At the beginning of the third millennium, a belt of nuclear missile instability was formed in Asia, in the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders. North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Iran are consistently building up their strategic arsenals, pushing each other and their regional neighbors into a protracted arms race. Militarization and, even more so, nuclearization* Asia in the foreseeable future may turn from a potential to a real threat to international peace and security of the Russian Federation.
South Asia is an extremely unfavorable region of the planet from the point of view of nuclear missile non-proliferation and international security. The subcontinent is bordered by two de facto nuclear states-India and Pakistan, which have unresolved border issues, as well as experience in full-scale wars. There is still a risk of inter-State armed conflicts, and the level of threat that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can fall into the hands of terrorists is increased. The processes of South Asian nuclearization and the intense rivalry between New Delhi and Islamabad in the nuclear missile field are virtually beyond the control of the international community.
In recent decades, the major Western powers have done little to "resolve" the explosive situation developing in South Asia, and their approaches have been largely inconsistent and declarative. To a certain extent, this also applies to Russia, which, while calling on India and Pakistan to renounce nuclear weapons and join the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear States, in fact did little to prevent or restrain the development of Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs.
Over the past decade, New Delhi and Islamabad have been rapidly building up their nuclear missile arsenals. Both India and Pakistan have accumulated significant stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile materials (OPM), and both countries continue to develop them intensively. India produces about 30 kg of weapons-grade plutony1 annually. Its existing reserves (according to various sources, 225 - 370 kg) are enough to produce 50-90 nuclear warheads.
Pakistan has" solid " reserves of OPM - 1.1 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and several tens of kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium. According to American experts, the Pakistanis can collect 30-50 uranium and 3-5 plutonium warheads 2. Islamabad is also expanding its production capacity for more "promising" material, plutonium. Construction of the second reactor for the production of weapons-grade plutonium 3 is currently being completed in Khushab (Punjab province, Pakistan). The plant's capacity can reach about 1000 thermal MW, which will allow producing up to 200 kg of plutonium per year. This material would be sufficient for the annual production of 40-50 nuclear warheads.4
India and Pakistan are improving their means of delivering nuclear weapons, primarily missiles. In service with the Indians-operational-tactical missiles (OTR) "Prithvi" 5, in the final stage of development are medium-range ballistic missiles (BRSD) series "Agni", the range of which can be increased to 2500 km. The range of action of Pakistani BRS is expanding, which are being put into service and are capable of hitting dozens of major cities in India. In 2003, the Ghori-2 IRBM (1,100 km range) was transferred to the troops, which, according to some experts, is still the only Pakistani missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. 6 Among the latest achievements of the Pakistani rocket industry is the Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6) solid-fuel BRSD with a range of up to 2500 km7, which was successfully tested.
WHO IS "HOLDING BACK" WHOM?
In fact, India and Pakistan are engaged in a "big nuclear game", while pursuing a number of interrelated strategic and tactical goals. New Delhi and Islamabad "in unison" cited the need to ensure national security as the reason for conducting nuclear tests in 1998 and applying for membership in the "nuclear club". They expect to have at their disposal effective means of strategic deterrence of potential opponents. The Indians view China from this point of view first of all (no matter what steps towards rapprochement and cooperation have been taken recently), and the Pakistanis view India from this point of view.
India's nuclear missile capability was conceived as a deterrent to China. On the eve of the Indian nuclear tests, the Indian Defense Minister, J. R. R. Tolkien, said: Fernandez said in an interview with the Hindustan Times that China is "the number one potential threat" and that it is "clearly not enough"to limit itself to discussing confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs) with neighboring Pakistan.8
* From English, nuclearization ("gaining nuclear quality") is a term widely used in modern Russian political science literature.
In the post-war period, the rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing became protracted, which was caused not only by unsettled border issues, but also by the objective desire of the two Asian "giants" for military and political dominance in the region. The defense programs were designed to" cool down "Beijing, which, by" liberating " Buddhist Tibet in 1951, initiated Chinese expansion toward the Indian Ocean. The Himalayan War of 1962 * left a deep mark on the memory of Indians, predetermining the subsequent activity of New Delhi in the military, including nuclear, field. The possibility of Chinese aggression has become a powerful incentive for India to build up its military capabilities.
In its foreign policy planning, India was also forced to take into account its neighborhood with a traditionally hostile Pakistan and the potential threat posed by the Sino-Pakistani tandem, which was created in the late 1970s on a de facto anti-Indian platform.
In turn, Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were fueled by the permanent perception of India as an enemy. Such concerns are well-founded. The regional rivalry between India and Pakistan, which developed immediately after the partition of British India in 1947, repeatedly resulted in full - scale wars (1947-1948, 1965, and 1971). If the "Chinese syndrome" is essential for New Delhi, then for Islamabad it is the "Indian syndrome" that appeared after the defeat in the armed conflict with the United States. The war with India in 1975,9 The war with India in 1971, which resulted in the split of Pakistan**, was a serious incentive for the Pakistani leadership to make a political decision on the creation of a nuclear potential.
The desire to guarantee national security was not the only reason for the nuclear choice of India and Pakistan. New Delhi and Islamabad also see nuclear weapons as a tool, an "auxiliary" means to achieve another strategic goal: to take a "worthy place" on the world stage. India and Pakistan were guided by political and prestige considerations. There is a widespread perception among the Indian and Pakistani political elites that the possession of nuclear weapons is an attribute of a great Power. In the socio-political circles of India and Pakistan, it is emphasized that the "five" permanent members of the UN Security Council are exclusively states that possess nuclear weapons.
The activity of New Delhi and Islamabad in the nuclear field is largely dictated by their expansionist-nationalist foreign policies. India has openly challenged the international nonproliferation community under the slogans of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party. Pakistan seeks to become a "nuclear missile guarantor" of the interests of the Muslim world. Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto emphasized the Muslim nature of the country's future nuclear potential. He claimed that "the Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations, as well as the communist powers, have this potential, while the Islamic civilization does not have it", claiming that it is "only a matter of time" 10.
Nationalist sentiments, which are widespread in both India and Pakistan, result primarily in social apologies for nuclear missile programs. In both countries, there is a strong public consensus in favor of further improvement of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. This circumstance has a corresponding impact on the policy of the ruling elites in New Delhi and Islamabad. The "all-party unity" that emerged in India and Pakistan in rejecting the NPT, the CTBT***, as well as criticism of the " five "for the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, became the argument that justified the 1998 nuclear tests."
As for Pakistan, its persistence in implementing the national nuclear missile program is also explained by the peculiarities of the country's socio-political structure. In Pakistan, the core of statehood is the army, and the rule of law-
* The Indo-Chinese border conflict of 1962, which resulted in China "recapturing" a significant part of disputed territory in the Himalayas from India. The defeat in the Himalayan War forced the Indian leadership to seriously think about improving the defense capability of their country.
** East Bengal emerged from Pakistan, where the State of Bangladesh was formed.
*** The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was opened for signature in 1996 but has not yet entered into force. India and Pakistan, which have been observing a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998, refused to sign the CTBT, retaining the right to improve nuclear weapons.
government - formally civilian-necessarily takes into account the position of the military, state policy on strategic issues is determined by the generals, in which supporters of the nuclear option prevail.
Soon after the 1998 tests, the parties ' arguments, especially Pakistan's, about the positive role of nuclear weapons in maintaining security and strategic stability in South Asia became dangerously erroneous. The fragility of regional peace is clearly demonstrated by the Indian-Pakistani armed conflict in Kargil.
In May 1999, with the support of Pakistani regular troops, a large group of Islamabad-controlled "Mujahideen" Islamic militants captured and held for several months strategically important heights in the Kargil sector in the northern Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kargil conflict turned out to be quite intense (battles were fought with the use of heavy weapons and aircraft) and serious peacekeeping efforts were required (primarily on the part of the US administration of B. Clinton) so that it did not transform into a full-scale war of de facto nuclear states.
In terms of historical experience, the Kargil crisis cannot be overestimated. The events of 1999 allow us to draw the following conclusions. First, periods of detente in India-Pakistan relations may suddenly turn into confrontations. Kargil "broke out" just three months after the trip of Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee to Pakistan and the signing of the famous Lahore Declaration in February 1999. * Secondly, the mere presence of WMD is not automatically a means of guaranteed deterrence of a potential enemy and, accordingly, does not exclude the possibility of military conflicts, especially local ones, between nuclear-armed countries.
Of course, both India and Pakistan are trying to avoid open clashes with the use of WMD, trying to position themselves as "responsible nuclear missile" states. The Indians and Pakistanis assure that they will not allow accidental or unauthorized use of their nuclear weapons.
New Delhi and Islamabad have adopted a series of CSBMs designed to convince the international community that any concerns about South Asian nuclear missile capabilities are groundless. In accordance with the bilateral agreement on non-aggression against declared nuclear facilities, the parties exchange relevant lists annually.12 In October 2005, during the visit of the Indian Foreign Minister to Islamabad, an India-Pakistan agreement on preliminary notification of ballistic missile test launches was signed. At the same time, the Indian side submitted to the Pakistanis for consideration a draft memorandum of understanding on measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.13 A hotline has been established between the first Deputy Ministers of the two countries, which, as stated in the joint statement of April 26, 2006, is aimed, among other things, at "preventing misunderstandings and reducing risks in the nuclear field"14.
India and Pakistan are developing national export control (EC) regimes that have recently come much closer to international standards. At the same time, both countries are actively adopting the experience of multilateral export control mechanisms - the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).15
Having supported the important non-proliferation resolution of the UN Security Council No. 1540 of 28 April 2004,16 Pakistan adopted the Federal Export Control Act (September 2004), according to which the Pakistani Government approved control lists of goods, technologies, materials and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery (December 2005 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, they are based on similar lists of NSG, MTCR and the Australian Group of 17.
In June 2005, India passed the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery (Prohibition of Illegal Activities) Act, which clearly defined export control rules and tightened penalties for violating them (sentences ranging from five years to life in prison).18.
The close attention of New Delhi and Islamabad to the issue of export control, no matter what the motives may be (in this case, the expectation of India and Pakistan that responsible behavior in matters of EC will contribute to solving the problem of international recognition of their nuclear missile status), is a positive factor: the effectiveness of barriers to horizontal cooperation increases. distribution.
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that in South Asia, even the most advanced CSBMs will not work as reliably as the Soviet-American agreements of the Cold War. The geographical proximity of potential opponents (the flight time is only 6 - 7 minutes) objectively does not allow us to exclude the possibility of spontaneous or preventive strikes against each other, including those inflicted "from fright".
ARE YOUR CONCERNS JUSTIFIED?
As mentioned above, the threat of "WMD - terrorism" appears to be quite real for South Asia. The lack of reliable information on the effectiveness of national EQ mechanisms and the level of security of Pakistan's strategic arsenals against the background of the activation of terrorist structures in this country does not allow us to remove concerns about the possibility of getting Pakistan's WMD or its individual components into the hands of terrorists. The degree of security reliability of nuclear power and research facilities located in Pakistan, which are potential targets of terrorist organizations, is also questionable.
* The Lahore Declaration was signed by A. B. Vajpayee and Prime Minister of Pakistan N. Sharif. The document declares the parties ' commitment to the principles of peaceful coexistence, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and settlement of existing differences through negotiations.
The international community is concerned about the possibility of overthrowing the current regime of Pakistan's President, General P. Musharraf, and the rise to power of Islamist fanatics who are ready to use nuclear weapons for their own purposes. After the 2001 decision of the Musharraf administration to support the US anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, the President and his inner circle were considered by Islamists to be traitors to the nation. The Pakistani leader has repeatedly (in 2002, twice in 2003) been the target of terrorist attacks, and terrorists have also attempted to assassinate the head of Government Sh. Aziza*.
From the point of view of nuclear nonproliferation, the world community considers Pakistan, from the territory of which the so-called "A. K. Khan network" operated, to be an extremely "problematic"country.
In 2003, a scandal broke out over the activities of an international underground syndicate of dealers in nuclear missile technologies and materials led by the" father " of the Pakistani atomic bomb, nuclear scientist A. K. Khan. The facts of the secret transfer of know-how and equipment (gas centrifuges) for uranium enrichment to the DPRK, Iran and Libya have become public.19 In a memoir published in the fall of 2006, Musharraf admitted that A. K. Khan had offered his services to "anyone who was willing to pay" since 1987.20 A number of experts believe that, despite numerous assurances from the Pakistani authorities, the "A. K. Khan network" (the nuclear scientist himself is under house arrest) has not been completely eliminated, and its individual surviving cells continue to function in various countries.21
Paradoxically, the seriousness of the threats to international security emanating from South Asia has not brought the international community together. It has failed to take effective, coordinated action against India and Pakistan. The "anti-nuclear" economic sanctions against New Delhi and Islamabad, imposed in 1998 by the United States and a number of other Western states, were essentially torpedoed by the "special position" of Moscow and Beijing, which refused to curtail partnership ties with their traditional allies (India and Pakistan, respectively). In 2001 - including "in gratitude" for the entry of Indians and Pakistanis into the anti - terrorist coalition-Washington not only lifted sanctions measures against New Delhi and Islamabad, but even began to think about officially recognizing the nuclear missile status of "democratic and responsible in non-proliferation issues" of India.
The process of South Asian nuclearization was facilitated by the actual evasion of members of the nuclear club from fulfilling the" disarmament " provisions of the NPT (article VI of the Treaty). The quantitative reduction of their strategic arsenals was offset by an increase in the quality and effectiveness of the remaining weapons - vertical proliferation took place. The inconsistency of recognized nuclear missile Powers, primarily the United States, in the field of disarmament and global strategic stability has largely predetermined the erosion of international nonproliferation regimes and increased the interest of non-nuclear countries in nuclear weapons.22
Since the 1998 nuclear tests, New Delhi and Islamabad have made significant progress in changing the world's attitude to their nuclear quality. Today, the Indian and Pakistani military nuclear potentials are already perceived as nothing more than"a given". In 2005, the Americans initiated a phased lifting of international restrictions on cooperation with India in the field of nuclear energy. In fact, we are talking about making such cooperation conditional only on a guarantee against the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.
On July 18, 2005, during the visit of Indian Prime Minister M. Singh to the United States, a joint statement was adopted in which the parties indicated their intention to expand cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Bush administration has pledged to push for the complete lifting of national and international anti-nuclear restrictions on New Delhi (in particular, the statement separately emphasizes the importance of resuming fuel supplies for Indian nuclear power plants). In turn, Singh announced his Government's agreement to the following retaliatory steps: dividing nuclear facilities into military and civilian ones, placing the latter under the control of the IAEA; strengthening national export control regimes; participating in negotiations on banning the production of fissile materials; and continuing to observe the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.23
Washington has tried to present the July agreements as an effective measure aimed at involving India in the global nuclear nonproliferation system. It was emphasized that the deal with the Indians is the best way out of the current situation, when almost the entire nuclear industry of a de facto nuclear state remained outside the framework of international rules of regulation and control.24 During the India-US summit in New Delhi (March 2006), the parties agreed that in practical terms the provisions of the Washington statement would be implemented before 2014 .25 If it were not for the "A. K. Khan network", the "Indian template" could probably be applied to Pakistan as well.
* Well-known banker, "architect" of the liberal reforms currently underway in Pakistan.
Russia bears its share of responsibility for the crisis trends in South Asia. In 1998, Moscow actually withdrew itself from solving nonproliferation problems on the subcontinent. Russia refused to impose "anti-nuclear " sanctions on its" strategic partner " India, and then - to avoid accusations of double standards-against Pakistan. In the late 1990s, the Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation developed, and Moscow and New Delhi continued to cooperate in the field of nuclear energy.
Russia has ruled out the possibility of revising the agreements on the construction of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant. It is noteworthy that the Kudankulam deal, worth about $ 2 billion, received a powerful impetus for implementation just a month after India's nuclear tests*.
By cooperating with New Delhi, Russia has complied with both the provisions of national legislation and international obligations stemming, in particular, from its membership in the NPT and NSG. However, following the "letter of the law" does not change the fact that Moscow's actions have reduced the effectiveness of the anti-nuclear pressure exerted on India by the international community after the 1998 tests. Russia's support, especially in strategic areas, helped India painlessly survive the sanctions period and finally assured the Indian ruling elite that it can continue its chosen course without fear in the nuclear missile field.
The US-initiated lifting of international restrictions on nuclear energy cooperation with India creates good opportunities for Russia to gain a foothold in the Indian market itself, competing with the Americans. Moscow does not hide its intention to dramatically step up its partnership with New Delhi in the field of nuclear energy, as soon as a corresponding decision is made within the framework of the NSG. It is significant that energy cooperation became, in fact, the central item on the agenda of negotiations during the recent (January 25-26, 2007) official visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India. Following the Delhi summit, a joint statement of the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy was adopted. The document declares the parties ' intention to expand nuclear energy cooperation without prejudice to the nuclear non-proliferation regimes.26 Russia has made a specific commitment to assist in the construction of four additional power units at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant, which is being built with Russian assistance. An important outcome of Vladimir Putin's visit is also an agreement to expand bilateral cooperation in space - in particular, intergovernmental agreements were signed that give India access to the resources of the Russian space navigation system GLONASS***.
After Vladimir Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation, Moscow's South Asian policy became more consistent and pragmatic. Russia ceases to be an outside observer of the "big nuclear game", making efforts to if not stop, then at least slow down and streamline the processes of nuclearization of the subcontinent. It is possible that this will require it to connect to this" game " in the region as one of the non-system participants.
Since the beginning of the global anti-terrorist campaign in 2001, the activity of Moscow has noticeably increased, previously shifting the main responsibility for practical actions in the field of non-proliferation to foreign countries.-
* An Addendum to the Agreement on the construction of the first two power units for the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant was signed in New Delhi on 21 June 1998.
** During the summit, a memorandum of intent was signed between the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of Atomic Energy of the Government of India to develop cooperation on the construction of additional power poles at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant, as well as the construction of new nuclear power plants.
*** GLONASS-Global Navigation Satellite System. It is designed to determine the location and speed of movement of sea, air and land objects, including people, with an accuracy of up to one meter. It is planned that the GLONASS system will start operating on a national scale at the end of this year, and on a global scale - by 2011. In its final form, it will consist of 24 spacecraft (currently 16 satellites are in orbit).
pad. Russia has made a significant contribution to countering the threat of WMD-terrorism. Moscow was one of the initiators of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1540, co-author of the Group of Eight Nonproliferation Action Plan, and is a participant in the Security Initiative against Nuclear Proliferation.27 In September 2005, during the 60th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in New York, the Russian draft international Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was opened for signing28.
Russia has intensified its dialogue with South Asian States on nuclear non-proliferation and strategic stability. In this regard, it is extremely important to establish and institutionalize partnerships with Islamabad. In 2002, a Russian-Pakistani Working Group on Counterterrorism and a bilateral Advisory Group on Strategic Stability were established at the interagency level. Regular meetings of these groups were held in Moscow in 2006. The development of relations with Pakistan gives Russia's South Asian policy balance, allows it to be "on the spot" and conduct an effective dialogue. So, in April 2005 Islamabad decided to withdraw its proposed amendments and support the draft convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, including through dialogue with Moscow through partner channels.29
Moscow's approaches to solving the problems of nuclear missile nonproliferation in South Asia are becoming pragmatic," down-to-earth", aimed at solving urgent problems. First of all, this is reflected in the desire of the Russian leadership to conduct a positive dialogue with New Delhi and Islamabad in order to take additional measures to ensure an adequate level of safety and security of strategic arsenals and nuclear facilities, and to improve national export control regimes. Moscow expresses the point of view on the expediency of India and Pakistan refusing to actually install WMD systems, the need to continue observing the voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests, and stopping the production of weapons-grade fissile materials30.
The approaches of Russia's nuclear club partners are also evolving in this direction. The convergence of the views of the "five" participants allows us to hope for the development of an optimal, realistic strategy for coordinated actions of the international community. It is already quite obvious that the" moment has passed", and India and Pakistan are unlikely to be forced to return to the" pre-nuclear " state. But it seems quite realistic and feasible to put the processes of nuclearization of the South Asian subcontinent (including the Indian-Pakistani nuclear missile race) in a certain direction and slow them down.
1 Nuclear weapons after the "Cold War" / Ed. by A. Arbatov and V. Dvorkin; Moscow. Carnegie Center, Moscow: "Russian Political Encyclopedia" (ROSSPEN), 2006, p. 252.
2 Ibid., p. 387.
3 The first production reactor for weapons - grade plutonium with a capacity of 50 MW was built in Khushab with Chinese assistance and put into operation in the late 1990s-See: South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China / edited by Lowell Dittmer. - East Gate Book, 2005, p. 182.
Warrick J. 4 Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program. - Washington Post, July 24, 2006.
Shilin A. A. 5 Strategic Balance in South Asia. Moscow: Nauchnaya kniga Publ., 2004, p. 201.
6 Ibid., p. 221.
7 Nuclear weapons after the Cold War, p. 388.
Hilary Synnott. 8 The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests. - International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999, p. 17.
Sotnikov V. I. 9 The nuclear problem in Indian-Pakistani relations (the second half of the XX - beginning of the XXI century). Monograph No. 1. Moscow: Nauchnaya kniga Publ., 2003, p. 42.
10 Cit. by: Sotnikov V. I. Decree of soch., p. 40.
Hilary Synnott. 11 Op. cit., p. 22.
12 N-facilities' List Swapped with India. - Dawn, January 2, 2006. (The Agreement entered into force in January 1991).
13 Agreement on Prenotification of Ballistic Missile Tests. - Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India http://meaindia.nic.in
14 Joint Statement, 4th Round of Pakistan-India Expert Level Dialogue on Nuclear CBMs Held in Islamabad on 25-26 April 2006. - Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India http://meaindia.nic.in
15 NSG, MTCR and the Australian Group are the main international export control institutions. The NSG (established in 1974 and currently consists of 45 member States, including Russia) regulates the export of nuclear and special non - nuclear materials, installations, and related goods and technologies. The MTCR task (established in 1987, 34 member countries, Russia joined in 1995) is to counter the proliferation of missile technologies and WMD delivery vehicles through appropriate export control measures. The Australian Group (formed in 1984, 39 member states, Russia is not a member of it, but in practice adheres to its rules and control lists) regulates the export and transportation of chemical and biological agents, installations and equipment, and dual-use goods that can be used to create chemical or biological weapons. India and Pakistan are not members of the abovementioned EC institutions.
16 This resolution outlaws any attempt by "non-State actors" to gain access to nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and requires all States to implement effective export controls and ensure an adequate level of physical protection for sensitive materials. - UN Security Council Resolution No. 1540 (2004). - Official UN website www.un.org
17 Government Classifies Control Lists: Goods Related to N-material. - Dawn, December 28, 2005.
18 Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War.., p. 232; Indian Law Against Proliferation Approved. - Dawn, May 14, 2005.
Nasir Iqbal. 19 Dr. Khan Admits He Transferred N-technology: Action to be Decided by NCA. - Dawn, February 2, 2004.
Musharraf P. 20 In the Line of Fire. A Memoir. - Free Press, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 2006, p. 293.
21 Proliferation Network 'Still Functioning'. - Dawn, September 11, 2006.
Rudnitsky Artem. 22 Understanding Nuclear Pakistan. Global, Regional and Domestic Dimensions. - World Affairs, Autumn 2005, Vol. 9, N 3.
23 India-US Joint Statement, Washington, July 18, 2005. - Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India http://meaindia.nic.in
24 Nuclear weapons after the Cold War, p. 402.
25 Suo-Motu Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the US: Implementation of India's Separation Plan, New Delhi, March 7, 2006. - Официальный сайт МИД Индии http://meaindia.nic.in
26 Joint Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of India and the President of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. New Delhi, 25 January 2007. - Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India http://meaindia.nic.in
27 National Report on the implementation by the Russian Federation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. - Document of the NPT Review Conference-NPT / conf. 2005/29, May 11, 2005, p. 1.
28 The importance of the convention is emphasized by Vladimir Putin in his public speeches. See: Speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the UN Security Council meeting, New York, September 14, 2005, posted on the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry www.mid.ru
Masood Haider. 29 Suppression of N-terror Treaty Approved by UN. - Dawn, April 14, 2005.
30 Statement by the representative of the Russian Federation at the NPT Review Conference in New York on 3 May 2005. See official website of the United Nations www.un.org
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