By the end of 1905, after a long period of rivalry, mutual suspicion, and outright hostility, relations between Russia and Great Britain had taken on a new dynamic. The changed international situation made it necessary to start searching for ways to resolve the contradictions that contributed to the development of the Anglo-Russian conflict. The Middle East was the region where the bulk of these contradictions were concentrated, where the interests of both powers most sharply clashed. Together with the Persian and Tibetan issues, the solution of the problem of Afghanistan should have helped to resolve these contradictions and end the conflict.

Key words: Afghan issue, great powers, Russian-British rapprochement, agreement on Afghanistan.

After the defeat in the war with Japan, the tsarist government was in dire need of a settlement of relations with Great Britain. The Russian authorities sought to strengthen their positions at least in part of those Asian territories for influence in which they fought such a long and uncompromising struggle. Russia needed a guarantee of the security of its southern borders and the peaceful development of relations with all its neighbors.

The British ruling circles also showed a desire to reach an agreement with Russia. The sharpness of the Anglo-German contradictions forced London to look for an ally in the person of the government of Nicholas II. Now that the interests of both sides coincided, they could only come to an understanding on the Central Asian affairs that had separated them until then.

The Anglo-Russian negotiations were launched in October 1905, when the Russian ambassador in London, A. K. Benckendorff, told the British Foreign Secretary, E. Gray, about the possibility of "reaching a friendly understanding in relation to Afghanistan, Persia and the Middle East." Apparently, the position of London gave every reason to hope for this, because soon A. K. Benckendorff conveyed to E. Gray a personal message from the Russian Foreign Minister V. N. Lamsdorff, in which he expressed satisfaction with the British desire for unity of action with Russia [Adamec, 1965, p.67].

Soon the tone of the Russian and British press changed. On April 1, 1906, the St. Petersburg newspaper Novoe Vremya, previously known for its anti-English stance, declared that rapprochement between the two powers was a natural process. The alliance with Great Britain was described by her as "a return to the cordial relations that existed before the era of Palmerston and Beaconsfield" [Modern Times]. Almost simultaneously, The London Times published articles calling for "mutual understanding with Russia" [The Times..., 16.03.1906]. 2 Vostok, No. 6

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Diplomatic consultations between London and St. Petersburg continued until January 1907, and the parties were limited to discussing only minor issues and did not touch on the details of the proposed agreement. Experts worked behind the scenes of the negotiations, carefully considering the content of proposals and possible arguments in defense of the position of their governments, calculating the enemy's steps, trying to anticipate his plans and actions. In short, a subtle diplomatic game was played, in which specific words, clear concepts and clear statements were completely excluded; on the contrary, up to a certain point, the parties managed only vague phrases, half-hints and assumptions.

In early January 1907, the British authorities finally expressed their opinion on Tibet and Persia, but were slow to make a similar statement on Afghanistan. The British ambassador in St. Petersburg, A. Nicholson, recommended that his government first receive from the Russian side a draft agreement on Persian affairs, and the authorities agreed with it [British Documents..., 1967, p. 522].

Only on February 23, 1907, in response to A. K. Benckendorf's appeal to E. Gray, the British ambassador informed the new head of Russian diplomacy, A. P. Izvolsky, about "the readiness of His Majesty's government to discuss the Afghan question" and gave a list of conditions that he should have taken into account when developing response proposals [British Documents..., 1967, p. 525].

The conditions were as follows: Russia recognizes Afghanistan as outside its sphere of influence and its foreign policy is controlled by Great Britain; the British government does not object to establishing direct contacts on local issues of a non-political nature between Russians and specially appointed Afghan officials; the Russian authorities refrain from sending their trade agents to Afghanistan; they stop issuing subsidies for Russian trade in this country the British authorities do not prevent the extension to Russian merchants of the same privileges that British and Anglo-Indian merchants already enjoy in the Emir's possessions [AVPRI, l.14].

A. P. Izvolsky promised A. Nikolson to present his version of the agreement on Afghanistan, having studied the position of all interested Russian departments. This was followed by several meetings of diplomats and military personnel of both sides. The exchange of views on the Afghan issue continued. Additional proposals were made, new approaches were outlined, and acceptable solutions were sought. In some cases, the interlocutors expressed themselves very frankly, finding common ground between their positions and, of course, not forgetting about the interests of their own country. Both the British and Russians sought to include in the text of the future treaty conditions that would maximize the consolidation of their political and economic advantages in Afghanistan.

On March 31, A. Nikolson had a conversation with the adviser of the Russian Embassy in London, S. A. Poklevsky. The interlocutors agreed on a number of controversial issues. In particular, S. A. Poklevsky made it clear that the proposal to send Russian commercial agents to Afghanistan may not be mentioned in the upcoming draft agreement. The British ambassador, in turn, convinced him that "a well-organized and equipped army of the Emir is an even greater threat to India than to Russia," and therefore British officers will not engage in improving its combat readiness.

The diplomats also discussed possible formulations of certain provisions of the future treaty. According to S. A. Poklevsky, it should have clearly stated that Russia and the United Kingdom undertake not to pursue a policy in Afghanistan that threatens the security of the Indian and Russian borders, respectively, and not to build aggressive pla-

1 In the present period, Habibullah Khan was the Emir of Afghanistan.

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new in relation to each other. However, his interlocutor suggested limiting himself to the obligation "not to annex any part of the Afghan territory" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 528].

On April 14, 1907, the military attache of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg, Lieutenant Colonel G. Napier, talked with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army, Lieutenant General F. F. Palitsyn, and the Assistant Minister of War, Lieutenant General A. A. Polivanov. A wide range of issues related to Afghanistan were discussed at the meetings. The Chief of the General Staff insisted on the need to establish normal trade relations between Russia and this state and convinced the British diplomat that the British government could contribute to this.

G. Napir and A. A. Polivanov paid close attention to the military component of the Afghan issue. Neither of them hid the fact that the territory of Afghanistan can be used both by Russia against Great Britain and by Great Britain against Russia. However, according to both, in the current situation, both St. Petersburg and London are interested "in preserving Afghanistan as a' buffer state 'and are ready to agree not to use it' for the purpose of inciting hostile actions against each other ' "[British Documents..., 1967, p. 530-531].

Contacts with high-ranking Russian generals allowed the British military attache to get a fairly clear idea of the tsarist government's position on the Afghan issue, and to understand what kind of relations with Afghanistan would suit St. Petersburg. It was also extremely important for the Russian authorities to get acquainted with the views of the British military and diplomats and get more specific information from them about the intentions of the London cabinet on the most pressing issues related to Afghanistan. Now both sides were ready to accurately and expertly propose concrete solutions, develop projects and formulate articles of the future agreement.

On April 27, 1907, in St. Petersburg, a Special meeting on the Afghan question considered the proposals of the British Cabinet, which A. Nicholson had transmitted to A. Izvolsky on February 23. The participants analyzed in detail each item of the British proposals. Paragraphs 2 and 5 were adopted without reservation. Differences of opinion were revealed primarily on the first point, which stipulated a) recognition of Afghanistan as lying outside the sphere of Russian influence and b) British control over its foreign policy. All participants of the meeting agreed with the first provision, but the second one was rejected by them. The Minister of Finance V. N. Kokovtsov was most strongly opposed to its adoption, claiming that " recognition... Britain's control over the international relations of Afghanistan" is equivalent to "recognition of the British protectorate over this country." So he suggested "instead of the text of the second part of the first paragraph of English sentences... to indicate only that Russia refuses direct political relations with the head of Afghanistan " [K istorii..., 1935, p. 29]. A. P. Izvolsky supported V. N. Kokovtsov, adding that the British side should be required to provide guarantees: "1) that it will not annex the Afghan territory, will not occupy its separate parts and will refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the country, and 2) that it will not take any actions in Afghanistan directed against Russia" [K istorii..., 1935, p.29].

Paragraph 3 of the English proposals, which stipulated the refusal of the Tsarist government to send agents to Afghanistan, was also not adopted in the original version. The meeting called for a number of amendments to the text. Thus, the Minister of Trade and Industry D. A. Filosofov pointed out the need to achieve a similar commitment from Britain, and the Chief of the General Staff F. F. Palitsyn suggested clarifying that" by refusing to send trade agents to Afghanistan now", Russia reserves the right "later... to raise this question" [K istorii..., 1935, p. 30]. From the point of view of the Minister of Finance, the 3rd point should have been

2*

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edit, specifically indicating that the Russian government, if it becomes necessary to send a commercial agent to Afghanistan, will first discuss this issue with the British side. The proposals of F. F. Palitsyn and V. N. Kokovtsov were recognized as the most consistent with the goals of Russian policy, and the meeting called for the adoption of such a formulation of paragraph 3, which, taking into account the opinion of London, would leave Russia the right to later return to the discussion of this issue [K istorii..., 1935, p.30].

Numerous protests were also caused by the 4th point of the English proposals demanding that the tsarist government refuse to encourage Russian exports to Afghanistan. D. A. Filosofov expressed strong objections in this regard. He said that there are no special bonuses for export to the Afghan possessions, and the British apparently had in mind a special procedure that provides for the return of Russian customs duties on certain types of goods, namely: duties on cotton products and excise taxes on sugar and kerosene. However, this measure, D. A. Filosofov pointed out, "is widespread throughout the borders of the Empire", and not only in its Afghan sector, and therefore "the demand of Great Britain is unfair", and the government should hardly make concessions to it in this matter. The point of view of the Minister of Trade and Industry was supported by A. P. Izvolsky [K istorii..., 1935, p. 31].

The decisions developed at the meeting formed the basis of the Russian draft convention, which was sent to A. Nikolson on May 15. The tsarist government recognized Afghanistan as lying outside its sphere of influence, pledged to conduct "all political relations" with IT "through the mediation of His Majesty's government" and not to send trade agents to this country. Both parties to the agreement had to respect the Emir's sovereignty, not interfere in the internal affairs of his country, and not attempt to annex any part of it. The Russian side pledged not to take measures that threaten the Afghan border, and the British side pledged to use its influence in Afghanistan only in a spirit friendly to Russia. The draft also referred to establishing direct contacts between the authorities of the border provinces of Russia and Afghanistan on local non-political issues. The article devoted to the Russian-Afghan trade was entirely written in the spirit of the decisions of the Special Meeting of April 27 [British Documents..., 1967, p. 533-535].

E. Gray, having received the draft convention, sent it for study to the persons responsible for carrying out the Afghan policy of Great Britain. However, here the London authorities encountered strong resistance to the colonial administration of India. Viceroy J. R. R. Tolkien Minto and his entourage opposed the signing of the treaty with Russia. According to Indian historian D. Singhal, " Minto feared that the agreement... It will lead to the fall of British influence in Afghanistan "(Singhal, 1963, p. 175). The Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-Indian Army, G. Kitchener, was of the opinion that the conclusion of an alliance with Russia would violate the foundations of Afghan-British relations, and recommended that London postpone the signing of the convention indefinitely [Adamec, 1965, p.69].

Despite the disagreements that had arisen with the colonial authorities of India, E. Gray and other liberal ministers were determined to firmly follow the planned course and advocated the early conclusion of an agreement with Russia on Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet [British Documents..., 1967, p. 536]. A number of important proposals to the British draft of the Afghan convention were made by Permanent Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Charles Harding. On June 7, he sent a memo to E. Gray, in which he outlined in detail his vision of the terms of the Anglo-Russian treaty. In particular, he drew attention to the insufficient, in his opinion, accuracy of the wording in the draft of A. P. Izvolsky, which revealed the content of the policy of both sides on the borders of Afghanistan. -

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It also recommended that the United Kingdom should not "take any measures that could be considered threatening to the Afghan border", and that the United Kingdom should not "encourage Afghanistan to take any measures that threaten Russia". He also supported the proposal of A. Nicholson to introduce an additional condition in the text of the counter-project that direct contacts between the Russian and Afghan authorities will be carried out only with the consent of the emir, and the British government should persuade him to this decision [British Documents..., 1967, p. 540-541]. This idea was approved by E. Gray, because in this case Russia was deprived of the right to independently achieve its goal (the treaty would have included a condition for mandatory British participation in shaping the position of Kabul).

The British Foreign Secretary himself objected to article 1 of the Russian draft agreement, which referred to Afghanistan as a "buffer state". According to E. Gray, it was necessary to completely abandon this characteristic and exclude this article from the contract. In case Russian diplomats decided to have their way, he was ready to offer a compromise: in the preamble to the convention, mention the" geographical position " of Afghanistan as "a country lying between the British and Russian territories" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 536].

Thus, by the beginning of June, the recommendations and considerations on the project of A. P. Izvolsky were fully studied at the British Foreign Office. The result of this was the development of a counter-project based on the proposals of St. Petersburg. A number of significant changes were made to the Russian document. There is no mention of Afghanistan as a "buffer" between the Asian possessions of England and Russia. Article 1 stated that the tsarist government would recognize Afghanistan as lying outside its sphere of influence and would conduct all political relations with it "through the medium of His Majesty's Government."

Article 2 dealt with the fundamentals of British and Russian policy in Afghanistan. The English side was obligated to: a) not to annex any part of Afghanistan or interfere in its internal administration if the Emir remains faithful to the agreements signed with the British government; b) to use his influence in Afghanistan in a peaceful spirit towards Russia and not to encourage him to take any measures that threaten the Russian border. The final part of article 2 of the English counterproject concerned the obligations of the Russian government, which was also ordered not to annex any part of Afghanistan, not to interfere in its internal administration, and not to take steps that threatened its border.

Article 3 deprived Russia of the right to send sales agents to Afghanistan, but with the proviso that " in the future, if the development of commercial ties indicates the usefulness of this, both governments will come to the necessary agreement." The establishment of direct relations between the Russian and Afghan border authorities on local issues of a non-political nature, "with the consent of the Emir, which His Majesty's government will try to achieve," was recorded in article 4 of the English draft convention.

The 5th and final article contained the obligation of the British side to use all its influence on the Emir in order to ensure the operation of the principle of "open doors and equal commercial opportunities" for Russia and Afghanistan in Afghanistan [British Documents..., 1967, p. 539].

On June 17, A. Nicholson presented the text of the counter-project to A. P. Izvolsky and during a personal conversation with him explained in detail the position of the London cabinet. He pointed out that the term" buffer State " can only be used colloquially, and not in an intergovernmental agreement, since in this case it will be possible to interpret it differently. Precisely by wanting to avoid the ambiguous

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According to the interpretation of this concept, the British authorities excluded from the Russian draft any mention of Afghanistan as a "buffer state". Touching upon the obligations of the two countries not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, A. Nicholson defended the conditions for compliance with these obligations by Britain, which were specifically stipulated in the proposed counter-project. No less insistently, the British diplomat convinced A. P. Izvolsky of the need to secure the consent of the Afghan ruler Habibullah Khan to the terms of articles 4 and 5 of the British draft convention. "We cannot bind the Emir with any obligations without his consent, and therefore we are forced to make a corresponding reservation," A. Nicholson pointed out [British Documents..., 1983, p. 545].

The Russian Foreign Minister acquainted a number of cabinet members, Chief of the General Staff and Turkestan Governor-General N. I. Grodekov with the conditions proposed by London. During the next two weeks, the Afghan issue was in the center of their attention, but A. P. Izvolsky conducted the main discussions in St. Petersburg with D. A. Filosofov and F. F. Palitsyn. As a result, by the beginning of July, the three main provisions of the English counter-project were determined, which caused the greatest number of objections in Russian government circles.

On July 3, the Foreign Minister explained the position of St. Petersburg in an interview with the British Ambassador. First of all, he expressed his disagreement with the British interpretation of the obligation of the contracting parties not to occupy or annex any part of the territory of the Afghan state. According to him, it turns out that the Russian government should follow this obligation without any conditions or reservations, while the United Kingdom makes the fulfillment of a similar obligation on its part dependent on the actions of the Emir of Afghanistan, in particular on his compliance with the provisions of the Kabul Treaty of 1905. A. P. Izvolsky opposed precisely such an unconditional nature of Russian sanctions. obligations [AVPRI, l. 85].

A. P. Izvolsky, in particular, stated that the content of the relevant articles of the English draft agreement is undoubtedly beneficial to Russia, but their entry into force is conditioned on obtaining the consent of the Afghan authorities, while all the obligations imposed on Russia, they come into effect from the moment the document is signed. The Minister concluded that it is difficult to agree with this state of affairs.

On the issue of officially establishing direct contacts between the Afghan and Russian border authorities, the positions of the parties also differed. A. Nicholson, following the instructions received from E. Gray, insisted that such contacts are possible only between specially appointed border officials. A. P. Izvolsky, on the other hand, insisted on adopting a different, broader formulation that would allow for the participation of "authorities of border provinces" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 548].

On July 8, the Russian minister held another meeting with the British Ambassador. This time, the general tone of their conversation was more acute. A. P. Izvolsky again drew attention to London's interpretation of Russian obligations in relation to the emir's possessions and stated his government's firm intention to include in the text of the agreement an article in which Russia's obligation not to annex or occupy any part of the Afghan territory would be made dependent on the situation in Afghanistan itself. In other words, St. Petersburg, following London, wanted to get the right to freedom of action in this country "in case of a change in the state of affairs." The discussion of direct Russian-Afghan contacts gave additional urgency to the conversation. A. P. Izvolsky even more strongly supported the participation of "the authorities of the border provinces" and even indicated that they should deal with the settlement of problems of a "broad plan" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 549].

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The position of the tsarist government seriously alarmed the ruling circles of Great Britain. A. Nicholson reported to E. Gray that the adoption of Russian proposals "will open the door to Russian interference [in Afghan affairs. - K. S.]". London responded very quickly. Having received a telegram from St. Petersburg on July 8, the British Foreign Secretary telegraphed a reply to A. Nicholson on the same day: "You must explain to Mr. Izvolsky that, although we have no desire to annex or occupy Afghan territory, the fear that we may do so is the main incentive for the Emir to comply with his obligations. self-imposed obligations... It is preferable to reach [the emir's] voluntary consent to the terms of the agreement by making [in its text] a reference to the need to obtain such consent" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 550]. E. Gray believed that the Russian authorities would be satisfied with the explanations and accept the proposed draft convention, if the British ambassador guarantees them that London's desire to get the Emir to approve its terms is dictated solely by the desire of England to " provide... independence of the [Afghan ruler. - K. S.] in internal affairs". As for the article on Russian-Afghan border cooperation, both E. Gray and C. Garding still insisted on adopting their well-known formulation [British Documents..., 1967, p. 550-551].

A. Nicholson, following the orders received, tried to prove to A. P. Izvolsky the importance of early approval of British initiatives. On July 13, their next meeting took place, but the tsarist minister did not give in. He reiterated the claims of the Russian government to the project proposed by London. Faced with such a strong reluctance on the part of the Russian authorities to accept their terms, the British abandoned for the time being active attempts to achieve the implementation of their demands. Morley analyzed the current situation and prepared new proposals, taking into account the comments of the Russian side. On August 12, A. Nicholson handed over to A. P. Izvolsky a memorandum of the "government of His Majesty", clarifying the degree of readiness of London to meet the tsarist cabinet halfway.

The British ministers first of all thanked their Russian colleagues for agreeing to grant Britain the right of freedom of action in Afghanistan if the Emir violates his obligations. At the same time, "taking into account the objections of the Russian government regarding the unconditional nature of the conditions proposed to it not to occupy or annex any part of the Afghan territory," the British side agreed not to include in the text of the convention the final part of article 2 of its own draft, where this was discussed. The memorandum also listed the obligations that Britain assumed under the treaty: to use its influence in Afghanistan in an exclusively peaceful spirit towards Russia, not to try to change the situation there and not to disrupt the existing political balance in the region as a whole; to seek acceptance by the Emir of all the provisions of the agreement, without exception, and not only those that it was mentioned earlier; extend to Russian merchants all commercial concessions that the British will receive from the emir in the future.

London also found a slightly different solution to the problem of organizing direct Russian-Afghan contacts. Without completely ignoring the claims of St. Petersburg to the participation of the authorities of the border provinces in them, the British authorities did not abandon their own demand to involve only special persons in this. As a result, the Russian government was offered the following formula:: "Specially appointed Russian and Afghan officials located either directly on the border or within the border provinces have the right to enter into direct contacts on local issues of a non-political nature" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 555-556]. Obviously, this wording is one of the most important provisions of the convention

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It was more favorable to the British side, allowing it to limit as much as possible the already narrow framework of Russian-Afghan relations.

A. Nikolson, passing the memorandum to A. P. Izvolsky, already knew what he should do if the St. Petersburg authorities did not agree with the simple deletion of the final part of article 2. In this case, following the instructions of E. Gray, he would have presented an alternative solution: article 2 remains in its original wording, only adding that "in the event of a change in the political status of Afghanistan, both Governments will make a friendly exchange of views on this subject." However, the British ambassador believed that the memorandum itself contained a sufficient number of arguments in favor of its adoption, and he would not have to make new concessions [British Documents..., 1967, p. 554].

However, A. P. Izvolsky reasoned differently. His actions completely coincided with the most unpleasant scenario for London. On August 17, at a meeting with A. Nicolson, he stated that his Government could not accept the provision of the English memorandum on article 2 of the draft convention on Afghanistan. The Russian Foreign Minister was convinced that the step proposed by Great Britain was insufficient. According to him, it "retains the possibility of occupying Afghanistan, while Russia is deprived of freedom of action there in general" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 557].

Two days later, on August 19, A. P. Izvolsky handed the full text of the Russian draft agreement to the British Ambassador. The tsarist authorities brought together all the conditions they had already expressed. Britain was required: not to attempt to change the political status of Afghanistan or interfere in its internal affairs; to use its influence only in a peaceful spirit towards Russia and not to encourage the Emir to carry out any activities that threaten it; not to annex or occupy the territory of Afghanistan if the Emir fulfills the obligations he assumed under the Kabul Agreement. to the 1905 agreement.

Russia recognized Afghanistan as lying outside its sphere of influence and pledged to conduct all political contacts with Kabul through the British government, not to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan, and not to interfere in its internal administration. "Specially appointed representatives of the Russian and Afghan authorities" could enter into " direct relations to resolve local issues of a non-political nature." The principle of "open doors and equal commercial opportunities" for British and Russian traders in Afghanistan was proclaimed. A separate article stipulated that " the parties will have a friendly exchange of views in the event of any change in the political status of Afghanistan." Finally, it was stipulated that the convention would enter into force "from the moment when the British government notifies the Russian government... on the Emir's consent to accept its terms" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 559-560].

The British Foreign Secretary got acquainted with the proposals of St. Petersburg on August 20. The next day was spent in consultations with members of the cabinet, so A. Nicholson received the necessary instructions only on the morning of the 22nd. From that moment on, the negotiations entered a crucial stage. The intensity of contacts between Russian and British diplomats has increased dramatically. A. P. Izvolsky's meetings with the British ambassador followed one after another. When they sought an acceptable solution to a particular issue, they rejected their old proposals and returned to them again, clarifying certain provisions of the convention, reminding each other of the obligations they had already assumed, or specifying new ones. Everyone tried to persuade the other person to accept their position unconditionally. In short, there was frank bargaining around the terms of the future agreement. New initiatives of London provided for the exclusion of the first and last paragraphs from article 2 (as proposed by A. P. Izvolsky on June 17) and the transfer of the phrase about the peaceful use of Great Britain

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Its influence in Afghanistan is included in the text of article 1, so that it alone sets out all the mutual obligations of the parties.

The conditions of the head of the Foreign Office suited A. P. Izvolsky. The London authorities, he considered, made maximum concessions, taking into account his criticism of the provisions of the August 12 memorandum [AVPRI, p. 200]. It was also important that it was no longer necessary to continue the dispute that had begun with the British ambassador, because the British side agreed to "enter into a friendly exchange of views" with the Russian government "in the event of any changes in the political status of Afghanistan" [British Documents..., 1967, p. 556]. A. P. Izvolsky reported on the content of E. Gray's latest proposals to Emperor Nicholas II. He said that he would approve them if the participants of the Special Meeting on the Afghan Question voted unanimously for their adoption [British Documents..., 1967, p. 557].

At noon on August 24, A. P. Izvolsky, absolutely sure of the favorable outcome of the meeting of the Special Conference scheduled for the evening of the same day, handed A. Ni-colson the text of what he thought was the final draft agreement. The document consisted of five articles. Article 1 included the obligations of the parties: the British government guaranteed that it had no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan, and would use its influence there exclusively in a peaceful spirit, without taking or encouraging the emir to take measures that threatened Russia. The latter recognized Afghanistan as lying outside its sphere of influence, agreed not to send commercial agents and diplomatic representatives there, and to conduct all political contacts with Kabul through the London cabinet. Article 2 dealt with relations between border authorities. Article 3 proclaimed equal trade rights and commercial opportunities for Russians and British in Afghanistan. Article 4 stipulated the entry into force of the Convention only after obtaining the consent of the Emir. Article 5 stated that "if there are any changes in the political status of Afghanistan, the Contracting Parties will make a friendly exchange of views on this subject" [British Documents..., 1983, p. 80].

On the evening of August 24, a Special Meeting was held, at which A. P. Izvolsky quite unexpectedly encountered the strongest opposition. The Foreign Minister was supported only by P. A. Stolypin, F. F. Palitsyn and A. A. Polivanov in proving the obvious benefits of the terms of the Afghan convention for Russia, while the other participants of the meeting criticized him for excessive, in their opinion, concessions to the British. As a result, it was decided by a majority vote to reject the latest initiatives of London [British Documents..., 1967, p. 564-565, 567]. This meant abandoning the conditions that had actually been agreed upon at the level of foreign ministers.

The British ambassador was forced to request new instructions and on August 26 received an order from the Foreign Secretary to insist on the already stated requirements. A. Nicholson regarded his words as a guide to action and on August 27 proposed to A. P. Izvolsky two options for solving the problem: to keep article 2 in the form in which it was presented in the British counter-project of June 17, 1907; to delete it. the final part of the agreement is excluded from the text of the agreement and additional article 5 (on the actions of the parties in the event of a change in the political status of Afghanistan) [British Documents..., 1967, p. 571].

A special meeting decided to adopt the last alternative, which A. P. Izvolsky informed A. Nikolson about on August 29. The convention was signed on the 31st. Under its terms, the British government pledged not to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan if the Emir would comply with the terms of the treaty of March 21, 1905; not to seek to change the political status of the Afghan state; to use its influence there only in a peaceful spirit, without undertaking or encouraging the Emir to take measures that threaten Russia. Russian Government,

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In turn, it recognized Afghanistan as being outside its sphere of influence and pledged to conduct all political contacts with it through the mediation of Great Britain. Russian and Afghan border authorities were given the right to engage in direct contacts on local issues of a non-political nature. The principle of trade equality of powers in Afghanistan was recognized. All these provisions came into force only after their approval by the Emir [Collection of treaties..., 1952, p.181].

English politicians had different views on the signing of the convention. The ministers who actively sought an alliance with Russia were fully satisfied with its terms. From the point of view of E. Gray, " Britain has sacrificed absolutely nothing in Afghanistan." J. Morley called this agreement a "huge gain" (Tripathi, 1973, p.168). Their opinion was entirely shared by Ch. Harding [Hardinge, 1947, p. 31].

The leaders of the parliamentary opposition took a different view. On February 6, 1908, J. R. R. Tolkien sharply criticized the main provisions of the Convention. Curzon. According to him, the cabinet ceded to Russia "the right to conduct direct contacts with the Afghan border authorities," while the British themselves "do not use this right." The second mistake is "allowing [Russia. - K. S.] to have sales agents [in Afghanistan. - K. S.] in the future." From the point of view of J. R. R. Tolkien Curzon, " a sales agent tends to forget that his goal is trading, and only remembers that he is just an agent." The former Viceroy of India also condemned the government for granting Russia equal commercial rights in Afghanistan with England [The Parliamentary Debates..., 1908, col. 1017-1019].

The views of British politicians on the settlement of relations with Russia were very accurately described in his" Memoirs "by S. D. Sazonov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1910-1916. According to him," a negative attitude [to the 1907 agreement-K. S.] was found mainly among persons belonging to the official staff of the Anglo-Indian government, or that group of British statesmen who always considered irreconcilable hostility to Russia to be the beginning of all political wisdom" (Sazonov, 1927, p.27).

Russia, having signed the convention on Afghanistan affairs with England, could celebrate its victory. She received from the British government almost everything that she had been seeking for many years. However, St. Petersburg did not take into account or did not want to take into account the fact that by linking the emir's decision with the entry into force of the agreement, Russia called into question the implementation of its success in the negotiations. A. P. Izvolsky and his supporters overestimated the strength of British influence in Afghanistan, betting on London's ability to persuade the emir to accept the terms of the Anglo-Russian treaty.

Russian politicians believed that the British position in Afghanistan, which was already strong, was strengthened after L. Deng signed an agreement with Habibul-loi Khan in 1905. In reality, the ability of England to manage the development of the situation in the Emir's possessions was extremely small. This was only an appearance of control, but in reality a lot depended on the good will of the Kabul ruler himself. In 1907, the tsarist government ignored the real interests of the emir, who did not seek to spread foreign influence in his country. In St. Petersburg, they considered that just an appeal to Habibullah Khan, just a request to agree to the terms of the convention, would convince him of the sincerity of the intentions of Russia and Great Britain, and prove their desire to treat him "as a subject of international law" [AVPRI, p.132].

Thus, an incorrect assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and a mistaken view of the nature of Anglo-Afghan relations led Russia to put forward conditions that could not be accepted in Kabul. The British authorities were just as wrong as the Russians. During the negotiations, they did everything possible to ensure that the provisions of the convention satisfied the Emir, but did not take into account that any attempts by neighboring powers to achieve any advantages in Afghanistan would be considered by the Kabul ruler as a threat to the independence and territorial integrity of his possessions.

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list of literature

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (hereinafter - AVPRI). f. 147. Op. 486. D. 232.

On the History of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, Red Archive, 1935, vol. 2-3 (69-70).

New time. 01.04.1906.

Sazonov S. D. Memoirs of N. P.: Book publishing House of E. Siyalskaya, 1927.

Collection of treaties between Russia and other states (1856-1917). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1952.

Adamcc L.W. Afghanistan. 1900-1923. A Diplomatic History. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965.

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