It has been more than a decade since the dictionary of sociologists and political philosophers introduced concepts that are genetically related to secularization, but denote completely different, often opposite processes. We are talking about the concepts of "desecularization", "postsecular" and even "asecularization". All these concepts, in one way or another, are connected with the phenomenon of "rebirth" or "return" of religion, which is celebrated all over the world. In this article, we will discuss the process of desecularization in relation to the Russian post-Soviet reality. As a working definition of desecularization, we will use the conceptualization of this concept proposed by Vyacheslav Karpov, based on the ideas of Peter Berger1.

Peter Berger defined desecularization primarily as a counter-process to secularization. Vyacheslav Karpov went further than Berger and made the necessary clarifications. According to Karpov, desecularization is a process of counter-secularization, during which religion restores its influence on society as a whole, reacting to previous and /or concomitant secularization processes.3 Expanding his definition, Karpov lists those trends, the combination of which forms, in his opinion, the process of desecularization. It highlights the following: "(a) Convergence between previously secularized institutions and religious norms, both formal and informal; (b) the revival of religious beliefs and practices;

1. Berger P. The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview//The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999; Berger P. Secularization Falsified// First Things. February 2008. P. 23-27 (see the Russian translation in this issue of the journal).

2. Karpov V. Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework//Journal of Church and State. 2010. Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 232-270. See also V. Karpov's article in this issue of the journal.

3. Ibid. P. 250.

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c) the return of religion to the public space (deprivation); d) the return of religious content to various cultural subsystems, including art, philosophy and literature, as well as the decline in the status of science in relation to the resurgent role of religion in world construction and world maintenance; e) changes in the substratum of society related to religion (religiously determined demographic changes, redefinition of territories and their populations on religious grounds, restoration of faith-related material cultures, increasing the share of religion-related goods in the general economic market, etc.) " 4.

In addition, Karpov speaks about the non-integration of various components of the desecularization process5, starting from the point of view of Jose Casanova 6 on secularization, and about the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of both secularization processes and desecularization 7. He also introduces the concepts of multiple, overlapping, and colliding desecularizations, pointing out the complexity that arises in a global context when overlapping counter-secularization processes.8
All these components make it possible to form an idea of desecularization. Based on Karpov's conceptualization, we will try to describe some aspects of the process of desecularization in post-Soviet Russia, as well as supplement the trends identified by him.

The starting point for describing desecularization processes is the previous secular situation, so when talking about desecularization in post-Soviet Russia, we should start with the specifics of Soviet secularization.

Traditionally, discussions about secularization distinguish two types of secularization: European (classical) and American. These types of secularization are fairly well studied and described 9. However, you need to add another type to them, which was harak-

4. Karpov V. Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework. P. 250.

5. Ibid. P. 248.

6. Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994. P. 211.

7. Karpov V. Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework. P. 250.

8. Ibid. P. 268 - 270.

9. A review on this topic is presented, for example, in: Uzlaner D. A. Formation of the neoclassical model of secularization in the Western sociology of religion in the second half of the XX century. 2008. Ng. pp. 135-148.

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The term is applied to countries with communist regimes (let's call it "Soviet secularization"). This type of secularization cannot be said to be something fundamentally new10, but this type, compared to the other two, is the least studied, both from a factual and theoretical point of view. We can also talk about the Soviet model of secularization, which was developed by Soviet sociologies11.

The main feature of Soviet-style secularization is that it was carried out through the actual suppression of religion and religiosity. This suppression took various forms: from the destruction and reduction of religious institutions and criminal prosecution of believers to psychological pressure on them in society (at school, at work, in the army, in the media, etc.) 12.

In addition, the repression of religion was carried out in the cultural and educational sphere through the reinterpretation of the role of religion in history and the desacralization of art (all religious content of works of art was interpreted as "thematic"), as well as through the silencing or criticism of religious, philosophical and theological traditions.13
An important feature of Soviet secularization is the" hyper-privatization " of religion. In the Soviet case, the main vector of the secularization process was aimed at ousting religion not only from the public sphere, but also from the private life of citizens, since non-compliance of private life (individual, family, group) with the doctrines of the Communist Party was regarded as a dangerous anti-social fact for the state. Individual religiosity in the conditions of Soviet society proved to be a serious obstacle to professional development.-

10. The" Soviet "or" Russian " type of secularization is mentioned, for example, in: Martin D. A General Theory of Secularization. Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 1978 и Berger P. Secularization Falsified.

11. Uzlaner D. A. Sovetskaya model ' sekularizatsii [The Soviet model of secularization]. 2010. N6. pp. 62-69

12. About 2011 attacks on the Church in the Soviet period, see, for example: Shkarovsky M. V. Russian Orthodox Church in the XX century, Moscow, 2010; Zadvorny V. L., Yudin A.V. History of the Catholic Church in Russia: short essay, Moscow: College of Catholic Theology, 1995; Sinelnikov SP. Soviet legislation on religious propaganda (1918-1930s) / / Istoriya gosudarstva i prava, 2011. N22. pp. 38-42.

13. On the antireligious program of Soviet schools in the 1920s, see: Balashov E. M. Shkola v rossiiskoe obshchestve 1917-1927 gg.: stanovlenie "novogo cheloveka"[School in Russian Society in 1917-1927: the formation of a "new person"]. St. Petersburg, 20oz; Sinelnikov Sp. Antireligious foundations of education in the Soviet school in the 1920s / / Scientific Theological portal " Bogoslov.py"/http://www.bogoslov.ru/text/951787-html.

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professional career and any form of active participation in public life and activities.

As a result, religion, which was being forced out of the private life of the citizen, went even deeper - into his secret private life. Religious people, as a rule, were forced to lead a double life: publicly demonstrating their belonging to the number of Soviet citizens, hide their religiosity in every possible way (this applies, in particular, to the phenomenon of secret priests and monks)14. The discovery of even individual religiosity in a Soviet person threatened him with reprisals. It is in this sense that we can talk about the hyper-privatization of religion. This is one of the main differences between Soviet secularization and European secularization, where private forms of religious expression could exist without hindrance.

Another extremely important feature of Soviet secularization was the transformation of religious consciousness among the bearers of religiosity. Together with Kyrlezhev, we define the essence of this process as "the distillation of religious consciousness. 15 "Distillation" is a consequence of the" hyper-privatization " of religion. It means that religious beliefs, values and motivations of believers are rigidly isolated, practically disconnected from the ideas, values and motivations characteristic of other sectors of cultural and social life. Carriers of a "distilled" religious consciousness are characterized by a radical attitude to the religious/secular (secular) opposition.

Even everyday life becomes secular (mundane) under the conditions of "hyper-privatization", since everyday life takes place in a godless society full of dangers. The life of a believer is focused on the purely religious sphere (prayer, ritual, fasting, reading religious books, communicating with clergy). Everything "external" that does not relate to the religious proper is turned out to be religious. -

14. The question of the "double life" in the Soviet Union as applied to Orthodox believers is considered, in particular, in the book: Beglov A. In search of "Sinless Catacombs": The Church Underground in the USSR, Moscow, 2008 (see the section "Survival Strategies in the Church Underground of the 1920s-1940s", pp. 78-98). In a broader context, this issue is discussed in the work of Alexey Yurchak: Yurchak A. Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

15. Kyrlezhev A., Shishkov A. Postsecularism in Post-Atheist Russia// Documents of the workshop "Politics, Culture and Religion in the Postsecular World". Faenza: Institute for East-Central Europe and the Balkans (University of Bologna), 2011 / http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB. php/L/EN/IDPagina/3100.

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It is considered "secular" in a negative sense, i.e. it is labeled as alien and dangerous 16. In their extreme forms, even religious institutions become" external "to the" distilled " religious consciousness.17
A good example of the manifestation of this consciousness is the teachings and letters of some authoritative confessors (usually of monastic rank)to their spiritual children. 18
During this period, communal religious life becomes extremely atomized and, for example, in Orthodoxy, monastic forms of organizing spiritual life begin to enjoy great popularity. The figure of the elder confessor, around whom a few spiritual children are grouped, is put forward in a prominent place.

The collapse of the Soviet regime removed the restrictions on religious life and activities imposed by Soviet secularization. Religion began to play an increasingly important role in Russian society. The expansion of the sphere of influence of religion (desecularization) in Russia was caused by two counter-secularization processes.

1. The return of religion to the public sphere In the 1990s and 2000s. Religious institutions and, especially, the Russian Orthodox Church, as the dominant religious community in Russia, rebelled-

16. Karelin R., archim. On the secularization of the Church//Christianity and Modernism, Moscow: Moscow Metochion of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, 1999, pp. 279-290.

17. For example, for Bishop Barnabas (Belyaev) who lived underground, as evidenced by his diary entries: Belyaev V. "Uncle Kolya" vs... Notebooks of Bishop Barnabas (Belyaev). 1950-1960. Moscow: Christian Library, 2010.

18. For example, Abbot Nikon (Vorobyov) writes: "I also advise you: do not trust people, do not talk about your faith and inner life. Talk to them as little as possible. And what's there to talk about? Also, read less novels and social books. In extreme cases, read historical books (Letter 303)": Vorobyov N., igum. Repentance is left to us: a collection of letters. Moscow: Sretensky Monastery Publishing House, 2005. A characteristic remark of another authoritative confessor of that period, Hieroschemonk Sampson (Sievers): "Do worldly household chores thoughtfully and sparingly, so that the demons, under the pretext of peaceableness, at home would not take away your solitude: concentration, prayer": The Elder Hieroschemist Sampson: a biography, conversations and Teachings, Moscow, 2002.

Archpriest Valentin Sventsitsky contrasts the religious with the secular: "Christianity and the world are two principles that are opposite to each other. The world hates Christ... Christians should hate the world... Meaning by this "hatred" for worldly relations with the father, mother, children, brothers and hatred for the worldly life": Sventsitsky V., prot. A monastery in the world. Sermons and Teachings, Vol. 1-2. Moscow, 1995-1996.

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new and significantly increased their presence in the public sphere 19. Representatives of religious confessions began to speak out publicly on important issues of public and political life, and participate in the work of public institutions (for example, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation 20). Coverage of the life of religious institutions, primarily the Russian Orthodox Church, began to occupy more and more space in the secular mass media.21 This process is the main desecularization process.

2. Restore the private sphere. The lack of pressure from the authorities and society has led to the fact that citizens were able to openly practice religion in their private lives without fear of reprisals. As a result, the number of believers has increased significantly.22 The restoration of the private sphere took place in the course of a return to pan-European democratic norms. In contrast to the European situation, when the privatization of religion was achieved through secularization, in the Russian post - Soviet situation, the same result was achieved through desecularization.

The return of religion in Russia is taking place simultaneously in the private and public spheres. The interweaving of private religiosity and the public presence of religion is revealed in the process of trying to solve a number of specific problems:

19.The Russian Orthodox Church has seen a particularly strong surge in public activity in recent years - the years of Patriarch Kirill's patriarchate.

20. The following official representatives of religious denominations are currently members of the CC of the Russian Federation (in alphabetical order):: Andrey Baljirov (Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia), Alexander Boroda (Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia), Nikon Vasyukov (Russian Orthodox Church), Albert Krganov (Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia), Damir Mukhetdinov (Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European Part of Russia), Sergey Ryakhovsky (Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians), Vsevolod Chaplin (Russian Orthodox Church), Fagim Shafiev (All-Russian Muftiate).

21. Roman Lunkin writes that "mentions of Orthodoxy and clergy in various contexts have been increasing steadily over the past twenty years": Lunkin R. Obraz ROC v svetskikh massmediya: mezhdu mifom o gosudarstvennoy tserkvi i fol'klorno-okultnom pravoslaviem [The image of the Russian Orthodox Church in secular Mass Media: between the Myth of the State Church and folklore and occult Orthodoxy]. Moscow: ROSSPEN PUBL., 2012, p. 171.

22. For an assessment of the religiosity of the Russian population in different periods, see, for example: Kaariainen K., Furman D. E. Believers, atheists and others (the evolution of Russian religiosity). 1997. N 6; They are the same. Religiosity in Russia in the 90s//Old Churches, New Believers: Religion in the Mass Consciousness of Post-Soviet Russia (Edited by Prof. K. Kaariainen and Prof. D. E. Furman). Saint Petersburg, Moscow: Letny sad Publ., 200o; Filatov S. B., Lunkin R.N. Statistics of Russian religiosity: magic of numbers and ambiguous reality//Sociological research. 2005. N6.

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school (how to ensure the right to receive information about religion in general education without violating the principle of secularism of public education?), army (how to ensure the right to worship in the army without reproducing pre-Soviet practice?), prison (the same problem), Church and museums (how to ensure the return of religious values and artifacts of the Church, at the same time ensuring the safety and accessibility of the relevant museum funds?), property (whether and how to make restitution of church property in the absence of restitution of property in general?)23.

Active public discussions continue on these and other issues in Russian society, which, regardless of their outcome, indicate the presence of desecularization trends. The very restoration of unfettered "private religiosity" is a public process that affects society as a whole and reveals the significance of religious aspects of its life. For example, the introduction of the institute of military clergy in the modern armed forces is aimed at ensuring the individual rights of military personnel and does not contradict either the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation or the principle of secularism of the state. 24 Meanwhile, public discussions often speak of a violation of this principle by the very fact of the presence of religion in this state institution. 25
What is replacing the above-mentioned "distillation" of religious consciousness? If "distillation" is a product of the Soviet type of secularization, then the saturation of this consciousness is "co-efficient".-

23. A selection of materials on these topics can be found on the website of the Sova Information and analytical center in the section "Religion and secular Society": http://www.sova-center.ru/religion/. Also on the Credo Internet portal: teaching the basics of religious cultures and secular ethics (http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=topic&id=361), the presence of religion in the army (http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/? act=topic&id=133)> restitution of church property (http://www portal-credo.ru/site/? act=topic&id=688), clericalization of state and public institutions (http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/? act=topic&id=756), etc.

24. Pchelintsev A. Russian Orthodox Church and army: experience of history and modern problems of interaction // The Orthodox Church under the New Patriarch (edited by A. Malashenko and S. Filatov), Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012, pp. 223-260.

25. A rather revealing polemic about the" clericalization " of the army unfolded on the pages of the Military-industrial Courier-see, for example: Ivaneev S. Batyushka komandiru ne pomoshniku / / MIC. 2011. N 31 (397); Shimanovsky M. Otvet marxistu i atheistu/ / MIC. 2011. N39 (405); Ivaneev S. Religion humiliates the warrior of the Russian Armed Forces/ / Military Industrial Complex. 2011. N45 (411); Ilyugtsenko R. In search of truth / / MIC. 2011. N47 (413); Ivaneev S. What is the danger of clericalization of the country and its armed defenders? 2012. N13 (430) et al.

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The project will be a desecularization process. But the irony is that from the point of view of the "distilled" religious tradition that was formed in the Soviet era, this "saturation" will look like secularization or secularization, that is, the penetration of secular issues into church life. As a result of secularization, the" spiritual "agenda certainly remains, but the gradual shift of focus towards "worldly" issues is perceived by the most conservative representatives of this consciousness as a negative and destructive process26.

A good example of this is the reaction to the call of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia for an active mission. In the first year of his patriarchate, Patriarch Kirill identified strengthening its influence on society as one of the Church's top priorities. According to him, "the activities of the Church now need to be evaluated not only by the number of churches and monasteries, but also by the impact that the Church has on the lives of people and society."27. According to Sergey Filatov, active missionary activity has become a means to achieve this goal. 28 Socio-political issues have taken a significant place in the sermon of the Primate of the Russian Church. At the first Council of Bishops after the election of the Patriarch, three official documents were adopted on the relationship between the Church and society.29
This activity has met with criticism among conservative members of the Russian Orthodox Church. This criticism is based on the accusation

26. Karelin R., archim. On the secularization of the Church.

27. Patriarch Kirill's speech in Tula and March 2009: cit. based on the materials of the website "Orthodoxy.ру"/http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/29612.htm.

28. In his work on the first years of Patriarch Kirill's patriarchate, Sergey Filatov writes that in the first year and a half almost all specific decisions and actions of the patriarch were somehow connected with the mission: Filatov S. Patriarch Kirill - two years of plans, dreams and inconvenient reality / / Orthodox Church under the new Patriarch (ed. by A. Malashenko and S. Filatova). Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012. p. 31.

29. The Council of Bishops of 2011 adopted the following documents on the interaction of the Church and society:: "Public activities of Orthodox Christians", " Practice of statements and actions of hierarchs, clergy, monastics and laity during election campaigns. The problem of clergy nominating their candidates for elections", "The attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church to deliberate and public blasphemy and slander against the Church". In addition, the Council of 2011 adopted the document "On the principles of organizing social work in the Russian Orthodox Church".

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in the secularization of the Church and the diminution of the actual spiritual aspect of Orthodoxy in favor of "missionary creativity" and "social activity" 30. Critics see the danger of the penetration of secular values into the Orthodox tradition, which will inevitably lead to "spiritual relativism" .31 The active involvement of the Church in social service is called "sly substitution", which threatens to "secularize, devalue and, finally, desalinate Christianity. The loss of the main saving mission in the worldly vanity " 32.

Andrey Karpov fears that the reform of Sunday schools carried out by the Department of Religious Education and Catechesis of the Russian Orthodox Church with a focus on state (secular) standards will strengthen the trend towards secularization. He writes: "It is really convenient when any educational standards are described in a universal language. But this means a convergence of secular and spiritual education. This is evidence of an ever-increasing confluence of Church and state. At the same time, the dependence of the Church on the state is growing, and tendencies towards secularization are also increasing."33
Orthodox publicist Nikolai Kaverin writes: "Today, in order to achieve a certain mysterious "missionary breakthrough" and "mass mission", a certain light version of the Orthodox faith is also offered: "glamorous, comfortable Orthodoxy", Orthodoxy-light, without self-restraint, without fighting sin, without prayer feat. This is based on a specific faith, which does not require any individual effort to rekindle it. Such a faith can attract at first with its deliberate anti-Asceticism, maximum adaptation to the modern secular way of life. " 34
Some secular analysts also assess the actions taken by Patriarch Kirill to strengthen his influence

30. Danilov D. Winds of church apostasy/ / Pravaya. ru. 28.09.2009 / http: / / pravaya. ru / look/17255.

31. Danilov D. Winds of church apostasy.

32. Yablokov M. Church and social service / / Russkaya narodnaya liniya. 22.05.2012 / http: / / ruskline. ru/analitika/2012/05/22/cerkov_i_socialnoe_sluzhenie/.

33. Karpov A. On standardization of Sunday schools / / Russkaya narodnaya liniya. 18.06.2011 / http: / / ruskline. ru/analitika/2011/06/18/0_standartizacii_voskresnyh_shkol/.

34. Kaverin N. The path to Euro-Orthodoxy//The Holy Fire. 28.12.2011/http://www.blagogon.ru/digest/275/

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The Russian Orthodox Church's view of society as the "secularization" of the Church. Thus, Filatov writes that the nature of the mission deployed by Patriarch Kirill is secular and, in fact, political: "Regardless of faith in God, Kirill and his associates do not preach faith in God, but a neo-Slavophil ideology of national revival, which is essentially secular." 35 Alexey Malashenko, speaking about the strategy of Patriarch Kirill, He calls the mission and "the active introduction of the Church into social and political life, its (the Church's) secularization"as two most important points. 36
Meanwhile, such "secularization" is a natural process, indicating that the religious and secular spheres, coming into contact, begin to influence each other. While religion was in the ghetto, there was practically no influence (except for diffuse processes at the borders). When these two spheres began to intersect in the public space, the transformations became more visible and caused a reaction.

It should be noted that even in ancient times there were periods in the life of the Church when we can see the connection between the strengthening of its influence on social and political life and its "secularization". First of all, this is the fourth century, when the Church in the Roman Empire underwent a rapid evolution, from being persecuted by the authorities to being a state Church. The mass influx of people to the Church and the active participation of church hierarchs in the social and political life led to the" secularization " of the Church, which was reacted to by the development of monasticism. The Russian theologian Alexander Schmeman writes: "Monasticism emerged from an almost unconscious, instinctive reaction to the secularization of the Church, not only in the sense of reducing its moral ideal, pathos of holiness, but also in the sense of its "entering the service" of the world-the Empire, civil society, natural values, everything that after the collapse of paganism was waiting for religious "sanction"from Christianity and sanctification"37. The similarity with the post-Soviet ecclesiastical situation is also added by the fact that during this period there was a transition from 2011 to the Church's active involvement in society. Vyacheslav Karpov in his work on desa-

35. Filatov S. Patriarch Kirill - two years of plans, dreams and inconvenient reality. p. 34

36. A. Malashenko The ROC Project: Conservative Modernization of Patriarch Kirill/ / NG-Religions. 23.12.2009/http://religion.ng.ru/society/2009-12-23/4_project.html.

37. Schmeman A., prot. Introduction to Liturgical Theology. Paris, 1961. p. 151.

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Kularizatsii considers the transition from the late Roman "sensuous" secularism to the Christian "ideational" era (according to Pitirim Sorokin) to be similar to the desecularization process38.

Perhaps a similar "secularization" takes place in other religions in the situation of their exit from isolation into the public space. However, this issue requires further study 39.

Summarizing the case of the Russian Orthodox Church, it can be suggested that a religion emerging from its ghetto into the public space will undergo transformations, becoming involved in the secular agenda, which will be perceived as "secularization" in relation to the tradition formed under the influence of secularization.40 It is important to recall that this process of" secularization " will be desecularization. This statement can be added to the list of trends shaping the process of desecularization that Karpov describes in his article. However, this assumption requires further study and verification, as it remains unclear whether it is applicable in contexts other than the post-Soviet one, in which the religion has been affected by secularization other than European or American.

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