Israel Keywords:, Palestine, propaganda, theses and counterarguments
One of the reasons for the long-standing insolubility of the Middle East conflict is related to its hoax. Attempts at an unbiased analysis of the underlying causes and consequences of this conflict are often hindered by the seemingly convincing rhetoric of proponents of a particular point of view, which are often mutually exclusive. Over the long years of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, demagogic and propaganda cliches deliberately introduced by the media into people's minds, which have a very remote relationship to reality, have become particularly important. And at a certain stage, they turn into self-sufficient factors that directly affect the course of events. Quite often, the population and leaders of both Arab countries and Israel are caught up in their own propaganda, which has a nationalistic and religious connotation.
The program document of the well-known Israeli NGO Gush Shalom 1 (translated from Hebrew as "Peace Corps"), entitled "Truth against Truth - a different view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict", states in this regard: "The actions of each of the parties (i.e., Israel and the Palestinians) are determined by their historical understanding (narrative) of the 120-year Arab-Israeli conflict. During this time, each of the sides has formed its own huge baggage of myths, reworkings of history, propaganda cliches and prejudices, which grow in abundance from the fear and hatred that accompany any war. The Zionist and Palestinian versions completely contradict each other, both in general points and in details. From the beginning of the conflict to this day, the Israeli leadership has always completely ignored the Palestinian national narrative. " 2
In this context, it should be noted that all Israeli governments, led by Labor, Likud or Kadima, which recently appeared on the Israeli political scene, 3 have considered and continue to consider the Middle East conflict exclusively through the prism of the security of the Jewish state. Israeli official propaganda has consistently portrayed its own state as a "small, peace-loving Western-style democracy" located "in the ocean of Arab dictatorships" that want to destroy it. Accordingly, Israel is positioned as a" victim " fighting against Arab and Palestinian terrorism, defending Western values from Islamic radicalism. This interpretation became more pronounced after September 11, 2001, when the concept of J. R. R. Tolkien was introduced.George W. Bush's "fight against terror" strategy was seamlessly integrated into the "clash of civilizations"scheme promoted by neoconservatives.
The main thing that Israeli politicians and propagandists deliberately overlook is the fact of the longest 44-year occupation of Palestine in modern post-war history. Their interpretation does not stand up to criticism from the point of view of objective analysis: Numerous testimonies show that Israel's persistent refusal to withdraw its troops and settlements from the Palestinian territories and to allow Muslims access to the holy sites of East Jerusalem is one of the main reasons for the radicalization of the Islamic world.
As an example, here are some examples of common propaganda cliches that Israeli politicians from the "right" camp and the ruling political establishment use to justify their approaches to the Middle East conflict. This is followed by counterarguments from Israeli historians and experts who have an alternative position. The article deliberately omits the interpretation of the Palestinian side for two reasons: first, it, like the Israeli one, often sins of bias and one-sidedness, and secondly, the author who resorts to its use invariably risks incurring accusations of "anti-Israel bias".
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Thesis: The entire territory of historical Palestine is the "land of Israel" and belongs to the Jews.
Counter-argument: The historical and religious claim of the Jews to the territory of Israel is well founded. However, it does not follow that all the land is from the Mediterranean Sea.
from the sea to the Jordan River should belong exclusively to one Jewish people. If we start from the traditional historical version, Jews, or Jews, formed the majority in certain areas of this territory for 1,900 years from the five-thousandth history of the region, and were in power for a relatively short time.
For about 1,400 years, the land of historic Palestine was owned by Muslims, and for most of that period by Arabs. The Arabs came to this land in 638 under the Caliph Omar, and then began a period that some historians call the "Arab colonization of Palestine." For several centuries, the territory of Palestine was dominated by the Arabic language and culture. Contrary to the well - known slogan "A land without a people is for a people without a land"voiced by many Zionists (including the first President of Israel, Chaim Weizmann) 4, the territory of Palestine/Israel was not empty when the first Zionists began to arrive.
In 1880, 400,000 Arabs and about 24,000 Jews lived in Palestine. Jews (i.e. approximately 6%). By 1922, the Jewish population had increased to 84,000 against 590,000 Arabs, accounting for 12%. By the time the State of Israel was established in 1948, the Jewish population had reached 630,000 among the 1,300,000 Arabs living in the land.5
Thus, as historical and statistical data confirm, both peoples living in the territory of historical Palestine and present-day Israel have the right to self-determination and independence. The claim of both Jews and Palestinians to their exclusive right to own the territory from p. Jordan to the Mediterranean leads to the perpetuation of the Middle East conflict, its permanent insolubility.
Thesis: By rejecting the UN's two-State solution in 1948 and launching a war against Israel, the Palestinians have made their "historic choice" and are fully responsible for everything. Therefore, they have no right to demand the "restoration of historical justice" and the return of refugees.
Counter-argument: The Zionist movement was initially based not only on the demand for land acquisition in order to exercise their right to self-determination, but also on the claim to the exclusivity of the right of Jews to own the land of Palestine/Israel. In practical terms, this attitude was expressed in the decision of the Zionist leaders to ensure the demographic predominance of Jews in historical Palestine. Military operations to "clear" the territory of the indigenous Palestinian population, Jewish combat detachments began to carry out long before the outbreak of the 1948 war. According to the Israeli historian Ilan Pappe in his book "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine", these actions in late 1947 and early 1948 against the Palestinians "were aimed at expelling the Palestinians"6. According to I. Pappe, in March 1948 - two months before the end of the British mandate for Palestine - the leaders of Jewish organizations adopted the Daled plan, which provides for the expulsion of the Palestinian population from their places of permanent residence. As a result, by the time Israel declared its independence, 250,000 Palestinians had been displaced from their homes.7
As another well - known Israeli historian, Benny Morris-a staunch Zionist, by the way, who belongs to the "right" camp-notes, there is no evidence that the Palestinians fled as a result of the calls of Arab leaders (this argument is often resorted to by Israeli propagandists who try to interpret history in the right direction for them). The same B. Morris admits that Jewish militants have carried out at least 18 armed attacks on the peaceful Palestinian population, which he describes as a "massacre"8. I. Pappe counts 36 such cases. One way or another, attacks on civilians were the main reason for the mass flight of Palestinians from their places of permanent residence. These are the true origins of the refugee problem.
The conclusions and purpose of the above research by Israeli historians is not to assign historical responsibility for the events leading up to the 1948 war, or for the war itself, to Israel. According to Jeff Halper, an Israeli publicist, professor of anthropology and head of the Israeli Committee against Home Destruction, the point is to "rethink" the Middle East conflict: it is necessary to realize that Israel is not a "victim" and that this state, like the Palestinians, is responsible for its emergence, development and current state. Moreover, Halper points out, the share of Israel's guilt "as an occupying Power with the strongest army in the Middle East, nuclear weapons and controlling 60% of the Palestinian territories is immeasurably greater than the share of the occupied Palestinian population dispersed in enclaves and without its own army." 9
Thesis: Israel has always sought peace with the Arabs, but the Arabs have consistently rejected Israel's peace proposals.
Counterargument: According to a number of reputable Israeli historians, the situation is exactly the opposite. One of them, Professor Avi Shlaim, on the declassified materials of the Israeli Foreign Ministry convincingly shows that " since 1948, the Arab countries have repeatedly proposed peace with Israel, but their attempts were rejected." Here are just a few historical examples.
In April 1949, the UN Conciliation Commission on Palestine convened a conference of Arab and Israeli representatives in Lausanne, Switzerland. All attempts of the Conciliation Commission to achieve a shift in the decision
The Palestinian problems have failed because of Israel's refusal to cede war-torn territories and allow the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion said at a cabinet meeting that the Israeli public is "intoxicated with the spirit of victory" and will not support any concessions to the Arabs. The head of the Israeli delegation, Elias Sasson, who received a letter with peace initiatives from Egyptian King Farouk, said:: "There can be no question of any concessions." 10
In 1949, the Syrian leader Husni al-Zaim openly announced that he was ready to become the first Arab leader to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. He also expressed the idea of resettling half of all Palestinian refugees in Syria. Husni al-Zaim repeatedly offered to meet with D. Ben-Gurion, but each time he was refused. As a result, no peace treaty was concluded between Israel and Syria, but only a ceasefire agreement was signed.11
King Abdullah of Transjordan negotiated with Israel for two years, but failed to make progress (he was assassinated in 1951). His offer to meet with David Ben-Gurion was also rejected. The comment of the then Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett was very eloquent: "Transjordan declares: we are ready to make peace immediately. We replied: of course, we also want peace, but we will not run to it, but prefer to go." King Abdullah stated: "I can make concessions to the Jews for the sake of peace. But without any concessions on their part, I have no chance of doing so. " 12
In 1952-1953, intensive negotiations were held with the Syrian government of the pro-American Adib al-Shishakli, who wanted to conclude peace agreements with Israel. However, these negotiations failed because the Israeli side insisted on full control of Lake Kinneret( Lake of Tiberias), Lake Hula and the Jordan River.
Since 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser has repeatedly offered D. Ben-Gurion to negotiate peace, but his efforts were not crowned with success. The Israeli attack on the Egyptian military base in Gaza in 1953 finally nullified the attempts of the Egyptians to negotiate with Israel.
In general, the reluctance of Israeli leaders after 1948 to engage in any peace negotiations with the Arabs was determined by the fact that after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria (known as the Rhodes Agreements of 1949), Israel received undoubted political, territorial and military advantages. The above-mentioned Israeli historian Benny Morris quotes an excerpt from a document declassified by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, in which D. Ben-Gurion postulated an attitude that essentially applies to Israel at the present time: "Israel will never discuss the possibility of concluding peace in exchange for ceding even a small piece of territory. Neighboring States have not earned an inch of Israeli land. We are ready to discuss only peace in exchange for peace. " 13
At the end of 1965, the Vice-president and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Abdel Hakim Amer, invited the head of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, Meir Amit, to visit Cairo. However, Tel Aviv rejected this proposal (Isser Harel, the Prime Minister's adviser on intelligence affairs, sharply opposed contacts with the Egyptians). It remains to be seen whether contacts between Israel and Egypt, if established, would have prevented the impending 1967 war. 14
Immediately after the end of the 1967 war, Israeli representatives probed the possibility of concluding peace agreements with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Jordan. The Palestinians were ready for this, but only on the condition of finding their own State. The Jordanians also wanted to make peace with Israel, but on the condition of gaining control of the West Bank, including the holy sites of East Jerusalem. King Hussein held several meetings with Israeli representatives. However, the Israelis rejected any options that provided for the return of the territories captured in the war. Israel's annexation of the Greater Jerusalem area and the start of settlement construction finally closed the way to peace agreements.15
In 1971, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat sent a letter to the UN Commission of Gunnar Yarring, 16 expressing his desire to start peace talks with Israel. According to some historians, Israel's acceptance of Sadat's proposal could have prevented the 1973 war17, but it was rejected. After the Yom Kippur War, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir also rejected all Sadat's peace proposals.
In 1978, Sadat tried to link the Israeli-Egyptian peace process with the settlement of the Palestinian problem. However, this approach was strongly opposed by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who refused to discuss any options other than the "Palestinian authority." 18
In 1988, five years before the Oslo peace process began, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) officially recognized Israel as part of the Green Line, expressing a desire to start discussing a settlement on this basis.19 There was no response from the Israeli side.
In 1993, at the beginning of the Oslo Process, PLO leader Yasser Arafat repeatedly declared in writing that he recognized Israel within the 1967 borders, i.e., in the territory that occupies 78% of historical Palestine. Despite the explicit and public recognition of Israel's legitimacy on the part of the Palestinians, the Israeli side did not act on the principle of a legitimate State.-
pu of reciprocity. The government of Ishaq Rabin did not recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination or to establish their own state within the generally recognized international legal borders - I. Rabin announced only the recognition of the PLO to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people. Since then, no Israeli Government has ever declared recognition of a Palestinian State in the West Bank (WB) in Gaza within the 1967 borders. 21
On the contrary, contrary to the logic of the Oslo peace process, the Israeli governments, led by Labor and Likud, allowed (or intentionally contributed to, which is essentially irrelevant) a doubling of the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories during the period of settlement negotiations between 1993 and 2000. Palestinian territories (OPT) (from 200 thousand to 400 thousand people). This, according to Professor Jeff Halper, can be considered the most serious blow to the peace process and the "two-State solution" to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the possibility of creating an independent viable Palestinian State decreases in direct proportion to the growth of illegal Israeli settlements.22
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ignored the Arab League's "Arab peace initiative" in 2002, under which Israel could receive full diplomatic recognition from all Arab and almost all Muslim States (with the possible exception of Libya) in return for ending its occupation of Palestine. Since then, the Arab League has confirmed its initiative several times, but the Israeli leadership continues to actually boycott this unique opportunity to establish peace and integrate the Jewish state into the Middle East region as its full member.
In mid-2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert rejected the so-called "Prisoners ' Document", in which the main Palestinian groups, including Hamas, announced their agreement to a political course aimed at achieving a "two-State solution" to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This created a situation where Hamas could become part of the political process and a participant in negotiations with Israel. Instead of taking advantage of this opportunity, the Olmert government continued its policy of a total boycott of Hamas, clearly demonstrating that the situation of "two Palestinians", a split in the Palestinian ranks, is much more profitable for Israel than a single partner on the Palestinian side.
According to some Israeli analysts, the list of missed opportunities to achieve peace with the Arabs should include the attitude of Israeli leaders to the settlement proposals coming from the Syrians. Thus, in response to the public statement of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made in the fall of 2006: "We are ready to immediately conclude peace with Israel, because we want to live in peace with this country", Prime Minister E. Olmert responded as follows: "We will never leave the Golan Heights." Then E. Olmert supplemented this statement with standard accusations of Syrians in complicity with terror, concluding that "the conditions for peace with Syria are not yet ripe" 23. This attitude remains unchanged for the Israeli leadership. E. Olmert, who began indirect negotiations with the Syrians under Turkish mediation (ended without success), and Benjamin Netanyahu, who replaced him as Prime Minister, as well as other leading Israeli politicians declare their readiness to negotiate with Damascus, but without returning the Golan (they call this requirement " preliminary In November 2010, the Knesset passed a law according to which the issue of the transfer of the Golan Heights should be decided not by the Israeli Government, but by a national referendum. Thus, the Israeli leaders made it clear that they are relieving themselves of responsibility for this problem and, therefore, it makes no sense for the Syrians to negotiate with them about this.
The thesis. During the Camp David summit in July 2000, the Palestinians rejected Barak's "generous offer" and then responded with violence, launching a second intifada. Therefore, "Israel does not have a peace partner in negotiations on the Palestinian side" (a well-known statement by E. Barak)24.
A counterargument. The" generous offer " allegedly made by E. Barak to Ya. Arafat at Camp David is one of the most widespread myths promoted by the Israeli official body at all levels. This mythologem is closely linked to the so-called "Bill Clinton parameters" put forward six months after the end of the Camp David talks, according to which Israel was offered to liberate 96% of the Palestinian territories. It is based on the false idea that everything is decided by the percentage of territory that Israel is willing to transfer to the Palestinians on the principle of "the more, the better."
However, the situation is different: even leaving behind 5% of the" strategic areas " of the ZBRI (and in reality - and East Jerusalem, the main settlement blocks and the so-called Latrun salient (no man's land), which Israeli politicians never include in their calculations, but which make up 10-15% of the occupied Palestinian territories Israel will be able to control the borders, movement of people and goods, water resources, airspace, and communications of a future Palestinian State.
To clarify this idea, J. Halper gives an interesting analogy. If you look at the plan of a modern prison (he took prisons in the USA as a model), it turns out: 92% of its territory is used by prisoners.-
measures, places of work, walking areas, meeting rooms, etc. Prison authorities and guards have only 8% of the prison's territory at their disposal: walls, prison administration rooms, rooms where keys to cells and bars are stored, weapons, and a room with security cameras. However, despite these proportions, it is the latter - the overseers-who control all the processes that take place in the prison.25
Any more than speculative arguments about the failure of the version replicated by the Israeli official about the" generous offer "of E. Barak, allegedly rejected by the Palestinians at Camp David and Taba (an Egyptian resort-the place of the last meeting of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in the framework of the "Oslo process" in 2000-2001), are said to be related to these issues. documents made public in Israel.
For example, the 26-page "Status of the Diplomatic Process with the Palestinians: theses for the Prime Minister", which is referred to by the Haaretz newspaper correspondent B. Ravid26. It was compiled by a team of leading Israeli military and political experts in the Barak government, headed by the then head of the Prime Minister's Office, Gilad Sher (signed at the end of the document). The document is a summary of the goals pursued by the Israeli delegation at the Camp David and Taba talks. They are strikingly different from the official Tel Aviv version of events and are summarized as follows.
1. Israel was to maintain settlement blocs in the West Bank that would house 80% of all Jewish settlers. To do this, it was proposed to annex from 8 to 10% of the Palestinian territory to Israel, along with all the infrastructure created on it-bypass roads for settlers, closed military zones, etc.
2. Barak's plan called for Israel to maintain a "security zone" (with the presence of army units) in the Jordan Valley, from the Dead Sea to the settlement of Meholah in the north of ZBRI (by 2000). The Jordan Valley was effectively annexed by Israel). Thus, in addition to the inevitable economic losses (the land of the Jordan Valley is the most fertile part of the ZBRI, rich in water resources), the Palestinian side, in case of accepting the proposal of E. Barak, was actually deprived of the opportunity to control the external borders of its future state. In addition, the Israelis demanded that the Palestinian State be demilitarized and that the Latrun area and the transport corridor connecting the Gaza Strip with ZBRI be under full Israeli control.
3. Contrary to the widely circulated Israeli version that E. Barak was allegedly ready to go to the partition of Jerusalem, this was never really discussed. E. Barak's plan provided for the preservation of the territorial continuity of Jewish settlements in and around East Jerusalem (primarily through the preservation of the settlements of Ma'ale Adumim and Har Homa for Israel). The Armenian and Jewish quarters of the Old City were to remain with Israel. The essence of Barak's main ploy was to hand over to the Palestinians the Abu Dis neighborhood (and two nearby villages) adjacent to Jerusalem, which was later to be renamed Al-Quds (which means Jerusalem in Arabic) and proclaimed as the capital of the future Palestinian state.27
Agreeing to such conditions could mean only one thing for Ya'akov Arafat: the inevitable political, and in the worst circumstances, physical death and departure from the historical scene as a " leader who betrayed the cause of the Palestinian people."
The thesis. Yasser Arafat unleashed a second " intifada "that ended the Oslo process.
A counterargument. Although the official Tel Aviv government publicly accuses Arafat of starting the second intifada (which began after Sharon's provocative visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000), both Israeli military intelligence officials and many political analysts admit that the intifada was a spontaneous uprising against what the Palestinians considered "perpetuating the occupation" .28 More In addition, a number of Israeli experts are of the opinion that the second intifada was unleashed just against Ya.Arafat as a kind of warning signal to the PLO leader not to make concessions to Israel.
Menachem Klein, an adviser to the Israeli delegation at the Camp David Summit in 2000, writes about this. "The statement that I am. Arafat, rejecting Israel's proposals, started the intifada, is a pure myth. There is no evidence that the Palestinian Authority planned anything like this. It is known that there were several leaders of Palestinian groups who were opposed to the PLO leadership, who turned to Ya. Arafat with a proposal to give the green light to a popular uprising using violence against Israel. Thus, they intended to get concessions from E. Barak in the negotiations. But Ya. Arafat refused this offer. The Israelis, instead of supporting Ya. Arafat and the official Palestinian leadership, on the contrary, began to blame and demonize them for everything. This reinforced radical forces (on the Palestinian side) and led to an escalation of violence during the intifada.
The Israeli leadership and Israeli negotiators failed to understand the true goals and causes of the intifada. They saw it as a low-intensity conflict, not a struggle for survival.-
dependence. Real concessions were needed on the Israeli side, similar to those discussed at the Taba talks in 2001.For example, the decision to evacuate several Jewish settlements could stop the intifada and help the Palestinian authorities restore calm. However, this was not done. " 29
Last but not least, the formal end date of the Oslo peace process should be considered the end of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in January 2001 in Taba. This happened after E. Barak recalled from this Egyptian resort the Israeli delegation, which was in the process of negotiations with the Palestinians and, as reliable sources indicate, is literally "on the verge" of reaching important compromise solutions on key issues of the Middle East settlement of the Second World War. Thus, even from a formal point of view, the party that put an end to the Oslo process is Israel, not the Palestinians.
The thesis. Israel is building a "security fence", which is mistakenly called a "wall" and whose purpose is to ensure the safety of Israeli citizens.
A counterargument. The official name of this structure in Hebrew is "michshol hafrada", which means"separation barrier". Only 20% of its route runs along the Green Line, the internationally recognized border between Israel and the Palestinian territories. 80% of the route of the barrier, or separation wall, which has a total length of 650 km and a height in some places of 26 feet (about 7 meters) (5 times longer and 2 times higher than the Berlin Wall), passes through the Palestinian territories. The separation wall cuts off, according to various estimates, from 9 to 11% of the Palestinian territory, completely encircles the cities of Qalqilya and Tulkarm, and cuts off the inhabitants of 38 Palestinian cities and villages from their agricultural land. About 50,000 Palestinians are trapped in a strip of land between the wall and the Israeli border, cut off from resources, work opportunities, and forced to leave their homes. All this does not fall under the criterion of "ensuring security", to which Israel appeals. In addition, many senior members of the Israeli leadership themselves have repeatedly made it clear that the true purpose of the separation wall is to establish a "demographic border" between Israel and the OPT. In particular, she stated this in December 2005. Then Israeli Minister of Justice Tzipi Livni 30, in January 2006 - Ehud Olmert 31.
The thesis. In principle, Jews and Arabs cannot live in peace. The Middle East conflict is a manifestation of the"clash of civilizations".
A counterargument. The concept of a "Judeo-Christian" civilization opposing Islamic civilization does not correspond to historical facts. Despite some instances of hostility, Jews have gotten along well with Muslims throughout the 1,600 years of Islamic history and have felt much more comfortable among them than, say, in Europe. This is why when Jews were expelled from Spain and Portugal in the Middle Ages, they found refuge in the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Pogroms and the Holocaust are products of European, not Islamic, civilization, which was not characterized by anti-Semitism in any form at all (this phenomenon was born, as is well known, in Europe). Except in very rare cases, which are the exception rather than the rule, Jews in the Islamic and Arab world did not experience the restrictions that were imposed on them in European countries.
According to Israeli historians of Sephardic origin (i.e., people from Muslim countries), relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine also developed relatively harmoniously until the first serious clash in Sejer in the late 19th century. It was caused by an attempt by Jewish emigrants who arrived in Palestine to expel Palestinian peasants from their agricultural land (the plot was bought by Jewish settlers from so-called absent landowners)32.
As Jeff Halper points out, "the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, like the Arab-Israeli conflict in a broader sense, is a political conflict involving the claim of two national movements to the same territory." In international law, the reason for the Arab-Israeli conflict is called the occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel. Any attempt to present this conflict as a "clash of civilizations" is nothing more than a hoax and manipulation of consciousness aimed at distorting its cause-and-effect relationship. This interpretation is primarily of interest to those who act-openly or behind the scenes-against a Middle East settlement based on international law.
The thesis. Israel is the only Western-style democracy in the Middle East.
A counterargument. Despite the fact that Israel has many of the characteristics and characteristics of a democratic government (freedom of speech, freedom of political organization, a well-developed judicial system capable of protecting citizens from arbitrary actions by the authorities, etc.), violations of the civil rights of minorities (primarily the Arab population, which makes up 20.3% of the total population of Israel) are a daily occurrence in the Jewish state reality. This is most clearly and clearly manifested:
- In land policy: 93% of Israel's territory is nationalized, officially owned by the Israel Land Administration and the Jewish National Fund, and virtually inaccessible to the Arab and other non-Jewish population of the country;
- that, despite the right to participate in parliamentary elections,
the Arab minority is excluded from making political decisions: representatives of Arab parties have never been part of the government coalition bodies involved in shaping Israeli foreign and domestic policy;
- the existence and application in practice of a number of discriminatory laws against the non-Jewish minority.33
According to a number of reputable Israeli and international experts, including, first of all, Professor Shlomo Zand of Tel Aviv University, Oren Iftachel, a political scientist and geographer from Ben-Gurion University, and Sami Samohu, a professor of sociology at the University of Haifa, the socio-political system in Israel
it is more correct to describe it as an ethnocracy 34. Using the definition of corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor Jean Toshchenko, we recall that ethnocracy (from the Greek ethnos-people, tribe, kratos - power) is a form of political power in which political, economic, social and spiritual processes are managed from the standpoint of the primacy of the national interests of the dominant ethnic group to the detriment of the interests of other ethnic groups..
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These theses are just a few, but very illustrative examples of attempts to interpret historical reality in the right direction for the Israeli political establishment. Based on historical interpretations and ideologemes chosen in a certain way, the country's leadership and leading analytical institutions working for it carry out the necessary ideological programming of the Israeli (and not only Israeli) population.
These attitudes, promoted as self-evident axioms that do not require proof, are replicated by leading Western (primarily American)media. Mass media also turn into stable stereotypes of public consciousness. Thus, an effective mechanism for manipulating world public opinion works, distorting the understanding of the Middle East conflict, its origins, and cause-and-effect relationship.
1 One of the leading Israeli organizations for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Among its stated goals is"the destruction of the so-called Israeli national consensus based on disinformation" - http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/ru/about/about_gush/
2 Truth against Truth, a Completely Different Look at the Israel-Palestinian Conflict. Third Edition - in Russian, see: http://zope.gush-shalom.org/index_ru.html
3 Avodam-the Israeli Labor Party-was formed in 1968. It was the ruling party in the Ma'arah bloc until 1977; in 1992-1996 and in 1999-2000 it headed the government coalition in Israel. The Likud Party was established in 1973, its leader B. Netanyahu is the Prime Minister of Israel since March 2009. The Kadima party was created by Ariel Sharon in November 2005. From January 2006 to September 2008, its leader, Ehud Olmert, was Prime Minister of Israel.
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_land_without_a_people_for_a_people without_a_land
Zand Shlomo. 5 Who and how invented the Jewish people. Moscow, EKSMO. 2010, p. 489; Sachar Howard M. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. New York: Knopf. 1981.
Pappe Ilan. 6 The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oxford: One World Publications. 2006
8 The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 1947 - 1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004.
Halper Jeff. 9 An Israeli in Palestine, Resisting Dispossession, Redeeming Israel. London, Pluto Press. 2008, p. 329.
10 Ibid., p. 90.
Morris Benny. 11 Righteous Victims: A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1881 - 1991, New York: Knopf. 1999, p. 264 - 265.
12 Ibid., p. 262.
13 Ibid., p. 265.
14 Ibid., p. 305.
Gorenberg Gershom. 15 The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967 - 1977. New York: Henry Holt. 2006, p. 175 - 176.
16 Gunnar Jarring is a Swedish diplomat who was appointed Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in 1967. He made several shuttle trips to the Middle East region in order to encourage the parties involved in the Middle East conflict to reach a settlement. His mission was not successful because of Israel's unwillingness to cooperate with it.
Morris Benny. 17 Op. cit., p. 388 - 389.
18 Ibid., p. 469.
19 Ibid., p. 610.
20 Arafat's first de facto recognition of Israel is considered to be the proclamation of the State of Palestine within the 1967 borders (i.e., on the territory of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as its capital) and the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 during the 19th emergency session of the National Council of Palestine in November 1988. in Algeria - see: Pyrlin E. D. The difficult and long road to peace. Vzglyad iz Moskvy na problemu mideastochnogo regulirovaniya [A View from Moscow on the problem of Middle East settlement]. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2002, p. 295.
Savir Uri. 21 The Process. New York: Vintage. 1988, p. 53.
Halper Jeff. 22 Op. cit., p. 94.
23 Ibid., p. 95.
24 Speech by Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak // Monde-Diplomatique, 07.10.2000 - http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/speechbarak200010
Halper Jeff. 25 Op. cit., p. 186.
Ravid Barak. 26 In 2001: Dramatic agreement on core issues // Haarez, 13.12.2007.
Reinhart Tanya. 27 Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 // Seven stories press. New York, Second Edition. 2005, p. 35.
Pery Yoram. 28 Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. 2006, p. 242.
29 Foundation for the Middle East - www.fmep.org/analysis/articles/origins_of_intifada.html; Halper Jeff, Johnson Jimmy, Schaeffer Emily. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Challenging Slogans through Critical Reframing. First Printed 2007. Revised Edition 2009 -http://icahd.org.dolphin.nethost.co.il/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/SlogensRhetori c.pdf
Halper Jeff. 31 Op. cit., p. 170.
32 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict...
33 In October 2010 Israel was visited by a delegation of" Wise Men " - former world leaders, organized by Nelson Mandela (South Africa) in 2007 and designed to help resolve the most acute international conflicts. The delegation included former US President John Kerry.Carter, former Irish President Mary Robinson and former UN Secretary-General's representative Lakhdar Brahimi. In a report published after the trip, the Sages noted that Israel has now adopted 35 laws that discriminate against the Arab minority, and about 20 similar bills are under consideration in the Knesset.
Zand Shlomo. 34 Decree, Op.
35 See: Tatarskiy mir, 2004, No. 17 - http://www.tatworld.ru/article.shtml?article=619§ion=0&heading
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