V. A. KOROCHKINA
Saint Petersburg State University
"Arab spring" Keywords:. Palestinian Authority, Middle East, Israel, "Palestinian spring"
The authorities of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) have twice announced the beginning of the "Palestinian spring". The first time was in September 2011, when Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority, submitted an application to the UN for Palestine's admission to membership in the organization.1 The second time was a year later, when discontent caused by higher prices and lower living standards resulted in protests in Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus and Ramallah. Then rioters threw stones at a portrait of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and called for the resignation of Abbas himself, who blamed Israel for the crisis.2
During the two years of the Arab Spring, popular protests failed to change the internal political situation in the Fatah - controlled West Bank and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Gaza Strip. For what reason?
The events that began in Tunis in December 2010 and affected a number of countries in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East, dubbed the "Arab Spring", will definitely have far-reaching consequences, according to the American historian Rashid Khalidi*, with a possible change in the balance of power in the region3. Russian orientalist A. M. Vasiliev, in his analytical review "Tsunami of Revolutions" - one of the first publications in our scientific literature about the "Arab Spring" - noted that there will no longer be dictators obedient to Washington who could ignore the opinion of their own peoples.4
The attitude of the United States towards the Palestinian-Israeli problem, in particular, remained unchanged: formal support for the idea of creating two states within the 1967 borders with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, Egypt,and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine. 5 In Israel, the revolutionary events are seen as the most inopportune moment for any decisions and concessions and are characterized as "a movement not forward, but backward", as "an Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, anti-democratic wave" .6
Indeed, there were concerns that the Islamists who had come to power in Egypt might join forces with Hamas in Palestine and seek to renegotiate the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Thus, M. Morsi, who was elected president of Egypt in June 2012, admitted that "agreements must be respected, but they can naturally be amended" 7.
There have been no significant changes in relations between the Middle Eastern States and Israel. Although there were events that would seem to indicate the opposite.
So, four times since the removal of Egyptian President X. Mubarak's Egyptian-Israeli gas pipeline exploded, putting relations between the two countries at risk. In Cairo, a 13-hour attack on the Israeli Embassy ended with the removal of the flag of this state and the hoisting of the flag of Egypt on the building against the background of a cheering crowd. Peaceful, unlike Cairo, anti-Israeli sentiments in Amman also resulted in demonstrations in front of the Israeli embassy: in the Jordanian capital, more than a thousand people, including representatives of the Islamic Action Front (Jordan's main opposition party), trade unions, demanded the termination of the Israeli mission in the country, the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador and the cancellation of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty of 1994 G. 8 Despite this, the King of Jordan tried to revive the negotiation process by bringing together Palestinians, Israelis, and representatives of the Middle East Quartet in his capital.9
Thus, there is no progress on pales-
* Rashid Ismail Khalidi - Professor at Columbia University, Co-chair of the Center for Palestinian Studies at the Middle East Institute at the Columbia School of International Affairs and Public Policy, editor of the academic journal Palestinian Studies (http://www.palestine-studies.org/journals.aspx?href=current&jid=).
** The Quadrilateral Institute of International Mediators for the Middle East Settlement ("Quartet") was formed in late 2001, consisting of Russia, the United States, the EU and the UN. The creation was initiated by Russia and the European Union. The international legal status of the Quartet was actually enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution No. 1397 of March 12, 2002.
the Palestinian issue, in general, has not gained priority in the international arena. But the Palestinian issue has remained important to many Islamist groups, some of which see the liberation of Palestine as a central issue for the Islamic world.
Thus, the supreme spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood (BM) in Egypt, Muhammad Badi, noted that the "Arab Spring" is a threat to the "enemies of Islam" both in the Arab world itself, represented by "pro-Western regimes", and for Israel, because the people rose up in search of their freedom and dignity, and that "the banner of Islam flies high." The Brotherhood hoped to unite peoples in Arab and Islamic countries to "solve the problem of the Arab and Islamic nation", the core of which is the settlement of the Palestinian issue. Thus, Islamists view the Arab Spring revolutions as a necessary psychological and political background for the liberation of Palestine and all occupied Arab territories.10
SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN PNA
In Palestine itself, a similar situation of uncertainty and large-scale political turbulence in the region has forced various Palestinian forces to relegate resistance to the Israeli presence to the background.
On January 28, 2011, thousands of Palestinians, organized by Hamas in support of anti-government protests in Egypt, took to the streets of Gaza. They expressed anger at the negotiators (Fatah leadership) with Israel due to the fact that the day before documents were leaked to the press confirming their readiness to make greater concessions to Israel than was officially reported. The protesters demanded that the FATAH leadership defend Palestinian interests without any concessions, stop the practice of coordinating the actions of the PA with the Israeli authorities on security issues, and stop persecuting Palestinians for political reasons.11
On March 15, 2011, young protesters simultaneously took to the streets of Gaza, Ramallah, Bethlehem and East Jerusalem. This gave rise to the March 15 protest Movement, in which the main role was played by people who were not religious and not tied to either Fatah or Hamas. Nevertheless, the demonstrators demanded an agreement between these warring Palestinian political organizations.12
The authorities in the autonomous region feared that events would develop according to the Egyptian scenario.13 However, once again, the protesters ' anger was directed not against internal forces, but against the Israeli authorities in the occupied Arab territories.
In August 2011, after a triple attack from the territory of the PA, which killed 8 Israelis, tensions between the parties to the conflict increased. As a result of retaliatory bombing by Israeli aircraft in Gaza, 15 people were killed, one person was killed and 18 people were injured from rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza. In addition to the Israeli and Palestinian casualties, 5 Egyptian security personnel were killed.
Some analysts have suggested that, firstly, the escalation of the conflict during this period could be related to the planned negotiations for the release of G. Shalit (an Israeli soldier abducted by Palestinian paramilitary groups) in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons. Secondly, these events may well have been aimed at disrupting Abbas ' plans to seek recognition of the State of Palestine in the UN14.
Diplomats of the" Middle East Quartet " took into account that the head of the PA would not cancel his decision to apply to the UN Security Council, so they tried to condition this event by the start of negotiations with Israel by the Palestinian side. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to immediately sit down at the negotiating table with Abbas.
The problem was that the conditions put forward by the Israeli side were unacceptable to the Palestinians in advance (it was about maintaining Israel's military presence in the Jordan Valley, extending its sovereignty to large settlement blocks, and recognizing the "Jewish character" of Israel by the Palestinians)15.The Palestinians, on the other hand, did not rule out this possibility, but refused to sit down at the negotiating table with the Israelis to discuss proposals that were not based on the 1967 borders and without a complete cessation of Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank. 16
Israel's reaction to the steps taken by the head of the PA at the UN in the fall of 2011 was extremely aggressive. The Israeli Cabinet discussed, among other measures, the possibility of revoking the Oslo Accords in whole or in part*, accelerating the pace of construction in Jewish settlements, and unilaterally annexing major Jewish settlements in the West Bank17.
Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations Ron Prosor announced plans to build 1,100 new residential buildings.-
* The Oslo Accords are the unofficial name of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, signed on 13 September 1993 by M. Abbas and Sh.Perez in Washington.
The United States has called it "counterproductive" and "disturbing."18 The Palestinians had little hope that Washington would thwart these Israeli plans, especially after President Barack Obama's "pro-Israel speech" at the opening of the UN General Assembly in September 2011, in which the United States held out its support to Israel. which included the phrase that "Israel is surrounded on all sides by belligerent neighbors." 19 Against this background, Abbas, returning to Ramallah from the United States on September 25, 2011, announced the beginning of the "Palestinian Spring" 20.
Another diplomatic victory for the Palestinians in the process of international recognition of their statehood was achieved on October 31, 2011, thanks to the admission of the PA to UNESCO. The very fact of membership in this organization is symbolic, since it allows the autonomy to obtain the status of a world heritage site for historical sites on its territory. This happened despite threats from the United States, Israel, and other countries to stop funding the organization.21 The US position on Israel's settlement activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as on Abbas 'efforts at the UN, only increased Palestinian skepticism about the Americans' ability to mediate in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
The actions of the head of the PA, aimed at recognizing the Palestinian quasi-state entity in the UN, were perceived ambiguously in the autonomy itself. In particular, Prime Minister S. Fayyad believed that the political consequences would lead to a deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the autonomous region. The PA is financially dependent primarily on Israel, with financial aid from abroad totaling 14% of GDP, while 22% of jobs are in the public sector of the economy, and therefore depend on budget funding.22
The tax policy implemented by the Israeli authorities in relation to the PA during the year led to higher prices, an increase in the budget deficit, and an increasing stratification in society. In the West Bank, mass protests were held demanding lower prices for basic necessities and pay salaries to state employees. There were also calls for the resignation of the President of the PA and the Prime Minister.23 As a result, the "Palestinian spring" received a new impetus, due to the decline in living standards in the West Bank.
The West Bank economy is severely constrained by the 1994 Paris Protocol, which defines the nature of economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The protocol obliges the PNA to equalize the prices of certain goods and its VAT rate with Israel's, forces Palestinians to use Israeli currency, and regulates customs procedures at border crossings with Jordan and Egypt. Restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on the export of goods from the West Bank significantly limit the potential of the Palestinian economy. In addition, Israel has the power to deviate from the Protocol without serious consequences.24
In this situation, M. Abbas and S. Fayyad objectively needed to express solidarity with the protesters. Thus, the head of the PA, avoiding responsibility for the decline in the standard of living of Palestinians, called for protests, not only against his government, but against the Israeli authorities.25 Indeed, the Palestinian public blamed the economic crisis not only on the authorities in Ramallah, but primarily on external forces and, especially, Israel.
Thus, if the "Palestinian spring" at its first stage could be called a movement against maintaining the status quo in relations with Israel and for consolidating Palestinian political forces, fueled by indignation at the resistance of Israel and the United States to the steps of the Palestinian leadership in the international arena, then by September 2012 the situation had changed. The protests were caused by the socio-economic situation in the PA.
Against the background of the prevailing protest mood in the Palestinian society, the UN General Assembly in November 2012, by a majority vote, awarded Palestine the status of a non-member observer State26. The increase in status meant that Palestine was recognized as a State (previously considered by the UN as an entity) occupied by another country.
Israel and the United States opposed granting Palestine statehood, arguing that such serious issues should be resolved through dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis, "through agreements reached by the parties, and not through UN resolutions that completely ignore vital issues of security and national interests for Israel." 27
HAMAS AND ATTEMPTS TO REACH INTRA-PALESTINIAN CONSENSUS
In addition to the actions of the Palestinian side to recognize its statehood in the international arena, the discontent of the Israeli authorities is caused by the possible presence of Hamas in Israel.
as part of the newly formed Government of National Unity 28. After all, Hamas, like Islamic Jihad, does not recognize the legitimacy of the occupation and the State of Israel itself. Palestine, according to Hamas, is a single territory that cannot be divided or have separate parts, and the current state is considered as temporary.
The protests that began in 2011 prompted Fatah and Hamas to resume negotiations to resolve the internal Palestinian divide. On May 4, 2011, in Cairo, the PNA leader M. Abbas and the head of the Hamas political bureau H. Mashal signed an agreement to create a Palestinian-wide government of "independent technocrats" and hold parliamentary and presidential elections within a year. At a meeting in Doha on February 6, 2012, Qatar mediated an agreement that Abbas himself would take over the post of Prime Minister. But the agreement was not implemented at that time, as both movements decided to wait for the results of the presidential elections in Egypt and the outcome of the conflict in Syria29.
The fact is that the revolutionary events of the "Arab Spring" in Tunisia and Egypt brought to power movements close to Hamas in ideology. In Tunisia, the moderate Islamist Ennahda party won the parliamentary elections. In Egypt , the Freedom and Justice Party was created by the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the parliamentary elections.
Hamas is inextricably linked to the Egyptian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. They, as well as the Jordanian brothers, are, as Dr. Larbi Sadiqi (a Middle East specialist and senior lecturer at the University of Exeter, UK) has so aptly pointed out, links in the same chain-more so than other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood.30
Thus, if the consequences of the Arab Spring for Fatah are related to the loss of one of its allies after the fall of the X-regime. After Mubarak and the departure of Amr Suleiman* from the political arena, the "geography" of the "Arab Spring" looked favorable for Hamas. The logic of a proper (for Hamas) development of events could lead to a full-fledged Palestinian "Arab Spring".
Overcoming existing differences and engaging with Fatah in a spirit of reconciliation is an integral part of this process, since, according to Hamas, Fatah has made many mistakes over the years, allowing external influence to lead it off the course of statehood and devalue the idea of Palestinian self-determination. In addition, in order to achieve political unity and a unified Palestinian position in relations with the international community, Hamas must learn to rule together with Fatah and make efforts to make this possible. As Dr. L. Sadiqi has pointed out, following the example of pro-Islamic forces in countries from Morocco to Egypt, power sharing and pluralism should be the main leitmotif of Palestinian politics. 31
The Arab uprisings and the Syrian crisis have changed the political map of Hamas, bringing it closer to Qatar. Doha's interest lies primarily in further weakening the Syrian regime and isolating Iran, as well as, as many analysts point out and cannot disagree with, directly participating in Palestinian affairs as a mediator between Hamas and the West**.
Relations between Fatah and Hamas have been far from warming recently, despite Egypt's repeated attempts to reconcile the West Bank (Fatah) and the Gaza Strip (Hamas). This is evidenced by the Hamas boycott of local council elections in the fall of 2012, which resulted in very low voter turnout in the West Bank.
Due to the boycott of Hamas, the main competition for Fatah was made up of independent candidates and representatives of various left-wing groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). At the same time, the results of the first stage of the election showed victory in many cities for candidates who had previously been expelled from Fatah. Thus, the Palestinians expressed distrust of Abbas and the Fatah old guard, which in light of the rise of Hamas in the wake of the "Arab Spring" was a serious blow to Fatah's authority.
The PA's extreme dependence on financial assistance from international and regional donors, an acute budget deficit estimated at $1.5 billion, 32 a high level of corruption in the government, the ongoing occupation, and unsuccessful attempts to form a national unity Government have all contributed to growing discontent in Palestinian society with the FATAH Government.
Such circumstances prompted the leaders of Fatah, Hamas and other Palestinian movements to actively address socio-economic problems, as well as to start negotiations.
* Vice-President of Egypt in 2011 Lieutenant General, since 1993 headed the General Intelligence Service. He was considered one of the possible successors of H. Mubarak.
** The role of Qatar in the revolutionary events of the "Arab Spring" is covered by many Arab researchers, one of whom is Mouin Rabbani (writing editor of the Middle East Report and co-editor of the online publication Jadaliyya), as well as Russian experts (I. L. Konstantinov, Middle East Institute).
on the formation of the Government of national unity, as evidenced by the meetings
M. Abbas met with H. Mashal in Cairo during 2011-2012. Thus, the stake was placed on resolving the internal situation in the PNA. The parties did not dare to use the new realities in the international arena to review relations with the Israelis from the position of a state of war with the "occupier".
It seems that today there is no need to talk about active resistance to the occupation. Yes, there were attempts to break through the sea (annual "Freedom Flotillas" since 2010) and land (storming the Syrian-Israeli ceasefire line in May and June 2011) borders of the occupied territories, there was an activation of paramilitary groups in the Sinai Peninsula and in Syria. But all this was happening against the background of stagnation in the process of negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, caused, among other things, by the wait-and-see attitude of the United States regarding the development of events in the region as a whole.
Islamist groups view the now relatively calm Palestinian situation as "in need" of a revolution. Meanwhile, the current state of affairs is explained, in our opinion, by the following factors.
First, internal Palestinian divisions prevented national forces from rallying around a single national idea.
Secondly, there is a stagnation in the internal political life of the PA: No presidential elections have been held since 2005, and no parliamentary elections have been held since 2006. The situation in the autonomy is complicated precisely because of the change of power in the West Bank, where there is already a question of who will lead the PNA and Fatah after the departure of 77-year-old M. Abbas.
Third, the passivity of the Palestinians is related to the lack of a serious alternative to the current political elite of the autonomy and to the realization of their weakness towards Israel after the first (from 1987 to 1993) and second (from 2000 to 2005) Palestinian intifada and the last major Israeli operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009)..
Fourth, in the current situation, the majority of Palestinians choose to deliberately isolate themselves from politics instead of resisting. A consumer model is being formed in Palestinian society, which by definition undermines the national spirit. The priority among young people is not social and political activity, but personal life, starting a family and finding a job. In addition, Palestinians, unlike citizens of other countries in the region, enjoy some political liberties.33
Fifthly, many Palestinians do not take to the streets, fearing the repressive security services of Fatah and Hamas, as well as the Israeli military.
Sixth, in the eyes of the Palestinians, the main culprit of their internal difficulties is not the Governments of M. Abbas in the PA or Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza, but Israel, whose occupation hinders the establishment of normal life and isolates Palestine from the rest of the world.
At first glance, the internal political situation in Palestine seems static and does not correspond to the intensity of the past "Arab Spring", but the resignation of Prime Minister S. Fayyad in April 2013 on the principle of a" lightning rod " may be a harbinger of the fact that the authorities of the autonomous region will not stand and will not withstand the next wave of protest actions. The alternative to the interrupted process of institution-building in the field of financial policy and security "according to Fayyad" is to return to the previous economic situation and increase the degree of authoritarianism of the political regime.
This claim is based on the fact that the figure of S. Fayyad was a kind of tool for attracting foreign financial assistance to the autonomy. 34 In the event of a suspension of American and European financial injections, the arrival of Qatar in their place is a moot point, due to the fact that Doha "sponsors" Hamas.
In addition, the Prime Minister, who positioned himself as an adherent of democratic principles of governance and transparency of the political process, inspired hope that the internal political situation in the PA would develop exactly according to this scenario. S. Fayyad had a chance to compete with M. Abbas in the question of a successor. However, according to some analysts, his attempts to limit the patronage system and reduce the corruption component in the political system of the autonomous region led to his resignation.35
Rami Hamdall, rector of Al-Najah University, and Secretary General of the Central Election Commission, who, like his predecessor, is formally unaffiliated with any of the Palestinian political movements, served in this position for less than a month.36
The resignation of S. Fayyad is unlikely to contribute to the formation of a government of national unity, the creation of which is expected by most of the Palestinian society. Hamas official Fawzi Barhoum called the appointment of Hamdallah "illegitimate", as his candidacy was not submitted for consideration to the Palestinian Legislative Council 37, and the council's Deputy Speaker Hassan Quraishi generally considers the appointment of a new head of state.-
Prime Minister's "senseless step" in the context of the authoritarian style of government of the head of the PNA M. Abbas 38.
* * *
The situation of instability in the region as a whole, caused by spontaneous popular protests, the incessant confrontation between various political forces, as well as multiplied by the objective, but so far "peaceful" discontent of the Palestinian society with the socio-economic situation in the autonomous region, maintains a state of tense uncertainty about the development of events in the" state on the road", in the" heart of the Arab world " - Palestine.
So far, the head of the PNA has managed to control the political situation in the part of the autonomy, i.e. in the West Bank. However, any short-sighted move, especially under the influence of external political forces, can lead to a new surge in the protest movement in the West Bank, which may lead to a change in the ruling elite both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank.
1 Abbas declares "Palestinian Spring" // USA Today. September 25, 2011 - http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011 - 09-25/abbas-palestinian-spring/50542996/l
2 President says Palestinian Spring has begun // Ma'an News Agency. September 7, 2012 - http://www.maannews.net/eng/View-Details.aspx?ID-517618
Rashid Khalidi. 3 The Arab Spring // The Nation. March 3, 2011 -http://www.thenation.com/article/158991 /arab-spring#
4 For more information, see: Vasiliev A.M. Tsunami of Revolutions / / Asia and Africa today. 2011, N 3.
Ewen MacAskill. 5 Barack Obama throws full US support behind Middle East uprisings // The Guardian. May 20,2011 - http://www.guar-dian.co.uk/world/2011/may/19/barack-obama-us-support-middle-east-uprisings
Barak Ravid. 6 Netanyahu: Arab Spring pushing Mideast backward, not forward // Haaretz. November 24, 2011 - http://www.haaretz. com/news/netanyahu-arab-spring-pushing-mideast-backward-not-forward-1.397353
Vinitsky 7 Mohammed Morsi: "We fight for power, but we preach peace" / / Asia and Africa Today. 2011, N 12, p. 7.
8 Gunmen blow up Egypt-Israel gas pipeline for fourth time this year // The National. July 13, 2011 - http://www.thenational.ae/ news/world/middle-east/gunmen-blow-up-egypt-israel-gas-pipeline-for-fourth-time-this-year; Crowds attack Israel embassy in Cairo // Aljazeera. September 10, 2011 - http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/ 2011/09/201199225334494935.html; Suha Philip Ma'ayeh and Vita Bekker. Israel sends home diplomats in Amman after protests outside its embassy // The National. September 16, 2011 - http://www.the-national.ae/news/world/middle-east/israel-sends-home-diplomats-in-amman-afte r-protests-outside-its-embassy
9 The final meeting between Israel and the PNA is being prepared // MIGnews.com - http://mignews.co.il/news/politic/world/250112_ 101049_99750.html
10 British Ambassador meets with peace-loving supreme guide of Muslim Brothers by Andrew С. McCarthy // National Review online. 27.03.2013 - british-ambassador-meets-peace-loving-supreme-guide-imislim-brotherhood-andrew-c-mccart
11 Gaza protests accuse Palestinian Authority of betrayal in talks with Israel // The Guardian. January 28, 2011 - http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/2011/jan/28/gaza-protests-palestinian-papers-leak
Demchenko A.V. 12 What slows down the "Palestinian spring"? // New Eastern Outlook. 12.10.2012 - http://www.ru.journal-neo.com/ node/119234
13 Gaza and West Bank protests demand end to Palestinian divisions // The Guardian. March 15, 2011 - http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/201 l/mar/15/gaza-west-bank-unity-protests
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16 Palestinians ready for negotiations if settlements stop // WAFA October 10,2011 - http://english.wafaps/index.php?action=detail&id =17706
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20 Abbas declares "Palestinian Spring"...
21 Israel suspended its financial participation in the UNESCO budget / / RIA Novosti. 03.11.2011 - http://ria.ru/world/ 20111103/479732192.html
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26 The UN General Assembly granted Palestine the status of a non-member observer State to the UN by 138 votes in favor / / UN News Center. 29.11.2012 - http://www.un.org/ russian/news/story.asp?NewSID-18697#.Ucw4w313DKR
27 The Permanent Representative of Israel to the UN called the resolution on Palestine unilateral / / UN News Center. 29.11.2012 - http://www.un.org/russian/news/story.asp7NewsID-18699#.Ucw66H13DKQ
28 Binyamin Netanyahu attacks Arab spring uprisings // The Guardian. November 24, 2011 - http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ nov/24/israel-netanyahu-attacks-arab-spring
Demchenko A.V. 29 Decree. op.
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32 Recent experience and prospects of the economy of the West Bank and Gaza. Staff Report // International Monetary Fund. 23.09.2012 -http://www.imf.org/external/country/WBG/RR/2012/091912.pdf
Demchenko A.V. 33 Decree. op.
Cohen R. 34 Fayyad steps down, not out // The New York Times. 03.05.2013 - http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/04/opinion/global/ Roger-Cohen-Fayyad-Steps-Down-Not-Out.html?pagewanted-all&_ r=0
Khaled Abu Toameh. 35 Palestinians: Why Salam Fayyad stands no chance against Fatah // Gatestone Institute. International Policy Council. April 11, 2013 - http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/ 3670/fayyad-vs-fatah
36 New Palestinian Prime Minister named as Rami Hamdallah // The Guardian. 02.06.2013 - http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/ jun/02/palestinian-prime-minister-hamdallah
37 http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/rami-hamdallah-palaestinen-serpraesident-abbas-benennt-neu en-regierungschef/8289546. html
38 PA's Abbas accepts PM Hamdallah's resignation // The Jerusalem Post. 23.06.2013 - http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Abbas-accepts-Palestinian-PM-Hamdallahs-resignation-3174 26
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