, in 2006 the trade turnover between them was about $120 million. The Chinese authorities intend to further strengthen ties between Tibet and Nepal, they say that the development of Tibet will only benefit Nepal, and take certain steps to promote cooperation. For example, China recently imposed a zero tariff on more than 300 goods imported from Nepal [Development of China's Tibet..., 2010].

* * *

Tibet's strategic importance is not limited to water resources. However, the fact that this region is one of the key hydrodonors of South and Southeast Asia already makes it a key component of global geopolitics. Without this region, the PRC is simply not only unable to become a global geopolitical pole, but also will not be able to solve the most important issues of its socio-economic development, becoming a very vulnerable state in many areas of security. It is in this context that the role and place of Tibet in Chinese geopolitics should be considered. This region of Asia is indeed one of those springboards through which the future geopolitical configuration of the world is being created.

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