80 years have passed since the formation of the first Workers ' (Social Democratic) party in Romania. The path she took was not easy and not always straight. The documents published in socialist Romania 1 show the complexity of the situation in the party, the depth of contradictions that existed between the left current and the reformists, the intensity of the struggle, and the difficulties that the revolutionary forces had to overcome.

By the time the party was founded, the working class had become a major factor in the life of the country. The introduction of Romania to the world market was accompanied by all the usual phenomena for capitalist civilization. Thousands of artisans, apprentices and apprentices were knocked out of their usual conditions of existence and gradually absorbed into factories, factories, mines, went to the construction of railways. Many of them began to understand the illusory nature of calculations for turning into" independent " hostesses. Although the burden of petty-bourgeois ideas had not yet been overcome, the process of class education of the proletariat could not be stopped.

At the turn of two centuries, the proletariat was already a considerable force: 37,000 people were employed in manufacturing enterprises alone, which were considered large by the conditions of that time, and several tens of thousands more worked on railways, oil fields, and water transport. It was the vanguard of the proletarian army. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, factory workers were still a minority of the 130,000 employed in industry and transport .2 The craftsman was still a typical figure of Romanian industry. But there was also a certain concentration of production.

The 1980s of the 19th century were marked by spontaneous strikes that were no longer similar to the previous ones. At the same time, the revolutionary circles, paying tribute to Lassallianism, Proudhonism and narodism in the 70s of the XIX century, stopped looking for any special ways of development for Romania, and the socialists turned to the working class and to the teachings of Karl Marx. The transition to Marxism took place in 1883-1884. In April, 1884.

1 "Documente din miscarea muncitoreasca din Romania. 1872-1916" (hereinafter-DMM). Bucuresti. 1947; "Documente din istoria Partidului comunist din Romania" (далее - DIPCR). Vol. I. 1917 - 1922. Bucuresti. 1956; "Documente din istoria miscarii muncitoresti din Romania" (далее - DIMMR). 1893 - 1900, 1910 - 1915, 1916 - 1921. Bucuresti. 1969, 1968, 1966; "Marea Revolufie socialista din Octombrie si miscarea revolutionara si democratica din Romania". Bucuresti. 1967. Collections of articles by the Romanian workers 'and socialist press are also a valuable source: "Presa muncitoreasca §i socialista din Romania". Vol. I-III. Bucuresti. 1964 - 1971.

2 " History of Romania. 1848-1917". M. 1971, p. 359, 360. In 1860, only 2 - 2,5 thousand people were employed in factories and factories.

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the first issue of the newspaper Revista Sociala (Social Review) was published, which immediately dissociated itself from anarchism and other petty-bourgeois theories that were then in circulation, and announced that it would defend not utopian, but scientific socialism: "Our newspaper is called upon, as long as it is strong enough, to fill the gap existing in our ideas, highlighting the ideas of scientific socialism " 3 . On the pages of this publication, the young K. Dobrogeanu-Gerea published a great work "Karl Marx and our Economists", in which he expounded and defended the main provisions of Marxist political economy.

Along with Revista sociala, the magazine Contemporanul (Sovremennik) played a major role in spreading Marxism. Here were published the works of Karl Marx and Fr. Engels. Here, in 1886, C. Dobrogeanu-Geri's study "What the Romanian Socialists Want" was published, followed by other works by this author, who soon became a leading theorist of Romanian social democracy. In his works, he proved the regularity and inevitability of the development of the socialist movement in Romania and subjected the thesis about the alienness of socialism in a backward agrarian country to reasonable criticism. In the work "What the Romanian Socialists want", the fundamental thesis about the dictatorship of the proletariat as a form of political power was voiced .4 At the beginning of 1888, F. Engels sent a letter to Iasi. "To my great satisfaction," he wrote, "I was able to make sure that the socialists of your country accept in their program the basic principles of the theory that managed to unite the vast majority of European and American socialists in a single unit of fighters - the theory created by my late friend Karl Marx." 5

The Romanian movement, organized in circles and then clubs, merged with the mighty stream of international social democracy. At the founding Congress of the Second International, it was represented by 5 delegates. On March 31, 1893, the first congress of Romanian Social Democrats opened, forming the Social Democratic Party of Workers of Romania (SDPRR). The program adopted by him set out the main Marxist principles. It stated that the development of the capitalist mode of production had prepared the necessary conditions for its replacement by a socialist one; that the proletariat was destined to play the role of the gravedigger of capitalism; that this difficult and majestic task could only be accomplished by the working class organized and armed with the theory of scientific socialism; that the party created in Rumania had the same goal as that it is committed to preserving the principles of proletarian internationalism and unswervingly implementing the decisions of the Congresses of the Second International. 6

The program also contained a list of immediate requirements: universal, equal and direct suffrage for all citizens over the age of 20, regardless of gender, religious or national affiliation, equal rights of women with men; universal, secular and free education; freedom of assembly, association, etc. For the first time in Romania, such specific work requirements were put forward as the adoption of laws on labor protection, an eight-hour working day. A positive feature of the program was the inclusion of requirements on the agrarian issue, although it stopped here halfway, limiting itself to the proposal to form a fund out of land purchased from farmers.

3 "Presa muncitoreasca si socialists din Romania". Vol. I, pt. I. Bucuresti. 1964, p. 287.

4 P. Dobrogeanu-Gherea. Scrieri social-politice. Bucuresti. 1968, p. 25.

5 K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 37, p. 4.

6 DIMMR, 1893 - 1900, pp. 52 - 53.

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landlords, for leasing their land plots to peasant societies and individuals.

At the congress, the influence of reformist concepts was quite clearly manifested. The effect was the immaturity and inexperience of the Romanian working class, the strong petty-bourgeois influence, the lack of proper training in class battles, and the considerable influence of the intellectual stratum. In the introduction to the program, it was pointed out that socialist transformations should be carried out first in the advanced countries of Western Europe, while the Romanians should wait for the signal from there and engage in their current affairs of a preparatory nature: propaganda and organization of the working people, concern for improving their situation, etc. This was the goal of the party's tactics. "From this,"the program pointed out," follows the moderation of socialist tactics in our country, the development of a movement along the path of strict legality. " 7

Still, the emergence of the SDPRR was important because it helped to rally the Romanian working class. The 90s of the XIX century were a time of rapid growth of professional organizations, which by the beginning of the XX century numbered in the hundreds. Their class character became more and more pronounced. This can be seen in the charters, which, as a rule, spoke about strengthening brotherhood and solidarity among workers, about the struggle to improve their social and material situation. Some of them called for a struggle to reduce the working day, sometimes (although not in all cases) - up to 8 hours. To most societies, however, such a demand still seemed too drastic. Workshop owners were not allowed in the association. The strike movement expanded, and A. Ionescu and I. C. Frimu showed themselves in it.

In the strike battles that exposed the antagonism between labor and capital, the class consciousness of the workers grew and strengthened. In Romania, unresolved problems of a bourgeois-democratic nature were acute. This circumstance helped the socialists to avoid the dangers of sectarianism, which caused so much harm to the labor movement in the developed capitalist states. But this peculiarity was turned to their advantage by the opportunists, who tried to reduce all the party's activities to the solution of exclusively democratic tasks, to limit them to the limits of legality, to the struggle for universal suffrage. They condemned the tactics of "violence and revolutionary action" and tried to turn the party into "entirely legalist and peaceful."

This program fully corresponded to the pan-European standards of opportunism. Many parties associate it with Russian "legal Marxism" and with Austro-Marxism. Such a course was bound to provoke a struggle with the revolutionary forces in Rumanian social-democracy. At the party congresses, there were violent clashes between representatives of opposite trends. The leaders of the left-K. Buzdugan, S. Stincu, R. Ionescu-Rion, K. Olcescu, A. Ionescu-opposed the "legal path" and demanded that the workers ' organization be placed at the center of the party's activities. They themselves devoted themselves wholeheartedly to this task and achieved considerable success. If in 1895 the Bucharest SDPRR club had 575 members, then in 1897 it already had 1315. The second largest party organization operated in Brail, a city of port workers. Here the club had up to a thousand members. Many advanced workers joined the clubs of Galac, Buzau and Targu Frumosa .8

The May Day demonstrations served as a review of the fighting forces of the proletariat. Thousands of people took to the streets under the slogans of the 8-hour ra-

7 Ibid., p. 55.

8 "Miscarea muncitoreasca din Romania. 1893 - 1900". Bucuresti. 1965 (hereinafter-MMR), pp. 67, 68-69.

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working day, Sunday rest, universal suffrage. May Day attracted the attention and sympathy of all the progressive forces of Romania to the proletarian struggle. The strike movement became more and more persistent, organized, and conscious. The class struggles, which were economic in their content and not yet mature enough in terms of the organization and consciousness of their participants, did not fit into the opportunistic schemes of an orderly and strictly legal campaign for universal suffrage, to which the reformists tried to reduce all the activities of the SDPRR. The gap widened between the opportunists who held key positions in the leadership of the party and the masses. One of the leaders of the SDPRR at that time, I. K. Atanasiu, wrote in his memoirs about the "hostility and insulting suspicion" that they "felt daily on the part of the workers" .9

The pressure from the left, the inability to overcome them and impose their own line of action, brought the crisis closer and forced the opportunists to change their course. Beginning in 1895, first in private conversations, then at a closed session of the Fifth Congress (1898), and then in public, they demanded the transformation of the party on a "broader basis", the rejection of socialist goals, which was tantamount to its liquidation. The unprincipled combinations of opportunists and liberals in the municipal elections of 1898 inflamed the situation in the party to the limit. An attempt by the right at the Sixth Party Congress (1899) to replace the socialist organization with an amorphous association of democratic forces failed. The revolutionaries, through A. Ionescu, responded to these intrigues by swearing allegiance to the "red banner of the international proletariat" .10 And then the renegades dealt the movement a heavy blow by breaking up the party, and they themselves defected to the liberals.

In the early years of the twentieth century, the Romanian labor movement faced new and difficult challenges. The industrial and financial crisis has narrowed the scope of the economic struggle. The party has ceased to exist. Then the clubs broke up. They were replaced by the "Working Romania" circles, which brought together those who did not flinch and were not disappointed.

Since the beginning of the century, the world has entered an era of social upheavals, the center of which was in Russia. Many of the rigid ideas of orthodox social democracy were being destroyed, and Lenin answered the questions raised by history about the course of the revolutionary process in the era of imperialism. The Romanian revolutionaries were faced with the task of not only restoring the party, but also achieving its transition to fundamentally new positions. In 1902, they managed to publish 23 issues of the weekly "Romania muncitoare" ("Working Romania"). The newspaper exposed the notorious thesis that socialism is unsuitable for Romania. She turned to a proven weapon - the writings of the founders of Marxism. Almost every issue published texts (mostly in excerpts) from the works of Karl Marx and Franz Liszt. Engels. It should be particularly noted that in Romania muncitoare a short but fundamentally important quote appeared, reprinted from Lenin's Iskra, with an assessment of the "Incident of Millerand". The newspaper quoted the words: "International socialism despises (this traitor - V. V.) and refuses all solidarity with it." 11

And here opens the most interesting, though still not fully read, page of Russian-Romanian revolutionary cooperation related to the transportation of Iskra . Iskra for almost a year

9 I. Atanasiu. Miscarea socialista. 1881 - 1900. Bucuresti. 1932, p. 331.

10 "Presa muncitoreasca si socialista din Romania". Vol. I, pt. II, p. 472.

11 N. Copoiu. Refacerea Partidului Social Democrat din Romania. Bucuresti. 1966, p. 91; "Romania muncitoare", 28. IV. 1902; see also A. Deak, I. Ilincioj. Lenin and Romania. Bucharest, 1971, p. 43.

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for two years it was transported to Russia via Iasi, Galac and Tulcu 12 . At the end of 1902, the connection was cut off for reasons that have not yet been clarified. It is important, however, to note (and Romanian and Soviet researchers agree on this) that the significance of Iskra transportation went far beyond the scope of "pure technology", and that it helped Romanians get acquainted with the newspaper's materials. In addition to condemning Millerand's treachery, in which the Romanian socialists literally followed Iskra, one can refer to the assessment given in Romania muncitoare of the tasks of the party press, which is similar to the provisions put forward in Lenin's famous article " Where to begin?". Getting to know Iskra helped the Romanian revolutionaries to better understand the situation in Russia. Romania muncitoare wrote in May 1902:: "The red banner of the revolution is once again raised in Russia; despotism will no longer be able to keep in check the new forces developing in society, it will fall, and the rays of freedom will shine in the darkness of the Russian Empire." 13

However, the return to kruzhkovism left its mark on the content of "Romania muncitoare". There were almost no original theoretical materials in the weekly, with the exception of articles on the peasant question, which spoke about the revolutionary potential of the village. There was no chronicle of working life in the newspaper. There were not enough forces, there were not enough trained personnel, and ties with the mass movement were weakened.

The internal and external conditions for a drastic change in the Rumanian labor movement were ripe only by 1905. On January 24, 1905, a protest rally against Bloody Sunday was held in the Eforia Hall in Bucharest. A wave of sympathy and solidarity with the Russian freedom fighters swept Romania. Following the capital, similar meetings were held in Iasi, Craiova, Bacau, Constanta. On March 5, the publication of the newspaper "Romania muncitoare"resumed. Alarmed by the events, the Romanian oligarchy sent additional military units to the Russian border. Patrols kept watch day and night. But news from Russia reached Romania in a variety of ways. These included newspaper reports, leaflets smuggled across the Prut, stories from participants in the Russian revolution, and testimonies from neighbors living in border villages. A correspondent of the newspaper Odesskiye Novosti, arriving in Romania, found that even the villagers were well informed about the revolt, that is, about the peasant movement in Russia .14 In the history of Russian-Romanian revolutionary relations, the stay of the battleship Potemkin in Romania also occupies an important place. For many decades, Russian sailors have kept in mind the warmth of the meeting they received and the strength of proletarian internationalism. 15 They themselves took an active part in the workers 'and peasants' movement of the country that sheltered them.

The revolution of 1905-1907 had a powerful impact on all the progressive forces of Romania: the proletariat, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia. The "Russian Experience" awakened thought and pushed for action. It was not simply a question of the broad growth of the working - class movement and not of the mechanical restoration of the social-Democratic Party, but of a profound qualitative transformation of the social-democratic party.-

12 Yu. Ya. Baskin, E. I. Spivakovsky. Lenin's Iskra in Romania. "Along the Lenin way". "Scientific Notes" of the Leningrad Higher Secondary School, Issue 2, L. 1970, p. 92. Romanian researchers have established that such famous figures as K. Buzdugan, I. K. Frimu, I. Nedezhde-Armashu participated in the transfer of Russian revolutionary literature (see A. Deak, I. Ilinciiu. Op. ed., p. 38).

13 Yu. Ya. Baskin, E. I. Spivakovsky. Edict. op.; A. I. Aleksandrov. Lenin's Iskra in Romania. Vestnik MSU. Ser. VII. Philology and Journalism, 1960, No. 6; A. Deak, I. Ilinchoyu. Edict op.

14 "Odessa news", 29. III. 1907

15 I. Lychev. Potemkintsy, Moscow, 1954, pp. 88-89.

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number shift. The barricade battles, mass political strikes, peasant unrest, and uprisings in the army and navy not only confirmed Lenin's conclusion that the center of the world revolutionary movement had moved to Russia, but also showed the failure of the reformist postulates about the "legal path" and the patient expectation of the arrival of socialism from the "advanced West". The task of reorganizing the entire movement on the basis of Leninism became the priority of the day.

It should be emphasized that the responses to the events in Russia were different. While the most influential and authoritative socialists, supporters of legalism, considered the lessons of 1905-1907 as a "purely Russian" phenomenon, 16 representatives of the revolutionary wing, who highly appreciated the international significance of the revolution of 1905-1907, sought to draw the maximum from the "Russian experience" to develop their own strategy and tactics. This approach was most clearly expressed in the speeches and deeds of I. K. Frimu. "The heroic struggle of the Russian comrades," he said, " has not only local significance, it has found a response all over the world... Their example inspired us too... It is our responsibility to draw lessons from what is happening in Russia and organize workers. " 17 The development of events in Romania itself proved how urgent and urgent this call was. In 1905, the curve of the strike movement began to rise steeply. Steaua Romine oil workers in Kympin handed over the strike baton to Bucharest blacksmiths and Turnu-Severin shipbuilders. Following this, a tanner's strike broke out, covering a number of cities, including the capital. The strike wave did not subside even in 1906. A report prepared by the Romanian socialists for the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International indicated that 56 conflicts occurred in Bucharest alone, and 13 in Galac. In the course of strikes, the workers ' professional organizations grew stronger.

The fragmentation of the movement and the absence of a single organizing center, at first even a trade union one, became all the more acute. In August 1906, at a conference in Bucharest, with the participation of 94 representatives representing 4,500 organized workers, the General Commission of Trade Unions was created. A year later, the second conference was attended by representatives of 6,700 proletarians .18

In the spring of 1907, a spontaneous peasant uprising unfolded, which was a milestone in the history of Romania.

The events of 1907 clearly revealed the attitude of various strata of the population towards the rebellious peasantry and exposed class relations in the country. The leaders of the big bourgeoisie once again confirmed their loyalty to the alliance with the landlords. This was reflected in the transfer of power from the conservatives to the liberals. The radical intelligentsia took a difficult position in relation to the peasant uprising. She resented the disasters of the village, the brutal massacre of the rebels. Voices of protest were heard in the press, from university departments, and in parliament19 . Students were particularly active. However, the radical intelligentsia saw in the uprising only an explosion of despair; they did not understand its social significance. Without accepting the revolutionary solution of the agrarian question, she, with the exception of some students who had joined the struggle of the peasants, began to compose land reform projects with renewed energy.

16 In the mind of K. Dobrogeanu-Geri, they were imprinted as "a terrible massacre" and "a strong hardening of minds" (E. I. Spivakovsky, V. I. Lenin and the Romanian revolutionary movement (in the pre-October years), Moscow, 1966, p. 12).

17 Cit. by: "People's Democratic Romania", 1951, N 3, p. 7.

18 They were delegated by 51 unions. Another 23 unions that existed at that time (about 1,800 members) were unable to send their delegates to the conference due to obstacles caused by the authorities ("History of Romania. 1848-1917", pp. 429, 474).

19 См. "Marea rascoala a taranilor din 1907". Bucuresti. 1967.

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Only the proletariat was on the side of the peasants from the very beginning. In Pashkani, Bukhushi, Galatsa and many other places, the workers marched together with the peasants who broke into the cities .20 In 1907, there were signs of the union of the proletariat and the peasantry, without which the collapse of the bourgeois - landlord system was unthinkable .21 However, the establishment of such an alliance was hindered by the objective difficulties experienced by the proletariat at that time. Even before the First World War, no less than half of the total number of wage earners was employed in small enterprises, and the proletariat was still replenished mainly from ruined artisans and peasants, who brought with them a load of petty-bourgeois errors and were susceptible to bourgeois ideological trends.

We must not lose sight of other factors that determined the tenacity with which reformism clung to its positions. Right-wing socialist leaders interpreted foreign experience in their own way. Expressing their sympathy for the Russian revolution and their condolences to the victims of the massacres, they sang in different voices Plekhanov's notorious thesis "we should not have taken up arms." From the defeat of the 1905 - 1907 Revolution. they concluded that the course of armed insurrection in general was disastrous. They compared the failure of the Russian "putschists" to the "brilliant successes" of German social democracy. K. Dobrogeanu-Gerya praised the achievements of the latter in every possible way: hundreds of thousands of party members, millions of supporters in elections, an impressive number of mandates in the Reichstag, and crowded demonstrations during congresses. In those years, Gerea created his main works - "Neocrefdom", "On Socialism in backward countries", "Postscript, or forgotten words", dedicated to the socio-economic and political development of Romania. They contained many true observations and sharp criticisms of the Romanian oligarchy. But to the basic question: revolution or evolution - he answered definitely and unequivocally in favor of the latter. Unlike Karl Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin, Gerya believed that nowhere in Europe were there any prerequisites, even objective ones, for the transition to socialism. He wrote about the "organic social development", the gradual "organic growth" of capitalist society into socialist society, and "growth" (he especially praised the German Social Democrats for this "beautiful" expression), which, in his opinion, cannot be artificially interrupted by violent actions. At the same time, Gerya condemned revolutionary tactics. If social-democracy, he wrote, "with the help of some miracle, violent revolution, conspiracy, etc." seizes power, it will not last even 24 hours and will either be reborn or fall, "because the necessary objective and subjective conditions have not yet developed" for the transition to socialism. Any such attempt was declared madness. Gerya argued that " social-democracy is unanimous in condemning the putschist-revolutionary tactics as bad, ridiculous and absurd." Evolution, not revolution - this is the essence of Dobrogeanu-Geri's views. He did not understand that the seizure of power by the proletariat would be the starting point for building a socialist economy and open up unprecedented opportunities for educating a new person. If the most developed countries, Gerea reasoned, were so far removed from the socialist revolution, then to talk about it in relation to Romania is tantamount to trying to marry a five-year-old baby. He repeatedly extolled the "famous and classic legal path" 22 .

20 " History of Romania. 1848-1917", p. 460.

21 "Marea rascoala a faranilor din 1907", p. 621.

22 C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea. Scrieri social-politice. Bucuresti. 1968, pp. 225 - 225.

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The socialist movement in Romania at the beginning of the century, as it appears from the documents, has not yet developed a purposeful revolutionary line. It was widely believed that the vanguard of world social democracy was the German Socialists. Many Romanian Social Democrats were inclined to overestimate the importance of the constitutional forms that existed in the country and the opportunities for legal activity that they opened up.

But latent processes of great historical significance were taking place in the Romanian labor movement. The practice of struggle pushed the left to the revolutionary path. Contrary to all the theories of the opportunists, the front of the class struggle was expanding; in the course of strikes, the proletariat came into conflict with the bourgeois state apparatus; this prompted it to seek allies and more perfect forms of organization; the ultra-legality and arch-moderate agrarian program preached by Gehry could not satisfy the left social-Democrats; they were in real life, and sometimes even in party relations. the documents went far beyond the reformist framework.

The left approached the " Russian experience "not from the" heights "of bookish reformist wisdom and not with the aim of" proving " its inapplicability on Romanian soil, but with genuine interest and readiness to learn its lessons. The rise of the strike movement, the creation of an extensive network of trade unions, their unification, the discussion of ways to revive the party - all this was influenced by the "Russian experience", which called the Romanian proletarian to storm the strongholds of oligarchy and capital. But the leaders of the workers, the fighters devoted to their class , are different. Gheorghiu, I. K. Frimu, A. Constantinescu, M. G. Bujor - they were not yet able to fight the reformists on theoretical issues, and sometimes in their impatience they fell into a left bank. All this shows how complex and contradictory the development of the socialist movement in Romania was up to the Great October Socialist Revolution.

This also affected the work of the congress that opened on January 31, 1910, which re-established the Social Democratic Party of Romania (SDPR). Reflecting the demands of the proletariat, the Congress adopted a program based on the principles of class struggle and internationalism. He proclaimed the aim of the party to be the socialization of the means of production, the abolition of the exploitation of man by man. For this purpose, the program stated, the party seeks to gain state (textual - governmental) power .23 This document included such important points as the requirements for universal suffrage, freedom of assembly and strikes, and an 8-hour working day. However, the reformist influence, and in particular the influence of the concepts of K. Dobrogeanu-Geri, affected the decisions of the congress quite clearly. The Congress proceeded from the assumption that socialism would occur in the distant future and must be preceded by a long period of capitalist development. Nothing was said about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the alliance with the peasantry, either in the debates or in the documents of the Congress. Universal suffrage continued to be promoted as the main political slogan. It was also supported by the leaders of the left, who did not recognize the leading role of the party in the labor movement and in this spirit considered the problem of relations between the party and trade unions. At the same time, the congress called for "extra-parliamentary actions", reflecting the mood of the broad masses: "We cannot lull ourselves into the illusion that we will win a parliamentary majority, which will bring about reforms for us; we must rely first of all on the main forces of the workers' army, which is fighting outside (Parliament - V. V.) and will force the bourgeoisie.read with our representatives " 24 .

23 DIMMR, 1910-1915, p. 11.

24 "Desbaterile Congresului de constituire al Partidului social-democrat si ale congresului sindical". Bucuresti. 1910, p. 125.

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The process of developing the party's agrarian program was slow. The year 1907 demonstrated two approaches to the peasantry. Workers on the streets showed their solidarity with the rebellious peasants and more than once met the punitive bullets with their chests. M. G. Bujor and a group of comrades called on the soldiers "not to shoot at those who suffer, at comrades in labor, at brothers, sisters or parents... Show everywhere who the real enemy is, and if it is necessary and possible, go over to the side of the rebels to fight against this enemy. " 25 But the leadership of the Rabochaya Rumania circle, under the clear influence of reformists, condemned Bujor's appeal, considering it anarchist. It itself, apart from some reform projects and the struggle for universal suffrage, could not offer anything 26 . In the context of an uprising, this tactic demobilized the movement. I. Teodorescu, for example, wrote with satisfaction that the granting of universal suffrage, as a rule, leads to a decline in the revolutionary wave. 27

After the uprising of 1907, party documents began to demand forced expropriation on the terms of redemption of all land ownership exceeding 300 hectares. This was clearly influenced by the left. But the party, including its left wing, has never been able to overcome the old, obsolete dogmas of the Second International. The expropriated land was supposed to be used to create a national fund, from which plots were to be leased to peasant societies or individuals for a period of at least 50 years .28 The main demand of the Romanian peasantry-the transfer of land to their ownership-was not reflected in the draft. The Socialists continued to regard it as a departure from their principles.

Centrism also reflected the ideological immaturity of the masses and the theoretical weakness of their leaders in Romania. The most prominent representative of centrism in Romanian social democracy at that time was X. Rakovsky. While condemning revisionism, he did not reveal the roots of this phenomenon and considered it a passing episode. According to him, "such tendencies were defeated and completely paralyzed" already at the Congress of the Second International in Paris (1900); four years later, as he claimed, the Amsterdam Congress "cleared the road, throwing back the revisionists"29 . And, most importantly, Rakovsky did not want to see revisionism manifest in Romanian social democracy, and he himself made concessions to it, justifying the recognition of legalism as the basis of the party's activity by the historical peculiarities of Romania. At the same time, local specifics were absolutized and pushed into the background the general laws of development.

The revolutionary wing of Rumanian social-democracy had not yet developed a coherent system of views; its representatives were unable to refute many of the reformist theses and had not yet grown to understand the need for an ideological and organizational separation from the opportunists. But they kept in touch with the masses and actively participated in everyday revolutionary activities. Revolutionary practice gradually destroyed the reformist concepts of legalism. The left has learned from hard, painful, and sometimes bloody experiences. In 1907, the punitive apparatus of the bourgeois-landlord regime followed the peasants and fell upon the workers. Hundreds of activists were expelled from the country under the pretext of foreign origin.

25 DMM, p. 364.

26 "Rascoala faranilol din 1907". Vol. I. Bucuresti. 1948, p. 792; DMM, pp. 365 - 366.

27 I. Theodorescu. Votul universal. Bucuresti. 1908, p. 28.

28 "Alianta clasei muncitoare cu {aranimea muncitoare in Romania". Bucuresti. 1969, p. 88.

29 "Viitorul social", 1970, N 2, p. 123.

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In Galac, the local prefect - and, by the way, a renegade from socialism - I. Atanasku committed a pogrom in the premises of the circle "Working Romania". In response, a general strike broke out. In December 1909, the Okhrana staged an assassination attempt on Prime Minister I. Bratiana, and a few days later the Parliament urgently passed the "Orlianu law", which banned trade unions in state-owned enterprises. However, the ruling circles of Romania could not stop the development of the class struggle. In 1907-1909, more than 120 strikes took place .30

In the pre-war years, the balance of power in the SDPR changed, the influence of reformists noticeably weakened, and the positions of revolutionaries, including theoretical ones, strengthened. In general party documents, their voice was increasingly heard. In 1911, the SDPR participated in parliamentary elections for the first time. In February, the party leadership issued a program manifesto in this regard, containing a Marxist formulation of the question of the state machine, classes and parties. However, this was not followed by revolutionary conclusions. The authors of the manifesto continued to focus on the demand for universal suffrage, which they saw as a powerful force "in the final emancipation of the workers." 31 But even on this issue, the programmatic differences between the opportunist and revolutionary trends became more pronounced in the pre-war years. While reformists continued to rely on universal suffrage as the only means of social transformation, 32 the writings of the left called for an armed uprising of the international proletariat that would free humanity from the shackles of slavery.

And in the party itself, the opportunists no longer felt as free as before. The process of polevenism became apparent during the 1914 election campaign. The party leadership, in which the positions of the left - A. Constantinescu, I. C. Frima, E. Arbore, D. Marinescu - were already quite strong, issued 10 manifestos explaining their positions. They said that only the overthrow of capitalism would save the workers from exploitation. The manifestos described the seizure of political power by the workers under the leadership of the party, and called on the proletariat "by all legal or revolutionary means at its disposal to wrest from the oligarchy the greatest possible rights for itself and for the entire people." 33 At the same time, the executive committee issued the manifesto "We demand complete expropriation!", which marked a major shift in the development of the agricultural program. The manifesto limited the size of land plots to 100 hectares, and all other land was subject to confiscation. The Party called for the elimination of the latifundia, which were the economic basis of the landlords ' rule and the mainstay of feudal remnants in the countryside.

The question of relations with bourgeois political trends was hotly debated in the party. The reason was the participation of some figures led by T. Dragu in the newspapers of C. Millet, who left the Social Democratic Party in the mid-90s of the XIX century, "Adevarul "("Pride") and " Dimineata "("Morning"), which took an openly chauvinistic position during the Balkan wars. This collaboration cast a shadow over the party. In October 1913, the SDPR Executive Committee adopted a special resolution entitled "Cooperation in bourgeois newspapers", which stated that the non-socialist press, "even the bourgeois-democratic press, seeks to keep the workers in intellectual and economic slavery to the ruling classes." 34 Soviet

30 " History of Romania. 1848-1917", p. 472.

31 DIMMR, 1910 - 1915, pp. 219, 226.

32 Ibid., p. 369.

33 DMM, p. 598.

34 "Balkan historical Collection". Chisinau. 1968, No. 1, p. 150.

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The historian A. K. Moshanu makes a well-founded conclusion that this decision of the executive committee of the party was sustained in the proletarian spirit and built on the same principles as the well-known Bolshevik resolution "On participation in the bourgeois Press" (1907). It is appropriate to link it with the program documents adopted both before and after 1913, in which it was outlined the correct approach to analyzing the alignment of class forces in the country, and the Romanian bourgeoisie was seen as a reactionary force and a leading partner of the ruling oligarchy. The break with Nezavisimye gazeta was a step in the practical implementation of these program provisions. It was necessary to establish the principle of hegemony of the proletariat and the leadership of the SPD in the process of not only socialist, but also democratic transformations in Romania. He sharply diverged from the opportunist concepts of cooperation with the" own "bourgeoisie, with the appeals of I. Sion to "help" domestic capital, which, they say, does not manage to win a place in the sun. T. Dragu's withdrawal from the party served as an indicator of its field strength.

In 1907, the first meeting of the Romanian socialists with V. I. Lenin took place in Stuttgart. In November 1911, he turned to I. K. Frim with a request to help two Russian emigrants; on December 22 of the same year, Lenin's article " On the Social-Democratic Faction of the Second Duma. Statement of the whole case." In March 1912, Lenin's report to the International Socialist Bureau on the Prague Conference was published here. The newspaper accompanied this publication with a significant note: all communications with the RSDLP should now be carried out through Vladimir Ulyanov, who lives in Paris at 35 Rue Marie Rose. This meant that the SPD intended to cooperate with the Bolsheviks, not with the Mensheviks.

At the same time, one should bear in mind the difficulties in the development of Romanian social - democracy and the relative weakness of its left-wing current, which slowly and painfully overcame the influence of reformism. Insufficient use of the revolutionary experience of the Russian proletariat aggravated these difficulties and slowed down the process of purging the party of opportunist filth. The SDPR remained a small organization-its number in 1912 did not exceed 500 people and only by 1915 had risen to 827 people . Party discipline was weak. Local clubs actually enjoyed autonomy. The Executive Committee submitted to the last pre-war Congress (April 1914) the question of reorganizing the party, transforming the clubs into sections and subordinating them to the central leadership. After a fierce battle, healthy forces prevailed at the congress: a new charter was adopted. For the first time, the party's program documents included the requirement to establish a republic. A slogan was put forward for the complete expropriation of landlords ' lands and their long-term lease to the peasants. 37

Romania's social democracy should be given an internationalist position on foreign policy issues. When the Bosnian crisis broke out in 1908, which brought Europe to the brink of armed conflict, the socialists of the Balkan countries gathered at the First Balkan Social-Democratic Conference (Belgrade, December 1909) and opposed the aggressive plans of the national bourgeoisie and the intrigues of the great Powers with their plan to create a Balkan Federal Republic. In the conditions of that time, only such a solution of the problem opened the way to war prevention, national settlement and social transformation.-

35 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 20, pp. 381-386; vol. 21, pp. 173-175; vol. 48, p. 41; see also A. Deak, I. Ilinchoyu. Op. ed., pp. 65-66.

36 "Lupta zilnica", 17.X.1915.

37 DIMMR, 1910 - 1915, pp. 745, 761.

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the initiative of the Socialists of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Romania. "The class-conscious workers of the Balkan countries, "he wrote in Pravda," were the first to put forward the slogan of a consistent democratic solution of the national question in the Balkans." "The real freedom of the Slavic peasant in the Balkans, like that of the Turkish peasant, can only be guaranteed by complete freedom within each country and by a federation of fully and completely democratic states." 38

However, there were huge difficulties on the way to the Balkan Federation. It was not only the relative weakness of the working-class movement, the backwardness and downtroddenness of the Balkan peasantry, but also subjective factors, among which the immaturity of the social-democratic parties should be emphasized. Rakovsky, who was expelled from Romania after the peasant uprising of 1907, settled in Sofia. Under the influence of his centrist concepts, with the help of Trotsky, who was also in Bulgaria at that time, he decided to "reconcile" the Bulgarian"close-knit" revolutionaries with the openly opportunist "broad"party. "Ultra-anarcho-social extravagance", "intrigues and falsifications", "ill-fated mission" - these are the terms used by D. Blagoev and G. Kirkov to describe these maneuvers, which, as one might expect, ended in failure .39 Rakovsky's" unifying efforts " also extended to international affairs, since he demanded that "everyone and everything" be invited to the next Balkan Conference of Socialists, and the SDPR executive committee on this issue for some time went along with him. In this regard, the question of convening a conference was "frozen", and moreover for a long time.

The Balkan wars contributed to the division of forces in Romanian social democracy. The party leadership, while strongly condemning the aggressive policy of the Romanian oligarchy, showed complete helplessness in determining ways to combat it. It proclaimed slogans such as" Long live democracy! "and" Long live universal suffrage! "but tried to keep the anti - war movement at the level of" legal " protest, arguing that otherwise repression was inevitable. However, the revolutionary wing did not intend to limit itself to this modest framework. His position was clearly expressed in a manifesto issued on September 29, 1912, by a group of revolutionaries from Ploiesti, led by St. Georgiou. The manifesto proclaimed "war on war" and called for a boycott of mobilisation 40 . This was an open challenge to legalist tactics, although the authors of the statement made the mistake of advocating the refusal of military service altogether, ignoring the possibility of using weapons for the purposes of the revolution.

In July 1914, the time of even more serious trials began for the Romanian proletariat. Reflecting the mood of the workers, the extraordinary joint Congress of the SDPR and Trade Unions (August 1914) noted in its resolution: "We proclaim that only with the destruction of capitalism and its replacement by a socialist society will humanity be saved from the catastrophe that will cover it with shame, ruin and plunge it into sorrow."41 In 1914-1916, the Social Democratic Party, while waging an anti-war campaign along with the struggle against poverty and deprivation, managed to combine the political and economic actions of the proletariat. By the Fourth Party Congress (October 1915), 47 large anti-war rallies and hundreds of meetings were held, and 600,000 leaflets and pamphlets were distributed. 42

38 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 22, pp. 151-152, 155.

39 E. I. Spivakovsky, V. I. Lenin and the Struggle for the Unity of the Working-class movement in the Balkans, pp. 18, 21.

40 DMM, p. 576.

41 Ibid., p. 611.

42 "Lupta zilnica", 16.X.1915.

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But even during this period, there was no unity in the party on issues of strategy and tactics. K. Dobrodzhanu-Gerya still proceeded from the impossibility of a revolution in the foreseeable future .43 He defended the European social-chauvinists and recommended the same course to the Romanian socialists: to defend, as far as possible, the neutrality of Romania; if "we have to drink the bitter cup" of military trials, then "the Romanian socialists, like their brothers in the West, will fulfill their duty"44 . The Jassy opportunists, led by Gelerter, took an openly pro-German position. They repeatedly repeated the old-fashioned statements about the "Russian threat" and advocated "decisive annexation of Romania to the powers of the Center" 45 in the event that war could not be avoided. The centrists led by Rakovsky also became more active. In a series of articles entitled "Social-Democratic tactics and war", he analyzed various variants of socialists ' behavior, omitting the only correct one - the revolutionary struggle against their own government. Rakovsky replaced the Marxist concept of just and unjust war with a false scheme of dividing wars into defensive and offensive ones, based on which he called on socialists to fight against "aggressors" if necessary. 46 V. I. Lenin gave the harshest assessment of Rakovsky's statements: "Rakovsky (see his pamphlet) for the defense of the fatherland. In my opinion, with such people we are not on the road " 47 . At the Zimmerwald Conference (1915), Rakovsky called for a "cure" for the Second International stricken by opportunism and opposed the draft manifesto put forward by V. I. Lenin on behalf of the left, which contained a concrete program of action for the overthrow of capitalist governments .48

Representatives of the revolutionary wing of the Romanian social democracy had to work in difficult conditions during the war. And although the entire ideological, political, and punitive apparatus of the ruling classes was against them, the left-wing current grew stronger and hardened during these years. Along with the party veterans A. Constantinescu, I. C. Frimu, E. Arbore - Ralli, D. Marinescu, A. Dobrogeanu-Gerea, A. Nicolau, Vasilescu-Vasia and many others were active in it. The Second Balkan Social - Democratic Conference, convened in Sofia in 1915, ended with the victory of the revolutionary wing. D. Blagoev and G. Dimitrov spoke at the conference together with the Romanian leftists D. Marinescu and E. Arborelli. The Conference condemned social-chauvinism and the class world and, overcoming the resistance of K. Dobrogeanu-Geri and some others, declared:: "The restoration of the International is possible only on the basis of revolutionary socialism and proletarian internationalism." 49 The conference delegates vowed to fight "tirelessly and without mercy against the nationalist, chauvinist and militant tendencies generated by the ruling classes of the Balkan States and against the imperialist policies of the great Powers." 50

Yet the representatives of the revolutionary wing of the Social-Democratic Party of Romania were unable to rise to Lenin's slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war, and were unable to combine the struggle against war with the struggle for the overthrow of the power of capital. These

43 P. Dobrogeanu-Gherea. Razboi sau neutralitatea. Bucuresti. 1914, p. 28.

44 "Lupta", 12.X.1914.

45 "Convorbiri sociale", 1916, N 1, pp. 6, 7.

46 "Romania muncitoare", 14.VIII.1914.

47 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 49, p. 117.

48 Ya. G. Temkin. Lenin and International Social Democracy. 1914-1917. Moscow, 1968, pp. 222, 223, 235, 240.

49 M. A. Birman. The struggle of the Left Social-Democrats of the Balkan Countries against the Imperialist War and the formation of the Balkan Workers ' Social-Democratic Federation, Moscow, 1966, pp. 17-18.

50 DMM. p. 637.

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The most important Leninist lessons were not fully understood by the left in Romanian social democracy at that time. Sometimes they found themselves caught up in a web of centrist phrases, as happened, for example, at the Fourth Party Congress (October 1915), when delegates approved a report stating: "When war becomes a reality, we will defend our homeland, so as not to lose our freedoms", while at the same time condemning attempts to impose military power on the workers. cooperation with the bourgeoisie in the name of "civil peace" 51 .

Only gradually, under the pressure of ordinary participants in the movement, did the elements of conciliationism that the left suffered from disappear. At rallies and meetings, the notorious concept of legalism was increasingly condemned. In December 1915, at a meeting in the Sidoli Circus in Bucharest, the ambassador of the Turnu - Severin workers, G. Lucretiu, said to the applause of those present: "Today we must advocate war, but not war with the Hungarian, Bulgarian, or Russian people, but by fraternizing with them, we must declare a holy war of the international proletariat against the capitalist class everywhere and everywhere." 52 This was how the advanced workers approached Lenin's idea: "the socialists must take advantage of the struggle between the robbers in order to overthrow all of them." 53 Discussions held in local party organizations in 1916 showed the further growth of the influence of the revolutionary wing. A. Constantinescu in Bucharest openly called for preparing for an armed uprising: "What else but an uprising can crush capitalism?" 54

Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente in August 1916 was preceded by brutal reprisals against anti-war workers, including the shooting of demonstrators in Galac on June 13. The Social Democratic Party, which was not officially banned, was effectively outlawed. The newspaper "Lupta" ("Struggle") ceased to exist; the archives of party organizations were confiscated; many activists were called up for military service, others were spied on, and others were thrown into prison without trial. Only after the February Revolution in Russia did the restoration of party ranks begin, and the activity of Romanian revolutionaries became more active. In 1917, on May Day, demonstrations of solidarity between Russian soldiers and Romanian workers were held in Iasi and other cities of the unoccupied zone of Romania. At the end of June, a group of socialists sent an appeal from Yass to the Petrograd Soviet. This document was imbued with feelings of revolutionary solidarity and class hatred .55 Formed at the end of July in Odessa, far from the" all-seeing eye " of Siguranza, the Romanian Social Democratic Action Committee completely broke with the tactics of reformism and legalism. "The Social - Democratic Party," said his first proclamation, "is entering the struggle for the overthrow of Rumanian tsarism." 56 True, the committee at that time called only for a bourgeois-democratic revolution. The collapse of the power of capital in the summer and autumn of 1917 was not mentioned in his documents. Even three days before the capture of the Winter Palace, Lupta wrote that not only in Romania, but also in Russia, " economic and social forces... we have not yet reached the maximum level of development that makes it possible to establish a socialist system. " 57

The Great October Socialist Revolution marked a radical turning point in the life and struggle of the proletariat of Romania and brought about a revolutionary revolution.-

51 "Lupta silnica", 30.X, 8.XI.1915.

52 "Lupta silnica", 8.XII.1915.

53 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 26, p. 315.

54 "Studii si articole de istorie", IV. Bucuresti. 1962, p. 291.

55 Voprosy Istorii, 1967, No. 12, p. 77.

56 DIPCR. Vol. I, p. 13.

57 " Lupta "(Odessa), 22. X. 1917.

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the revolutionaries of this country on the broad road of Leninism. The Russian example, the experience of the struggle at home, and the glorious traditions of proletarian internationalism helped them to embark on the right path. In mid-November, the Odessa Committee declared its firm support for the Soviet government; in January 1918, its appeals included direct calls for a socialist revolution in Romania: "The people's revolution has reached the threshold of our country... Soon the power will belong to the working classes... Rumania will be transformed into a republic of workers and peasants. " 58 The Odessa Committee was echoed by the Romanian revolutionaries who remained in occupied Bucharest. They welcomed the October Revolution with the manifesto " Citizens and Workers! Shout and sing for joy!", in which they wrote: "Peace has been won on the barricades of Russian cities by the blood of revolutionaries", workers and peasants illuminated by the light of socialism...". Condemnation of reformism, a call to adopt revolutionary tactics, proletarian internationalism are the essence of the document 59 . However, this manifesto also had certain shortcomings. It lacked an analysis of the socio-economic situation in Romania: the authors tended to skip the stage of bourgeois-democratic transformations, and did not fully understand the program and tactical installations of the Bolsheviks.

The sparks of the October Revolution ignited the fire of the communist movement in Romania. The Proletarian Revolution was put on the agenda. Romanian Communists in Russia created their own group, which was part of the Federation of Foreign Groups under the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

In the spring of 1918, an Action Committee headed by A. Constantinescu was formed in the deep underground in occupied Bucharest. The May Day manifesto of this committee was signed "group of Bolsheviks". It called for a socialist revolution 60 . At the same time, at a meeting of the remaining members of the old party executive committee and representatives of a number of organizations in the capital, it was decided to develop a new program. It appeared only six months later, when the war ended and the former Kaiser's army left Romania.

The struggle for the establishment of the Communist Party has entered a new phase. Many Romanian revolutionaries from Russia returned to the country. The ideological gap between revolutionaries and reformists has become quite clear. The latter continued to place their hopes not on the proletarian revolution, but on "the Western democracies, which, as they said, now have the decisive say in the new order of nations." 61 Young communist groups took opposite positions. "The Russian Revolution," they declared, " is also our revolution... Only the revolution will help our liberation! Only with weapons in our hands, like the Russian workers and peasants, can we become masters of our own destiny. " 62

In December 1918, the "Declaration of Principles" appeared, which was, in fact, a draft of a new program. This document was issued on behalf of the entire socialist Party, not just its left-wing groups, and showed that the revolutionary ideology had become predominant in the party ranks. The "Declaration" emphasized the world-historical significance of the October experience and sharply condemned pre-war social-democracy. 63

58 Cit. by: V. Iiveanu. 1918. Din lttptele revolufionare din Romania. Bucuresti. 1960, p. 178.

59 "Marea Revolutie Socialists din Octombrie si miscarea revolutionary si democratica din Romania. Bucuresti. 1967, pp. 15 - 18.

60 DIPCR, vol. I, p. 49.

61 DIMMR, 1916 - 1921, p. 107.

62 Ibid., pp. 110 - 111.

63 Ibid., p. 126.

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However, there were also weaknesses in this document. The Romanian communists have not yet learned to apply Lenin's doctrine of revolution to the specific conditions of their country. The "Declaration" did not analyze the specific features of the country's historical development; nothing was said about the intertwining of imperialism with the remnants of feudalism, about the deep penetration of foreign capital into the Romanian economy, or about the specifics of its agrarian relations. They have not yet fully realized the need for an organizational separation from the opportunists.

The rise of the class struggle, which culminated in the demonstrations of December 13(26), 1918, in Bucharest and the October general strike of 1920, strengthened the position of the left wing of the party. But the reformists were not going to give in. Among the Social Democrats of Transylvania and Banat, which became part of Romania after the World War, they had a significant influence. The reformists also took advantage of the mass arrests of revolutionaries. At the beginning of 1919, reformists and centrists found themselves in the majority in the Provisional Executive Committee of the party. They approved the forcible annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The revolutionaries of Braila and Galac regarded this action as the desire of "some political buffoons" to "brazenly raise their hand to socialism" 64 .

In the struggle that unfolded, the tactics of Romanian reformism at a new stage were clearly outlined: exaggerating historical features as a "theoretical" justification in order to minimize the role of the general laws of the revolutionary process, ignoring Leninism, the experience of October, and denying its international significance.

The left relied on the party organizations of the major industrial centers. At the beginning of 1920, the branches of the party in Bucharest, Ploiesti, Kympin, Brail, Galac and other cities demanded to form a Communist party and join the Third International. In November of the same year, an underground meeting of communist groups was held, which called for "immediate and unconditional membership in the Comintern" and formed its own Central Committee, which marked the first step towards organizing the left wing. The official leadership of the party, given the current situation, was forced to send a delegation to the Second Congress of the Comintern. Although it arrived in Moscow late, its representatives had a conversation at the ECCI, and a group of delegates was received by V. I. Lenin. The rise of the working - class movement in Rumania, the enormous influence of October on the masses of the people, the support of V. I. Lenin, and the assistance rendered by the Comintern-all this helped the Rumanian revolutionaries to achieve success.

On May 8, 1921, the party Congress opened in Bucharest. The reformists, anticipating their failure, refused to participate in its work. The Congress expressed its fervent support for the proletariat of Soviet Russia, "the vanguard of the international working class in its struggle for emancipation from the yoke of capital," and decided to create the Communist Party of Romania. The overwhelming majority of delegates voted in favour of joining the Comintern unconditionally .66 The formation of the Communist Party marked a historic milestone in the development of the entire revolutionary movement in Romania. The stubborn struggle of the left Socialists, in which they relied on the all-conquering power of Marxism-Leninism, on the historical experience of October, and on the help of the Comintern, was crowned with victory.

64 Ibid., pp. 165 - 167; DIPCR. Vol. I, pp. 123 - 125.

65 For more information, see: E. I. Spivakovsky. On some problems of the history of the Communist Party of Romania. "Вопросы истории", 1971, N 3; "Crearea Partidului Comunist Roman", Bucuresti. 1971.

66 All delegates who voted in favour were immediately arrested.

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