SYRIA AND the EAST (Russian version of the Cambridge Ancient History chapter) *

This publication aims to introduce readers to the Russian original of the first part of the fifth chapter of the seventh volume of the Cambridge Ancient History, written by the outstanding Russian historian M. I. Rostovtsev (and translated into English by E. Minns) .1 It is a natural continuation of the publication of Yu. N. Litvinenko, who published the Russian original of the opening part of another Rostovtsev chapter of the same volume - the chapter devoted to Ptolemaic Egypt 2 .

For this reason, the authors do not need to address a number of issues that have already been covered by Y. N. Litvinenko, such as the need to publish the original text, the circumstances of its discovery in the archives, etc. 3 Our commentary will deal only with some questions of a more general nature : the place of this work in Rostovtsev's scientific biography, the peculiarity of his conception of the history of the Seleucid state and the Hellenistic East in general, and finally, the fate of the ideas expressed by him in the historiography of later times.

There is probably no reason to doubt that the pinnacle of Rostovtsev's scientific work is his three-volume Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, published in 1941.4 It is naturally very interesting for us to trace how the historian gradually developed the concepts that were then so forcefully expressed in his monumental work. It is clear that these two chapters (Ptolemaic Egypt and Syria and the East) should be considered as an important stage in the creation of a three-volume book. In any case, this relationship is established on the basis of not only logical conclusions, but also evidence belonging to Rostovtsev himself: in a letter to A. A. Vasiliev dated December 1, 1925, he directly connects these works .5

It is necessary to point out that if Rostovtsev was specifically engaged in Ptolemaic (and Roman) Egypt for many years, then the history of the Seleucids was not included in the sphere of his immediate interests at the time under consideration, 6 although , of course, he was interested in it, which, in particular, he was interested in.

* The publication was supported by the Russian Foundation for Scientific Research in the framework of research project No. 98-01-00066 "Academician M. I. Rostovtsev and the Hellenistic-Roman East (new archival materials)".

1 The authors consider it a pleasant duty to express their heartfelt gratitude to Academician G. M. Bongard-Levin, who provided us with a copy of the text of this chapter, which is kept in the Yale University Archives (Mikhail I. Rostovtzeff Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 1133. Series I. Box 16. Folder 168).

Rostovtsev M. I. 2 Ptolemaic Egypt / / VDI. 1999. N 4. pp. 189-196; see also Litvinenko Yu. N. Rostovtsev's Ptolemaic Egypt (To the publication of the Russian original of M. I. Rostovtsev's chapter for the Cambridge Ancient History) / / Ibid. pp. 180-188.

Litvinenko. 3 Uk. op. p. 180 cfl.

Rostovtzeff М.I. 4 The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World. V. I-III. Oxf., 1941.

Bongard-Levin G. M., Tunkina I. V. 5 M. I. Rostovtsev and A. A. Vasiliev: six decades of friendship and creative cooperation / Scythian Novel, Moscow, 1997, p. 265 ("I dream that I will soon be able to start writing a book on the social and economic history of Hellenism. This topic is very interesting to me. In the meantime, after the book on animal style, you need to write two articles for Cambridge Ancient History"). Judging by the date, Rostovtsev is referring to these two chapters for the seventh volume.

6 For the period preceding the writing of the chapter on the Seleucids, we can note a very small number of Rostovtsev's works related to this issue: Hellenism // Encyclopedic Dictionary

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in particular, says his review of the book by A. Boucher-Leclerc 7 . Only later, in connection with the management of the excavations in Dura-Europos, Rostovtsev began to actively and specifically deal with the Hellenistic East, thereby preparing his general work. Thus, this chapter can be considered an important stage in his scientific biography - the beginning of his special studies on the Seleucid problem.

It is very important that the chapter was published as part of one of the volumes of the Cambridge Ancient History, the publication of which can be considered one of the most interesting and fruitful international projects in the field of ancient history carried out in the first half of the XX century. Twelve volumes (and five volumes of illustrations) of this publication, published between 1924 and 1939, presented a general picture of the history of the ancient world, reflecting the main achievements of science in the XIX-first third of the XX century. The significance of this collective work is very great, for decades it was considered a kind of "standard", and in the future not only students and teachers, but also academic researchers constantly turned to it, seeing it as a kind of result of the research of their predecessors. The fact that the second edition of the Cambridge Ancient History has been published since 1970 is also a recognition of the significance of this publication.

The most important reason for the success of the Cambridge Ancient History is the participation of leading experts in various fields of ancient history. Among them was Rostovtsev, then a professor at Yale University. He became one of the authors of the seventh, eighth, ninth and eleventh volumes of the edition. It seems that none of the scholars who contributed to the Cambridge Ancient History were represented by the four volumes of this edition.

The seventh volume of the Cambridge Ancient History has the title "Hellenistic Monarchs and the Rise of Rome" 8 and, accordingly, a somewhat peculiar composition. The first nine chapters are devoted to the history of the Hellenistic period9, and the next nine chapters describe the history of early Rome up to the beginning of contacts with the Greek world. Then two chapters describe events in Greek history that are closely related to the history of Rome (chapters dedicated to Agathocles and Pyrrhus), after which it is Rome's turn again (in a special chapter there is a story about the First Punic War). Finally, in the final part of the volume in two chapters, authored by W. W. Tarn ("The struggle of Egypt against Syria and Macedonia" and "Greek Alliances and Macedonia"), the foreign policy history of the Hellenistic world is described, followed by chapters related to the problems of Roman history - up to the Roman conquest of Illyria.

Thus, the place of the two Rostov chapters is rather peculiar: they are "framed" by two chapters written by W. W. Tarn, which first deal with the problems of the history of the Diadochi up to the final design of the new states (Ptolemaic Egypt, the kingdom of the Seleucids, Macedonia), and then - the history of the political and military confrontation between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids. Rostovtsev thus had to provide a picture of the political, economic, social, administrative, and ethnic structure of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms, which was a much more complex task than those faced by W. W. Tarn.

The structure of the chapter "Syria and the East" is as follows. The entire text is divided into

Brockhaus-Efron. 1904. 80. pp. 651-655; Hellenistic Asia in the era of the Seleucids (about the book: Bouche Leclerq. Histoire des Seleucides, P. 1913) / / Scientific Historical Journal. 1913. 1. С. 39-63; Notes on the Economic Policy of the Pergamene Kings // Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir W.M. Ramsay. 1923. P. 359-389; рец.: Cumont F. Fouilles de Doura- Europos (1922-1923). 1926 //The American Historical Review. 1927. 32. P. 836-841; see also Zuev V. Yu. Materials to the bibliography of M. I. Rostovtsev // The Scythian Novel, p. 200 cf.

7 While at Oxford in 1919 - the first half of 1920, Rostovtsev gave a series of lectures on "The Economic History of Hellenism and Rome" and suggested that Clarendon Press publish a book based on them "Studies in the economic History of the Hellenistic and Roman world", in the first (Hellenistic) volume of which he planned to give "the lion's share"To Egypt (see Litvinenko. Uk. op. p. 181. Note 11). Consequently, the Seleucid kingdom was not in the foreground for him at that time.

8 The Cambridge Ancient History. V. VII. The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Rise of Rome / Ed. S.A. Cook, F.E. Adcock, M.P. Charlesworth. Cambr., 1928.

9 " Leading Ideas of the New Period "(W. S. Ferguson), "The Arrival of the Celts" (J. D. de Navarro), "New Hellenistic Kingdoms" (W. W. Tarn), "Ptolemaic Egypt "(M. I. Rostovtsev), " Syria and the East "(M. I. Rostovtsev), "Macedonia and Greece" (W. W. Tarn), "Athens" (K. F. Angus), "Alexandrian Literature" (E. Barber), " Hellenistic Science and Mathematics "(group of authors).

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six paragraphs: "The Seleucid Empire, its character and development", "Organization of the Seleucid Empire", "Empire: Asia Minor", "Empire: Syria, Mesopotamia and Babylonia", "Empire: Phoenicia and Palestine", "Results of Seleucid activity". A certain emphasis on describing the fate of individual regions is striking - the feature ("regionalism") that Zh. Andro in relation to Rostovtsev's three-volume book 10 . However, in the three-volume book itself, this feature is not as clearly reflected in terms of the organization of the material as in this chapter. It is also noteworthy that among the regional essays there are no sections devoted to two important areas of the Seleucid state: the Iranian and Central Asian satrapies. The reason for this is not due to the author's lack of attention to these areas (to some extent, information about them is available in the chapter), but to the almost complete absence of sources on them at that time. Already in the three-volume book, the picture is changing, and the eastern parts of the Seleucid kingdom occupy a more important place, although, of course, the degree of their study in the late 30s is completely not comparable to what is available today .11

Naturally, we can't comment on the entire content of the chapter. We will mention only a few of the most important problems, from our point of view.

First of all, the entire presentation of the material is based on a comparison of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms, starting with the characteristics of natural conditions and the availability of sources and ending with the problems of organizing economic and social life. The immeasurably more plentiful source material on the history of Egyptian society helps the author to understand much of the history of the Seleucids, especially the history of state institutions, based on the self-evident idea of their common origin. This method proved to be very effective at that stage of scientific development.

For Rostovtsev, Hellenism, mutatis mutandis, is a phenomenon whose main characteristic feature is the contact and interaction of Greek and Eastern civilization12 . Thus, the historian remained in line with Droysen's understanding of Hellenism, but, as later researchers rightly noted ,on an immeasurably broader basis, including primarily the material aspects of genesis. 13 In addition, Rostovtsev, which, from our point of view, is more than fair, understood these contacts not only as a peaceful process of interpenetration, but also as a process of struggle.

Rostovtsev's understanding of Hellenism was very different from that which was characteristic of the European historical science of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which limited this concept only to the framework of culture and focused mainly on what later researchers somewhat ironically called the "radiance" of Greek culture in the East. The East was presented as something amorphous, backward; it should have been happy to accept the "light" of a new culture that came from the West. Although after Rostovtsev the derogatory attitude towards the East gradually disappeared, the desire to limit Hellenism only to the sphere of culture persisted for quite a long time .14

Rostovtsev's attitude to the general concept of Hellenism was very positive.

Andreau J. 10 La derniere des grandes syntheses historiques de Michel Ivanovic Rostovtseff / Rostovtseff M.I. Histoire economique et sociale du monde hellenistique. P., 1989. P. VII.

11 Let us point out for comparison the place that the eastern regions occupy in some of the recent generalizing works. In E. Will's book on the political history of the Hellenistic world (Will E. Histoire politique du monde hellenistique. V. 1-2. Nancy, 1979-1982), in each of the chapters that deal with the history of the Seleucids, there must be a section dedicated to these regions (vol. 1-pp. 66-67, 262-290, 301-308; vol. 2 - with. 51-68, 301-302, 348-352, 400-404, 407-415). In the seventh volume of the second edition of the Cambridge Ancient History, in the chapter traditionally called " Syria and the East "(Musti D. Syria and the East // The Cambridge Ancient History. V. VII. Pt 1. The Hellenistic World / Ed. F.W. Walbank, А.Е. Austin, M.W. Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie. Cambr., 1984. P. 175-220), the Iranian and Central Asian regions are assigned a special paragraph (with a separate addition devoted to the dating of the separation of Bactria and Parthia from the Seleucids), and all other regions are considered in a more general form.

12 For more information, see Andreau. Op. cit. P. VIII.

13 For the fundamental difference between Rostovtsev's concept and the constructions of his predecessors from this point of view, see Momigliano A.m. I. Rostovtzeff / A. Momigliano. Studies in Historiography. L., 1966. P. 91-104.

14 For more information about these issues, see Koshelenko G. A. Grecheskiy polis na hellenisticheskom Vostoke [Greek Polis in the Hellenistic East]. Moscow, 1979, pp. 23-79.

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different ones. It was most sharply criticized by Marxists. A. B. Ranovich tried to combine ideas about a specific historical situation with the Marxist idea of a socio-historical formation. He considered Hellenism as a certain natural stage in the development of the slave-owning formation .15 Although this concept was strongly rejected in Russian science16, Western Marxists still actively fought Rostovtsev's views. Based on the idea of an "Asiatic mode of production", a number of researchers began to consider the Seleucid state as a typical Asian one, as a direct heir to the Achaemenid kingdom, in which the role of the Hellenic principle was reduced to a completely invisible level .17 Later, this idea, having left its Marxist cradle, spread quite widely among scientists of various schools and trends .18 Thus, the ideas expressed by Rostovtsev continue to be relevant today.

Rostovtsev, pointing out the process of interaction between Greek and Eastern principles in the structure of the Seleucid state, emphasized its complexity. In particular, he noted its multi-level nature. One of these levels is the interaction of the state machine, consisting mainly of Greeks and Macedonians, and the mass of the local population. The second level is the interaction of representatives of different ethnic groups and different cultural traditions within the same political body (military colony, polis). These ideas in this chapter are outlined by the author in a summary form, and they are presented in a more detailed form in his three-volume book.

Accordingly, Rostovtsev considered a number of more specific issues from this point of view. In particular, he notes, although not in an emphatic form, the confrontation between the Seleucid state and the bulk of the country's population. Later, these ideas found their more complete (but perhaps even more vulgar) expression in the concept of the "colonial" structure of the Hellenistic state .19 Based on Rostovtsev's ideas, much has been done to understand the nature and forms of protest of the local population against the power of the conquerors; 20 Unfortunately, the historian's concept of the Seleucid state and the Greek poleis of the East as natural allies remains poorly developed .21 Rostovtsev's thoughts on the nature of Hellenistic statehood were extremely fruitful. They were accepted by his student (at St. Petersburg University) E. Bickerman and found in him a brilliant defender 22 .

It is possible to point out a number of other problems and their solutions, which, appearing briefly in the corresponding chapter of the Cambridge Ancient History, and then in a detailed form in the Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, had a strong impact on subsequent generations of researchers (for example, the idea of the fundamental difference between the colonization of the East by Alexander the Great and the Seleucids, the special role of religious policy of the Seleucid dynasty, etc.).

However, it is necessary to focus on two problems and their solutions by Rostovtsev, which for a long time have been the object of the most fierce criticism. We are referring to his constant accusations of modernism. The reason for this is, on the one hand, his attempts to bring the economy of Hellenistic states (and ancient Greece) closer to the capitalist economy in some respects, and, on the other hand, his attempts to bring the economy of the Hellenistic states (and ancient Greece) closer to the capitalist economy.

Ranovich A. B. 15 Hellenism and its historical role. M.-L., 1950.

16 See a number of works by K. K. Zelin (first of all: K. K. Zelin The main features of Hellenism / / VDI. 1953. N 4. pp. 145-156; on. Nekotorye osnovnye problemy istorii hellenizma [Some basic problems of the history of Hellenism]. XXII. pp. 99-108), the conclusions of which were accepted by almost all domestic researchers.

Kreissig N. 17 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Seleukidenreich. V., 1978 (see the review of V. A. Gaibov and G. A. Koshelenko on this book: VDI. 1980. N 4. pp. 190-197), as well as numerous works by P. Briand (the first of them, as far as we know: Briant P. Remarques sur les "laoi" et esclaves ruraux en Asie Mineure hellenistique // Actes du Colloque 1971 sur l' esclavage. P., 1972. P. 93-133).

18 The most striking example: Slierwin-White S., Kuhrt A. From Samarkand to Sardis. A New Approacli to the Seleucid Empire. L., 1993.

Bokshchanin A. G. 19 Parthia and Rome. Part 1. Moscow, 1960.

Eddy S.K. 20 The King is Dead. Studies in the Near Eastern Resistance to Hellenism. 334-31 B.C. Lincoln, 1961.

21 See Koshelenko. U. K. Op. pp. 222-248.

Bikermun E. 22 Institutions des Seleucides. P., 1938, but especially Bikerman E. The Seleucid State / Translated by L. M. Gluskina. Moscow, 1985. This work should be considered not as an ordinary translation, but as an expanded and revised edition of the French original.

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on the other hand, his definition of land relations in Asia Minor as feudal. These ideas are still outlined in this chapter, and they are fully developed in his last major book.

The first of Rostovtsev's ideas was sharply criticized by many authors, from A. B. Ranovich to M. Finley. The reasons for this lie in the fact that Rostovtsev was the last of the great "modernists", and his concepts were created on the eve of the beginning of the rise and the subsequent unconditional dominance of the ideas of modern"primitivists". Naturally, for adherents of the new direction, it was he who was the most desirable and convenient victim. There was a lot of justice in their criticism. However, as is often the case, the child was thrown out along with the water. Modern "primitivists" strongly excluded from the economic structure of the ancient era everything that resembled market relations. Now, however, the situation has begun to change. The voices of those researchers who point out the rather great complexity of the economic life of the ancient world and the great importance of the market in it are becoming increasingly loud .23 Perhaps it is time to re-examine Rostovtsev's views on ancient, and in particular Hellenistic, economics. It is likely that the true nature of his views is obscured by not entirely successful terminology. If we replace the term "capitalism "with the term" market relations", then it is quite likely that its schemes will be immeasurably closer to historical reality than the views of the"primitivists".

As for the problem of feudalism in Asia Minor, it must be admitted that based on the materials of sources available to researchers at that time, the conclusion about feudalism seemed quite natural. Even now, when the number of sources has multiplied and as a result it has become possible to draw more nuanced conclusions, the conclusion about a certain similarity of the land holding of a major Macedonian functionary in the Seleucid state with feudal relations in medieval Europe still remains attractive .24 Accordingly, the following question seems quite reasonable: can there be similar public institutions in various large state structures, separated, for example, by millennia? A priori, we can assume that there is such a similarity. So, if you look at this problem with open eyes, then maybe Rostovtsev's mistake is not so great.

In conclusion, we can say that the chapter "Syria and the East" is the first draft of a large section that was devoted to the structure of the Seleucid kingdom in the three-volume "Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World". To a certain extent, the chapter already contains ideas that will be presented in a complete form to the reader of the three-volume book. As for the ideas themselves, they undoubtedly played a stimulating role in the study of the Hellenistic East-even those that were not accepted by the next generation of scientists.

The published sections of the chapter retain all the features of the author's spelling (with the exception of those that correspond to the "old spelling", which Rostovtsev adhered to all his life). The notes contain up-to-date literature on the issues and issues covered in the chapter.

G. A. Koshelenko, V. A. Gaibov

SYRIA AND THE EAST

/ . The Seleucid empire. Its character and development 25

When, in 281, Seleucus I, long king of his Syrian, Mesopotamian, and Iranian monarchies, annexed Asia Minor, with its Greek cities and Greek or Hellenized populations on its western coast, and seemed to have established himself firmly in the empire of Asia Minor.

23 For more information about this issue, see Marinovich L. P., Koshelenko G. A. Drevnegrecheskaya ekonomika [Ancient Greek economy]: one hundred years of discussions / / Problems of history, philology, culture. Issue IV. Part 1 (history). 1997. pp. 82-96.

24 For the latest literature, see Billows R. A. Kings and Colonists. Leiden, 1995. P. 111-145.

25 In addition to the new literature on the history of the Seleucids cited above, see also Musti O. Lo stato dei Seleucidi: dinastia, popoli, citta da Seleuco ad Antioco III / / Studi Classic! e Orientali. 1966. 15. P. 61-197.

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However, like his predecessors, the Persian kings and Alexander the Great, Antigonus and Lysimachus, he faced a series of problems of great importance and insurmountable difficulty. 26 And these problems were inherited from him by all his immediate successors up to Antiochus III the Great, whose failure in the struggle against Rome completely changed the character of the Seleucid Empire and, accordingly ,the main lines of Seleucid policy. 27

The power of Seleucus I and his immediate successors, like that of his predecessors, was a diverse multinational and multicultural entity. The Iranian plateau with a number of Iranian and pre-Iranian tribes, united by the nationality of the dominant race, but so different in the way of life of individual tribes and peoples - steppe nomads, mountain shepherds, farmers, gardeners and winegrowers (the latter with former urban, merchants and administrative centers) made up the eastern third of the empire, in the era of the Persian kings the center and foundation their power and domination over the rest of the country. In one part of this vast area, a special, high culture was created, imperial in its type, the culture of the Persian kings and the Persian nobility, in which elements of the old Sumerian and Elamite culture were mixed with the culture of Babylonian-Assyrian (with an admixture of Hittite and Aramaic elements) and with the way of life and religion of the Iranian tribes, carriers of state power. Adjacent to this cultural area were the luxuriant Indus and Ganges cultural areas to the southeast, and to the northwest the Armenian plateau, valleys, and foothills of the Caucasus with the high Hittite-Caucasian culture that flourished so luxuriantly in the so-called Van kingdom of the Chalds.

The center of the Seleucid empire was the multi-thousand-year-old kingdom of Babylonia and Assyria with its cultural annexations: Syria , a land of Aramaic trade caravan cities, Phoenicia, a land of large commercial and industrial coastal urban centers, and Palestine, the coastal Philistine part of which was an extension of Phoenicia, while the inner Jewish part lived the primitive life of shepherds, farmers, and gardeners under the shadow of Jehovah and his temple in Jerusalem. In these annexations, the old way of nomadic Semitic life was fancifully mixed with the high culture of Babylon and Assyria, Egypt and the Hittite Empire. The foundations of Babylonian life were firmly and forever established; they could be destroyed, but they could not be changed.

All innovations were available to the mobile commercial and industrial cities of Syria and Phoenicia, with their motley population. The stability of Palestine's new theocratic order has not yet been seriously tested. If the eastern third of the empire can be called a priori Iranian, then this central part of it was primarily Semitic. The star of Imperial Assyria set, but his successor, Auramazda, did not attempt to fight the power of Bel, Marduk, Jehovah, and the many Baals.

The third, northwestern, part of the empire-Anatolia-was even more diverse and its culture and way of life were even more complex. Beyond the belt of Greek seaside towns with their Greco-Oriental culture and Greco-Oriental temples, in the river valleys, on the Asia Minor plateau, in the Taurus and Anti - Taurus mountains lived both the old elements of the already complex and composite Hittite culture, and new bizarre cultural formations: Phrygian Pessinunt, Lydian Sardis, Carian Halicarnassus, Lycian Termess, Cilician Tare, etc., etc., whose complex culture and religion are still so poorly known to us 28 .

Creating from this complex of tribes, peoples and geographical areas that were not connected to each other in any way and, of course, pulled in different directions, was truly not an easy task. This task was especially difficult for the new rulers of the empire-the epigones of Alexander. The Persian kings had a strong foothold in their Iranian subjects, who were and remained the dominant nation, despite all the liberalism of the Persian kings.

26 On Seleucus I and his activities, see Seyrig N. Seleucos I et la fondation de la monarchic syrienne / / Syria. 1970. 47. P. 290-311; Mehl A. Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich. I. Seleukos' Leben und die Entwiklung seiner Machtposition. Leuven, 1986; Grainger J.D. Seleukos Nikator: Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom. L. - N. Y., 1990.

27 Об Антиохе III см. Schmitt Н.Н. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos' des Grossen und seiner Zeit. Wiesbaden, 1964.

28 There is a huge literature on the fate of the population of Asia Minor in Hellenistic times. Here are just a few names: Debord P. Aspects sociaux et economiques de la vie religieuse dans 1'Anatolie greco-romaine. Leiden, 1982; Mastrocinque A. La Caria e la lonia meridionale in epoca ellenistica 323-188 a.C.). Roma, 1979; Robert L. Villes d'Asie Mineure. P., 1956.

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Alexander's people, the Macedonians, were behind him, and they held his power until his death. To what extent his policy of" merging the races " would have been successful, whether he would have succeeded in creating a solid world empire with a Macedonian-Persian army and Hellenic culture, is an unsolved and unsolvable question. For the duration of Alexander's life, the strength of his power was ensured primarily by his personal charm and his connection with Macedonia.

The situation of Seleucus I and his successors was much more difficult. After the death of Seleucus, it was obvious that it was useless to dream of reuniting the Seleucid state with Macedonia. This reunion was open as a possibility (anything was possible in the bizarre world of Hellenistic political life), but it was madness to build any real policy on this vague possibility. The facts had to be reckoned with, and the facts spoke for themselves. Seleucus and his successors, the Macedonians and Greeks, like the Ptolemies in Egypt, could not rely on any part of their empire and did not dare to build their power on it. They gained their power through the hands of Macedonian soldiers. Without Macedonia and Greece behind them, the Seleucids could, of course, have dissolved this handful of Macedonians into the Iranian, Semitic, and Anatolian world of their subjects, but they did not dare and could not decide on this experiment. This meant exchanging a more or less solid and personal domination for the specter of a possible solid support of their power by the East, bought at the price of orientalizing the dynasty, the army, and the administration. It was easier and more correct, as for the Ptolemies, to rely on the common interests of the dynasty and the army, the dynasty and the dominant nation of the conquerors, i.e., the dynasty and the Macedonians and the Greeks .29 The logical conclusion was - and this conclusion was probably suggested to Seleucus by his experience and observations in the eastern third of his empire in the early years of his reign - that since Macedonia and Greece were beyond their reach, he should create a new Macedonia and Greece in his own country, in those parts of the empire that were most likely to be firmly held hopes.

From the very first years of the Seleucid Empire, it was clear that with the inevitable and incessant rivalry with the Ptolemies and the impossibility of capturing Macedonia, this new Macedonia and Greece would be created in western Europe In Asia, relying on the freedom-loving cities of the coast was unwise and impractical. It was clear that for these cities and for access to the sea, as well as for the cities of Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, there would be a long and protracted struggle, which, as is well known, never actually ceased, and that therefore the center of power, the military and political headquarters of the kingdom, should be located in an area more easily defended and less open to attack and at the same time closer to the eastern part of the power. Hence the policy of the Seleucids, carried out consistently, though hastily, with enormous expenditure of money and energy - the policy of Macedonian and Greek colonization of the empire, especially in its central parts. Colonization was the work of the first two Seleucids, Seleucus I and Antiochus I. To them, the empire owes the Macedonian-Hellenic core, which ensured the strength of the dynasty and the empire, its more than two-hundred-year existence. The colonization system was not developed by them. In the person of Alexander and Antigonus, they had predecessors. But the goals and pace of colonization were new. The colonization of Alexander and Antigonus was discussed above. Alexander's scope was broad, but his colonies were scattered all over the face of the mainly eastern part of his empire and were almost exclusively military and commercial in nature; military and commercial strongholds of central power, islands of Hellenism in the eastern world, scattered singly rather than in compact groups. The Macedonian-Greek urban development of Antigonus was also mainly military and commercial .

The activities of Seleucus 1 and Antiochus I 31 were quite different. Their goal, along with fortifying the borders and major trade routes with military and civilian colonies of an urban character, 32 was to create large areas densely covered with a network

29 См. Edson С. Imperium Macedonicum: the Seleucid Empire and the Literary Evidence // Classical Philology. 1958. 53. P. 153-170.

30 In the modern literature, however, this view is not the only one. Antigonus 'colonization policy is sometimes considered a "model" for Seleucid colonization. For the new literature on Antigone, see Bryant R. Antigone Ie Borgne. Les debuts de sa carriere et les problemes de I'assemblee macedonienne. P., 1973; Billows R.A. Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State. Berkeley, 1990.

31 For the activities of these kings in creating new Greek settlements, see Koshelenko, UK. op.

32 For the military colonies of the Seleucids, see Cohen, S. M. The Seleucid Colonies. Studies in Founding, Administration and Organization. Wiesbaden, 1978.

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Macedonian and Greek towns and villages, real Macedonian-Greek provinces. These settlements were partly new population centers in an empty place or on a place where an insignificant village or village used to exist, and partly the reconstruction of old cities and villages with renaming them, with changes in their social and political life, with the introduction of a large and strong group of new settlers into the population. Between these new Macedonian-Greek regions, chains of Macedonian-Greek fortified cities were stretched along the main roads, providing communication and communication between these regions.

These Macedonian-Greek nests of towns and villages stretched from the coast of M [aloy] Through Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Babylonia, as far as Bactria and Sogdiana. The first group was the Lydian-Phrygian and Carian group in M [aloy] Asia, with military and administrative centers in Sardis and Keleni (Apamea Kibotos) 33 . The second, even more cohesive and strong, stretches from the northern part of the Syrian coast (north of Phoenicia )along the entire course of the Orontes and its tributaries, along the middle course of the Euphrates and along the course of the Habir with its tributaries. 34 It was Syria, the heart and core of the empire, with the political capital of the empire, Antioch on the Orontes, 35 the military capital, Apamea, 36 and the commercial capital, Seleucia (in Pieria) and Laodicea. As long as only one attempt has been made to excavate one of the most insignificant and border towns of this core (Dura-Europe, on the Euphrates), 37 our understanding of the Seleucid monarchy will be very vague and full of gaps.

Babylonia with Susiana was the last nest of Greek cities in the western part of the empire, the gateway to the eastern and its administrative and military center. Its capital, political and economic, and the second capital of the empire was considered Seleucia on the Tigris . The extent to which Babylonia and Susiana were Hellenized will be discussed below .39 But the attempt, and a successful one, was undoubtedly made.

Judging by the scanty and fragmentary information from our pathetic sources, the policy of colonization did not stop at the Tigris. What, however, was the nature of this colonization in the Eastern satrapies, we do not know .40 Whether the sole purpose of the Seleucids was to maintain and strengthen, in part to recreate, the network of Alexander's colonies along the great trade and military routes, or whether they also sought to create large Hellenic nests of towns and villages here, is difficult to determine. I personally think the latter is more likely. The existence of such nests is attested in Media, in Parthia and Arya, in Persia, and finally in Bactria, 41 and possibly in Sogdiana.

I will confine myself here to these general remarks on the colonization policy of the Council of Europe-

33 For military and civilian colonies in Asia Minor, see idem. Hellenistic Settlements in Europe, the Islands and Asia Minor. Berkeley, 1994.

34 For Greek cities in Seleucid Syria, see Grainger J. D. The Cities of Seleucid Syria. Oxf., 1990; Seyrig N. Seleucus I and the Foundation of Hellenistic Syria / / The Role of the Phoenicians in the Interaction of Mediterranean Civilization / Ed. W. A. Ward. Beirut, 1968. P. 53-63.

35 For the history of Antioch, see Downey G. L. A History of Antioch in Syria. Princeton, 1961.

36 For Apamee, see Bally J.-C. Les grandes etapes de 1'urbanisme d'apamee-sur-l ' Oronte / / Ktema. 1977. P. 3-16.

37 Rostovtsev here refers to the excavations of Dura - Europos in the early 20 - ies under the leadership of F. Cumont F. Fouilles de Doura-Europos. T. I-II. P., 1926. Further excavations in the late 20s-30s were conducted under Rostovtsev's own supervision. Reports of these works are widely known. Rostovtsev's summary of Dura-Europos: Rostovtzeff M.I. Dura-Europos and Its Art. Oxf., 1938. Also see Perkins A. The Art of Dura-Europos. Oxf., 1973. For the main results of the Franco-Syrian expedition to Dura-Europos in recent years, see Gaibon V. A., Koshelenko G. A. Dura-Europos after M. I. Rostovtsev / / VDI. 1999. N 3. pp. 221-232.

38 For Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, where significant archaeological excavations were carried out after the writing of this chapter, see Invernizzi A. Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, Greek Metropolis in Asia // VDI. 1990. N 2. pp. 174-185.

39 For the fate of Susiana in Hellenistic times, see Novikov S. V. South-Western Iran in the ancient era, Moscow, 1990; on Susa, see Le Rider G. Suse sous les Seleucides et les Partnes. Les trouvailles monetaires et l' histoire de la ville. P., 1965.

40 See Koshelenko, Uk. op.; Frey R.N. The History of Ancient Iran. Munchen, 1984. P. 137-176.

41 Of particular importance were the excavations of the ancient settlement of Ai - Khanum (Afghanistan) under the leadership of P. Bernard. A series of reports has been published, one of which is particularly important: Bernard P. Fouilles d'AI Khanoum IV. Les monnaies hors tresors, questions d' histoire greco-bactrienne. P., 1985.

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leucidov. This will be discussed in more detail in the general overview of the components of the Seleucid Empire, which will be given below.

On the Macedonian-Greek population of these parts of the empire, on those elements of the local population that merged with the Macedonians and Greeks, the Seleucids relied as their most solid base and, in general, like the Greek - Macedonian population of Egypt, this part of the population of the empire faithfully and firmly supported the power of the Seleucids.

The political history of the Seleucids, as described above, is the history of the gradual contraction of the empire towards its center. Already Seleucus I did not own Bithynia and Pontus in M [aloy] Asia and was forced to accept Ptolemy's capture as part of the southern part of M [aloy] Asia, as well as t[ak] naz [yuvaemoy] Kelesiriya and Palestine. Under Antiochus I, except for the success of Ptolemy Philadelphus and the expansion of his power in M [aloy] A serious blow to the western part of the empire was dealt by the Galatians ' capture of part of Asia Minor and the separation of Pergamum from the empire .42 Under Antiochus II, the empire also began to shrink in the east. Around 255, Bactria was separated from the empire under the rule of Diodotus (India, as is known, was already lost under Seleucus I) 43, from 249/8. Parthia counted the years of its independent existence 44 . At about the same time, the independent kingdom of Greater Cappadocia was formed. Things were better in the West. After the breakneck successes of Ptolemy Philadelphus, the Battle of Xhosa restored Antiochus II's rule in M [aloy] Asia. But Pergamum remained independent and did not return to the Seleucid fold.

The brilliant victories of Ptolemy III Euergetes I permanently reduced the limits of the empire not in the center of the empire, but in the west. With the exception of the Troad, the Seleucids lost their influence on the entire western coast of M [aloy] Asia. For a short time, both in the west and in the east, the old power of Seleucus I and Antiochus I was restored by Antiochus III. And yet he was forced to consider the independence of Pergamum, Bactria, and Parthia as immutable facts. A new era in the history of the Seleucid Empire begins after the victory of Rome over Antiochus III. Asia Minor for the Seleucids was lost forever and irrevocably. Direct dry access to Greek civilization, to the Greek cities of M [aloy] The service was discontinued permanently. All hopes of independent trade in the Mediterranean, based on a military fleet, were also put to an end: the Syrian merchants were made dependent on the good offices of Rhodes and the increasingly Roman protectorate of Delos. It is not surprising that both Antiochus III in the last years of his life, and especially Antiochus IV and the most active and talented of his successors, especially Demetrius I and Antiochus VII Sidetes, henceforth set as their main task to strengthen and strengthen the center of their kingdom - Syria, reunited with Kelesyria and Palestine, Mesopotamia and what is left of the Land of Egypt. it was possible to keep from the nearest Iranian localities.

Their task was thus twofold. To rally your kingdom and defend this united Semitic-Greek kingdom from the pressure of a resurgent Iran. The first could be achieved only in one way - the same way that Seleucus I and Antiochus I followed-by expanding and strengthening the nests of Hellenism by creating new Greek cities and strengthening the Greek element in the old ones, so that the whole kingdom would take on one, Greek, imprint. To this cause Antiochus IV and his successors devoted themselves wholeheartedly .46 They had no reason to think that they would encounter insurmountable obstacles along the way. The experience of the past, the success of Seleucus I and Antiochus I, suggested that the external Hellenization and urbanization of the new Seleucid possessions, the once Ptolemaic provinces of Phoenicia, Celes-ria, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan, and the strengthening of the Hellenization of Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Media, Susiana, and Persia, would be as painless and successful as the experience of the Hellenization of the Aramaic regions, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and Babylonia and the Iranian Medes and Persians by Seleucus I and Antiochus I. Let's not forget that in Phoenicia, Kelesiriya and

42 For new literature on the Kingdom of Pergamum and its politics, see McShane R. B. The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum. Urbana, 1964; Hansen E.V. The Attalids of Pergamon. Ithaca - London, 1971; Alien R.E. The Attalid Kingdom: a Constitutional History. Oxf., 1983.

43 For the time and circumstances of Bactria's secession from the Seleucid kingdom, see Vore-arachchi O. Monnaies greco-bactriennes et indo-grecques. Catalogue raisonne. P., 1991.

44 For contemporary discussions of the time and circumstances of the emergence of the Parthian Kingdom, see Wolski J. L'Empire des Arsacides. Leuven, 1989.

45 For new literature on Rhodes, see Berthold R. Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age. Ithaca, 1984.

46 The most important subsequent work on Antiochus IV: Morkholm O. Antiochus IV of Syria. Copenhagen, 1966.

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Beyond the Jordan, the main work of urban planning and Hellenization was already done by the Ptolemies. Only Palestine remained. But here, too, much had already been accomplished in the last years of the Ptolemaic rule by the efforts of the Tobiades, Philhellines, and business men of a new purely Hellenistic type. Relying on the new outwardly Hellenic cities, their Hellenized population, and the rational exploitation of the country's rich resources, the Seleucids hoped to protect the country from the Parthians and retain at least part of the Iranian provinces of Media, Susiana, and Persia.

They were wrong about that. The Hellenization of Palestine failed despite heroic efforts. This is explained not so much by the desperate resistance of the Jews as by the fact that the hands of Antiochus III's successors were tied .47 Behind them was Rome and its consistent insidious policy of weakening the Seleucids. Rome did not allow the Seleucids to finally break the resistance of the Jews, nor to unite Syria and Mesopotamia into one whole, nor to defend Hellenism in Mesopotamia from the attacks of Iranism. It wasn't the Maccabees and Parthians who defeated the Seleucids, but Rome. Both the Jews and the Parthians under Mithridates I and Phraates II owed their success to Rome. The ghostly independence of Judea was the beginning of the feudalization of Syria and Mesopotamia. Most cities, both along the coast and within the country, are becoming independent, and many have small dynasties of local origin. The same process is observed in nominally Parthian Mesopotamia after the defeat of Antiochus VII Sidetes in 129 BC. In the first century BC, the Seleucid kingdom no longer exists, and Rome itself has to take on the task of saving Syrian Hellenism from Iranism advancing from the East and from Aramaism rising from the bowels of Syria itself.

II. Organization of the Seleucid Empire

a. The power of the tsar

Like Ptolemy Soter, Seleucus I laid the foundations of his connection with the satrapy that later became the center of his empire - Babylonia, as satrap first after the treaty of Triparadis, and then from 312, after Ptolemy Soter's victory at Gaza. From about this time (this year - 1 dios, October, for the Greeks, 1 Nisan, May or April, for the Babylonians - begins his era, called the Seleucid era, which remained in the East for a number of centuries), his Eastern subjects call him king long before the time when the rest of the world is still alive. the Diadochi officially adopted this title. The power of Seleucus I and his successors, like that of the Ptolemies, was twofold. In the eyes of his army, his friends, and the Macedonian and Greek inhabitants of his country, as well as in the eyes of the rest of the Greeks, the king's authority was personal, based on his personal superiority and personal qualities, and on the support of the army 48 and "friends" 49 . This gave him the right to consider himself and his descendants as the legitimate heirs of Alexander the Great . This point of view is clearly stated both in the (probably apocryphal) speech of Seleucus I to his friends and army on the occasion of the romantic wedding of his son and his appointment as king of the East and co-ruler (Arr. Syr. 61), and in the decree of Ilion in honor of Antiochus I (OGI. 219): honors given by the city Antiochus, motivated by the fact that he guaranteed peace to the cities and multiplied his kingdom-all this "mainly due to his [sic. his own superiority, as well as the favor of his "friends" and the army. " 51

In general, in the eyes of the Greeks, the king, his family, his "friends" and his army form one undivided whole, the bearers of power in the empire. Along with this realistic, matter-of-fact foundation of power, which rested entirely on the loyalty of "friends", i.e., officers and officials of the tsar, and on the loyalty of the army, guaranteed to the tsar in so far as he himself

47 For the relationship between the Seleucids and the population of Judea, see Bickerman E. The God of the Maccabees; Studies on the Meaning and Origin of the Maccabean Revolt. Leiden, 1979; Bar Kochva B. Judas Maccabaeus: the Jewish Struggle against Seleucids. Cambr., 1989.

48 For the Seleucid army, see Laiiney M. Recherches sur les armees hellenistiques. V. 1-2. P., 1949-1950; Bar Kochva B. The Seleucid Army: Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns. Cambr., 1976; Bikerman. Uk. soch. p. 50-99.

49 For the royal friends, see Herman G. The Friends of the Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials / / Talanta. 1980/81. 12/13. P. 103-149.

50 For more information, see Goukowsky P. Essai sur les origines du mythe d' Alexandre (336-270 av. J.С.). Т. 1-2. P., 1978.

51 On the character of the Seleucid royal power, see Bickerman, UK. op. pp. 5-24.

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the Seleucids, like the Ptolemies, needed, of course, another, higher, philosophical, and religious sanction of their power, a sanction which would have made them more independent of the good will of their court and their soldiers.

Undoubtedly, like the Ptolemies and Antigonus Gonatus, the philosophers of the time suggested or formulated the philosophical sanction for them. We hear an echo of their formulas, for example, in the same speech of Seleucus I to his army, of which I have just spoken. Explaining the marriage between Antiochus I and his own stepmother, he says: "Not the customs of the Persians and other peoples, but a common law for all, I will impose on you, a law according to which what the king decides is always just." This is not the place to question whether we have here the influence of the Stoic teaching of a "king" as opposed to a tyrant, or the Pythagorean teaching of a "king - animated law". What is important is that this phrase clearly provides a philosophical, rather than historical (continuity of power from Persian kings and Persian tradition) justification for the absolutist nature of the king's power. Let me also remind you of Antiochus IV's commitment to Epicurean philosophy and the fact that Alexander Balas was an ardent adept of stoicism.

The same desire for the highest sanction of power in the eyes of the Greek and Hellenized population of the empire, especially in the eyes of the Greek cities, whose submission to the authority of the king was so contrary to the whole tradition and essence of the Greek city-state, is also reflected in the gradual transformation of the cult of the deceased kings of the Seleucid dynasty and the living king and queen into a state institution .52 From the time of Seleucus I, and at any rate from the time of Antiochus I (OGI. 250, 251), the divine descent of Seleucus from Apollo, probably first proclaimed after the Battle of Nisus by the Didymaean Oracle of Apollo, who , like the city of Miletus, was always patronized by Seleucus and Antiochus, 53 was generally accepted and became part of the official protocol. This divine origin of Seleucus made it possible for the Greek cities to establish, on their own initiative, the cult of the king in the forms already customary for that time. Thus, Ilion (OGI. 212, cf. 219) dedicates to Seleucus I an altar in the agora with the inscription: decides to offer sacrifices every month on this altar and to arrange an agon of young men every five years in the month to which the name of the king was given. The Athenians of Lemnos give him similar honors. It is very likely that divine honors were paid to Seleucus I in the numerous cities he founded. After his death in Seleucia (Pieria), Antiochus I built him a temple-mausoleum under his cult name (Nikatorion) - like Zeus Nicator. The same type of homage is paid by Greek cities to Antiochus I and his successors: prayers offered by priests (and among them the priest of Antiochus) to Apollo and other gods for the health of the king (Ilion, OGI. 219), the celebration of the king's birthday, the dedication of a sanctuary to him, sacrifices, and the agon oath of "happiness" to the king (witnessed for Seleucus II), granting a special cult nickname (Soter for Antiochus 1, "God" for Antiochus II - Arr. Syr. 65), etc. And for the successors of Seleucus I, it is likely that the cities they founded were particularly zealous in organizing their worship.

There is no doubt that at least since the time of Antiochus III, a, m, b, and before, there was no Greek city in the Seleucid Empire that did not have the cult of deceased kings and the cult of the living king in one form or another. It is possible that one of the Seleucids (not earlier than Antiochus II) introduced a certain order into this chaos and finally transformed the cult of kings into a state institution with special priests and special regularly performed ceremonies. This is at least the impression given by Antiochus III's order to the governor of Lydia, recorded in his (?) (OGI. 224, cf .244), appointing a highly aristocratic lady as high priestess of the cult of Laodice, the wife of Antiochus III, in all the temples of the satrapy. 54 In the motivation of his order, the tsar mentions that bishops of his cult exist throughout the kingdom. That's what the inscriptions say, datiro-

52 See Bickerman, UK. op. pp. 221-240.

53 Here Rostovtsev gives the following reference: "OGI 214 and OGI 213 (cf. A. Wilhelm, Neue Beitr. 6, 1921, p. 54 ff.); Milet VII Bes. p. 68 (cf. M. Holleaux REG 36, 1923, p. 1 ff.) and Milet, Erg. d. Ausgr. I, 7 (1924), No. 193. The Apama inscription definitely indicates that many Miletians were in the ranks of Seleucus ' army at the Battle of Nisus."

54 For new epigraphic documents concerning the royal cult, see Robert L. Inscriptions seeleucides de Phrygie et d'lran / / Hellenica. 1949. 7. P. 4-22.

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As in Egypt, they were created by priests of the royal cult (OGI. 233, Antioch in Pieria), and inscriptions where the list of priests gives an official list of kings (deceased and living) - objects of worship (OGI. 245, 246). The cult name that all the Seleucids had, however, was not part of their official name until Antiochus IV Epiphanes. Such was the royal power of the Seleucids from the Greek point of view. What was the formula of this power for the diverse non-Greek population of the empire, we do not know. The Seleucids ruled over a country to which they were strangers, by right of conquest. Whether, however, they tried, like the Ptolemies in Egypt, to assume the appearance of their former kings in the eyes of the local population and to gain the recognition of the local gods and their priests, we have neither direct nor indirect information. In any case, they did not pursue the religion and cult of local gods and hardly insisted on introducing their Greek cult in eastern temples. One form or another of the cult of kings, and without any special pressure, undoubtedly existed in all eastern temples. In all Eastern monarchies, the king played a prominent role in the cult of the gods, and it is unlikely that his figure disappeared from the cult life after the termination of legitimate local dynasties. It must also be assumed that in most of the eastern states that became part of the Seleucid empire, the power of the new kings was recognized by the priesthood without protest. It is unlikely that the first Seleucids (before Antiochus III) considered it necessary to interfere in the affairs of temples and priests. In Babylon and Babylonia in general, as the mass of business documents from this period show, almost everyone connected with the life of temples, temples live their old life with all its features, worship the old gods in their former forms and feed on the income from the faithful priests and acolytes of temples.55 It is possible that since the expulsion of the Seleucids from Asia Minor, their policy towards Eastern temples has changed somewhat. The re-attested cases of the" robbery "of the Eastern temples by Antiochus III and his successors, I would be inclined to explain, as well as the" robbery "of the Jerusalem temple by Antiochus Epiphanes, as attempts by the later Seleucids to assert their blood ownership over the temple property, a right belonging to them as" anointed of God", representing God on earth. Let us recall that the Ptolemies did the same in Egypt. In the difficult times after Rome's victory over Antiochus III, the Seleucids considered themselves entitled to mobilize the rich resources of the Eastern temples for the state. However, they overestimated their strength and degree of recognition of their religious legitimacy. Antiochus III was killed after robbing the temple of Bel in Elam. Antiochus IV did not even manage to reach the richest temple of Nanaia in the same area. It is well known how strongly the orthodox part of the population of Judea resisted him, and how, for the first time in the history of the Seleucids, he had to resort to a policy of religious persecution and, perhaps, the imposition of his own cult in Greek forms in order to break this resistance. Antiochus III's policy towards the temple in Jerusalem was probably the traditional policy of the early Seleucids towards Eastern temples in general: non-interference in the forms of religious life and privileges to the priests as payment for their loyalty and support.

There is no doubt that the local non-Greek population of the empire did not show much enthusiasm for the Seleucids, passive submission was the highest that the Seleucids could demand from them. That is why it is so easy to separate one part after another from the empire, and why the process of Arameanization and feudalization is so fast, even in the center of Seleucid power - Syria and Mesopotamia, as soon as the central government and the imperial army collapsed. But the Macedonian-Greek population of the central parts of the empire, and probably the periphery, was quite loyal, moreover, it was deeply devoted to the Seleucid dynasty. It felt that it, as such, its dominion, was standing and falling with the Seleucids. This is especially evident in the difficult times of the second century BC. The populace of the capital and the army often interfere in sometimes dirty and always bloody dynastic disputes, but in these interventions and revolutions, loyalty to the dynasty and the desire to support its most worthy representative always play a major role.

b. Courtyard and central administration. Provincial governance 56

Among this Macedonian-Greek population is the family of the king. his court, senior officials, officers and soldiers of the army and navy play, of course, the main, decisive role in life.-

55 For the Babylonian temples of the Seleucid period, see McEwan G. J. P. Priest and Temple in Hellenistic Babylonia. Wiesbaden, 1981; Punch V. Uruk zur Seleukidenzeit. V., 1984.

56 See Bickerman, UK. op. pp. 32-45.

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no king. The organization of the Seleucid royal family, court, and bureaucracy is unlikely to have been very different from that of the Ptolemaic and other Hellenistic dynasties. And here, undoubtedly, the Macedonian tradition was fancifully mixed with the tradition of Eastern monarchies. Even in the Seleucid kingdom, the wives of kings, often their own sisters, play a prominent role in life and politics. But on coins, the portrait of the queen appears later than in the Ptolemaic kingdom, not earlier than Demetrius Soter. Inheritance in the Seleucid kingdom is also determined by the rules of Macedonian and Greek civil inheritance law. Friends of the king make up his council And other members of the same group of people closest to the king probably take part in it, bearing the titles of "educator of the king", his "peer", his "relative", his bodyguard It is possible that in some cases these titles correspond to reality, i.e. that the" educator of the king " Crater (OGI. 256) was indeed the tutor of Antiochus Cyzicenes, but in the inscription this name is closely connected with other undoubtedly honorary titles. The king is surrounded by "royal regiments" ) and a mass of servants, which are managed by individual members of the court with the same titles as in the courts of other Hellenistic monarchs. And here, gradually, such titles as "stolnik", "kravchiy", "sleeping bag", etc., are often made honorary titles.

Among the highest officials, our sources from time to time call the titles of the most important and influential officials: "grand vizier" chief of the royal chancellery Minister of Finance Chief quartermaster and quartermaster of the military forces chief physician The Minister of Finance was in charge of the t [ak] naz[yuvaemogo] - the name under which the state, i.e. royal, treasury was united, and the management of the king's property, taxation, and probably also coinage. The center of coinage was the main mint in Antioch, which was run by special officials whose monograms regularly appear on the Seleucid coins minted in Antioch .57 As in the Ptolemaic kingdom, there were also provincial mints next to the central mint. The mint of Seleucia-on-the-Tigris was a large permanent yard. Tyr had its own plentiful minting of imperial coins. Depending on political and economic conditions, the imperial coin was also minted in other major cities and provincial capitals. The question of the place of coinage of the Seleucid coins, which is well developed for the Ptolemaic coins, needs a number of careful special studies. Of course, the tsar's cash register, his "treasure" or his "money box", also had a special manager. This official probably bore the title or as in other Hellenistic monarchies.

Undoubtedly, the number of high-ranking officials was much more significant than our scanty information suggests. A chance mention in an inscription (OGI. 244, cf. 224) of the king, which records the appointment of one of the king's old friends as senior priest of the temples and cults centered around the temple of Apollo at Daphne, shows, first, that the king had a special office and archive, where all the king's orders were recorded, and Of course, this office had a special director (in Alexandria-m [ozhet] b[1] , in Antioch - and, secondly, that the major sanctuaries of the empire were, if not in the personal jurisdiction of the king, then at least in the jurisdiction of a special official who (or the head of the archive?) and addressed to the tsar's letter on the appointment of the bishop of Daphnia. It is unlikely that the supposed "minister of temples" was only in charge of Greek temples. It is much more likely that temples that were not connected with the city, temples of the Eastern type scattered throughout the Seleucid Empire, needed special control. The owner of the temple property, according to Eastern tradition, was the king, the representative of God on earth, and it is unlikely that the Seleucids did not insist on this tradition. It is also certain that each of the major officials had a large number of officials and slaves at their disposal. The organization of central government in the Roman Empire gives some faint idea of this. But we have no information about all this. Only a systematic excavation of Antioch could give us some idea of this.

Unfortunately, the local and provincial administration of the Seleucid Monarchy is not available to us either.-

57 См. Newell E.T. The Coinage of the Eastern Seleucid Mints. N.Y., 1978; idem. The Coinage of the Western Seleucid Mints. N.Y., 1977.

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many people know better than central management 58 . A few inscriptions scattered all over the face of the Seleucid Empire cannot replace the thousands of papyri found in Egypt. And here only systematic excavations in the cities of the Seleucid kingdom on the border of the desert, where there is hope to find documents on parchments, can illuminate this gloom.

In contrast to the Ptolemaic empire, we do not have in the Seleucid empire that sharp division into the country that forms the center and basis of the king's power - Egypt and the overseas possessions of the king - his provinces. Nor is there that marked division between the capital, the Greek center of the king's power, Alexandria in Egypt, and the country, on the one hand, and the provinces, on the other. The distinction between Egypt and the provinces was traditional in the history of Egypt, and the singling out of Alexandria as a special whole is a symbol of the sharp division between the country and the Greek cities that was created by the Ptolemies. The Seleucid empire had a different past and different traditions - the traditions of the Persian kings, especially Darius and his successors, and the traditions of Alexander the Great. The multi-ethnic and multi-regional Seleucid State demanded division into separate administrative districts. This division was natural, historical, not artificial, and generally remained under the Seleucids what it was under the Persians and Alexander. A return to the tradition of Cyrus-to rule the country as a conglomerate of the dominant country and vassal kingdoms-was impossible, and something similar to such a return is seen in the Seleucid power, as well as in the Persian power, only in the era of its final and rapid disintegration.

Our information about the division of the Seleucid Empire into administrative districts and the administration of these districts is extremely scanty and contradictory. Historians, even Polybius, don't stick to one particular terminology. There are very few inscriptions, especially for the eastern parts of the empire. It is unlikely, however, that the Seleucids used native terms to refer to their main administrative divisions. In all probability, these main divisions were called satrapies under the Seleucids, as well as in Persian times and under Alexander. Appian says that these satrapies numbered 72 in the Seleucid kingdom. Combining the indications of writers and inscriptions, however, we are not able to count more than 25 satrapies. It is impossible to assume that Appian invented his own number. It is also difficult to think that the mistake should be attributed to the handwritten tradition of Appian. One thing remains: next to the divisions into large districts-satrapies, there was also a division of these satrapies into smaller districts. Asia - hyparchia mentioned twice in inscriptions, the same division - in Media Atropatene (papyri from Avromana); in Kelesiriya, Phoenicia and Palestine-m [ozhet] b[2], merida, which are mentioned by Josephus and the books of the Maccabees. Appian probably had before his eyes a complete list of the administrative divisions of the Seleucid empire, calculated the divisions and gave them all the name satrapius.

No less difficult is the question of the administration of satrapies. The governors of satrapies are often called satraps in our literary sources. Inscriptions, although they know the official name of the satrapy and use it, but the name of the satrap is not given to governors. The use of the title of satrap by writers is explained, in my opinion, partly by literary tradition, partly by the fact that the title of strategos was worn not only by provincial governors, but also by commanders of active army units, who were not always at the same time governors, and even by military supreme magistrates of Greek cities, who sometimes, especially under Epiphanes, they were also the heads of the garrisons of these cities and, probably, were not chosen, but appointed by the king. Such strategists are known to us for Antioch and for Babylon (OGI. 254). Under these conditions, it is clear that Ptolemy III Euergetes I in his famous letter (Wilcken, Chrest. n 1, col. Ill, 11), listing the civil and military authorities of the Seleucid state, names: satraps (governors), strategists (army commanders) and hegemons (regimental commanders). It should also be taken into account that sometimes the Seleucids appointed a special governor-general over a complex of regions. Under Seleucus I, the governor-general of the East and his co-ruler was his son Antiochus I, and in general, the governorship of the East for the first Seleucids was traditionally [see above, p. 312] 60 . These governors-general did not have a special title. The same Governor-General M [aloy] Asia under Antiochus I I consider Alexander, upomi-

58 See Bickerman, UK. op. pp. 124-190.

59 Written in a different hand in the margins of the manuscript.

60 Insert is written in a different hand.

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according to Syll. 3, 426, 46 cf. and OGI. 229, 101. M [ozhet] b[1], the same governor-general was also Antigonus of the inscription Mnesimachus from Sardis. Naturally, therefore, that when

Polybius speaks of such a command (V, 46, 6. 7), he calls Xenoites and his subordinates - the strategists of Susiana and the "Red Sea" - eparchs.

Meanwhile, we know that the governor of Susiana held the title of strategos (OGI. 147). I think, therefore, that the satrapies were ruled by military and civil governors-strategists. They were subordinated to the governors of the divisions of the satrapies, where they took place, the hyparchs and meridarchs, as well as the commanders of garrisons and military governors of individual Greek cities-epistates or frurachs, who sometimes also served as the supreme magistrates of the city-strategists. It is very likely that the strategists of the satrapies were also the commanders of those military units that were recruited in their satrapy during the war. Whether they retained this command even during military operations, of course, depended on the good will of the tsar. 238 These guards of the hyparchy, whose center was Erisa in Caria or Phrygia, together with the military settlers of that area, place an honorary inscription on a certain Menodorus - that area or the entire province. This random inscription, m [ozhet] b[1], which refers to the period of Pergamon rule, but reflects the administrative structure of the Seleucid kingdom, shows, first, that the Phylacites were probably recruited from military settlers and were a military, state, and not civil and city police, and, second, that the Phylacites were the first to be recruited from the Seleucid empire. that their main role was to assist the highest financial official of the hyparchy or satrapy, probably in collecting taxes and taxes.

The same inscription shows that the financial management of the satrapy was concentrated in the hands of a special official. Whether he was subordinate to the strategos and hyparchus or directly to the Minister of Finance in Antioch, we do not know. According to some inscriptions, the administration of the king's property, mainly his lands in the provinces (these lands will be discussed later in the review of individual parts of the monarchy), was in the hands of the stewards and diekets .62 The inscription OGI. 225 (Antiochus II) shows that the steward did not receive orders directly from the king, but from the strategos of the satrapies, to whom the king gives instructions directly. The order of the king is carried out, according to a special order of the steward, by the hyparch. This probably shows that the steward was in charge of the royal lands of the entire satrapy, and suggests that he was subordinate not only to the king directly, but to a certain extent also to the strategist of the satrapy.

Each satrapy undoubtedly had its own capital. The capital of Lydia was Sardis. It is possible that Sardis in the life of M [aloy] Asia also played a larger role, i.e. that they were the capital of a whole complex of satrapies, the capital of the military and civil. Here, probably (with branches in other major cities), the royal treasury was located, probably divided (as in the capital, see below) into military and civil coffers There was also a central archive managed by a special one Such archives were scattered throughout all the provinces of the Seleucid monarchy and were located both in the capital and in the larger cities. small towns, in the same place as the treasury offices. Thus, in ancient Uruk, we find a special state and a special manager of it, Whose seal is decorated with the same types as the coins of his time: the head of a deified king (king Apollo) or the figure of Apollo, as on coins, which proves that chreophylacus was a royal, and not a municipal official and not a private person, as in the case of in Egypt. At a somewhat earlier date, the same official is attested for the capital of Susiana (Seleucia on the Euphrates) and probably for Dura (Europa) on the Euphrates. The existence in Dura in the age of the North points, in my opinion, to the existence of the Treasury department in Dura in the Seleucid era. For Syria and Palestine, local ones are mentioned in the eastern provinces, Mesopotamia and Media, as can be seen from the inscriptions of Dura and from the papyri of Avromanus, and general lines of government were maintained even in the Parthian era.

The attitude of the strategists towards the Greek cities located within their satrapies will be discussed below. It is very likely that all the temples of their satrapies were also subordinate to them, and therefore, like the Ptolemaic governors of Cyprus, and not as chief priests

61 Written in a different hand in the margins of the manuscript.

62 See Bickerman, UK. op. pp. 100-119.

63 This passage actually mentions

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In the time of Antiochus III and after him, they also have the title of bishop. This title in connection with the title of strategos, however, is attested only in one inscription for Syria and Phoenicia (OGI. 230).

We know little about the taxation of the Seleucid monarchy. Something is known for Palestine in the time of Antiochus III and his immediate successors, for Babylonia and Mesopotamia, and for M [aloy] Asia. Since there is no reason to believe that taxation in the Seleucid kingdom was the same in all its parts, and since it is very likely that it was adapted to the economic structure and economic resources of individual parts of the Seleucid kingdom and was determined by centuries-old traditions (as it was in Egypt), the information about tax taxation will be analyzed in connection with a study of the economic and social life of individual parts of the Seleucid empire. However, it should also be noted here that the information that we have about the tax levy, information that comes from official documents, leaves the impression that not only the terminology, but also the essence of the part of the tax levy that we know, was Greek. At the same time, there is no doubt that the payers of taxes were not only the Greeks, but also the local population, even mainly the local population. The Greeks were also those financial officials who manage the taxation and collection of taxes and taxes. We do not know in what language the documents related to taxation were written: tax receipts, demanding statements, receipts, etc., or what language the local population used in their official communication with Greek officials (statements, complaints, etc.). Note that the only mention of "royal judges", or "judges in the affairs of the royal tenants" (for Eolida in M [aloy] Asia), which leads us to believe that the judicial institutions, since they were connected with the central government, were also Greek. All this suggests that, as in Egypt, the records management of the provincial administration was Greek not only in so far as it concerned the Greek population, but also for the local population.

The documented forms of business life of private individuals were determined, however, in all probability, by the origin of counterparties. It is not surprising, therefore, that Dura's contracts are written in Greek and follow the rules of Greek law. The contractors were Macedonian colonists. It is also clear that the contracts of Avromanus are written in Greek. The contractors, although of Iranian origin, were descendants of military colonists, probably of the Seleucid era, and were undoubtedly largely Hellenized. In any case, the life of the military colonists, probably regardless of their origin, was organized in the Greek way. It should be noted, however, that in the Parthian period (in the first century BC), Greek documents coexisted with Pahlavi documents, which indicates the reiranization of the once Hellenized colonists.

On the other hand, numerous documents of the Seleucid era from Babylonia, mainly from Uruk, which give us a number of testimonies about the economic life of the Babylonian temples at this time, are written on clay tablets in cuneiform script and in the Babylonian language and do not differ in appearance and content from the same documents of an earlier time, despite the fact that some of the counterparties were either Hellenized Babylonians or Babylonized Greeks, as their double names indicate. 64 However, we must assume that there were duplicates (?)along with these documents. on parchment, as was customary for official documents in the Assyrian era. Among the witnesses in the documents, the "scribe on the skin" is often mentioned. Isn't this leather scribe identical to the above-mentioned Greek one, and doesn't this indicate that there was also a copy in Greek (or Aramaic?) written on parchment. In Uruk, quite a few t[ak] naz[ываемых] "bull" were found, i.e. broken pieces of river mud with numerous seals on them: a number of private seals and one or more official ones (usually a chreophylaxis). It is very likely that these bulls were suspended from documents on parchment, apparently written [sic.] in Greek 65 .

In any case, Greek law, together with the Greek administration, penetrated with the Seleucids into countries that had previously lived in a different legal order. From among the Greek colonists, as in Egypt, Greek law also penetrated the local population. This is definitely indicated by the fact that back in the IV century A.D. the Syriac-Roman legal code was created, registering the current law of Syria at this time.

64 See references in note 55.

65 For new bullae found in Seleucia, see note 38.

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It is not based on local or Roman law, but on Greek law. This has been clearly demonstrated in recent times by the comparison of the codex's rules concerning the inheritance of ab intestate with those of the Hellenistic law on the same subject, the copy of the first century BC of one chapter of the laws of the Macedonian colony of Dura-Europos on the Euphrates, and the laws given to the colony by its founder Nicanor under Seleucus I.

C. Army and Navy 66

The composition and organization of the Seleucid army is very poorly known to us. Writers tell us about the size and composition of the active Seleucid army in wartime, some inscriptions give an idea of the composition of the garrisons, from the inscriptions and from the parchments of Dura and Avromanus we know something about t[ak] naz[ываемых] that is, about the soldiers - holders of land plots, the reserve of the Seleucid army.

The active Seleucid army was not large, no more than 70,000 at times of the highest tension. This is explained, of course, by the difficulty of moving and feeding a larger army, the need to select only soldiers who are really capable and willing to fight, and the need to have a large part of the army recruited from elements that could be relied upon, i.e., from military settlers of the power, who could be opposed to mercenaries, on the one hand, contingents, among the Iranian and Asiatic tribes of gl[avny] obr[az], on the other hand, and, finally, the huge funds that absorbed the payment of salaries and the maintenance of the army.

Unfortunately, we do not know how large the salaries of soldiers during the campaign and those who were on garrison duty were. The horsemen were paid triple the pay of the foot soldiers, and the mercenaries, m [ozhet] b[1], were paid higher than the soldiers from the Kateks and cleruchs and soldiers recruited from the non-Greek population of the empire. Since the competition in recruiting soldiers was great, and even military settlers could easily go to the service of Seleucid rivals, since the number of experienced officers was limited, and a good officer was expensive and was not connected with a certain country, it was natural that the Seleucids often could not pay their mobilized army and were forced to resort to the use of the army. either to help "friends", or to raise funds for churches. A brief description of the partial mobilization is characteristic in 1 Mass. 3, 27. In this mobilization, the first thing that Antiochus IV does is to open and pay out of it an annual salary for soldiers in order to have them "under arms". Since there was not enough money in the tax offices and taxes were tight, Epiphanes (this, of course, does not correspond to reality) decided on an expedition to Persia.

Advanced military technology required large expenditures on military bases, arsenals, parks, horse repairs and horse factories, military chariots, the maintenance and care of elephants, not to mention the costs of building and maintaining naval bases. The main land military base of the Seleucids was Apamea, near the capital of the kingdom of Antioch and close to large forests rich in timber. Iron and copper were probably supplied by the mines of the Black Sea coast. Apamea was hardly the only Seleucid military base. With the empire's enormous size, a number of such bases were needed. In M[Scarlet] Asia was probably such a base. Sardis. Media was the main center for cavalry repairs, and this explains the Seleucid efforts to hold this province at all costs and Hellenize it as much as possible.

The Seleucid army consisted of cavalry and infantry. Cavalry, as in the Ptolemaic kingdom and other Hellenistic monarchies, was a privileged type of weapon. One letter from Antiochus III is addressed to "strategists, hyparchs, hegemons of infantry, soldiers, and the rest" (i.e., the civilian population?) (OGI, 217). In peacetime, a small number of active-duty soldiers were probably distributed between the capital, where the royal guard was stationed, military bases, and the main Seleucid strongholds in the provinces where permanent garrisons were located. I have already mentioned the Seleucid military police. The mobilized army during the war was divided into two parts: regular cavalry and infantry, and auxiliary units and detachments of special weapons. The regular army nominally consisted of Macedonians and was drawn from the Macedonian and Greek populations of the Empire, mainly from the population of urban and non-urban military colonies. The Macedonian cavalry is referred to as its component parts:

66 See references in note 22.

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squad "tsar's regiment" and t [ak] naz [yuvaemaya] It is impossible to distinguish between these three groups. It seems that the regular cavalry, part of which was the tsar's guard, included a large number of Iranians, probably recruited from Iranian military settlers (see below). The special cavalry regiment consisted of armored (horse and rider) cataphracts, probably Iranians. They also call the cavalry detachments of the Tarentines (origin or type of weapon?), Scythians, Dagians and Arodes on their dromedaries. I have already mentioned the elephant bands and the old heritage of the East - chariots with swords.

In the infantry, the main role was played by the Macedonian phalanx and the hypaspists (the tsar's guard?). The light infantry consisted of Greek, Cretan and Asiatic mercenaries (Pamphylians, Pisidians, Carians, Cilicians, Mysians, Cypriots, Thracians, Illyrians, Gauls [sic.]). The special forces were slingers (Thracians and Kurds), archers (Mysians, Elimites, Medes, Persians) and javelin throwers (Lydians). This list, of course, is far from complete.

A major role in this army was played by hired Greeks and Asians of Asia Minor. One of the goals of the Romans after the Battle of Magnesia was to stop these mercenaries from gaining access to the Ceuleucid army. Not surprisingly, one of the articles of the peace treaty was to prohibit the Seleucids from recruiting soldiers in the sphere of Roman influence. Of course, the Romans could not stop the influx of mercenaries into the Seleucid army. But they stopped the Seleucids ' regular recruitment activities outside their kingdom.

The bulk of the army, however, was formed from the time of Seleucus I and Antiochus I by Macedonians and Greeks, who settled in large numbers within the Seleucid kingdom: in M [aloy] Asia, Syria, Mesopotamia and Babylonia, Media, Persia and Elimaida. Unfortunately, we cannot determine the number of these new settlers, but the fact that the Macedonian phalanx numbered 20,000 men at the Battle of Raphia, 16,000 at the Battle of Magnesia, and 20,000 again at the Daphne review, suggests that we must add the Macedonian cavalry, the garrisons of the cities, and the military police that were recruited [sic. of the Macedonian-Greek population of the state, shows how significant was the population of the state, which was officially considered Macedonians and Greeks. True, undoubtedly, local elements quickly became part of this population, true, in the East, as the Avromanian passages show, many Iranians also became military settlers, true, since the time of Antiochus III, military colonists are sometimes recruited from the local population (Jews), nevertheless, the number of Macedonians and Greeks in the region is still very small. The Seleucid Empire was probably very large.

It must be assumed that military service was required not only for those soldiers (and their children?) who received land from the kings while on active duty, but also for the Greek and Macedonian population of cities. Unfortunately, we do not know exactly what the obligations of both parties towards the State were.

Some information about the organization of military settlers, t [ak] naz[ываемых] we can learn from some of the inscriptions of M [aloy] Asia (the famous sympolitia of Smyrna and Magnesia on Sipila-OGI. 229; the inscription from Thyatira-OGI. 211 and the famous inscription of Mnesimachus from Sardis) 67 . From these documents, we can conclude that not all Macedonians who lived in one place or another were soldiers and officers and were registered as such. An inscription from Thyatira distinguishes "soldiers and officers"from the Macedonians of this city. The rest, obviously, were not on the military lists. Active duty probably lasted for a certain amount of time. All active - duty military settlers are listed on lists maintained by special officials-separate groups of them are assigned to separate chiliarchies. They live either in cities (e.g. Imer, Magnesia, Thyatira, etc., see the following chapter 68) or in villages, or the meaning of this latter term is unclear to us: a military permanent camp? All of them get from the ground - there are two sizes - equestrian and infantry. Individuals can be holders of more than one whether they received this one for free or for a fee, we don't know. The second is more likely. Freedom from the land tax, from paying a tenth of the crop, is not the rule, but the exception. As the parchments from Dura show, it is inherited, can also fall into the hands of women and children.

67 For new documents, see Billows. Kings and Colonists. P. 146-182.

68 Rostovtsev refers to the section below on the parts of the Seleucid empire.

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can be sold. Inheritance rights, however, are limited: if there are no heirs provided for in the law, then the property passes to the king. It is possible that the same thing happened in the case of non-fulfillment of certain conditions by the holder: payment of taxes, non-cultivation of land, non-fulfillment of military service. This latter, however, is only an assumption, which is not attested in the sources. In this case, theoretically, the land remained the property of the king.

Even in peacetime, the unit does not work for its own employees, but carries out military duties. Meanwhile, those who are assigned to Magnesia and live partly outside the city, and partly, m [ozhet] b[o], in a camp outside the city (for military training? of a certain age?), do not perform any duties and do not receive any salary, then soldiers (some of them are recruited from Magnesia) who live in Palemagnesia are on garrison duty and therefore receive salary and provisions When they are transferred to Palemagnesia they received double in addition to the former in the territory of this region.

Along with them there are, however, in the mentioned fortress and soldiers who do not have These soldiers are given upon their transfer to Smyrna citizenship in the amount of a horseman's section. Like Magnesia, they are all tax-free. Most of these garrison soldiers - Timon's squad - are infantry from the phalanx. In addition, there are Persians under the command of Oman, probably a detachment of cavalry.

From this scattered information, it is clear what a huge cost the creation of each military settlement required. As the information about the new foundation of Lysimachia and the withdrawal of the Jewish colony to Asia Minor by Antiochus III shows, when new settlers settled, they not only had to allocate land, give them houses to live in, but also help them acquire equipment and guarantee them certain benefits in terms of paying taxes, at least for the first time. for the first time. The inscription of Mnesimachus of Sardis, and that of Antiochus II, which speaks of the sale of land to Laodice, give us an idea of the means by which the Seleucids paid for the enormous expenses of maintaining a permanent army and military settlements. Plutarch's account is known of how Eumenes, Alexander's secretary, obtained money to pay the salaries of his army by selling land belonging to Persian barons to his officers. Extensive sale of land by the Seleucids (see below; probably also for granted land-those who received it [sic. The same need for gold to pay the soldiers ' salaries as the behavior of Eumenes is largely due to the fact that they did not pay the cities, their family members, and the officers of their army. It is not for nothing that the payment of Laodice comes in the inscriptions of Mnesimachus, which I consider Seleucid, and not Pergamon, the income (in gold) from those lands that are distributed (or sold) to army officers does not go to the local treasury, and I think that here it is not part of the active army (and, of course, not a division satrapies), and a well-known group of military settlers belonging to one or another chiliarchy, both in peacetime and in wartime. The money went partly for needs (for example, money for orphanages-boarding schools of various kinds), and partly for the payment of salaries to those of the chiliarchy who were on active service in garrisons or in the police. The revenues - both fixed and lump-sum-from these sales and perpetual leases were, of course, extremely large. These lands, however, will be discussed in the next chapter 69 .

Our information about the Seleucid fleet is even scanter. This fleet did not play a decisive role in the life of the state and did not acquire any special laurels. But he promoted the land army, guarded military transports with hired soldiers, and was a major factor in the political life of the time. Antiochus III fielded such an impressive naval force during the war with Rome that the Romans considered it necessary to include in the treaty a clause limiting the scope of the Seleucid fleet to Asian waters. The Seleucids also maintained a special squadron in the Persian Gulf.

We know almost nothing about the equipment of the fleet and its contents. It is possible that the system of trierarchy also existed in the Seleucid empire, i.e., that ships were built, equipped, and maintained by certain groups of individuals. In 2 Mass. 4, 19 there is a curious information that at Epiphanes the Embassy of Jerusalem asks to use the money transferred not for sacrifices to Hercules, but for the construction of trierae. It is possible that the general command of naval bases and the navy was in the hands of Po

69 This refers to the section of Rostovtsev's chapter that follows.

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at least Athenaeus, under Antiochus I, the holder of this title, is not only the holder of large lands granted to him by the king (OGI. 221, 54), but also plays a prominent role in protecting the Greek cities of M [aloy] Asia from the Galatians (Syll. 3, 410-about 274 BC). Individual squadrons were commanded by Navarchs.

d. Seleucid economic policy

Our scanty information about the Seleucid empire, about the policy of the kings and their activities for the benefit of their country, does not allow us to form a more or less accurate idea of the direction and goals of their economic policy. One of the main items of their income, about which, unfortunately, we know almost nothing, was undoubtedly the income they received from the taxation of trade. The great trade routes of the ancient world connecting Central Asia, India and Arabia with the Mediterranean, both by sea and by land, passed through the Seleucid empire. The Ptolemies took great pains to divert some of their trade with Arabia and India from the routes that the Seleucids controlled to those under their control, i.e., to the western ports of Egypt on the one hand, and to the ports of Palestine, Phoenicia, and Celes-ria on the other. The Ptolemaic loss of control over Palestine, Phoenicia, and Syria under Antiochus III was undoubtedly a huge blow to the Ptolemies and forced them to pay special attention to the development of Egypt's maritime trade with India and Arabia. For the Seleucids, however, the unification of the entire Syro-Palestinian coast in their hands was undoubtedly a major compensation for the loss of M [aloy] Asia and its ports, the result of Antiochus III's war with Rome. Control of the Syro - Palestinian coast undoubtedly prolonged the existence of the Seleucid monarchy.

The efforts of the Seleucids during the first period of their power, that is, until the end of the reign of Antiochus III., were mainly directed at keeping in their hands and under their control the sea-trade route from India along the Persian Gulf to the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates, on the one hand, 70 and those overland routes from China, Central Asia and India went through the Iranian plateau to the Tigris and Euphrates. The old trade routes, established and regulated by the Persians and inherited from them by Alexander, who scattered the most important of his colonies along these routes, were not abandoned by the Seleucids. Relations with India under Seleucus I and Antiochus I, despite the loss of political control over India, were constant and lively .71 This is evidenced by the activities of Megasthenes and Daimachus, their embassies to India to the court of Sandragupta and Amitrohata, 72 and especially by the expedition of Patroclus, the closest collaborator of the first Seleucids, who explored the trade route that went from the Caspian Sea to the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and collected [sic. This book contains very valuable information about both the Caspian Sea coast and India, information that was widely used by Eratosthenes. Further still, Demodamus of Miletus, "general of Seleucus and Antiochus, who crossed the Jaxartes and erected an altar to the Didymean Apollo on the other side of the river" (Plin. [HN] VI, 49).

Huge efforts were expended by the Seleucids, especially by Antiochus I, during Seleucus ' lifetime and after his death, both on the most intensive Hellenization of Media, Parthia and Arya, and on the restoration and maintenance of Alexander's largest bases on the Far Eastern trade routes: Alexandria Ariana [sic.] (Herat) , Antioch Margiana [sic.] Arachosia (Kandahar), and Alexandria on Etymander (Helmand). Many cities were created and maintained by them in Northeastern Iran; Antioch in Scythia and Alexandria in Jaxartes are mentioned.

The Seleucid efforts to maintain constant communication with the Far East were not in vain. Even the separation of Bactria and then Parthia did not break the ties of the Far East with the Seleucid kingdom. This is evidenced both by the recent discovery of Syrian woollen fabrics in Mongolia and the likelihood of a direct influence of Hellenistic art on the development of art in China during the Han Dynasty. The importation of Greek products to the nearest Iranian parts of the empire was also brisk under the Persians;

70 См. Polls D.T. The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity. V. II. Oxf., 1990; Suites J.-T. The Arab-Persian Gulf under the Seleucids // Hellenism in the East: the Interaction of Greek and Non-Greek Civilizations from Syria to Central Asia after Alexander/Ed. A. Kuhrt, S. Sherwin- White. L., 1987.

71 См. Karttunen K. India in Early Greek Literature. Helsinki, 1989.

72 Amitroghat (Amitrokhad) is identified with Bindusara, see Bongard-Levin G. M., Il'in G. F. India in ancient Times, Moscow, 1985, p. 210.

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under the Seleucids, as the discovery of the handles of Rhodian amphorae in Sousse shows, it was regular.

Both the sea trade route from India and the main land routes from there and from Central Asia converged from time immemorial in Babylonia, at the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates. Here Seleucus I founded the second capital of his kingdom, Seleucia on the Tigris, which was more convenient and more favorable for the concentration of the kingdom's Asiatic trade in this city than even the position of Babylon. But as the main capital of the kingdom Seleucia was not suitable: it was too far removed from Greece and the Mediterranean, on whose relations both the economic and military prosperity of the empire depended. The main capital of the kingdom was therefore moved to Antioch on the Orontes, the port of which was Seleucia in Pieria. Since the foundation of Antioch, the main concern of the Seleucids has been to link their own land with convenient and safe roads. the western and eastern capitals, to make this route more attractive and cheaper than the route through the desert to the ports of Palestine and Phoenicia. Two main roads were created by the Seleucids to connect Antioch with the great Mesopotamian roads of the Persian kings: one - from Antioch to Zeugma (on the Euphrates), from there-through the bridge to Edessa and Nisibis to connect with the Persian road leading to the Iranian satrapies, the other-through the same Zeugma across the Mesopotamian plain through Anthemusias and Ichneumus - to Nicephorus, and thence by the great Persian road to Babylon and Seleucia.

Since Seleucia in Pieria, after all, never attracted much trade, and the main outlets of eastern trade still remained the large ports of M [aloy] Since the route through Asia Minor was also the main route from the Seleucid kingdom to the Greek world and to the Aegean Sea (the sea route from the North Syrian ports could always be blocked by the Ptolemies), the first Seleucids paid no less, if not more, attention to the great Persian trade roads of M [aloy] Asia, developing and improving the country's road links and strengthening the most important stages and intersections between the Macedonian colonies.

The situation changed significantly in the later period of the Seleucid kingdom, in the second century BC. Communication with the East, despite the advance of the Parthians, did not stop: the finds in Mongolia belong to the first century BC, but the preference for northern roads over southern ones no longer had a raison d'etre. Therefore, the route from Seleucia across the desert to the ports of Palestine was revived again, especially when the Euphrates road mentioned above was closed to large-scale trade by the robber behavior of Arab sheikhs, who seized the most important points in the Mesopotamian plain during the era of political anarchy in the second half of the second and early first centuries BC. Because of this, and because of the constant interruptions in relations with Parthia, during the wars the sea route across the Persian Gulf from India and the corresponding route across the desert to the ports of Palestine began to play a more important role than in the third and early second centuries BC. part of it was sent through the Seleucid empire (see, for example, [imer], a significant amount of Arab odorous essences that Seleucus I and Antiochus I give to the temple of Apollo in Didymae, - OGI. 214), now completely out of the hands of the Ptolemies, and now went through Petra either to Gaza or through Damascus to the - now Seleucid-ports of Phoenicia. Finally, as mentioned above, the closure of M[aloy] Asia for the Seleucids and the revival of the commercial life of Palestine and Phoenicia put these ports in direct connection (bypassing Alexandria) with the Greek world. This explains the revival of Seleucid relations with Delos, Rhodes, and the cities of Greece, and the appearance in large numbers of Phoenician and Syrian merchants both on Delos and in Italian Delos - Puteoli.

How the maintenance of roads was organized, the security of communication along them, and the taxation of trade in the Seleucid kingdom are very poorly known to us. Roads, as it seems, were, at least in M [aloy] Asia, part imperial, part urban. Their maintenance in the Kingdom of Pergamum was the responsibility of the landowners through whose lands the road passed. It is possible that the Pergamon kings inherited this rule from the Seleucids, and those from the Persians. The Seleucids also inherited from the Persians the organization of postal communication along the royal roads.We do not know how much the Seleucids did for the development of agriculture and industry. Random evidence suggests that they acclimatized amom and backgammon within the empire. There is no doubt that the settlement of large numbers of Greek and Macedonian colonists in all parts of the Empire could not but affect the introduction of Greek agricultural methods and the increase in the area under cultivation. There is also no doubt that the appearance of Greek artisans and industrialists in the commercial and industrial cities of the kingdom led to a change in the economy of Greece.

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a significant Hellenization of industrial products, which were exported mainly to places where Greek taste and Greek skills reigned supreme.

I will also mention the wide scope of coinage in the Seleucid kingdom. In contrast to the Ptolemies, who minted their coins first according to the Rhodes standard and then according to the Milesian, i.e. Phoenician, standard, the Seleucids adopted and retained the Attic standard almost to the end of their rule. The same standard was adopted by other kingdoms of Asia Minor and the Far East. In the world market, the Seleucid coin successfully competed with the Ptolemaic one, but neither of them became world coins, and did not displace the coins of Greek cities and smaller Hellenistic kingdoms from circulation .73

SYRIA AND THE EAST

(Russian Version of the Chapter for the "Cambridge Ancient History")

M.I. Rostovtzeff

This is a publication of the first part of the chapter "Syria and the East" written by M.I. Rostovtzeff for the first edition of Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 7. The original Russian text is in some respects different from the edited English one and reflects the author's original idea in a clearer way.

In the preface the publishers describe the circumstances of this work's appearance paying attention to the fact that the Hellenistic East had never been special subject of Rostovtzeff s study before this paper, while his chapter on Ptolemaic Egypt in the same volume was a result of his thorough and long research in the history of Hellenistic and Roman Egypt.

This chapter, as the publishers indicate, could be considered as a preliminary study for Rostovtzeffs major work "Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World", in which the problems of the history of Seleucids' state are discussed in detail. The publishers' preface gives a brief outline of the historiography of the question for the moment when Rostovtzeff was working on the chapter and points out the new ideas he proposed for the understanding of the problems of Seleucids' state and Hellenistic East in general.

The notes refer to the modem literature on the problems in which Rostovtzeff was interested.

73 End of the second section of the chapter.

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