The article deals with the history of the Persian Cossack Brigade in 1882-1885, when it was commanded by P. V. Charkovsky. During this time, the brigade acquired a classic look, which was not formally changed until the end of the XIX century. Outwardly, it was a well-organized, well-equipped and well-trained military unit, but it had certain internal problems. The Russian Foreign Ministry's view of the brigade as a political project prevailed. His main goals were to prevent British instructors from joining the Iranian army and to strengthen Russian influence on the Shah. The result was an emphasis on external training in the training of the team. Combat capability and internal integrity were sacrificed to ostentatious effect.

Key words: Iran, Persian Cossack Brigade, V. P. Charkovsky, Head of Persian Cavalry training.

The Persian Cossack Brigade (hereinafter referred to as PKB; officially known as His Majesty the Shah's Cossack Brigade) is a unique military unit of the Persian Army that existed under the leadership of Russian instructors from the moment the first regiment was formed in 1879 until 1920 (in 1916 it was reorganized into a division). Its creation was initiated by the Russian envoy to Tehran I. A. Zinoviev. It was closely connected with the Russian conquest of Akhal-teke and the struggle with Great Britain in this regard, as well as for influence at the Shah's court [Khidoyatov, 1969, pp. 348-423]. Despite the available publications [Gokov, 2003; Gokov, 2008; Krasnyak, 2007; Ter-Oganov, 2010; Ter-Oganov, 2012; Rabi and Ter-Oganov, 2009], some fragments of its history require more detailed study. One of them is the period from 1882 to 1885, when Pyotr Vladimirovich Charkovsky was the commander of the PKB, or the Head of training of the Persian Cavalry (hereinafter referred to as the Head), as his position was officially called. So far, its activities in Iran1 have been described in the most comprehensive way in a study by N. A. Abramovich.K. Ter-Oganova [Ter-Oganov, 2012, pp. 62-67]. But the internal problems and the real state of the PKB are poorly covered by him. In this article, I try to give the most complete analysis of the activities of P. V. Charkovsky and the situation of the brigade during the period under review.

The first Head was Lieutenant Colonel, then Colonel of the General Staff (hereinafter referred to as the General Staff) Alexey Ivanovich Domontovich, who stayed in Persia from 1879 to 1882 and liked Shah Nasreddin [Krasnyak, 2007, p.72-78; Ter - Oganov, 2012, p. 52-62]. In 1882, at the end of the contract, A. I. Domontovich, despite the requests of the Shah, was not retained in his post. The reason for this was the conflict with I. A. Zinoviev [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 392]. By order of the Minister of War P. S. Vannovsky, from March 1882, the Caucasian authorities were concerned about finding a new candidate for the post of Head. On the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District

1 In the text, the names "Persia" and "Iran" will be used synonymously. Iran was called by its inhabitants themselves, and Persia was called by Europeans.

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Lieutenant General P. P. Pavlov's General Staff, approved by General A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov, Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasus and Commander of the troops of the Caucasian Military District, appointed at the beginning of 1882, it was decided to send Colonel P. V. Markovsky, who was part of the Kuban Cossack Army, instead of A. I. Domontovich.

The new Manager came from the Petersburg nobility. He was born on April 15, 1845, and graduated from the Pavlovsk Cadet Corps, the Mikhailovsky Artillery School, and the Nikolaev General School Academy. He joined the service on September 29, 1861. He served in the Life Guards horse artillery brigade. With the rank of captain, he participated in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. During the first year of the war, he was awarded the Orders of Vladimir of the 4th degree with swords and a bow, St. Stanislaus of the 2nd degree and St. Anna of the 2nd degree with swords. After completing the crash course of the General School Academy, he was released to the General School. In March 1878, he was renamed Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff, and in August he was promoted to colonel for distinction. In 1879, he was awarded a gold weapon for the campaign. From March 1878 to January 1879, P. V. Markovsky was a division commander of the Horse artillery brigade and served as Chief of Staff of the 1st Caucasian Cossack Division. From January 1879 to October 1882, he was listed only as Chief of staff [Glinoetsky, 1882, p. 174; List of generals by seniority, 1891, p. 840; List of Generals by seniority, 1896, p. 659]. At the same time, he was an active participant in military intelligence in the Caucasus. While in this position, P. V. Markovsky was appointed Secretary of the Trebizond Consulate [RGVIA, f 446, d. 44, l. 19] 2. In the Ministry of War, neither the Chief of the General Staff N. N. Obruchev nor the head of the Department raised any objections to the candidacy, which was reported to the envoy in Tehran [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 8-9].

On June 5, 1882, Emperor Alexander III authorized the appointment of Colonel of the General Staff P. V. Markovsky to the post of Head of training of the Persian cavalry [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 19-20] 3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed about this. Since the Shah insisted on the speedy arrival of a new Head [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 16], N. K. Gira, who was appointed Foreign Minister on March 28, 1882, telegraphed the charge d'affaires in Teheran (I. A. Zinoviev was on vacation in Russia) to urgently start negotiations on resuming "at the previous level". based on a contract for our instructor" [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 27]. On July 16, the Russian charge d'affaires in Tehran, K. M. Argiropulo, signed a new three-year contract with the Shah's government [RGVIA, f.446, d. 44, l. 52-53] 4.

The terms of the contract basically repeated the text of the agreement of 1879 [Krasnyak, 2007, p. 79; RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 52, 57-59; Ter-Oganov, 2012, p.63-64; Browne, 1910, p. 228-232]. It was written in French and Persian and consisted of eleven articles. The first of them stated that P. V. Markovsky was appointed by the Caucasian authorities to replace A. I. Domontovich for three years as a military instructor of the Persian "Cossacks". He was charged with the training and drill of cavalry units designated by the Persian Ministry of War, according to the Russian model. The second article stipulated that 3 officers and 5 constables were appointed by the Caucasian administration to assist the colonel. It was stated that the colonel should give the names of the members of the military mission to the envoy in Tehran, and the latter-to the Iranian government.

The third article was devoted to the issues of material and financial support. The manager was to receive 2,400 tumans (24,000 French francs) per year,

2 In fact, he was a secret military agent.

3 In the short service record of P. V. Markovsky was listed as " Head of training of the Persian cavalry and commander of a brigade of three horse regiments and a horse battery." He held this position from October 4, 1882 to February 14, 1885 [List of generals by seniority, 1896, p. 659].

4 The text of the contract was agreed with the Chief of the Caucasian Military District.

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paid quarterly, and daily forage for five horses. The chief officers were left a salary, as under A. I. Domontovich-each about 1,200 tumans (12,000 French francs). The content of the constables was 20 fogs per month or 240 fogs per year per person5. The fifth article stipulated that this money should be paid starting from the date of signing this agreement. The sixth article stated that 400 tumans (4006 francs) - an advance for two months-should be issued to the colonel on the day of signing the contract. Under the fourth article, instructors were required to receive 100, 75 and 24 semi-imperials from the Persian government to pay for their travel, 6 respectively. According to article ten, at the end of the contract, the Persian government undertook to pay the officers the same amount of travel expenses for returning to Russia. At the same time, the right to them was retained by members of the military mission, if "the agreement is canceled at the request of the Persian government before the end of the specified period."

The seventh article stated that in all matters related to the service, the colonel must act in accordance with the instructions of the Persian Ministry of War, to which he is subordinate. The same ministry was obliged to pay him a salary. By the eighth point, the Iranian government was obligated to compensate P. V. Charkovsky for all travel expenses made by the colonel on his orders. The ninth article stated that the colonel could not cancel or change the provisions of the contract, and could not leave the service of the Persian government before the end of the three-year term. The exception was illness, which would have made P. V. Charkovsky unable to perform his duties. The colonel was allowed leave of absence for a period not exceeding three months, "if his health or private affairs require it." But in this case, the general staff member was not entitled to receive any payments (including salaries). from the Tehran government. Similar conditions were recorded for other members of the military mission. According to the last, eleventh article, instructors from the moment of receiving the amount for travel expenses through the Russian diplomatic mission within two and a half months had to arrive in Tehran.

At the same time, the process of enrolling the colonel in a new position was taking place. As noted, since 1879, he was secretary of the Trebizond consulate, being a secret military agent. According to tradition, before being appointed to this post, P. V. Charkovsky was dismissed from military service with the retention of his full-time position, but without pay, the right to be promoted to the next rank, etc., and was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the renaming of the rank of collegiate adviser. 7 Therefore, when sending him to Persia, the reverse procedure was necessary. This required coordination between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were completed in early July. By the highest order of July 16, P. V. Charkovsky was returned to military service and renamed Colonel of the General Staff [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 43]8. And on July 18, P. P. Pavlov was instructed to sign the head of the General Staff of the Russian Army.-

5 In the report of K. M. Argiropulo [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 52], for some reason it was indicated that the salary of the constables was increased. In fact, the financial conditions for hiring instructors in comparison with the contract of A. I. Domontovich remained unchanged.

6 Semi-imperial-a Russian gold coin with a value of 5 rubles.

7 In the "Table of Ranks", this civil rank corresponded to the military rank of colonel.

8 This practice was typical for covert military agents who were acting in positions of responsibility for a civilian agency. As a rule, such officers were dismissed from military service and enlisted in civilian service with a rank corresponding to their military rank according to the" Table of Ranks", and then sent to work abroad. Basically, the Ministry of War used the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including consular ones, as a "cover". The reason for the transfer from department to department was the decree of Peter III of February 18, 1762 "On granting liberties and freedom to the entire Russian nobility" [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire, 1830, No. 11444, pp. 912-915]. However, virtually every case was decided separately and approved by the emperor. Some authors, apparently unfamiliar with these features, mistakenly indicate that "Markovsky was awarded the rank of colonel, and he was enlisted in the General Staff" [Krasnyak, 2007, p. 8; Tsr-Oganov, 2012, p.63].

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General Staff officer N. N. Obruchev to summon P. V. Charkovsky from Trebizond to Tiflis. Upon arrival, the colonel received an eight-day vacation [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 45-46]. His trip to Iran was delayed because one of the new instructors, Cornet Denisov, sent by the General Staff, was expected in Tiflis [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 46-47]. Finally, in August, the mission left for Tehran. Along with the change of the Head, there was also a change of Russian instructors. Esaul E. A. Makovkin was retained by the Caucasian authorities for a second term. In addition to him, Esaul Menyaev and Cornet Denisov were appointed officers of the Kuban Cossack Army [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 53]. As for the constables, some of them were replaced, and some remained for the second term [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 27].

The new commander clearly did not have the same initiative in political affairs as his predecessor, but he knew his job well and tried to do it. During his command of the PKB, P. V. Charkovsky brought the number of people in the brigade to 900 9 by including 300 muhajirs in it. Muhajirs were natives of Transcaucasia (Erivan and Baku regions) who left it after the signing of the Turkmanchay Peace Treaty of 1828 and settled in Persia [Kolyubakin, 1883, p. 61-62; Mamontov, 1909, p. 91]. A. I. Domontovich was assigned 400 men from the irregular cavalry of muhajirs, who were distinguished by extremely weak discipline [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 391]. V. A. Kosogovsky wrote that " under Charkovsky, it was possible to convince the remaining 300 Teheran muhajirs, 10 who at the initial formation of the brigade did not want to become Cossacks and sat in best 11, to enter the brigade on the same conditions on which the first four hundred were accepted, that is, with the preservation of their ancestral or military status. hereditary content" [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 392]. Following V. A. Kosogovsky, modern researchers claim that the part of muhajirs who did not agree to serve in the brigade, through the efforts of P. V. Charkovsky, was enlisted in the brigade under the same conditions as their compatriots [Krasnyak, 2007, p. 79; Ter-Oganov, 2012, p.64].

However, it seems to me that this transfer took place not only at the insistence of the colonel, but at the request of the Muhajirs and the Shah themselves. Initially, the Muhajirs reacted negatively to attempts to enroll them in the PKB. Their boss openly harmed A. I. Domontovich, not wanting to lose his position. However, the situation has changed over time. The main thing in this change was the financial support and status that its first commander achieved for the brigade. When the Muhajirs ' salaries were getting worse from year to year, the stable situation of their tribesmen who were in the PKB could not but attract them. At the same time, the inclusion of the remaining Muhajirs in the PKB ranks temporarily solved the problem set by A. I. Domontovich. In 1880, he wrote to I. A. Zinoviev that the situation of muhajirs who were not included in the brigade has a corrupting effect on their fellow tribesmen - "Cossacks" (Krasnyak, 2007, pp. 132-133). In particular, the first Manager drew attention to the fact that, without performing any service, they live in Tehran and enjoy their maintenance. "Such facts," he wrote," have a very unfavorable effect on the "Cossacks" who are performing a rather difficult service, forcing them to avoid it with all their might " [Krasnyak, 2007, pp. 132-133].

In 1883, P. V. Charkovsky formed the third regiment and the Kadam squadron, i.e. veterans (in this case, old people), out of muhajirs of different sexes and ages.

9 This figure should be taken as rounded. The exact number of "Cossacks", unfortunately, is not known.

10 N. K. Tsr-Oganov names a figure.in 250 Teheran muhajirs [Tsr-Oganov, 2012, p. 59], and A. I. Domontovich reported about 200 people who lived in Teheran and evaded admission to PKB [Krasnyak, 2007, p.132].

11 A place that gives anyone persecuted by the authorities the right of temporary inviolability (a mosque, a foreign embassy, etc.).

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He enrolled women and children as pensioners, who continued to receive the hereditary salary of muhajirs in the form of pensions. In addition, the colonel transformed the Guards half-squadron into Squadron 12 and formed a choir of musicians [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 393]. In October of the same year, as a gift from the Russian Emperor Alexander III, the PKB received 4 guns of the 1877 model and 532 charges for them [Kublitsky, 1884]. On the basis of these guns in 1884, P. V. Charkovsky formed a horse battery at the PKB [Ter-Oganov, 2012, p. 65].

These changes were related to Russia's foreign policy plans in the Middle East. In 1881-1885, the empire conquered the Turkmen lands, which were partly claimed by Persia. Russia's advance provoked a response from the British, who sought to create an anti-Russian bloc in the Middle East (Davletov and Ilyasov, 1972; Turkmenistan's annexation to Russia, 1960, pp. 549-797). Therefore, maintaining peaceful relations with Iran and attracting the Shah's favor to Russia were among the most important tasks of Russian diplomacy. The PKB served as one of the instruments of foreign policy influence.

The structure of the team began to look like this. At its head was a colonel of the Russian General Staff, who was in charge of training the Persian cavalry; Russian officers and constables were considered his assistants-naibs. The PKB consisted of three regiments: two from muhajirs and one from volunteers. "When forming, the staff in each regiment was supposed to have four squadrons, and in the third-only personnel for four squadrons" [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 481, l. 5]. The number of regiments of the brigade according to the lists was 800 people 13. "In the 1st and 2nd regiments 300 people each, in the third about 150 and in the battery about 50," wrote Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 146]. In addition to them, there was a guards squadron, a Kadam squadron and a musical choir. At the head of each regiment was an Iranian general with the rank of sarhang (colonel) or sartip (general). He was usually subordinate to a junior Russian officer-instructor. These Russian officers were the actual regimental commanders. In each regiment, a Russian officer had at his disposal one constable, with whose help he trained the regiment [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. "They are held in high esteem by the Persian officers," wrote Misl - Rustem, " who shake hands with them and obey them in everything. This is due to the fact that Russian constables are much more educated and know how to behave better with the lower ranks" [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p.148]. The regiment, or fouj, was divided into 4 squadrons (hundreds), which were commanded by Iranian staff officers. According to Misl-Rustem, who observed the PKB, the latter "try to recruit as many people as possible to their squadrons from their "nukers", i.e. servants, or peasants of their villages and related villages. With such nookers, they are better off, get more profit, and it is easier to manage them" [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. Each squadron was divided into 4 deste (platoons). Each regiment had a banner with the Persian coat of arms. They were kept either in the colonel's apartment or in the duty room.

At the disposal of the brigade were barracks, stables, storerooms for fodder. There were small workshops (in which the "Cossacks" themselves repaired weapons and equipment), tseikhgauzy, a blacksmith shop and an infirmary. All this was located in the central part of Tehran. PKB officers, including the Head of the Department, lived in houses located opposite the barracks (Misl-Rustem, 1897, pp. 142-146). "Cossacks" who were not in the

12 And not "added to the brigade", as O. A. Krasnyak and N. K. Ter-Oganov claim [Krasnyak, 2007, p. 79; Krasnyak, p. 3; Ter-Oganov, 2012, p.64]. The Guards half-squadron, modeled on the Russian Life Cossacks, was formed by the first Head. It consisted exclusively of officers.

13 In one of the latest works on the history of Russian foreign policy, the absurd figure of "2,000 well-armed cavalrymen" intended to become the shah's personal guard is given [Sergeev, 2012, p. 175].

14 Pseudonym of one of the PKB instructors esaul Msnyasva.

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They lived partly in barracks, partly in apartments in various parts of Tehran [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 515, l. 204]. P. V. Charkovsky sought to equip the unit entrusted to him on the model of European armies. Through his efforts, the exterior of the premises (especially the infirmary, kitchen and barracks) was kept clean and tidy. In 1883, by order of the colonel, a duty room was made [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 143].

The appearance of the "Cossacks" was as close as possible to that of the Russian ones. They wore the uniform of Caucasian Cossacks. The first regiment was dressed in the uniform of the Kuban Cossack army with red beshmet and papakh tops. The second regiment wore the uniform of the Terek Cossack Army with blue beshmet and papakh tops. The third was distinguished by green beshmet and papakh tops. On the shoulder straps of the "Cossacks" were embroidered the "initials" of the regiment to which they belonged. The uniforms of the batteries copied those of the Russian"Kuban". The Guards squadron was equipped in the uniform of the Russian Life Guards Cossack Regiment. On solemn occasions, its soldiers and officers wore red uniforms, in everyday life-blue, trimmed with braid, and Circassians. Armament consisted of Caucasian daggers and sabers, as well as rifles of the Berdan No. 2 system. The latter, however, were issued only for the duration of exercises [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p.141]. It should be noted that the appearance of the "Cossacks" Russian instructors followed, starting with the creation of the unit. This was explained by the psychological impact that well-equipped cavalrymen exerted not only on the Shah, his entourage, and the residents of Iran in general (thus raising the status of Russia in their eyes), but also on foreign observers (Medvedik, 2009, p.120).

Initially, the composition of the PKB was formed exclusively from cavalrymen. "Those who wanted to join the brigade brought a horse with a saddle," wrote Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 141]. D. N. Curzon reported that " the lower ranks should have their own horses, but to keep them in order and replace them with new ones in case of loss or damage, each person is allowed to use 100 cranes every year in excess of the prescribed amount" [Kurzon, 1893, p. 134]. In reality, the treasury saved on these "vacations". All the horses were stallions. Only in the Guards squadron were they a certain color-gray. The PKB had state-owned horses. They were used for the internal needs of the brigade, a group of musicians rode on them, and a battery was transported [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 481, l. 6].

PKB was trained according to abbreviated Russian military regulations, which were translated into Persian. Classes were held at the Meydan-e Meshk training ground, located near the brigade barracks. At first, each "Cossack" was trained separately, then squadron, regimental and all-brigade exercises were conducted. In addition, they practiced driving and jig racing.

A certain idea of the training of the brigade is given by the testimony of the Russian officer A.M. Alikhanov-Avarsky. He visited Persia in mid-1883 and observed the PKB Guards squadron that formed Nasrudin Shah's personal guard. "A few minutes later, the Shah's escort squadron passed us in a platoon, with music at its head, perfectly dressed in red Circassians," A. M. Alikhanov - Avarsky described his impressions of the review of the troops accompanying Nasreddin Shah on his trip to Bujnurt. we are talking about the Life Guards of His Majesty's Cossack regiment, the Cossacks of which formed the convoy of the Russian emperor. - O. G.); even the officers were in Russian epaulettes" [Alikhanov-Avarsky, 1898, p. 157]. "As far as one can tell from a single playthrough, the imitation seems to have succeeded this time not just by appearance alone... the squadron made such an impression on us (the officers who watched the review - O. G.) that it seemed that it could, without any exaggeration, enter the environment of any European army with dignity" [Alikhanov-Avarsky, 1898, pp. 157-158].

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Under P. V. Charkovsky, the PKB also received its first baptism of fire 15. In 1882, 100 " Cossacks "were" among other troops "sent by the Persian government to the Astrabad region"to curb the Turkmens." Then, in 1884, 300 people were sent, and in 1885 - 100 people [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 20]. Unfortunately, all that is known about the details of the expeditions is that among the "Cossacks" 28 rifles were killed and lost [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 20]. The latest expedition against the Yomud Turkmens was reported in the collection of the Russian Military Ministry as follows:: "In 1885, an expeditionary force was sent to the Atrek River to pacify the Yomud Turkmens. During the performance, it consisted of 1,600 infantry, 200 Cossacks, 16 and 200 irregular cavalry, a total of 2,000 people. 600 people arrived at Atrek, the rest deserted along the way" [Collection of the latest information on the armed forces of European and Asian states, 1894, p. 804].

However, the external gloss could not cover the internal decomposition. The PKB was increasingly permeated by the system of relations characteristic of the Persian armed forces and society as a whole. The main problem remained financial. P. V. Charkovsky was forced to resort to extensive savings measures, as a large amount of money was spent on the maintenance of pensioners. In addition, the team's funding system required the Manager to be able to solve economic issues in such a way as to avoid riots in the PKB and at the same time preserve its appearance. The latter was more important to Nasrudin Shah than combat capability.

A. I. Domontovich's remark about the "sloppy issuance of money for the maintenance of the brigade", which "hinders the proper conduct of business", still remained relevant [Krasnyak, 2007, p. 133]. In the Persian army, there was a complex system of issuing sums for the maintenance of individual military units [Vrevsky, 1868, p. 29; Francini, 1883, p. 27-28]. Since the PKB was part of the Iranian armed forces, it was also subject to generally accepted norms. The entire system of financing was "tied" to the Minister of War, who distributed the country's military budget. And in the case of the PKB, it was he who was the most important obstacle, since he kept part of the brigade's funds in his favor. It should be noted that a significant reason for the financial troubles of the PKB was also the fact that initially no long-term documents defining budget allocations, their expenditure and reporting were agreed and signed. In fact, everything was carried out on the basis of agreements between the Russian Mission and the Shah and the Minister of War each time a new Head was appointed. As a result, P. V. Charkovsky was constantly faced with untimely disbursement of money for the maintenance of PKB [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 4]. In addition, money was paid to the team only starting a few months after the beginning of the year [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 90]. The budget for 1882-1883 was 66,536 tumans [Ter-Oganov, 2010, p. 77] and had no tendency to increase. Misl-Rustem described the financial side of the brigade's life as follows::

"The colonel is granted a certain amount of money for the brigade, according to the budget approved by the Shah ... but all the money will not be given to him: having withheld a lot in favor of the war Ministry, and even "saraf" the tax collector will collect interest, since checks are issued for receiving money prematurely. Then the colonels must sometimes present, like real Persians, gifts to the Minister of War and even to the Shah... After all, these gifts also cost a lot, which should cause savings, in view of which, especially in the summer, half of the people in the team are on vacation, while everyone is listed" [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p.150]. In addition, "the salary of the third regiment was issued in addition to the Russian colonel and was paid extremely inaccurately" [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 90].

15 N. K. Tsr-Oganov erroneously calls the first such action an attempt to use the brigade in 1895 to disarm the Turkmen Yomud tribe [Tsr-Oganov, 2012, p. 86].

16 The number of" Cossacks " differs here from that indicated in the certificate of one of the following PKB commanders.

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The cost savings resulted in a reduction in the quality of training of the team's personnel. I had to save on almost everything. Thus, the above-mentioned author, who observed the PKB for about 6 years, reported that P. V. Charkovsky "dressed people in shirts for the summer, and hid Circassians in tseikhgauz, on the one hand, on the occasion of the heat, and on the other - to save Circassians" [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p.151]. There was a gradual departure from the principles of management laid down by A. I. Domontovich. An indicator of this was the case when P. V. Charkovsky decided not to give portion money to his hands, so that they would not be spent for other purposes. "But he did not manage to do this for long," Misl - Rustem reported, " there was a murmur, and the food stopped cooking." "The fact is, "he explained," that the Persian Cossack manages to feed his entire family with the rations he receives, but it is unthinkable to do this from a cauldron" [Misl - Rustem, 1897, p.145]. Thus, the idea of the first Manager that the provision of food for people should not be given to each rider, retreated before the realities of Persian life. The result of financial problems was that by the time the contract ended, the colonel failed to provide "reports on spending amounts" in time. The Russian envoy described this as a "misunderstanding" [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 5]. And it consisted in the fact that the Minister of War Kamran Mirza withheld part of the payments in the amount of 6000 tumans in his favor [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 393]. Nevertheless, with each new Manager, the "misunderstanding" grew and in the end almost led to the liquidation of the PKB.

Under P. V. Charkovsky, such a general Persian phenomenon as the transfer of part of the brigade's personnel "on leave"became widespread. Continuing to be registered in the PKB, soldiers were released to their homes to earn money. This made it possible to save their salaries (half-pay was supposed to be allocated to a soldier on vacation), but it also caused complaints about the colonel in an effort to enrich himself at the expense of the "Cossacks" [Misl-Rustem, 1897, pp. 151-152].

Externally, the structure and activities of the PKB looked quite respectable. However, it is difficult to fully agree with the opinion of A. Rzhevussky, expressed at the beginning of the XX century, that " The Persian Cossack Brigade... it occupied a special position in the Iranian armed forces and by that time was already a well-organized military unit" [Krasnyak, 2007, p. 80; Ter-Oganov, 2012, p.65]. Indeed, by Persian standards, the PKB was an elite unit with good organization and funding. At the same time, external indicators should not obscure internal processes.

As stated in the "Report on issues related to the current situation of the Persian Cossack Brigade", compiled in October 1907, at the very beginning of its existence, the PKB was an "ordinary, only better trained" part of the Iranian army [Rybachenok, 2012, p. 452] 17. Thus, despite the relatively regular training of Cossacks (three times a week, no more than two hours each (Kublitsky, 1884, p. 71)), the main thing that the PKB was taught was a jig show and a fashion show, or a ceremonial march (Alikhanov - Avarsky, 1898, p.223). "All the people who are at the head of the army," explained one of the officers who observed the PKB in 1883, "including the Minister of War Naib os-Soltane, have no idea about military affairs and consider it the height of perfection if a unit marches approximately evenly in a ceremonial march" [Kublitsky, 1884, p.71]. "The brigade goes through the ceremony wonderfully," noted Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 149]. An extremely negative description of the PKB was given by the Russian officer A. M. Alikhanov-Avarsky, who visited Khorasan in 1883. Its number does not always reach even 750 people, 18 he said. "This one is basically

17 The PKB was separated from the rest of the army only in 1896, with the psrspodchinsnism se to the First Minister - Sadraz [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 515, l. 58].

18 Full-time strength of a cavalry regiment in Russia.

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a militia cavalry regiment (So in the text - O. G.) is quite arbitrarily called a brigade, and even more so - a Cossack one, because, apart from the costume of the Caucasian mountaineers, this part has nothing in common with the Cossacks" [Alikhanov-Avarsky, 1898, p.222]. The training of the brigade, from the point of view of the European military, was far from in the best condition. The internal reason for this, most likely, was not the colonel's unwillingness, but the lack of funds. P. V. Markovsky took care of the PKB, but had to adapt to the existing conditions.

Thus, "during the 6 years that I stayed in Persia, the brigade did not have a single live ammunition firing exercise" [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p.149]. "Why waste expensive ammunition?! - quoted the statement of the Minister of War, the third son of Nasrudin Shah, Kamran Mirza Naib os-Saltane A.M. Alikhanov-Avarsky. -...After all, in wartime, you will have to shoot not at birds, not even at single people, but at the masses, at which even our boys will not miss! " [Alikhanov-Avarsky, 1898, pp. 212-213]. It was necessary to save cartridges, since there was nothing to replenish their loss. "I know for certain," Kublitsky reported , "that at the present time in the Cossack brigade, the entire combat set of cartridges for 600 Berdan 19 rifles is limited to two and a half thousand, i.e. only four cartridges per gun" [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 69]. At the same time, they were not always spent rationally, and not through the fault of the Manager. Thus, due to the poor quality of local gunpowder, cartridges from Russian rifles were used for idle firing on the orders of the Minister of War at the Shah's maneuvers of the Tehran garrison [Kublitsky, 1884, p.68]. The same applied to artillery:

"For 1883 to 1898," the new commander of the PKB V. A. Kosogovsky reported to the envoy K. E. Argiropulo in 1898, " The Persian Cossack battery, because it was impossible to replenish the shells released, did not fire live shells at all, only from time to time releasing a few grenades for the amusement of the Shah. The consequence of this is that, being well trained in drill and action with guns, officers and servants in fact have no idea about firing live shells" [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 38].

The PKB was also only partially privileged. It consisted in the fact that the "Cossacks" were trained by Russian instructors, the brigade was under the patronage of the Russian diplomatic mission and its salary was paid regularly in comparison with other units of the Persian army. Otherwise, the PKB was an integral part of the Iranian armed forces, which was subject to most of their rules and shortcomings. The brigade was part of the Tehran garrison. Contrary to popular belief [Kalugin, 2003, p. 364; Rybachenok, 2012, p. 451; Sergeev, 2012, p. 175; Strelyanoe (Kalabukhov), 2007, p. 215; Shishov, 2012, p. 20], the brigade was neither a personal convoy nor the Shah's guard. Escort functions were performed only by "Cossacks" from the Guards squadron, who accompanied the Shah on trips around the country. Under Nasruddin Shah, the "guard" and personal units protecting the Persian ruler were Ghulams (Krasnyak, 2007, p. 57; Frankini, 1883, p. 20-21).

As already noted, the brigade had barracks, stables, fodder storerooms, and other household and living quarters at its disposal. However, Misl-Rustem, who observed them from the inside, reported that some of the existing buildings were decorated for show to visiting senior officials, and the main buildings were not updated and gradually fell into disrepair [Misl-Rustem, 1897, pp. 142-146].20
19 D. N. Curzon incorrectly stated in his work the number of berdanki donated by the Russian government in 1000 pieces [Curzon, 1893, p.126; Curzon, 1966, p. 588]. This figure was followed by other researchers [Andreev, 2006, p. 57; Zoka, 2001, p. 68]. In fact, in 1879, the Shah wanted to buy 1,000 rifles and 300,000 rounds of ammunition from Russia [Astrakhan-Gilyan..., 2004, p. 39; Khidoyatov, 1969, p.370]. However, for the brigade, the Russian emperor in the same year gave only 600 Bsrdan No. 2 rifles free of charge [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 20].

20 However, it should be noted that this author does not always say which of the colonels of II. V. Markovsky or N. D. Kuzmin-Karavaev who succeeded him-the sketches belong to.

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Another negative phenomenon that "overwhelmed" the PKB was an overabundance of officers. The fact is that in military production, the brigade commander was not independent and could not regulate it. As part of the Persian armed Forces, the PKB also fell under their practice of forming a command corps. "The quality of officers is also ignored here - they are produced not only by the Minister of War for a fee, but also by the brigade commander himself without much discrimination" [Alikhanov-Avarsky, 1898, p.233]. In addition, the Shah himself made officers for making offerings. There was an unwritten rule in the Persian army, according to which all ranks from naib (sub - lieutenant) to sultan (captain) were complained by the commander of the fouj, from sultan to sartip (general) - by the Minister of War, and sartip became only at the behest of the Shah [Collection of the latest information about the armed forces..., 1894, p.797]. A colonel could be promoted independently to the sultan without informing the Persian ruler.21 Only the approval of the Minister of War was required. However, M. A. Alikhanov-Avarsky was not quite right in criticizing the brigade commander. In Russia, the heads of individual units had the right to submit for production as staff officers and award [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 121]. The first Managers also sought control over the chin production.

PKB commanders were put in such a position that they had to put up with assignments "from the outside". To an ignorant person, especially accustomed to the strict system of promotion to officer ranks in the European armies, it seemed that the Manager was promiscuous in his choice. But under the rules that prevailed in the armed forces and administration of Persia, rank production became a profitable item for the producer. It is difficult to say how much the first two colonels used their position to improve their own financial affairs. There is no direct information of this kind about P. V. Charkovsky. Perhaps he adopted the practice of his predecessor regarding the production of non-noble "Cossacks" as officers, as he was forced to struggle with the privileged position of former residents of the South Caucasus. It can be assumed that the colonel also promoted muhajirs to officers in order to gain their loyalty. Those who considered themselves descendants of prominent muhajirs "found service in the lower ranks of the brigade humiliating" [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 393]. The same situation was observed when non-native muhajirs were appointed as commanders over high-born muhajirs. Therefore, the Manager was forced to maneuver to avoid intra-team conflicts. As for the sale of ranks, Misl-Rustem extended his thoughts about the financial impurity of the brigade commanders to the first three colonels, based on rumors and misunderstood actions [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p.150].

Indirect information shows that P. V. Charkovsky enjoyed great authority among his subordinates [Misl-Rustem, 1897, pp. 145-146]. There is no doubt about his competence: he did a lot to equip the PKB, developed the "Manual for training Cossack Horse Artillery", translated into Farsi and published in Tehran in 1885. [Ter-Oganov, 2012, p. 65]. Foreign observers noted that "the influence of seconded Russian officers continues to be noticeable" [Armed Forces of Persia..., 1888, p. 129]. From the outside, the brigade really made an impression. The English physician Williams wrote: "Three years ago (the Russian translation was published in 1887 - O. G.), the Shah had three Cossack regiments that received the correct salary, with Europeans as instructors. I have never seen a more beautiful train of soldiers and horses" (Williams, 1887, p. 179). The activity of Russian instructors had an external effect. Williams ' opinion was shared by many

21 The information given by N. P. Mamontov [Mamontov, 1909, p. 92], who visited Iran in 1908 and wrote that the promotion of officers was entirely dependent on the Head, is of a later nature and is not applicable to the period under review.

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observers. Fears that these regiments represent a serious military force were clearly expressed in the political circles of Great Britain [Medvedik, 2009, p. 117; Rothstein, 1960, p. 221]. Nevertheless, during the period under review, the Russian government was not interested in creating an organized armed force in Persia [The most recent report of Lieutenant-General Kuropatkin..., 1902, p.60]. In this context, an interesting question that still remains open is the colonel's attitude to the Russian diplomatic mission in Tehran.

N. K. Ter-Oganov claims that there was a conflict between P. V. Charkovsky and A. A. Melnikov in 1885. The reason for it, as in the case of A. I. Domontovich, was the desire of the PKB commander to achieve the status of a military agent and greater independence from the Russian diplomatic representative [Ter-Oganov, 2012, p. 109]. Unfortunately, the author does not provide any references to the documents or details of the conflict. Sources that I know of do not allow me to say with certainty that there are sharp contradictions between representatives of the Russian Empire in Tehran. Therefore, if there were any, they are waiting for their researcher. However, this question is important for a better understanding of the history of PKB and requires a little explanation.

A. I. Domontovich, according to the envoy, made the same demands as P. V. Charkovsky, according to N. K. Ter-Oganov. And it should be noted that from the point of view of the position of the Head and personally his first commander of the PKB had a reason to do this. The fact is that up to the beginning of the 1890s, only the duties of the Manager were defined in writing, but not his rights.22
"Having left Russia by order of the Caucasian authorities with the constables, I found myself in the position of an entrepreneur here," wrote A. I. Domontovich. "The constables are dependent on the money question, the officers are paid by the Persian government, and I don't even have any instructions from my superiors as to their relationship to me. The authority of a regimental commander, with all his actual rights, is hardly sufficient in such circumstances. Here, in the midst of a Muslim, fanatical people who do not value their lives in any way, we are faced with the demand for various shy and not always understood rules. The slightest mistake, slowing down the officers in the execution of my instructions can bring evil " [Krasnyak, 2007, p. 130].

On December 5, 1892, the next Head - Colonel of the General Staff N. Ya. Shneur-received the shah's destikhat (handwritten order), which established new rules for managing the brigade. On this occasion, he wrote to his superiors: "this is the first attempt to establish some order in the brigade and determine in writing the rights of the Head of training of the Persian cavalry, since until now everything was done according to established custom" [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 89]. A. I. Domontovich, heading the PKB, formally, he was listed as a staff officer for assignments of the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District, who was on a business trip. In the case of P. V. Charkovsky, this drawback was apparently taken into account - he was officially appointed commander of the PKB. However, it was a palliative solution. Formally, he remained only one of many commanders of military units, even if he was in a somewhat privileged position. In Iran, where position and status were of great importance, this hindered, reducing the authority of the Head of both the highest dignitaries and the Muhajirs of the brigade, especially the noble ones.

A military agent (attache) was an official representative of the Russian Ministry of War abroad. He was included in the diplomatic corps, enjoyed appropriate privileges and was subordinate to the envoy in political matters [RGVIA, f. 401, on. 4, D. "On military agents and persons holding their positions"]. Neither the first nor second Managers had any of this, with the exception of dependence on the head of the diplomatic corps. The brigade commanders will simultaneously appear as-

22 O. A. Krasnyak, on not quite clear grounds, claims that according to the contract, "the Russian officer - commander of the brigade was granted great rights" [Krasnyak, 2007, p. 75]. This is fundamentally wrong.

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They were secret military agents, i.e. they were supposed to deliver intelligence information to the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District. The status of a military attache would have made colonels more active in this area. And so the workload of brigade affairs did not allow them to fully perform the functions of military intelligence.

In addition, the colonels were in a delicate position. Formally, according to the contract, they were supposed to report to the Minister of War (and informally-to the Shah). As representatives of Russia, they were required to coordinate all their actions with the head of the Mission. And as secret military agents, PKB commanders depended on the command of the Caucasian Military District (although this dependence was less than the first two). As a result, Managers found themselves in triple overlapping subordination. The main problem in this situation was how to behave in the event of a conflict of interests between the Shah's and Russian sides. Failure to comply with the wishes of the Persian ruler or the Minister of War led to a deterioration of their attitude towards the head and PKB. In turn, ignoring or incomplete implementation of the instructions of the Russian Mission could provoke a conflict with it and recall from Tehran. Based on the above, it is not surprising that P. V. Charkovsky actually addressed the envoy and the Caucasian authorities with requests to strengthen his position. However, the facts proving this are not yet known. Judging by the external signs, P. V. Charkovsky, apparently, in contrast to A.I. Domontovich, did not seek to play an independent role, trying to fulfill the instructions of the Russian Mission.

In June, due to the end of the contract, V. P. Charkovsky went to Russia [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 393]. Prior to the arrival of the new Manager, the performance of his duties was entrusted to esaul E. A. Makovkin. Together with the colonel, 2 officers and 1 constable from the mission left Persia. The rest decided to continue their service in the PKB.

Thus, during the command of P. V. Charkovsky, the PKB acquired a classic look, which did not formally change until the end of the XIX century.23. Outwardly, it was a well-organized, well-equipped and well-trained military unit. However, the internal problems that have manifested themselves in the brigade since its inception have become more pronounced during the period under review. They remained outside the attention of outside observers, but gradually began to have an increasing impact on the internal climate of the PKB and its position. After A. I. Domontovich's replacement and I. A. Zinoviev's transfer to the post of Director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the view of the PKB as a political (partly even advertising) project prevailed. Its main goals were to prevent British instructors from joining the Iranian army and to satisfy the Shah's need for a well-trained military unit with Russian hands. The result was an emphasis in brigade training on external training, where combat capability and internal integrity were sacrificed for ostentatious effect. In the future, this played a negative role, putting the PKB on the verge of liquidation in the first half of the 1890s.

list of literature

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Andreev A. I. Tibet in the Politics of Tsarist, Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Publishing House; Nartang, 2006.

Astrakhan-Gilan in the history of Russian-Iranian relations. Astrakhan: Astrakhan State University Publishing House, 2004.

Armed Forces of Persia by Lobcl Jahresbcricht, 1887 / / Collection of geographical, topographical and statistical materials on Asia, 1888, Issue 29.
Vrevsky A. B. Persia // Voenno-statisticheskiy sbornik [Military Statistical Collection], St. Petersburg: Voennaya tipografiya, 1868, Issue 3.
23 The only exception was Kadam, which was liquidated in 1889. [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 393].

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The most comprehensive report of Lieutenant-General Kuropatkin on his trip to Teheran in 1895 to carry out the highest emergency assignment entrusted to him // Appendix to the Collection of Geographical, Topographical and Statistical Materials on Asia. 1902. № 6.

Gokov O. A. Russian officers and the Persian Cossack Brigade (1877-1894) / / Canadian American Slavic Studies. 2003. Vol. 37. № 4.

Gokov O. A. The crisis in the Persian Cossack Brigade. 1889-1895 P. / / Clio. 2008. № 2.

Glinoetsky N. P. Historical sketch of the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. A special application. Saint Petersburg: Tip. Headquarters of the Guard Troops and Pstsrb. voen. okr., 1882.

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Zoka Ya. The Army of Iran in the Qajar era. 2001. № 5.

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Kolyubakin A.M. Essay on the armed forces of Persia in 1883 and the population as a source of recruitment of the Persian army (Compiled from Russian and foreign sources) / / Collection of geographical, topographical and statistical materials on Asia, 1883, Issue 4.
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Krasnyak O. A. Russian military Mission in Iran (1879-1917) as a tool of Russia's foreign policy influence [Electronic resource] Access mode: http://www.hist.msu.ru/Scicncc/Conf/01_2007/Krasniak. pdf.

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Mamontov N. P. Ocherki sovremennoi Persii [Essays on Modern Persia], St. Petersburg: Printing House of V. F. Kirshbaum, 1909.
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Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). F. 446. D. 44, 46. F. 401. Op. 4. D. 57. D. "On military agents and persons holding their positions". On. 5. d. 61, 481, 515.

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Collection of the latest information about the armed forces of European and Asian states, St. Petersburg: Military Printing House, 1894.

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Strsyanov (Kalabukhov) P. N. Cossacks in Persia. 1909-1918 Moscow: Tsntrpoligraf Publ., 2007.

Tsr-Oganov N. K. The Persian Cossack Brigade: the Period of Transformation (1894-1903). 2010. № 3.

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Shishov A.V. The Persian Front (1909-1918): Undeservedly forgotten Victories, Moscow: Veche Publ., 2010.

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