Relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States in the fields of economy, military-technical cooperation and politics during the reign of King Faisal developed in the context of intense competition between the United States and the traditional ally of the Saudis - Great Britain, as well as with France, Japan and Germany for promising Arabian concessions and military contracts. These relations developed steadily and by 1975 brought the United States to a leading position in terms of influence in the KSA, while the diversification of economic, political and military contacts with other countries continued.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia, United States of America, economic relations, military-technical cooperation, King Faisal Al Saud.

The coming to power of King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in November 1964 was greeted with enthusiasm by the Americans, as they pinned on this politician their hopes for further penetration into the Arab world. The new king needed the location of the United States, although, however, not all American analysts were definitely optimistic: at one time, Faisal, as head of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), objected to the military presence of Americans in it and spoke out against the "Eisenhower Doctrine"proposed by the United States.

Even when Faisal was Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, there was a warming of Saudi-American relations. It occurred during the period of the revolution in Yemen, paradoxically, despite the political recognition of the Yemeni Arab Republic by the United States in December 1962, which Faisal opposed, in particular during his visit to the United States and negotiations with John F. Kennedy in October [De Gaury, 1966, p. 111]. The reason for the improvement of relations was military cooperation, the need for which was demonstrated by the fighting of the Saudi military in Yemen. The Americans assisted the Saudis in supporting the Yemeni monarchist forces, and the United States, along with Britain, was selected as a source of military assistance, including instructors and military engineering personnel. Cooperation in the oil sector continued and gained strength: geological exploration, oil production, processing and export of oil and petroleum products. Gradually, Saudi-American contacts began to cover other sectors of the economy.

In November 1965, an intergovernmental agreement was signed in Jeddah between the United States and Saudi Arabia on the construction of a desalination plant and a power plant in the Jeddah area [Agreement between..., 1965, p. 2], and this project was successfully implemented. In the course of further negotiations, it was decided to provide training for specialists to work at these facilities. In October 1969, Charge d'affaires a. i. of the United States to

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In Saudi Arabia, U. A. Stoltzfus suggested that Deputy Foreign Minister M. I. Masoud consider amendments to the agreement, which consisted in "meeting the requirements for professional training" of personnel. It was assumed that the KSA government would provide a sufficient number of personnel for the start-up, operation and maintenance of plants in Jeddah for a period of 5 years [Agreement between..., 1970, p. 3]. The United States followed its usual practice of sending American technical specialists to facilities being created in KSA, followed by training to work at these high-tech enterprises local workers. In a response note on January 20, 1970, the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister agreed to an addendum to the Agreement, which resulted in the Americans launching a training program for local personnel to operate the desalination plant and power plant.

This short episode highlights two features of U.S.-Saudi economic cooperation. First, it is a complete coordination of the actions of American companies operating in Saudi Arabia with the activities of the US Foreign Ministry. Secondly, as already noted, the emphasis of the Americans on training programs for Saudi specialists with the help of their own engineers, instructors and qualified personnel. This scheme was common to all US projects in the KSA, including military and defense ones.

At the threshold of the 1970s, experts predicted a slight drop in the growth of KSA imports and expected a further decrease in the share of the United States in these imports. For several years in the late 1960s, the Kingdom's total imports steadily increased: in 1967 they amounted to $ 647 million, in 1968 - $ 796 million, in 1969 - about $ 915 million. At the same time, only the share of the United States in 1968-1969 showed a drop of 17% [US Department of Commerce..., 1970, p. 2]. Nevertheless, American analysts were not too pessimistic, pointing out that even the decline in this indicator by the end of the decade from 187.2 to 154.3 million dollars. compared to that in the UK - $ 134.8 million at the end of 1969) should not stop American business from developing Saudi sales markets [US Department of Commerce..., 1970, p. 9]. They attributed this fact to the massive strikes of port workers that swept across the United States and a decrease in the supply of American military equipment to the KSA.

At the same time, the supply of American food products to the KSA was prevented by a sharp competition with other developed food exporting countries, which the Americans actually lost at that time. In the United States, prices for food products rose in the late 1960s, and even the sale of one of the main American export food crops, rice, faced fierce competition, the price of which also rose significantly.

Another important category of US exports to Saudi Arabia - machinery and transport equipment-fell from 54.6% to 35.1% in the second half of the 1960s [US Department of Commerce..., 1970, p. 10]. In addition to high prices compared to the United Kingdom, France and Japan, American firms were inferior, especially to Japanese firms, in that they did not provide sufficient maintenance for their cars, did not use the potential of local distributors, including a system for stimulating sales growth.

American companies saw great benefits for themselves in providing services for servicing high-tech industries or complex mechanisms supplied to the Kingdom. Local workers were not prepared for such activities without prior professional training, which was provided by the same American companies. Moreover, the most promising and successful companies in the tenders were those that undertook to provide warranty service or control for a number of years after the completion of projects.

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King Faisal's plans to reform the army had long been in place by the early 1970s. For this purpose, the rich experience and achievements of the European and American military were actively used. Two Saudi-American projects were launched with multimillion-dollar contracts for work for the Saudi defense Ministry. In 1970, another military contract was signed for works for the Armed forces and the National Guard of the KSA.

Some difficulties for hiring foreign specialists were due to the strictness of Saudi visa and labor laws. The fact is that they contained requirements that some foreign hired engineers, workers and military personnel were not ready to fulfill, 1 as a result of which they experienced significant difficulties in obtaining work permits in Saudi Arabia and work visas. This applied not only to foreign companies that worked in the KSA, but also to local companies that applied for work visas.

Of course, the lion's share of American investment has always been in the oil industry. Such investments had the most favorable impact on the US balance of payments. It is known that King Faisal chose this area as the most painful point of influence in order to achieve political goals during the brewing Arab-Israeli conflict in the summer of 1973, and then during the October 1973 war itself. Back in April of that year, Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani said that the increase in ARAMCO's oil production could not be realized on the previously planned scale (up to 20 million barrels per day by 1980) if the United States did not change its pro-Israel foreign policy. His deputy, the King's son Saud, generally agreed with the minister [The Economist, 05.05.1973]. By the end of the summer, this position was openly expressed by King Faisal himself. He stressed that he appreciates the established warm relations with the United States, but cannot allow the United States to support Israel in the fight against the Arabs [The Economist, 01.09.1973]. The oil issue was at the top of the agenda at the October-October 1973 meetings, since its settlement was actually required by the economies of both countries, which were suffering from the Arab League (LAS) embargo on the supply of Arab oil to the West.

Despite the importance of oil cooperation, the United States has nevertheless tried to diversify its investment policy in Saudi Arabia, directing funds to the development of other areas of the economy. This was facilitated by the fact that the Kingdom remained a country with full freedom of entrepreneurship and liberal laws governing investment policy, including in the field of natural resource extraction. At the same time, foreign investors represented in the eyes of Saudi entrepreneurs, both public and private, a source not only of capital, but also of knowledge and professional skills of Western specialists who could assist in creating and managing projects in areas not related to the extractive industry.

In the sphere of implementing economic projects, Americans preferred the form of joint ventures. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, there were already precedents for setting up enterprises without equity participation. An example of this was the comfortable hotel in Jeddah, built in 1969 and operated by an American company.

In general, the Saudi investment market in various fields (mining, military, services, etc.) remained very attractive to the United States by the early 1970s. In the above-quoted document provided by the US Embassy in Jeddah in Ama-

1 One of these items was a column about religion, without which the visa could not be issued. In other words, a person who refused to recognize himself as a follower of a particular denomination was not allowed to enter the KSA.

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According to the US Department of Commerce, the growing orientation of Saudi officials and entrepreneurs towards American goods and services was noted, and it was advisable to use this fact to intensify economic contacts with the KSA. The Kingdom itself, despite the negative economic factors - dependence on imports of goods and services, the lack of convertibility of the Saudi rial, excessive openness of its commodity policy and huge foreign exchange injections into the economy - was, according to experts, the most preferred for investment among countries with comparable GDP [US Department of Commerce..., 1970, p. 11].

A year before the impending crisis of the monetary system in August-December 1971, the United States noted a forced decline in the investment opportunities of its companies. At the same time, the KSA continued to feel the need for American goods and services of American specialists, and the Faisal government was ready to remove all currency restrictions to facilitate the import of goods and services from the United States or from other countries if they showed more favorable conditions.

Thus, the road to Saudi markets was open to the Americans, and only the will of private companies with the support of the administration, a favorable political background (which existed in the early 1970s) and an early solution to problems related to the financial system were required. American companies were in a hurry to take advantage of the wide opportunities for themselves in Saudi Arabia: Along with the supply of military equipment, weapons and ammunition, projects in the social sphere and the private sector have also begun to be implemented. In 1970, contracts were signed and immediate plans were discussed for the following large-scale projects: the construction of new airports in Jeddah and Riyadh, where orders for equipment alone were estimated at 40-60 million dollars, a plant for the production of sulfur from natural gas in Abqaiq with a capacity of 550 tons per day and a cost of 24 million dollars, the expansion of the oil construction of a new refinery in Jeddah ($55 million), reconstruction of a college in Dhahran for oil and gas professionals ($18 million) , construction of a flour mill and grain storage facilities in Jeddah and Dammam ($22 million), construction of eight new berths in the port of Dammam ($35 million). United States dollars.), the creation of national telecommunications networks (including ground stations), the permission for which was issued after the examination of the International Telecommunication Union (eng. International Telecommunication Union) - 50-70 million dollars [US Department of Commerce..., 1970, p. 9]. Small projects were also discussed with American construction firms for the construction of roads connecting the country's main highways, roads to the Jeddah lubricants plant, reconstruction of secondary airports, services to support communication and telephone systems, municipal water distribution programs, improved sanitation and asphalt roads.

Over time, the focus on the United States became obvious, although active contacts were maintained with Great Britain, France, and to a lesser extent with Japan, Germany, and Spain. Thus, in 1974, Saudi military orders for American military equipment and various types of weapons significantly increased, and the number of American military personnel and instructors at Saudi military bases increased. By the end of the reign of King Faisal 2, it became obvious that the American direction would be dominant in the Kingdom's foreign policy coordinate system. Along with the energy sector, the military sphere has become one of the main components in cooperation with the United States.

A striking final act of King Faisal's foreign economic policy in the American direction was the signing of the Agreement on Economic Cooperation with the United States on February 27, 1975 [Agreement between..., 1975, p. 2]. This document laid the foundation for further cooperation between the two countries in various areas of the economy.

2 King Faisal was assassinated on March 25, 1975.

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list of literature

Agreement between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia. Desalination. Signed in Nov. 11 and 19, 1965 // Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5932. Washington: Gov. print, office, 1965.

Agreement between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia. Desalination / Amending the Agreement of Nov. 11 and 19, 1965. Effected by exchange of notes signed at Jidda Oct. 13, 1969 and Jan. 20, 1970 // Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6814. Washington, Gov. print, office, 1970.

Agreement between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia. Economic Cooperation // Treaties and Other International Acts Series 8128. Washington, Febr. 27, 1975. Washington: Gov. print, office, 1975.

Dc Gaury G. Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia. N.Y.: Pracgcr, 1966.

The Economist, 1973.

US Department of Commerce. Bureau of International Commerce. Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States. Saudi Arabia. Prepared by American Embassy of Jidda, April 15, 1970. ET 70-46. Washington: Gov. print, office, 1970.

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