It is believed that China is a unique, unique state in the world, which has been preserving the continuity of its history and statehood for more than a millennium, based on the successive change of ruling dynasties. It is widely believed that more than 200 years ago, the understanding of China and the Chinese as a multinational community was very similar to what we now associate with the national identity of twentieth-century China and its citizens (for example, [Zhao, 2006, p.14]). This view, however, is based on the ancient sinocentric model and does not stand up to comparative historical analysis [Dmitriev and Kuzmin, 2012]. Of particular interest in this context is the Qing Era — the last period when China was under the rule of the emperors. Can the Qing Empire be considered China? This article is devoted to this issue.

Keywords: Qing, China, Mongolia, Tibet, statehood, independence, Sinocentrism, Tibetan Buddhism, Xinhai Revolution.

Each state must have a unique set of characteristics. These signs may change over time, but there must be something in common - something that allows us to recognize the continuity of the existence of this state. It is these characteristics, and not declarations (even if they are recognized), that define this State and distinguish it from others. Let's try to compare the distinctive features of the Qing Empire with those of other empires that had similar principles of legitimation of power, as well as with China (after all, it was formed long before the Qing Empire).

China. In the previous article [Dmitriev and Kuzmin, 2012], we analyzed the history of the formation and scope of the concept of "China" - the Middle State (Chinese Zhongguo), as well as the problem of "Chinese dynasties". There are several significant features of China that remain specific to it throughout its history, regardless of all the changes and official declarations:

1) General socio-cultural concepts based on a common historical and mythological past, a common written language, the concept of the Middle State as the center of the civilized world, the only cultural state surrounded by barbarian peoples.

2) The idea that all surrounding peoples are vassals-submissive or disobedient-of the Son of Heaven (ruler of the Middle State), who, through his benevolent power of te , gradually softens their morals and leads them to the idea of submission to China.

3) Logical conclusions from the first two points in real state and regional policy: a) the practice of cultural assimilation of ethnic minorities, whose culture, of course, was considered as lower than that of China, and Sinicization as a natural process and a benefit for the assimilated themselves. This practice has led to a rapid increase in the number and range of inhabitants.-

page 5
The main ethnic group-the Han Chinese (Huaxia): regional differences between its representatives (in language, costume, habits) did not affect the sense of their ethnic unity; b) not too clear distinction in historical memory of the territories that were actually part of the empire, with those that were dependent on it of various kinds, often quite virtual; c) extremely negative attitude towards the Russian people. It was assumed that the normal direction of the historical process can only be considered the expansion of the territory subject to the Son of Heaven (or another ruler of China).

from the Chinese Qing Empire. Borrowed provisions of the Qing world-building concept. The Manchus adopted a number of provisions of the Chinese world-building concept even before they conquered China, along with a number of other foundations of its civilization, which largely formed the Far Eastern macrocivilization. After the conquest, the declaration of this concept was intended to legitimize their power in the eyes of the Han Chinese , the vast majority of the empire's population. The most important provisions here are the sacralization of imperial power, which should extend to the whole world from its center to the periphery, a centralized Middle state, which is eternal and main in the world. Any missions of foreigners to Beijing were interpreted as the arrival of tributaries, the territorial expansion of the empire - as "pacifying the barbarians", spreading the good influence of the emperor, etc.

"The empire and the state, according to the Chinese, are two things that are significantly different from each other. An empire is a state in which, in addition to the ruling people, there are other peoples who have succumbed to it <...> The state in Chinese is called guo, but in relation to foreign possessions, the Chinese understand the word guo as a secondary power; therefore, the title guo-wang is freely conceded to foreign possessors, which in the European concept means: king and in the concept of the Chinese, the sovereign of a secondary power, and for the most part dependent" [Bichurin, 1842, pp. XXVIII, XXXII]. At the same time, the term guo or guojia in Chinese is interpreted depending on the context as both a state and a country [Galenovich, 2011, pp. 40-41].

The Manchus sought legitimacy in the eyes of the Han people and in cultural history and political continuity. Although the first Qing emperor to rule in Beijing, Fulin (government motto - Shunzhi, years of rule 1643-1661), was attracted to Buddhism, in public he positioned himself primarily as a Confucian emperor [Liu, 1989, p. 73]. The same can be said of the emperors after him. Hongli (Qianlong, 1736-1795), while acknowledging the ethical principles of traditional Chinese thought, did not define the exact nature of the Manchu connections with the Chinese Ming Empire (he argued that the Manchus were never subjects of the Ming court), but insisted that the continuity was completely consistent with the character of the previous dynasties of China (Crossley, 2000, p.305).

Along with the concept of empire, the Manchus adopted its designations in the Chinese manner. "China is called by various names from its inhabitants. The Tartars of China call it Tai-Tsing Kye, which means the state of great purity; in books and letters to the Emperor they call it Shang Kye, that is, the highest, independent monarchy; the scholars call it Hung Kye, the state or color of the center; and when they speak of it with praise, they call it Tien-Gia, which means a state that contains everything that is under heaven" [Geograficheskoe..., 1789, p. 6].

However, the official name of the empire was Da Qing-guo (Great Pure State). Before 1644, the Qing court referred to China in Manchu as Nikan gurun (Han State), or Nikan-i Daimin-i gurun (Han Great Ming State) [Jiu Manzhou dang, 1969, p. 21, 223; Kyu Manshu to, 1975, p. 173, 250, 266; Li Xuezhi, 1971, p. 57-63 (cited in Zhao, 2006, p. 5)]. After the fall of the Ming in 1644, the Manchu monarchs began to apply to their state, which included subordinate Han

page 6
and non-Han lands, the term Dulimbai gurun (Middle State, i.e. China), as well as the Ming Empire (Zhao, 2006, p. 11).

The word "China" is found in many official and private Qing writings in Chinese and Manchu, such as edicts, treaties, personal writings of emperors, and travel descriptions of Manchu officials (Zhao, 2006, p.6-8). A detailed study of the Chinese materials of the XVII-XX centuries showed that the documents used not only "Zhongguo", but also "our territory", "our dynasty", and "state dynasty" as the equivalent of the "Qing state" (Zhao, 2006, p. 10). The term "Zhongguo" is on a par with these unofficial names, which is not surprising: after all, there can only be one empire in the world. What is important is not so much its specific name, but the name of its state during the time period of a particular dynasty (in this case, the Qing).

The following changes can be traced in Russian-Chinese documents from the 17th to the 20th centuries. In the second half of the XVII century. (after the capture of Beijing by the Manchus), the Qing Empire is called the Chinese State, the Bogdoy state, or the Kingdom of China [TSGADA, f. Mongol Affairs, op. 1, 1673, d. 2, l. 10-14; f. Sibirsky prikaz, stlb. 535, l. 3-9; f. Sibirsky prikaz, stlb. 535, l. 17; Additions..., 1857; Vedomosti..., 1961]. The surviving Chinese versions contain more than 160 diplomatic documents from the Qing court to Russia in 1661-1734. The Qing Empire is also referred to by the Manchu term Dulimbai gurun (Zhao, 2006: 9-11).

Starting from the Kyakhta Treatise of October 21, 1727, in the Russian version of the Russian-Qing documents until 1862, the first lines indicate the Great Daiqing State, the Daiqing Empire, but the text uses the terms Middle State, China, etc. [Sbornik kontraktov, 1889, pp. 10-15, 50-195]. It is noteworthy that the Mongolian text of the Aigun Treaty of May 16, 1858 begins with the words "Their Daiqing ulus", which should literally mean "Great Great Qing State" - as in the Russian version [ibid., pp. 119, 120-121]. After 1862, the Russian-Qing documents and Russian diplomatic correspondence invariably use the words China, the Chinese Empire, the Great Chinese State [AVPRI, F. Chinese Table; F. Mission in Beijing; Collection of Treaties, 1889, p. 211 et seq.; Grimm, 1927]. In the treaties of the Qing Empire with all European countries in the XIX-XX centuries, except for Russia, it was designated only as China or the Chinese Empire, and not the Qing Empire (for texts, see [Masmshtau, 1921]). For Europeans, the name China and its analogs were consonant with Qing and the old names derived from the Qin Empire.

In the Mongol tradition dating back to the Qing period, the empire is called Manj Chin uls - the Manchu Qing State, and China (Hyatad), or the Middle State (Dundad uls) - "China proper" (Han provinces). Variations in the form of Daichin uls, Manj uls, Chin uls, our Great Qing, the state of our Manchu Emperor, imperial power were also used, for example [Jambadorgi, 2005, p. 116; Erdenipel, 2005, p.161, 247; many sources are found in Elverskog, 2006, and Batsaikhan, 2010].

So, along with Da Qing-guo, the Manchus and Chinese also used Zhongguo, Tianxia (Middle Kingdom), and a number of other words as equivalents for simply designating their "most important" state. Therefore, using only the official name was not considered mandatory.

Provisions of the Qing world-building concept that contradict the Chinese one. The Qing Empire was created by the Manchus and received its name outside of China (then the Ming Empire). For some time, both states existed simultaneously. In 1627, the Manchu Khan Abahai (Hongtaiji) tried to discuss the border with the Ming court, suggesting the Shanhaiguan outpost on the Great Wall of China as a border point, and considered his state independent from the Han Empire-Nikan Gurun (Zhao, 2006, p. 6). Many features of his state Abakhai's father, Nur-

page 7
Khatsi, borrowed from the Mongols (for more details, see [Farquhar, 1971, p. 18-19]). After the conquest, all of China became part of the already existing foreign state-the Manchu Qing Empire. So the source of central power in this empire was outside of China.

After the capture of Beijing on June 6, 1644, the Manchus in October of the same year brought there their already proclaimed (October 8, 1643) Fulin Emperor. October 30, 1644 they re-proclaimed him emperor - this time of all the captured lands and those that will be brought to submission [Nenomnin, 2005, p. 44]. This was intended to legitimize the power of the Manchus in China, just as they did in Mongolia, by adopting the Mongolian insignia of supreme authority (see below).

Qing emperors from Fulin to Hongli used the word "China" to refer to the entire territory of their empire, whose borders were rapidly expanding [Zhao, 2006, p.6-8]. At the same time, China itself was considered as a conquered state (Smith, 1996, p.145). This meant a conceptual revision of the concept of China. If earlier the states of Central Asia and the outer zones were designated by the terms and fan man, meaning barbarians (Wang, 1999, p. 290), then the Manchus have revised this. In particular, terms like i and man disappear almost entirely from Ming Shi ("History of the Ming"), completed by Qing historians in 1739. Instead, Qing historians used wai-guo (foreign states) and Xi-yu (Western Region) - terms that were free of ethno-cultural connotations; referring to the Qing Empire as Zhongguo, its historians (mainly Han) apparently decided that the Qing Empire should be called Zhong-guo. The political continuity of Chinese history is a fundamental issue for the Chinese view of the world [Wang, 1999, p.303].

Emperor Yinzhen (government motto - Yongzheng, years of reign 1722-1735) pointed out that the concept of "barbarian people" refers only to geography, and not to the differences between "Han Chinese" and "non-Han Chinese" (i.e., non-Han subjects of the Qing), and Manchuria for their dynasty is the source of the Middle Kingdom [Li, 2008, p. 346-347]. According to the next Hongli Emperor (in 1755), "There is a view of China (Zhongxia) that non-Han peoples cannot become subjects of China and their lands cannot be integrated into the territory of China. This does not represent our dynasty's understanding of China, but instead a representation of the earlier Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties " [Huangchao wenxiang tongkao, 7338 (cit. no: Zhao, 2006, p. 4, 11-12)]. Hongli conquered Xinjiang, but according to many Confucian officials and intellectuals, its people did not deserve Qing rule, and the territory-protection, some even considered it useless [Jia, 2011, p. 1-9]. These people emphasized the distinction between "inside" and " outside "where" inside "meant" China proper "and" outside " meant the territories outside of Jiayuguan, the extreme western outpost on the Great Wall of China. Hunley objected: "All the tribes are made Qing subjects, all their lands belong to us, and the border is now Ili. How can you divide them into internal and external ones?" according to: [Jia, 2011, p. 4]).

It is significant that the Yinzhen Emperor avoided the concept of" Chinese "- Zhongguo Ren , using instead Zhongguo zhi ren- "people of China", to emphasize that they are subjects of the empire, and not ethnic Chinese (Crossley, 2000, p.46). If necessary (including in treaties, for example, Nerchinsk in 1689), the expressions "people of China" were used - Zhongguo zhi ren, Zhongguo zhi min manzh. Dulimbai gurun-i niyalma [Zhao, 2006, p. 14]. Judging by the translation of the" Code of the Chamber of Foreign Relations " (Lifanyuan), the expressions "subjects" or "subjects" of the Middle State are used in relation to the subjects of the Qing Emperor, "Mongols and Chinese", "borders" and "limits" of Mongolia and China, etc. [Lipovtsov, 1828, pp. 67, 70, 287-291].

However, han ren as a self-name remained in the consciousness of the Chinese in the late XIX-early XX centuries. and was the leading among the names. It is most common

page 8
It occurs in contexts that characterize the essence of Sino-Manchu ethnic contradictions, and Han ren (Han Chinese) and Zhongguo ren (Chinese) were used as synonyms in these cases (Kryukov et al., 1993, p. 329).

Hongli denied that the ruling Aixin Gioro clan, or the Manchus in general, had changed under the influence of Confucian civilization or anything else. He argued that cultural identity is absolute and that the Aisin Gioro line, which has dynastic continuity with the earlier dynasties of China (i.e. Han and foreign), is the pinnacle of the primordial civilization of the Northeast, that it rules China because of the unique and hereditary support of Heaven, that the right to universal competence is the mission of the ruler (for more details, see [Crossley, 2000, p. 261-262, 268, 270, 303-304]). This view, different from traditional Chinese, existed until the end of the Qing dynasty.

Consider the legitimation of Qing power for the Mongols - a legitimation quite different from that used for the Chinese.

First of all, it was a succession from Genghis Khan, supported by kinship. For example, Emperor Abahai, or Khuntaiji, belonged to the Genghis Khan line on his mother's side; Xuanye (Kangxi, 1662-1722), partly a Genghisid Mongol, also emphasized this continuity with declarations of ownership of the seal of the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (Puchkovsky, 1963, pp. 340-341; Crossley, 2000, p.212, 224). The title of Bogdokhan (great Khan) was presented to Abakhai by the Mongols. The Manchus declared the preservation of the traditional way of life of the Mongols, a common Buddhist faith and similarity in lifestyle. The Mongols occupied an important place in the imperial administration, and their writing was the basis of Manchu. All emperors had Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese names.

The Mongols were aware of their connection to the Qing Empire, not to China: they became part of "our Great Qing" through the personal vassalage of the Mongol princes of the Manchu dynasty. If the Mongolian stories of the early Qing period are based on the idea of their separateness in the general Indo-Tibeto-Mongol-Manchu Buddhist history, then in the XIX century there were changes. Mongolian stories at this time focus not exclusively on the Mongols in Qing, but rather on the trans-ethnic, Buddhist Qing, in which the Mongols are a part along with the Manchus, Chinese, and Tibetans (Elverskog, 2006, p.135).

In the eyes of Tibetans, the legitimacy of the Qing emperors was associated with the fact that they positioned themselves as world monarchs who exalted Buddhism [Crossley, 2000, p.242] and were associated with the Dalai Lamas-theocratic rulers of Tibet - with a mentor - patron relationship [Shakabpa, 2010, p. 456, 498-501]. Hongli pointed out in the "Sayings for Lamas" written in the Yonghegong Buddhist Monastery that, unlike the Yuan Dynasty, the Qing Dynasty gives lamas the title "mentor of the state", and not"mentor of the emperor". This was not true. As a Buddhist who studied religion and received tantric initiations, Hunli could not help but know that, according to the canons, the lama who gave these initiations became his root mentor (for more information, see [Kuzmin, 2012, pp. 261-273]). The fact is that in Chinese educated circles there was a certain anti-Buddhist bias-this religion, like Taoism, was considered the lot of the common people, and its passion was unworthy of a "noble husband" (naturally, this did not prevent Confucian intellectuals from performing both Buddhist and Taoist rites in everyday life). A Manchu version of a Hongli saying in Yonghegong says, "When I started studying the [Tibetan] scriptures, I was criticized by some Chinese for leaning toward the Yellow Church," i.e., the Galug school. Interestingly, the Chinese version of the phrase does not contain the word "Chinese" (Farquhar, 1978, p. 26). The Buddhist faith of the Manchu emperors, the initiations associated with it, etc., were mostly not reflected in Chinese documents (Uspensky, 1996, p. 43).

page 9
Tibet was a state whose dependence on the Qing Empire was determined by the personal connections of Buddhist hierarchs with the Qing emperors and some very uneven influence of the Manchus on Tibetan politics. However, according to some Chinese officials and chroniclers, it became part of the Qing territory (Lu, 1828, pp. XXP-XXSH; Martynov, 1978, pp. 235-278; Smith, 1996, p. 148). It is difficult to agree that the "mentor-patron" relationship was a self-deception for the hierarchs of Tibetan Buddhism, and the reality was vassal relations with the Qing emperors [Besprozvannykh, 2001, pp. 307-308]. Vassalage must be recognized by both sides (as, for example, in the case of Mongol princes and Qing emperors).

The Tibetan term Rgya-nag, which denoted China, literally meant "black expanse"; the same principle was used to construct the name of India, Rgya-kar, literally "white expanse", as well as the archaic name of Russia - Rgya-ser,"yellow expanse". According to the most widespread opinion, the names of China and India reflected the most common, from the point of view of Tibetans, color of clothing in both regions (in the case of Russia, the name was probably explained by the unusual hair color of the inhabitants) [Das, 1902, p.304, 305, 306]. The concept of "black expanse" did not cover Tibet and did not indicate any special connection between Tibet and China, just as the name Tibet Bod did not cover China [Sperling, 2004, p.34]. Moreover, it is difficult not to notice that, at least from the point of view of toponymy, the Tibetans did not distinguish China from the neighboring regions (since India was almost never a single state, then we can talk about the name of the region).

So, the methods of legitimizing one's power in relation to different peoples in the Qing Empire were different. This was contrary to the Chinese model of world order, which assumed the introduction of" barbarians " to Chinese culture. The Qing emperors, on the other hand, tried to prevent this, as well as the Sinicization of the Mongols and Tibetans. Following Confucianism, they still had official shamans, but they were also sincere Buddhists. The growth of the empire was carried out not at the expense of introducing "barbarians" to Chinese civilization, but at the expense of seizures, imposing relations of vassalage or patronage, but not Chinese acculturation and assimilation (which, of course, could not completely exclude in practice an increase in the share of the Chinese population in the dependent territories and the Sinicization of part of the dependent peoples, but this was precisely the practice rather than state policy; on the contrary, the state tried to fight these processes).

The crisis of the Qing world order concept and the Xinhai Revolution. After the conquest of China, Han assimilation of the Manchus took place, despite the best efforts of the emperors. The fears expressed by Abachai as early as 1636 were fulfilled: "What I fear is that the children and grandchildren of later generations will abandon the Old Path, neglect archery and horse riding, and enter the Chinese path!" (cit. according to: [Elliott, 2001, p. 9]). By the end of Hongli's rule, 80% of provincial officials were Han Chinese (Rigger, 1994, p. 197). In the 19th century, many Manchus forgot their native language, and some began to register as Chinese in order to avoid military service (the Manchus were considered to be part of one class - the military). The French missionaries Yuk and Gabe, observing how the Manchus adopt the Chinese language and customs, and seeing how many Chinese there are in Manchuria, even believed that "the Mandzhur nationality has completely disappeared" (Guk and Gabe, 1866, p. 75).

The transition of the Empire from a tributary to a contractual system of international relations from the second half of the XIX century. it was accompanied by a progressive crisis. The Empire had to abandon the perception of all other countries as "barbaric periphery", unworthy of equal relations. This was a departure from the centuries-old Chinese tradition. To counter the expansion of Europeans, Americans and Japanese, a new policy was adopted - the settlement of remote territories by the Han Chinese.

page 10
Manchuria was the first to be Sinicized. From 1907, when the ban on Han Chinese settling there was lifted, to 1930, the population in this area increased from 17 to 34 million people. Both the Qing leadership and the Chinese Republicans saw this settlement as the only way to keep Manchuria under Beijing's rule [No, 1998, p. 147]. The share of Han Chinese in the population of Manchuria in the 1930s reached 93% [Manchuria, 1934, p. 94]. The inevitable consequence was the Sinicization of the local population.

The new policy extended to Mongolia and Tibet. "According to the project developed and highly approved on December 21, 1906, it was eventually decided to establish 2 departments: the Colonization Department, which will be responsible for the colonization of Mongolia, the construction of railways, the extraction of natural resources, fisheries, etc., and the Border Protection Department, which will be responsible for training troops from the Mongols and Tibetans, the distribution of weapons and weapons to the education, trade development, etc. "[Brunnart, Gagelstrom, 1910, pp. 134-138].

However, some Chinese authors of the time pointed out that the Manchus were still unable to assimilate to the Han, as they were still completely alien conquerors (Zarrow, 2004, pp. 67-107). Moreover, by this time, the Manchus had a well-documented and imperially approved national identity, history, language, and homeland-everything that constitutes a national identity [Crossley, 1990, p. 9]. The Qing Empire clearly preserved the differences between the conquerors and the conquered: "... from this point of view, the Qing Empire was truly a Manchu empire, not a Chinese one: Pax manjurica, not Pax sinica" [Elliott, 2001, p. 5].

In Chinese (Han) society, there was always dissatisfaction with the power of the Manchus, which was expressed in uprisings and the creation of secret societies. "It is our belief that the empire is the empire of China, and not the empire of the Manchu barbarians... Alas! Since the bad Ming rule, the Manchus have taken advantage of the opportunity for unrest in China; they have stolen the empire of China" (from the Taiping proclamation, cit. according to: [Elliott, 2001, p. 23-24]). Later, ihetuani was considered "the first and main evil that disrupted the correct course of the historical life of the Heavenly Empire... the establishment of a non-native Manchu dynasty in 1644 on the "dragon throne of the Son of Heaven", a disagreement with the national traditions and pride of the Chinese people. All the anti-dynastic aspirations of patriotism, embodied in the ideas of secret societies, can be perfectly characterized by the Chinese formula... fu-ming fan-qing-the restoration of the Ming dynasty and the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty" [Rudakov, 1901, p. 3]. It was Han nationalism that was the driving force behind the Xinhai Revolution, which resulted in the abdication of the Manchu dynasty in favor of the republic.

Did the Manchu dynasty legitimately transform its empire into the Republic of China?

First of all, the following fact should be noted: from 1861 to 1908, the empire was actually ruled not by the emperors, but by the Dowager Empress Cixi. It had the status of regent (1st regency - 1861-1873, 2nd-1875-1889, last - 1898-1908) [Bland, Backhouse, 1910, p. 51]. Its first regency was the result of the coup of 1861, which removed the power of the regents appointed by the Yizhu Emperor before his death (Xianfeng, 1850-1861) [Kwong, 1983, p.221-238]. The regent holds all power up to the age of majority of the emperor (this was also confirmed in the imperial decrees on the power and powers of the regent, issued as early as 1908 [AVPRI, f. 188: Mission in Beijing, op. 761, d.1271, 1272]). The Tongzhi Emperor died in 1875 before the age of 20, and according to Cixi's instructions, her nephew Zaitian (Guangxu, 1875-1908) was appointed emperor, which was not entirely legal. He came of age, formally ruled on his own, and conceived reforms that Cixi and her entourage considered dangerous for themselves. In 1898, Cixi took away the imperial seal from Zaitian and on the same day issued a decree on his behalf introducing regency administration -

page 11
the emperor was allegedly unable to resolve many issues related to the management of the empire in a difficult situation and "asked Cixi to take the reins of power back into his own hands" [Usov, 2003, p.16]. Zaitian not only did not rule, but also lived under house arrest, was regularly humiliated, and the day before Cixi's death, he was poisoned by her.

The next emperor, Pui, did not rule as a minor. The regulation on the rights and authority of the Prince Regent was developed by the State Chancellery together with the ministries and general departments and approved by an imperial decree on November 30, 1908. "All state affairs are decided by the Prince Regent and published in the form of imperial decrees under his seal. Moreover, in particularly important matters, the Prince Regent requests a decree from the Dowager Empress Leungyu" [Brunnart and Gagelstrom, 1910, pp. 32-33]. The regent Prince Chun (Puyi's father) resigned on December 6, 1911, shortly after General Yuan Shikai's return to power. The latter preferred to see his weak - willed half-sister Longyu, the widow of Zaitian, as regent. It was she who issued a decree on behalf of Pui on February 12, 1912, abdicating the dynasty and turning the empire into the" republic of the five races " - at the insistence of Yuan Shikai. It said, in part,: "[We] welcome the establishment of the Great Republic of China, which includes all territories inhabited by five ethnic groups, i.e. Manchus, Han Chinese, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans " [Zhongguo dier lishi dang'an guan, 1991: 2.72 - cit. пo: [Zhao, 2006, p. 16]. Three decrees related to the abdication of the dynasty prescribed the founding of a republic, the elimination of all national borders and prejudices, and the preservation of ceremonial rights, generous material support, and so on for the emperor (see [Weale, 1918, p.295-298]). They show the belief of the imperial family that it renounces only political power, but retains all the ancient ceremonial rights and titles - the concept of a republic was incomprehensible to them (Weale, 1918, p. 28-29).

So, since the 19th century, emperors have been removed from power by a regent with questionable legitimacy, who issued imperial decrees herself, and then another regent deposed the dynasty in favor of the republic. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the acts issued by them is questionable, since the functions of the regent are limited to the temporary administration of the empire until the emperor comes of age. The supreme authority of the emperor remained undisputed, and the regent had no right to depose the emperor and eliminate the monarchy.

The problem of continuity of Republican China from the Qing Empire. The Republicans declared a republic in the wake of Han nationalism and did not coordinate their program with the court. Moreover, the local overthrow of the Manchu government was accompanied by the destruction of walls around Manchu enclaves in Han cities and cases of extermination of Manchus [Elliott, 2001, p.93; Zarrow, 2004, p. 94-95]. The decree on the abdication of the emperor did not become the legal basis of the republican state. In the first constitutional regulations of the Republic of China of 1912-1914, there are no references to imperial decrees (for texts, see [Weale, 1918, p. 299-350]). Moreover, Sun Yat-sen's declaration on assuming the post of interim president of China called for the "complete destruction of the remnants of the abominable autocracy", and in his message on renouncing this post in favor of Yuan Shikai (at the grave of Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming Empire) - on the establishment of a free republic and the destruction of a strong enemy of the nation, i.e., theE. Manchurov [Sun Yat-sen, 1985, pp. 121-123; Sidikhmenov, 1985, pp. 288-289; for the text of renunciation, see Giles, 1912]. There were no appeals against the Qing Dynasty abdication decree and later. For example, in the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of China (1946 It is stated that the Constitutional Assembly adopts the Constitution "by virtue of a mandate received from the entire body of citizens, in accordance with the teachings bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen at the founding of the Republic of China" [The Constitution of the Republic of China...].

page 12
By accepting the Qing Empire's treaty obligations to foreign powers, the Republicans demonstrated the Republic of China's succession from that Empire to international treaties. Without this, the republic would not have been recognized by the Powers that needed to preserve their economic and strategic interests there. Yuan Shikai was elected permanent President of the Republic on October 6, 1913. The diplomatic corps demanded to confirm the obligations of earlier (Qing) international treaties. He stated that these obligations will be fulfilled [Belov, 2001, p. 104]. This was the main thing in the international recognition of the new state. According to modern international law, legally, the succession of States occurs when one State ceases to exist, and another begins to exist or gains control over the territory lost by the first. The main question is whether the successor State accepts the international obligations of the predecessor State [West's..., 2008].

However, the historical continuity of the State is not limited to international treaties. The Republic of China (see above) and the PRC did not declare their succession from the Qing Empire. In republican China, most of the features that distinguished this empire from China were discarded, including different forms of legitimization of central power for different peoples (see above). But one of the most important features of the empire, multi-ethnicity, from the very beginning received an analogy in the form of a "republic of five races". Since then, the idea of a "single multi-ethnic China", which was consistently ruled by different dynasties, has been used as a justification for the historical continuity of the Republic of China and the PRC from the Qing Empire. How correct is this concept?

Ever since the capture of Beijing, the Qing emperors have repeatedly pointed out that for them, the Manchus and Han are "one family" and should live without conflicts, which, however, did not prevent them from establishing national divisions and in other decrees unflattering to speak about the Han [Elliott, 2001, p.100-213]. Only at the beginning of the 20th century, when the Qing Empire was already on the verge of collapse, did ideas and petitions spread (including from no less than 18 Manchu, Mongolian, and Han officials from Beijing, Jiangsu, Ningxia, Heilongjiang, Hunan, Anhui, and Guangxi) that China was a multiethnic country, and that it should be considered a multiethnic state. In this country, reforms should take place that reduce the divisions between Han and non-Han, and a strong unified state should be established [Zhao, 2006, p.21-22]. It was not an "imperial Chinese nation" (as Byung Ho Lee (2011, p. 229) believes, for example): the concept of a nation applies only to a nation-State, i.e., one that represents the form of self-determination of a given nation in a given sovereign territory. Such a state was the Republic of China. There, "one family" was understood differently than in the empire: this is not the emperor's paternal concern for all his subjects, but their equality before the laws. How was this equality interpreted?

In the early 1910s, the nation-building of the" father of the republic " Sun Yat-sen was guided by the traditional Chinese model: to make the Chinese the sole nation of the country; assimilation of non-Han was fixed as a program requirement first of the Tongmenghui, then of the Kuomintang. In the late 1910s, another goal was set: to "melt" into a single nation together with the rest, in order to create a new principle of the Chinese nation (zhonghuamingzu ). But in 1921, Sun Yat-sen stated that the Han Chinese should simply be renamed Zhonghua mingzu, i.e., he began to lean towards the original plan [Moskalev, 2005, pp. 86-87].

At the beginning of the Republican era, Western anthropological concepts were widely discussed in China, and attempts were made to" justify "the original kinship of the" five races " [Ishikawa, 2003, p.8-26; Leibold, 2006, p. 188-194, 210-212]. Along with blood relations, environmental factors were also discussed. For example, " according to Chiang Kai-shek, Zhonghua mingzu, which emerged as a result of the merger of the five clans, was formed back in

page 13
the state created by this nation dates back at least 5 thousand years" (Kryukov et al., 1993, p. 350). As stated in Chiang Kai-shek's book, the five nations (or clans) are distinguished in China not by race or blood, but by religion and geographical environment (Chiang, 1947, p.39-40). Many Chinese scientists and politicians of the Kuomintang era have argued that the "five races of China" are related to each other and/or have cultural, economic, political, and historical commonalities. The term" national minority / small ethnic group " (shaoshu mingzu ) for the first time in Chinese history, he appeared only in 1924 at the Kuomintang conference, and in 1926 at the CPC conference [Jin, 1987].

Republican nationalism, based on a traditional sinocentric ideology and increasingly interpreted within the framework of Western concepts (see, for example, [Ishikawa, 2003, p. 8-18]), became the key to obtaining the political legitimacy of the Republic of China within the borders of the Qing Empire. But at the same time, movements of non-Han peoples were spreading, which from the very beginning were directed not so much against the Qing monarchy as against the impending Chinese control over the former imperial territories [Crossley, 2000, p.343].

The presidential mandate of October 28, 1912 stated that the "republic of the five races"was established. After the proclamation of this republic, national movements became more intense. In order to annex Outer Mongolia and Tibet to China, Yuan Shikai unsuccessfully tried to win over Bogdo-gegen VIII and the Dalai Lama XIII, who declared their independence. At the same time, Yuan Shikai used imperial phraseology: China, Mongolia and Tibet have long been "one family", the connection between Mongolia and Tibet, on the one hand, and China, on the other, was destroyed due to the oppression of Mongols and Tibetans by Qing rulers, and now it is time to "eradicate abuses" of the Manchus [Information..., 1912]. This" eradication " took place as follows: by the decrees of Yuan Shikai of April 15 and 21, 1912, the status of Mongolia and Tibet as vassal territories was abolished and they were equated with the provinces of China proper [AVPRI, f. Chinese table, f. 136, l. 126, 158]. As for the Manchus, the prediction of Yuk and Gabe was fulfilled: "If the revolution deposes the current ruling family, then Manjuria will have no choice but to completely and completely merge with the Chinese people" (Guk and Gabe, 1866, p. 82). Interestingly, the French missionaries in this fragment also note the exceptional role of the Manchu dynasty in preserving the ethnic independence of the Manchus, as we wrote above.

As noted by Japanese researchers, the so-called "republic of the five races" was a new political construct that was used to forcibly suppress the legitimate national aspirations of the former Qing "border peoples" who wanted self-determination from Han domination [Leibold, 2006, p.188-191]. In addition, Han nationalists, like the Chinese Communists, saw the " border peoples "as potential allies in the struggle for independence from foreign imperialism and internal feudalism [Leibold, 2003, p. 2]. Despite the declarations of universal equality," national minorities " were in fact initially excluded from the process of nation-building. Citizens of the " five races "were declared equal before the laws, which, however, were written and are written by Han Chinese, and in such a way that they contribute to the cultural and ethnic assimilation of"national minorities".

Thus, the multiethnic nature of the state is not a criterion for the continuity of the Qing Empire and republican China. The latter was created as a state of the Han Chinese, in whose interests other peoples were included in it, despite the declarations of equality.

The continuity is declared and actual. Criteria for the continuity of States as their historical kinship have not been developed, and if in some cases such continuity is obvious, in others it may be a matter of dispute. Good

page 14
An example is the Roman Empire, which largely laid the foundations of modern European civilization. This empire had similarities with China: the sacralization of central power; universalism and claims to world domination; the view of non-Romans as "barbarians"; ideas about the civilizing, cultural and imperial role of Rome; the gradual spread of Roman civilization from relatively small territories to vast areas. The succession from the Roman Empire was claimed by Byzantium (officially called the Roman Kingdom, and its inhabitants-the Romans), the empire of Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Empire. After the capture of Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire became one of the "legal successors"; two states - the aforementioned Holy Roman Empire (headed by the Habsburgs) and the Grand Duchy of Moscow - began to use the coat of arms of Byzantium - a double-headed eagle. In Moscow, the concept of the "third Rome" was developed, which proclaimed Moscow as the sole and last successor of Rome; the genealogy of the Moscow grand dukes was semi-officially traced back to Octavian Augustus.

Most of these "Roman Empires" were located outside of Italy, and their inhabitants and rulers were not descendants of the Romans. At the same time, Rome itself and other Italian territories could be part of states that did not consider themselves the successors of the Roman Empire.

Analogies can be found in the Far East. States that adopted the Chinese-centric concept of Zhongguo began to use the Chinese concept of dynasties. These "dynasties" (ciao )themselves - a phenomenon that is fundamentally different from what is meant by dynasties in European history (Doronin, 1995, p. 153-158; Kuzmin, 2010, p. 455-473). There were several "foreign dynasties of China" - in fact, when neighbors seized China and it was completely or partially part of foreign states. Such states often adopted Chinese political rhetoric, declaring themselves the only empire in the world (however, such a discourse was most actively used by the conquerors in the Chinese part of their empires proper). China's neighbors, who were part of the Pax sinica-the Far Eastern sphere of Chinese cultural dominance-often tried to apply not only Chinese characters or Confucian rituals, but also political ideology: the Emperor of Vietnam in the early 19th century. he declared his state China - the Middle State (Trung quoc), and the non-Vietnamese-barbarians; the term "Middle State" was also used as a self-designation in Japan, and it was believed that Japan is the "golden mean" not only in terms of geographical location, but also in terms of climate, growth and morals of the inhabitants and etc.

Conclusion. Thus, the self-names of States and declarations of their succession from one Power or another do not in themselves create historical continuity. Formation, structure, socio-cultural concepts, methods of government, and national policies distinguish the Qing Empire from China as a state, which was the Ming Empire before it, and then became the Republic of China and the PRC. The Qing Empire was not China. However, the name "China"was used, although it often had different meanings. In reality, Manchu-occupied China was only one part of the Qing Empire. Qing China is not a state, but a part of the empire, which can be described with the same justification as, for example, Qing Turkestan. "The Qing Empire was a Manchu empire ruled (at least at the top) by an ethnic minority, as an unambiguously multi-ethnic and multi-lingual enterprise" (Horowitz, 2004, p. 477). The declarations of the Manchus that their country is the main, Middle state are similar to the declarations of the German, Ottoman, Russian and other monarchs about their continuity with the Roman Empire. They are not the subject of international law and cannot be the basis for any legal conclusions - they are facts of history and culture, but not of jurisprudence.

page 15
As Chinese scholars rightly point out (for example, [Wang, 1999, p. 304, 395]), the Chinese worldview underwent major changes in the course of Chinese imperial history. However, these changes are more logically explained not within the same empire with different dynasties, but by the fact that Chinese and foreign "dynasties", in particular Ming and Qing, are different empires, and therefore their understanding of the fundamental principle of the "Middle State" was different.

The Han national state-the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China - acquired almost the entire territory of the Qing Empire, not because of the continuity of the existence of a single state, but because of the re-occupation of the lands of neighbors much weaker than China. Such seizures were impossible (or only possible in some cases) when other empires (such as the Ottoman, German, and British empires) collapsed due to internal and international reasons. But in this case, the great powers felt that their interests would be better served in a "united China" than in the states that regained their independence after the collapse of the Qing Empire. The "unity of China" within the Qing borders is a product of Han and Western imperialism. The modern view of the People's Republic of China as a multinational state of the "one Chinese nation", which has existed continuously for several millennia and, at least since the Middle Ages, included modern" national minorities", is a historical myth.

LIST OF LITERARY TEXTS

AV / 1RI Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire.

Batsaikhan O. Mongol tuuhiin ekh survalzh (1911-1921) (Original sources on Mongolian history (1911-1921). Ulaanbaatar. 2010.

Belov E. A. Brief history of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1913. Moscow, 2001.

Bssprozvannykh E. L. Leaders of Tibet and their role in Tibeto-Chinese relations of the 17th-17th centuries. Волгоград, 2001 // http://window.cdu.ru/window_catalog/filcs/r25629/volsul96.pdf.

Bichurin N. Ya.Statistical description of the Chinese Empire, St. Petersburg, 1842.
Brunnart I. S., Gagslstrom V. V. Modern political organization of China. Beijing, 1910.

Vedomost ' o kitayskoy zemle [Bulletin on the Chinese Land]. Strany i narody Vostoka, Moscow, 1961, Issue 2.

Galsnovich Yu. M. Russia in the "Chinese Mirror". Interpretation in China at the beginning of the XXI century of the history of Russia and Russian-Chinese relations. Moscow, 2011.

Geograficheskoe i istoricheskoe opisanie Kitayskoy imperii [Geographical and Historical Description of the Chinese Empire].
Grimm E. D. Collection of treaties and other documents on the history of international relations in the Far East (1842-1925). Moscow, 1927.

Gyuk and Gabe. Journey through Mongolia to Tibet, to the capital of the Thale Lama. Moscow, 1866.

Jambadorji. Crystal Mirror // Istoriya v trudakh uchenykh lam [History in the Works of Scientists], Moscow, 2005.
Dmitriev S. V., Kuzmin S. L. What is China? Sredinnoe gosudarstvo v istoricheskom mythe i real'noi politike [The Middle State in the Historical Myth and Real Politics]. 2012. № 3.

Supplements to Historical Acts, 1857, vol. 6, No. 6 / III // http://www.vostlit.info/Tcxts/Dokumcnty/China / XVll/1600-1620 / Rus kit 1/121-140/134.htm

Doronin B. G. Were there Chao (dai) dynasties? // Society and the State in China, Moscow, 1995.
Kryukov M. V., Malyavin V. V., Sofronov M. V., Chsboksarov N. N. Etnicheskaya istoriya kitaytsev v XIX nachale XX veka [Ethnic history of the Chinese in the 19th and early 20th centuries].
Kuzmin S. L. Hidden Tibet. History of Independence and Occupation, St. Petersburg, 2010.
Kuzmin S. L. Otnosheniya "mentornik - pokrovitel" i problema statusa Tibeta [Mentor-patron relations and the problem of the status of Tibet]. Ulan-Ude Publ., 2012.

Lipovtsov S. Code of the Chinese Chamber of Foreign Relations, St. Petersburg, 1828, vol. 2.

Lu Huazhu. Description of Tibet in its present state. St. Petersburg, 1828.

Manchuria. Ekonomiko-geograficheskoe opisanie [Economic and Geographical Description], Part 1, Harbin, 1934.
Martynov A. S. Status of Tibet in the XVII-XVIII centuries. Moscow, 1978.

Moskalev A. A. Nation and Nationalism in China, Moscow, 2005.
Spanin O. E. History of China: the era of the Qing. XVII - beginning of XX V. M., 2005.

Puchkovsky L. S. The idea of continuity of the origin of the Khans in the Mongolian Chronicles of the XVII-XIX centuries / / Proceedings of the 25th International Congress of Oriental Studies, Moscow, 1963. Vol. 5.

Rudakov A. I-he-tuan Society and its significance in recent events in the Far East. According to official Chinese data. Vladivostok, 1901.

Collection of agreements between Russia and China. 1689-1881 St. Petersburg, 1889.

page 16
Information about the countries of the Far East. Irkutsk, 1912, No. 3.

Sidikhmsnov V. Ya. Manchu rulers of China, Moscow, 1985.

Sun Yat-sun. Selected works, Moscow, 1985.
Usov V. N. The Last Emperor of China. Well (1906-1967). Moscow, 2003.

Tibetan Buddhism in Beijing under the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) in the Cultural and historical context of the Epoch. Authorsf. doct. diss. SPb., 2004.

TSGADL Central State Archive of Ancient Acts.

Israel. The ultimate cause of religions in Mongolia / / Istoriya v trudakh uchenykh lam. M., 2005.

Bland J.О.P., Backhouse Е. China under the Empress Dowager. Being the History of the Life and Times of Tzu Hsi. L., 1910.

Byung Ho Lee. Forging the Imperial Nation: Imperialism, Nationalism, and Ethnic Boundaries in China's Longue Durée. Ph. D. Diss. Univ. of Michigan, 1911.

Chiang Kai-shek. China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory. N.Y., 1947.

Crosslcy P.K. Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China // Late Imperial China. 1990. Vol. 11. N 1.

Crosslcy P. A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 2003.

Das S.Ch. A Tibetan-English Dictionary with Sanskrit Synonyms. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Book Dcpt. 1902 (Reprint: Delhi. 2000).

Elliott M.C. The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China. Stanford, 2001.

Elvcrskog J. Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China. Honolulu, 2006.

Farquhar D.M. Mongolian Versus Chinese Elements in the Early Manchu State // Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i. Vol. 2. 1971. N 6.

Farquhar D.M. Emperor as Bodhisattva in the governance of the Ch'ing Empire // Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1978. N 38(1).

Giles H.A. China and the Manchus. Cambridge, 1912. http://www.gutcnbcrg.org.

Ho P. 1998. In defense of Sinicization: a Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's "Rccnvisioning the Qing" // Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 57. N 1.

Horowitz R.S. International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century // Journal of World History. 2004. Vol. 15. N 4.

Ishikawa Y. Anti-Manchu Racism and the Rise of Anthropology in Early 20th Century China // Sino-Japanese Studies. 2003. Vol. 15.

Jia J. Whose Xinjiang? The Transition in Chinese Intellectuals' Imagination of the "New Dominion" during the Qing Dynasty // Harvard-Yenching Institution Working Paper Ser. 2011. http://www.harvard-ycnching.org/sitcs/ harvard-ycnching.org/filcs/fcaturcfilcs/Jia%20Jianfci_Whosc%20Xinjiang.pdf.

Jin B. When Docs the Word "Minority Nationality" [Shaoshu Minzu] [first] Appear in our Country? // Nationality Solidarity (Minzu Tuanjie). 1987. Vol. 6 // http://www.columbia.edu/itc/calac/barnctt/pdfs/link21-jinbanggao.pdf.

Kwong L.S.K. Imperial Authority in Crisis: An Interpretation of the Coup d'Etat of 1861 // Modern Asian Studies. 1983. Vol. 17. N. 2.

Lcibold J. Rethinking Guomindang National Minority Policy and the Case of Inner Mongolia // China Reconstructs. Lanham, 2003.

Lcibold J. Competing Narratives of Racial unity in Republican China: from the Yellow Emperor to Peking Man // Modern China. 2006. Vol. 32. N 2.

Li D. "The Central Kingdom" and "the Realm under Heaven" Coming to Mean the Same: the Process of the Formation of Territory in Ancient China // Frontier History of China. 2008. Vol. 3. N 3.

Liu A. Two Rulers in One Reign: Dorgon and Shun-chih 1644-1680. Canberra, 1989.

MacMurray J.V.A. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China. 1894-1919. N.Y., 1921.

Rigger Sh. Voices of Manchu Identity // Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers. Seattle, 1994.

Shakabpa W.D. One Hundred Thousand Moons. An Advanced Political History of Tibet. Vol. 1. Leiden-Boston. 2010.

Smith W.W. Tibetan Nation. A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations. Boulder, 1996.

Sperling E. The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics // Policy Studies. 2004. Vol. 7.

The Constitution of the Republic of China // http://www.taiwandocumcnts.org/constitution01.htm.

Wang Q.E. History, Space, and Ethnicity: the Chinese Worldvicw // Journal of World History. 1999. Vol. 10. N2.

Wcalc B.L.P. Fight for Republic of China. L., 1918.

West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Ed. 2. 2008. The Gale Group, Inc. // http://lcgal-dictionary. thcfrccdictionary.com/Succcssion+of+Statcs.

Zarrow P. Historical Trauma: Anti-Manchuism and Memories of Atrocity in Late Qing China// History and Memory. 2004. Vol. 16. N 2. Special issue: Traumatic Memory in Chinese History.

Zhao G. Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century // Modern China. 2006. Vol. 32. N 1.

page 17

Permanent link to this publication: