THE SELEUCID ARMY IN THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN OF ANTIOCHUS III1

The article is devoted to the expedition of the Seleucid king Antiochus III against the Parthians in 209 BC. The author shares the opinion of M. I. Rostovtsev that the main goal of the king was not Parthia, but Greco-Bactria. He did not intend to conquer the Parthians, but only to force them to recognize his authority and make peace so that they could move on. During this campaign, Antiochus III proved to be a talented general, capable of solving various military tasks. His army fought with equal success in the desert, in the mountains, stormed the fortifications. As a result, the Parthians were pacified and respected the terms of the treaty until the accession of Mithridates I.

Key words: Antiochus III, Seleucids, Parthians, Cataphracts.

Antiochus III's campaign in Parthia (209 AD)2) was part of the Anabasis (212-205/204) - a large-scale expedition to the east in order to recover previously fallen satrapies. Seleucid control over Parthia was lost, according to various sources, in the early or mid-240s. At the turn of 230 AD, Antiochus III's father Seleucus II made a campaign against the Parthians, but the results were highly controversial.3
M. I. Rostovtsev made a curious and, in my opinion, convincing suggestion, according to which the Anabasis was caused not only by the imperial ambitions of the tsar 4, but also by economic reasons. The Kingdom lost access to its main source of gold, which came from Siberia and the Altai to Bactria (Rostovtzeff, 1941, p. 446-447; cf.: Green, 1990, p. 293-295). Therefore, it was Greco-Bactria (which also declared independence) that became the main goal of the expedition, but to reach it, Antiochus III had to pass through the lands of the Parthians.5
According to Justin, the king led a huge army of 100,000 infantry and 20,000 horsemen to the east (centum milibus peditum et XX milihus equitum, XLI. 5. 7). Many researchers consider these figures to be very high [Dibvoiz, 2008, p. 40, note 29;

1 This publication in a certain sense continues the topic raised in the journal earlier [Balakhvantsev, 2015]. The author expresses his gratitude to A. S. Balakhvantsev for the opportunity to get acquainted in advance with the text of his article, which gives a general description of the conflict under consideration with an emphasis on the situation of Parthia.

2 Other dates are sometimes found in the research literature (211 or 210; hereafter, all dates are BC), but the version with 209 has more supporters.

3 A. S. Balakhvantsev has an original interpretation of the campaign of Seleucus II as successful; in his opinion, the fall of Parthia from the Seleucid kingdom occurred only after the defeat of Antiochus III at Raphia [Balakhvantsev, 2000, pp. 201-216]. Anyway, after 217. Antiochus did not control Parthia.

4 According to N. Dibvoiz, "the reason for the attack on Parthia is unknown, except for the fact that it was once a Seleucid possession" [Dibvoiz, 2008, p. 39].

5 "Strategic expediency dictated to the tsar the need to protect himself from the possibility of an attack on the flank and rear when moving east" [Bokshchanin, 1960, p. 201, note. 149].

page 5
Walbank, 1967, p. 236; Sherwin-White, Kuhrt, 1993, p. 197], since Antiochus III fielded much fewer warriors in other campaigns.6 Based on this, Y. Volsky estimated the number of Seleucid troops at 50-60 thousand people [Wolski, 1999, p. 75], G. Apergis - at "70,000 or more", of which about 35 thousand. regular troops and 15 thousand mercenaries [Aperghis, 2004, p. 193, 201, 241]. According to A. G. Bokshchanin, the number of individual detachments mentioned in Polybius 7 is too large in comparison with the data of Justin (Bokshchanin, 1960, p. 4). 201, approx. 150]. At the same time, B. Bar-Kohva is in no hurry to discard them, although he admits that they are rounded up. According to an Israeli historian, Antiochus III, in the absence of internal and external threats at that time, was able to gather all available forces, primarily the eastern contingent [Bar-Kochva, 1979, p. 10]. B. Bar-Kochva draws attention to the fact that not the entire Seleucid army participated in the battle of Magnesia: about Antiochus III lost 10 thousand men in Greece (Liv. XXXVI. 19. 11). The researcher believes that this expeditionary force was even larger - about 18 thousand people [Bar-Kochva, 1979, p.17-18]. However, B. Bar-Kohva agrees, the presence of such an army would threaten serious problems with management and supply. Polybius ' work does not contain general figures for the Seleucid army, but it was large enough (X. 28. 1)that the Parthians chose not to meet it (X. 29. 1-2) .8
The Parthian king Arshak II hoped that Antiochus III would not dare to go through the waterless desert from Media to Parthia at all (Polyb. X. 28. 1). When this hope was not fulfilled and the Seleucid army set out on a campaign, he made the only correct decision in this situation - he ordered wells to be filled up on its way. Antiochus, however, was able to prevent this by sending forward a thousand horsemen under Nicomedes from Cos, who drove the enemy back from the wells and ensured the king's troops an unimpeded march to the Parthian capital of Hecatompilus (X. 28.5-7), which was located "in the depths of Parthia"9. Thus, this calculation of Arshak II was not justified either.10 He abandoned Hecatompilus without a fight and retreated to Hyrkania. His next move was to try to stop the Seleucid army in the border mountains of Elburz by blocking the pass."

Earlier, Alexander the Great divided his army into three parts to cross the mountains (Ar. Anab. III. 23. 2). Antiochus III preferred to go by one road instead of three. 12 To reach the pass, the army had to go up about 300 stadia13; the way lay mainly along the dried-up riverbed and was obstructed by trees and trees.-

6 Thus, at the Battle of Raphia (217), Antiochus III had 62,000 infantry, 6,000 horsemen, and 102 elephants (Polyb. V. 79. 13); at Magnesia (190), 60,000 infantry, 12,000 horsemen, and 54 elephants (Liv. XXXVII.37.9; 39.13). The sources do not mention the participation of war elephants in the eastern campaign, with the exception that Antiochus III received them in Greco-Bactria and India (Polyb.XI.34.10, 12).

7 In the Parthian campaign, 1,000 horsemen of Nicomedes (Polyb. X. 28. 6), 2,000 Cretans of Polyxenides (X.29.6); in the Bactrian campaign, 10,000 Peltasts and 2,000 royal guards (X.49. 3, 7).

8 Antiochus III obtained additional funds for this campaign by requisitioning, following the example of Alexander the Great and the Diadochi, valuables totaling about 4,000 talents from the Ecbatani temple (Polyb. X. 27. 12-13).

9 Hereafter, the text of Polybius is quoted in the translation by F. G. Mishchenko.

10 The Russian translation of N. Dibvoiz's monograph speaks of Arshak's "exceptional wisdom" in his decision to destroy the wells [Dibvoiz, 2008, p.40]. The original text uses the expression "obviously wise policy", i.e. simply "obviously wise policy" (Debevoise, 1938, p. 17). Since it did not give the desired result, it is hardly necessary to talk about its "exceptional wisdom".

11 At the same time, it is doubtful that Arshak II in this case acted in concert with the Bactrians: the allied relations between the two kingdoms were severed after the king of Greco-Bactria Diodotus II was overthrown by Euthydemus I.

12 Attempts to reconstruct the path of the Seleucid army from Hecatompilus to the Elburz Mountains and further along the pass were repeatedly made in historiography [Walbank, 1967, p. 236-238, fig. 8; Bar-Kochva, 1979, p. 142-144]. Polybius will not give a detailed description of the area, which would allow us to establish the route with any accuracy. See also: [Balakhvantsev, 2015, p. 10-11].

13 Approximately 60 km.

page 6
moons. In addition, the "barbarians" 14 reinforced the defense with barricades and placed ambush detachments over the road, being confident that the phalanx and the enemy's baggage train would not be able to pass (Polyb. X.30.1-3; 5).

Nevertheless, the Seleucid king took the necessary precautions. He learned beforehand from the local population about the upcoming difficulties (Polyb. X. 29. 3) 15. The most vulnerable phalanx, siege engines and baggage train were placed at the end of the column. The tsar divided the light infantry into mobile detachments and sent them to the mountains on either side of the road - they were supposed to cover the column from above and knock the enemy down from the commanding heights (X. 29.4-5; 30.9). To each such detachment were assigned "sappers" to clear the area recaptured from the enemy. The first group of archers, slingers, acontists and stone throwers (including local mountaineers) was led by the strategist Diogenes 16, the second (two thousand Cretans with shields 17, κρητας αστπδιωτας) - Rhodian Polyxenides 18. The direct cover of the column was provided by two detachments of medium infantry-the Torakites (Οωρακιτας, "warriors in armor") and the Phyreophores (Ουρεοφορους, "warriors with large shields") under the leadership of the Scythian Nicomedes 19 and the Aetolian Nicholas 20 (Kh.29. 5-6)21.

The effectiveness of this scheme was convincingly demonstrated in the first skirmish with the barbarians. The soldiers of Diogenes skirted the enemy cordon from above along the mountain paths and dispersed it by shelling, causing great damage; the slingers especially distinguished themselves (Polyb. X. 30. 6-7). After that, the "sappers" were able to clear the road for the main forces. However, regarding further developments and how to interpret the fra-

14 Polybius does not specify who exactly held the defenses on the pass. In the research literature, these "barbarians" (βαρβαροι) are considered either the Parthians themselves or their allies from the local Tapuri tribe. In this regard, a peculiar position was taken by U. Tarn. In one of his works, he called the Parthians a nation of horsemen, who cannot be these "barbarians" [Tarn, 2010, p. 20]. In another, he did not find any fundamental differences between the early Parthian and Seleucid armies (Tarn, 1932, p. 577). Consequently, there could also be Parthian infantry in the Elburz Mountains.

15 But, of course, he could not know the full picture: the journey was "much more difficult and narrow than Antiochus had expected" (Polyb. X. 30. 1).

16 Governor of Susiana and participant in the war with the usurper Molon, who defended Susa from his army; later strategos of Media (Polyb. V 46.7; 48.13-15; 54.12).

17 Cretans in the ancient world were known as skilled archers and often served as mercenaries in this capacity [Griffith, 1935, p. 15, 53; Launey, 1949, p. 248-286; Haniotis, 2013, p.132, 158]. Referring to the image from the stele from the Demetriades, N. Secunda believes that archers in Crete, unlike all other regions of Greece, were specially taught to use a light shield: it gave protection from arrows and allowed them to fight in close combat. "This unique feature of equipment" is what made Cretan archers so popular [Sckunda, 2001, p. 20-21]. Interestingly, he does not quote Polybius here.

18 The future Seleucid navarch, a participant in the Roman-Syrian War of 192-188 (see, for example, Liv. XXXVI.43-45; App. Syr. 22).

19 A mercenary commander known only for his participation in this campaign. In the future, it may be considered a Brown or Amizon epistat [Grainger, 1997, p. 109].

20 This Aetolian is usually identified with a veteran of the 4th Syrian War who, at the head of the Ptolemaic forces in 219-218, fought with Antiochus III in Kelesirium and was defeated at the Battle of Porphyrion. According to Polybius, Nicholas "surpassed in experience and courage all the generals of Ptolemy" (V. 68.5). How he ended up in the Seleucid service is unknown. It is possible that he himself went over to the side of Antiochus III following the example of a certain Kereus (V. 70. 10) [Stâclin, 1936, Sp. 359], or that after Porphyrion he simply ended up in captivity with part of his army (Polyb. V. 69.11) [Taylor, 2013, p. 58].

21 Only fragmentary information is known about the equipment of the Torakites and Firsophors. Presumably, among the Firsophores, it included a helmet, a large oval shield of Galatian or Thracian origin( from Oυρα - door), a spear and several javelins, a sword, Macedonian boots, and among the Torakites-also armor (possibly chain mail) [Head, 1982, p. 114-115, fig. 41-42 (reconstruction); Nutt, 1993, p. 163-164; 388-389]. F. G. Mishchenko's translation does not take this nuance into account, and his description " warriors in armor and with large shields "(Polyb. X.29.6) is suitable only for Torakites. Nevertheless, the available information is too limited to say anything definite about the tactics of these units [Sekunda, 2007, p. 348], although some researchers see some similarities with the "iphicrate peltasts" [Nutt, 1993, p. 164].

page 7
Yandex. Money management system "strelki... they captured convenient positions under the cover (eφεδρευοντων) of detachments armed with shields, slowly moving along the ravine in battle order" (X. 30.9) - in other words, how the tactical interaction of different infantry units was carried out - opinions differ. Polybius outlined the tasks of the archers, but did not specify to which category the Cretans (also armed with shields)should be assigned: to the light infantry or to the medium, i.e. to the "upper" or "lower" cover 22.

B. Bar-Kohva is inclined to the second option, interpreting it in a very peculiar way. In his opinion, the Cretan aspidiotes were in the vanguard of the column and played the role of a kind of bait (bait), i.e. they distracted the enemy's attention and revealed its location to the archers of Diogenes 23. Thus, it was they who started the battle. If necessary, the Torakites were to go up into the mountains and help Diogenes ' group in hand - to-hand combat, while the phyreophores were to remain below and cover the column itself (Bar-Kochva, 1979, p. 144-145; Bar-Kochva, 2002, p. 124-125).

This scenario can't help but raise questions. The first one concerns the actions of medium infantry: if the fireophors and Torakites were really distinguished not so much by a shield (as B. Bar-Kohva clearly believes, speaking about the" freedom of hands " of the latter), but by armor, in this reconstruction they would at least be worth swapping places, since with similar weapons (spears, javelins and swords), they would be more likely to the mobile traffic lights were just 24. As for the use of Cretans as bait, according to S. Nutt, it is unlikely that Antiochus III would have used valuable mercenaries as expendable material and would not have found a different use for them [Nutt, 1993, p. 216-217].

In general, S. Nutt's version seems more convincing. In accordance with it, the battle was started by the arrows of Diogenes, after which the soldiers of Polyxenides approached" slowly and in perfect order " and provided the shelling, while having shields, they were ready to go into close combat. The task of the Torakites and Fireophores was probably to suppress the remaining pockets of resistance, although their direct participation in the battle is not mentioned [Nutt, 1993, p. 153-154, 216-217]. Continuing this idea, it can be noted that the Phyreophores with their large shields and javelins were better suited for the role that B. Bar-Kohva assigned to the Cretan archers.

According to E. A. Razin, there were three rifle groups - forward and two flank groups (Razin, 1999, p. 259-260). In principle, this is quite possible, since in Polybius the soldiers of Diogenes could act both in the ranks and out of them (x. 29. 5), thereby forming several groups. It is also possible that the Russian historian ranked Cretans among the Riflemen.

Anyway, in seven days (Polyb. X.31.1 ) the Seleucid army overcame this route and reached the pass. The time spent, apparently, should be explained not so much by the persistence and steadfastness of the enemy, but by the routine work of sorting out the rubble on the road. At the pass where the remaining barbarians had gathered, the defenders made their last stand and resisted the Seleucid infantry for some time, 25 until light detachments circled them from the rear 26 and put them to flight. The rout was complete; "the king made every effort to moderate the ardor of the pursuing soldiers, and with the sound of a trumpet called them back, wishing to go down to Hyrcania with all the army in order" (X. 31.4).

22 In this case, F. Walbank considers not only Cretans to be lightly armed, but also Torakites with phyreophores (Walbank, 1967, p. 239).

23 B. Bar-Kohva compares this tactic to scouting in unarmored vehicles (especially jeeps) in modern warfare.

24 B. Bar-Kochva in this case "arms" the Torakites with only swords [Bar-Kochva, 2002, p. 124-125].

25 Polybius speaks of the Phalangites (φαλαγγιτας, X. 31. 3), although perhaps we should refer here to the same Thorakites in armor and with spears, better equipped for fighting in the mountains.

26 The maneuver was carried out at night (Polyb. X.31.3), and it is not entirely clear whether this refers to the night before the infantry battle (thus, it took one day and ended in a victory for the tsarist troops) or after it (i.e., on the first day the battle ended without success).

page 8
On the other side of the mountains, Antiochus III established a base at Tambracus and laid siege to the city of Syrinx, the Hyrcanian capital, where barbarians had fled from the mountains, "as well as from the surrounding areas" (Polyb. X.31.6). The Parthians turned the city into another "final frontier" by laying "a triple ditch not less than thirty cubits wide and fifteen deep, with a double embankment at the edges of each of the ditches with a strong wall at the top" (X. 31. 8). According to W. Tarn, Syrinx was fortified by local Greeks in order to block the way of Antiochus ' throwing machines (Tarn, 2010, p. 21). The defenders of the city resisted fiercely "not only on the surface of the earth, but also under the ground", but the royal troops broke through the defenses, filled up the ditches and destroyed the city walls with trenches (Polyb. X. 30. 9-10). In response, the defenders massacred all the Greeks in Syrinx, looted their possessions, and tried to escape with the loot during the night. A detachment of Seleucid mercenaries under the command of a certain Hyperbates 27 intercepted them on the road and forced them to return to the city; the king launched a general assault, and Syrinx capitulated.

Unfortunately, the text of Polybius ends here, and it remains unknown what the formal end of the Parthian campaign was. According to Justin, Antiochus III formed an alliance with Arsaces II (ad postremum in societatem eius adsumptus est, Just. XLI. 5. 7). It is possible that the corresponding negotiations took place in one of the two cities (Achrian or Calliope) mentioned by Polybius (Bokshchanin, 1960, p.203). Such a finale of the campaign, according to A. G. Bokshchanin, was too favorable for the Parthian king, who even retained power. The historian connects this with the massacre of the Greeks in Syrinx, which allegedly had a strong impact on Antiochus and forced him to end the war [Bokshchanin, 1960, p. 203; see also: Koshelenko, 1979, p. 128, 268]. At the same time, as W. Tarn pointed out, the scale of the massacre was hardly significant: since the Greeks could not evade the construction of fortifications, capture the city gate or acropolis and defend themselves on their own, there could not have been many of them.28 In addition, the direct perpetrators of the massacre were intercepted by Hyperbat and returned to the city; it is possible that after the fall of Syrinx, they suffered the punishment they deserved.

So the apparent softness of the Seleucid king is easier to explain by the fact that he has already achieved his goal-forced Arshak to recognize his supremacy and ensured the unhindered continuation of the campaign. 29 The events of the campaign known to us, when the hopes of the Parthians to stop the tsarist army were repeatedly destroyed (in the desert, in the mountains of Elburs, on the outskirts of Syrinx), allow us to agree with M. M. Diakonov's conclusion : the Parthians did not become a serious opponent for Antiochus III [Diakonov, 1961, p. 178] .30 However, the campaign as a whole should hardly be considered as an act of conquest

27 This name is mentioned only in connection with the siege of Syrinx (Polyb. X.31.12).

28 "...the Greeks... were too few to resist successfully" [Tarn, 2010, p. 20].

29 In other words, Antiochus III continued the same policy as earlier in Media, Atropatene, and Armenia, where he left the previous dynasties in power. The fate of Molon and Achaeus, who had previously declared themselves kings in Media and Asia Minor respectively, did not befall them, even if they did not show the courage that Justin attributes to Arsaces (mira virtute pugnavit, XLI.5.7). Even O. Bouche-Leclercq wondered what this bravery really consisted of [Bouche-Leclercq, 1913, p. 162]. W. Tarn believed that Antiochus III conquered Comisene and Hyrcania, and left the rest of the Parthian lands to Arshaca as a "subject ally" and possible ally. a counterbalance to the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom (Tarn, 1932, p. 576; see also Bevan, 1902, p. 20).

G. A. Koshelenko draws attention to the fact that after Arshak II, it was not his descendants who began to rule, but relatives of his father Arshak I. According to the scientist, the conclusion of the treaty with the Seleucids "almost nullified the successes of the period of Arshak I's reign" and caused discontent among the Parthian nobility, or even a rebellion that ended in the overthrow of the tsar and a change of power [Koshelenko, 1976, p. 33-34; Koshelenko, 1977, p. 90; see also: Lcrncr, 1999, p .46].

30 S. Sherwin-White and A. Kurht refer to the Parthians of the late third century as nothing more than raider gangs (Sherwin-White and Kurht, 1993, p. 197). At one time, J. Rawlinson, based on a short remark by Justin, made Arshak a brave partisan who, even after the fall of all major cities, did not lay down his arms, exhausted the Seleucid army and achieved an honorable peace [Rawlinson, 1893, p. 60-61]. But so romantic

page 9
hike. Antiochus III did not seek to enslave or destroy the Parthians, but only to pacify them. He did not go so much to Parthia as through Parthia.

The Seleucid army itself proved to be quite a flexible tool, capable of solving a wide variety of combat tasks. Antiochus III demonstrated his talent as an organizer and tactician, who planned and successfully carried out the army's march through the desert and mountains to Hyrcania, stormed its capital, and forced the Parthian king to conclude a favorable agreement to continue the Anabasis. Thus, the campaign of 209 can serve as an argument against the persistent view of the degradation of the Greek-Macedonian armed forces and military art as such after the death of Alexander the Great and the Diadochi.31
The consequence of this campaign, according to W. Tarn [Tarn, 1930, p. 76], was the appearance in the Seleucid army of cataphract cavalry - "a dense formation of men-at-arms with long spears on horseback, protected by armor" [Mielczarek, 1993, p. 47]. However, it is unclear when and under what circumstances Antiochus III became acquainted with the cataphracts. They were clearly not among the Parthian cavalrymen who tried to destroy the wells at the beginning of the campaign, and then Polybius does not directly mention cavalry (in contrast, say, to the large-scale battle on the Arius River in the Bactrian campaign, Polyb. X. 49). M. J. Olbrycht's statement about the "effectiveness of Parthian cataphracts", which allegedly struck Antiochus [Olbrycht, 2010, p. 78], without foundation. The tsar's interest in cataphracts could have been of the same nature as Alexander the Great's interest in war elephants: the general's desire to learn another military innovation (the first elephants in Alexander's corps were Persian, who did not have time to prove themselves in battle). If we are talking specifically about the Parthians, Antiochus could simply have captured cataphract equipment in Hecatompilus or one of the Hyrcanian cities.

However, this innovation was not entirely Eastern: if heavy cavalry and horse armor were known in the East even before the appearance of the Greeks and Macedonians, 32 the long spear first appeared among the Persians under Macedonian influence (Diod. XVII. 53. 1) [Nikonorov, 1997, p. 20-22; Nefedkin, 1998, p. 74-75; Olbrycht, 2010, p. 67-70]. In addition, there is no consensus among researchers about the organization, equipment, and tactics of the Seleucid cataphracts, i.e., about the nature and scope of the reform carried out.33 Thus, M. Melsharek names scale armor as the main feature of Parthian equipment, but at the same time admits that Seleucid cataphracts could fight in the usual Greek armor, and horses - only in headpieces and breastplates, known from the image on the frieze of the Pergamon temple of Athena. Thus, the creation of cataphracts was an improvement of the Macedonian heavy cavalry in the direction of even greater "weighting" 34. M. Mielczarek sees the Parthian influence primarily in the manner of fighting in a close column, which is unusual for Macedonians [Mielczarek, 1993, p. 70-72; Mielczarek, 1998, p. 102, 104]. For his part, B. Bar-Kochva speaks of heavy armor in the Median style, although later repeating the idea of W. Tarn about the Parthians [Bar-Kochva, 1979, p. 42, 74].

biography is more consistent with historical fiction than scientific research. It is not known about any real exploits of the Parthian king (unlike Euthydemus of Bactria, who defended his capital during one of the most significant sieges in ancient history - Polyb. XXIX.12.7) in the war with Antiochus III. The example of Artabazan and Xerxes (Polyb. V. 55; VIII.25) demonstrates that it was possible to remain in power without exploits. It is true that here some Parthian sympathizers go to the other extreme, giving Arshak credit for this particular circumstance. Thus, Y. Volsky considers his retreat before the Seleucid troops to be part of some clever strategy [Wolski, 1999, p. 77].

31 One of the latest publications written from these positions: [Serrati, 2013].

32 Herod. 1.215 (about massagets), Xen. Anab. I. 8. 7 (on the Persians), etc.

33 For recent publications, see [Mielczarek, 1993, p. 67-72; Mielczarek, 1998; Sekunda, 1994, p. 21. 71-72; Nefedkin, 2007, pp. 220-232].

34 Wed.: Xen. Anab. 1.8.7; Hipp. 1.7. M. Melsharek finds in the Seleucid reform much in common with what Xenophon noted and proposed.

page 10
Finally, it is not known whether the Parthians themselves created the cataphracts that defeated the Romans at Carrhae in 53 BC. In particular, A. M. Khazanov dated the Parthian cavalry reform from the second to the beginning of the first century and justified it by the need to resist the Seleucid and Roman troops [Khazanov, 1971, p. 78]. According to this logic, Antiochus III carried out his reform much earlier, since the Seleucid cataphracts began their service at the end of the third century - they participated in the decisive battle of the 5th Syrian War at Panion (200). Thus, questions both about its dating and about Eastern influence (Persian, Median, Armenian Parthian or Bactrian?) they remain open.

The" Parthian question " became relevant to the Seleucids again only by the middle of the second century in a changed world, when Antiochus III lost the war with Rome, and his immediate descendants unleashed a political crisis.35 Taking advantage of the weakening of the central government, the Parthians went on the offensive and began to push the Seleucids from the east, but at the same time they could not achieve success comparable to the victory at Carrhae.36 So, if they had some "exceptionally effective military formations that guarantee success in battles with serious opponents" [Olbrycht, 2010, p. 78], in this case, as in 209, they did not show themselves.

list of literature

Balakhvantsev A. S. The Parthian campaign of Antiochus III // Vostok (Oriens), 2015. N 1.

Balakhvantsev A. S. Seleucus II Kallinikos and Parthia // Interstate Relations and Diplomacy in antiquity. Part I. Kazan: Masterline, 2000.

Bokshchanin A. G. Parthia i Rim: Vozrozhdenie sistemy politicheskogo dualizma v Perednoi Azii [Parthia and Rome: The Emergence of a System of Political Dualism in Western Asia].

Dibvoiz N. K. Politicheskaya istoriya Parfii [Political history of Parthia]. St. Petersburg: Philological Faculty of St. Petersburg.GU, 2008.

Dyakonov M. M. Ocherki istorii Drevnego Irana [Essays on the History of Ancient Iran]. Moscow: Publishing House of Oriental Literature, 1961.

Koshelenko G. A. Genealogy of the first Arshakids (once again about the Nis ostracus N 1760) / / History and Culture of the peoples of Central Asia (ancient and Middle Ages). Moscow: Nauka, 1976.

Koshelenko HA. The Parthian State // Istoriya Irana [History of Iran], Moscow: MSU Publishing House, 1977.
Koshelenko G. A. Grecheskiy polis na hellenisticheskom Vostoke [Greek Polis in the Hellenistic East]. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1979.

Nefedkin A. K. Cavalry of the Hellenistic era (military and social aspect). Diss. ... Doctor of Historical Sciences, St. Petersburg, 2007.

Nefedkin A. K. Battle scene on the golden lining of Akinak's scabbard from Chertomlyk and the military reform of Darius III: on the question of interpretation of the image / / Bosporan Kingdom as a historical and cultural phenomenon: Materials of the scientific conference. December 1998. St. Petersburg: B. I., 1998.

Rol ' nomadov evraziyskikh steppei v razvitii mirovogo voennogo iskusstva [The role of nomads of the Eurasian steppes in the development of world Military art]. Scientific readings in memory of N. E. Masanov: Collection of materials of the International Scientific Conference. Almaty: LEM Publ., 2010.

Razin E. A. Istoriya voennogo iskusstva [Military Art history]. XXXI century BC-VI century AD St. Petersburg: Polygon Publ., 1999.

Khazanov A.M. Ocherki voennogo dela sarmatov [Essays on military affairs in Sarmatov]. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1971.

Haniotis A. Voina v hellenisticheskom mire [War in the Hellenistic World]. St. Petersburg: Philological Faculty of St. Petersburg.GU, 2013.

Aperghis G.G. The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Bar-Kochva B. Judas Maccabaeus: The Jewish Struggle against the Seleucids. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Bar-Kochva B. The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

35 After the death of Antiochus III, the succession was disrupted first by his younger son, Antiochus IV (who removed his nephew, Seleucus IV's son), and then by Seleucus IV's younger son, Demetrius I (Antiochus IV's son was killed). The confrontation between the two branches of the royal house dragged on for many years and destabilized the situation in the empire.

36 Antiochus IV died during a campaign in the east, before reaching Parthia (Polyb. XXXI.9.3-4). Demetrius II won a series of victories over the Parthians and was treacherously captured in peace negotiations (lust. XXXVI. 1.4-5). The army of Antiochus VII defeated the Parthians three times and died in a popular uprising provoked by the atrocities of his generals: a mass massacre of Seleucid soldiers quartered for the winter in various places began (lust. XXXVIII.10.1-10; Diod. XXXIV.16).

page 11
Bevan E.R. The House of Seleucus. Vol. 2. L.: Edward Arnold, 1902.

Bouche-Lcclcrcq A. Histoire des Seleucides (323-64 avant J.-С.). Part. 1. P.: Ernest Leroux, 1913.

Debevoise N.C. A Political History of Parthia. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Grainger J.D. A Seleukid Prosopography and Gazeteer. Leiden-New York-Koln: E.J. Brill, 1997.

Green P. Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age. Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1990.

Griffith G.T. Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935.

Head D. Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars, 359 BC to 146 BC. Goring-By-Sca: Wargames Research Group, 1982.

Launey M. Recherches sur les armees hellenistiques. Vol. I. P.: E. de Boccard, 1949.

Lcrncr J.D. The Impact of Seleucid Decline on the Eastern Iranian Plateau. Stuttgart: Franz Stcincr Vcrlag, 1999.

Mielezarck M. Cataphracti and Clibanarii. Studies on the Heavy Armoured Cavalry of the Ancient World. Lodz: Oficyna Naukowa MS, 1993.

Mielczarek M. Cataphracts - Α Parthian Element in the Seleucid Art of War // Electrum. 1998. No. 2.

Nikonorov V.P. The Armies of Bactria: 700 BC - 450 AD. Vol. 1. Stockport: Montvert Publications, 1997.

Nutt S. Tactical Interaction and Integration: A Study in Warfare in the Hellenistic Period from Philip II to the Battle of Pydna. PhD Thesis. Newcastle, 1993.

Rawlinson G. Parthia. N.Y.: O.P. Putnam's Sons, 1893.

Rostovtzeff M.I. The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World. Vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941.

Sekunda N. Land forces // The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. Vol. I. Cambridge: University Press, 2007.

Sekunda N. Seleucid and Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168-145 BC: Vol. 1: The Seleucid Army under Antiochus IV Epiphanes. Stockport: Montvert Publications, 1994.

Sekunda N.V Antigonid Shield-Device on a stele of a Cretan from Demetrias // Archeologia. 2001. No. 52.

Serrati J. The Hellenistic World at War: Stagnation or Development? // The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World. Oxford: University Press, 2013.

Sherwin-White S., Kuhrt A. From Samarkhand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire. Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1993.

Stahelin F. Nikolaos (1) // Pauly's Realencyclopadie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Hlbd. 33. Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmuller Verlag, 1936.

Tarn W. W. Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930.

Tarn W.W. Parthia // The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. IX. Cambridge: University Press, 1932.

Tarn W.W. The Greeks in Bactria and India. Cambridge: University Press, 2010 (Reprinted edition).

Taylor M.J. Antiochus the Great. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2013.

Walbank F. W. A Historical Commentary on Polybius. Vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.

Wolski J. The Seleucids: The Decline and Fall of their Empire. Krakow: The Enigma Press, 1999.

page 12

Permanent link to this publication: