China Keywords:, Chinese diaspora, policy towards foreign compatriots, cultural expansion

The potential of foreign diasporas is actively used by a number of countries around the world. For this purpose, official concepts or programs for interaction with diasporas are developed. At the same time, the support of foreign compatriots becomes an important direction in the foreign policy activities of a particular country.

The Diaspora, according to D.polit. N. T. V. Poloskovoy, is "not only a form, mechanism and means of existence of historically formed communities that are carriers of certain ethno-cultural traditions, but also a political tool." At the same time, "the so-called rules of the game that the diaspora is forced to adhere to depend not only on the situation in the country of residence, but also on the policy principles that the historical homeland adheres to in interaction with the diaspora^"1

Interaction between the historical homeland and the diaspora is often a mutually directed and mutually beneficial process involving specially created institutions of power structures, on the one hand, and various diaspora organizations, on the other. There are several models of interaction, the main of which are "repatriation", paternalistic (protection) and pragmatic (partnership)"².

The migration exodus of Chinese and the creation of diasporas began long before the 20th century.

Some of them emigrated from Southern China as early as the 14th and 16th centuries, others traveled illegally to colonial plantations in the 19th century, and many fled the revolution, civil wars, and famine as early as the 20th century.

China has long understood the importance of the diaspora and maintained diverse ties with it3. This tradition is continued by the leadership of the People's Republic of China, very successfully using the huge material, scientific, technical, cultural and linguistic potential of foreign compatriots (huaqiao).

Today, about 40 million Huaqiao live outside the borders of the PRC. Their most numerous communities are located in Indonesia (about 10 million people)⁴, Malaysia (7 million)⁵, Thailand, the United States, Singapore, where they make up the majority of the population, Canada, Peru, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Russia, Australia, Japan, South Korea, etc.*

ZIGZAGS OF BEIJING'S PRE-REFORM POLICY

Beijing's policy towards the Chinese diaspora has undergone major changes due to the development of the situation inside the country.

In the history of the PRC, there are usually several main periods: the recovery period (1949-1952), the transition period (1953-1957), the" great leap forward "and the" cultural revolution " (1958-1976), and the regulated market economy (from 1978 to the present).

At the early stage of State construction in the pre-constitutional period (1949-1954), which included the reconstruction period until 1952 and the beginning of the transition period before the adoption of the Constitution in 1954, a policy of protecting foreign Chinese was declared. It is reflected in the 58th paragraph of the Common (joint) Program ⁶, while-

The article was prepared with the help of materials received under a grant (visit to libraries) from the Jiang Jingguo Foundation (CCK Foundation) at the European Association of Chinese Studies (EACS).

* For more information, see the following article (editor's note).

adopted at the plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1949. This program was considered a temporary constitution of the country.

This policy meant that the state directly protected its citizens in full, since foreign Chinese under the" Citizenship Law " of 1929, adopted by the Kuomintang government, were considered citizens of China, and then of the PRC. This approach clearly contradicted the real situation of large Chinese emigrants, especially in Southeast Asia( SE), and subsequently forced Beijing to sign bilateral citizenship agreements with a number of these countries.

For example, according to the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Citizens (dated April 22, 1955), "...persons who hold both the citizenship of the People's Republic of China and Indonesia must choose the citizenship of one of these countries at their own request. Both men and women have the right to retain their citizenship when they marry. If one of the parties entering into a marriage expresses a desire to take the citizenship of the other and obtains it, then it loses its original citizenship. Children born in China, whose parents or only their fathers have Indonesian citizenship, are considered Indonesian citizens. " ⁷

Evidence of the state's active attention to foreign Chinese and their relatives in the country, as well as to returned citizens, is the political slogan of that time: "encourage participation in the political life of Huaqiao and Guiqiao (re - emigrants or repatriates) and relatives of Huaqiao and Guiqiao in the PRC-Qiaojuan, guarantee a stable life of Guiqiao and Qiaojuan." During this period, government agencies provided assistance in implementing land reform in Qiaoxiang ("native villages or emigrant lands") and receiving remittances from relatives from abroad.

It was legally established that all ethnic Chinese, wherever they were, were citizens of the PRC and an integral part of China. Thus, they were encouraged to invest in China, and among those who returned to their homeland, they were encouraged to cultivate loyalty to the PRC.⁸

Even in the first years of the PRC's formation, the diaspora, which was considered by Beijing as citizens of the PRC, was used as a resource for achieving foreign policy goals.

So, Mao Zedong, informing Stalin in a cipher telegram (dated November 23, 1950) about the consent to supply high-quality rubber to the USSR from the PRC, wrote:"...Currently, we have 18,000 (eighteen thousand) tons of natural rubber. I have given an order to the Ministry of Trade to immediately supply the Government of the Soviet Union with 8,000 (eight thousand) tons of rubber at the price of its procurement by us... if the situation does not change, then with the help of Chinese emigrants living in Southeast Asia, we will be able to continue harvesting

natural rubber... We can now order 50,000 (fifty thousand) tons of natural rubber, which is extremely necessary for the Government of the Soviet Union, and even more than 70,000 (seventy thousand) tons.... " ⁹

The policy of the People's Republic of China during the transition period of state building (1953-1958) can be described as encouraging naturalization (taking citizenship of the country of residence). Great importance was also attached to the mobilization of re-emigrants (guiqiao) and relatives of emigrants (Qiaojuan) "for socialist revolutionary construction" ¹⁰.

By starting to establish diplomatic relations with the newly independent Asian countries, the PRC sought to avoid aggravation of relations with the host countries of the diaspora, primarily in Southeast Asia.

It became increasingly difficult to influence the minds of compatriots through education, as more and more Chinese in Southeast Asia received education in their host countries, which was facilitated by the policy of local authorities.¹¹ It was difficult to adapt to the local conditions of the Huaqiao who returned to the PRC, which caused social tension.

In 1957. Beijing was forced to make adjustments to its policy towards its compatriots.

Re-emigration was stopped, which saved the PRC from the problems associated with the settlement and adaptation of Chinese people who returned to their homeland. ¹²

Along with the basic principle of the policy towards foreign compatriots, enshrined in Article 98 of the 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China: "The People's Republic of China protects the proper rights and interests of Chinese living abroad"¹³, Huaqiao were now encouraged to take local citizenship and integrate into society in the host country. If Chinese citizenship is retained, Beijing has called on its citizens not to participate in any political activities, campaigns, or events. Despite this call, Southeast Asian countries were wary of naturalizing Huaqiao due to the increased economic influence of the Chinese diaspora and the activation of local communist parties. ¹⁴

During the period of the" great leap forward "and the" cultural revolution " in 1958-1976, the policy towards foreign citizens of China maintained the principle enshrined in Article 98 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China of 1954,15 This formulation is almost verbatim repeated in article ^{27 of the new Constitution of 1975,16}

However, in practice, the approach to foreign compatriots varied depending on the political and ideological slogans put forward by the CCP. At first, Beijing's policy was characterized by tolerance, but then it began to change towards discrimination.

During and after the Great Leap Forward (1959-1965), the Sanhao ("three well") course was held. It implied a positive attitude to Huaqiao's acceptance of any of the three decisions: naturalize, retain Chinese citizenship, or return to the PRC.

The policy towards re-emigrants and their relatives was based on the slogan "treat them equally, take care of their characteristics, engage in transformation", that is, labor re-education and nationalization of private property (in 1960, a large number of Indonesian Chinese repatriates from Indonesia appeared, who were called "a nation within a nation").¹⁷.

But even before the "cultural revolution" in 1963, all Huaqiao privileges were abolished. And with its onset, re-emigrants and relatives of foreign Chinese, and after them all the Huaqiao, were declared class enemies, " parasites, capitalists and spies." They were regularly attacked and threatened by the Red Guards.

The label of "foreign relations" has acquired an extremely negative connotation and has become simply life-threatening. They were forbidden to travel abroad, visit relatives, exchange letters, receive money transfers, and return to their homeland. ¹⁸ The property of re-emigrants was confiscated, and their villages and farms were seized by militant Red Guards.

This led to the fact that since the mid-60s, due to discrimination, capital flows of foreign Chinese were directed to Hong Kong, Ma-

kao, to Taiwan (it was then that Taiwan's economy spiked due to such investments) and to the Southeast Asian countries. The Huaqiao did not see the point of investing in mainland China, where investors, receiving 8% per annum, did not participate in the distribution of profits, did not have the right to vote, and were subjected to various types of persecution.

In 1973, more than 50 thousand Guiqiao left the PRC, and in general, only 100 thousand of the half-million Chinese who returned to the PRC in 1949-1966 remained. ¹⁹

The Red Guards also instigated anti-government demonstrations in Hong Kong, Burma, Indonesia and Cambodia, which led to violence and riots and significantly cooled China's relations with Southeast Asian countries.

In Cambodia, there is a grotesque tragic situation in the spirit of F. Kafka. Beijing supported the bloody Polpot regime, and Chinese schools in Phnom Penh taught Maoist ideology and the ideas of the "cultural revolution"along with the history and culture of ancient China. At the same time, the ethnic Chinese population of the country was brutally exterminated by the Khmer Rouge. People were killed just for speaking Chinese. And when one of the Huaqiao secretly asked the CCP representative why the party supported such a regime, the answer was: "Bear with it... be patient." The number of the Chinese diaspora in the country has decreased from 400 thousand to 200 thousand people.

Unfortunately, the PRC still ignores the genocide of the Chinese population in Cambodia, as well as the fact that China's borders were closed to refugees from North Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict ^{in 1979.20}

A RADICAL TURNAROUND

We have seen a completely different picture since 1978, when the policy of "four modernizations" (agriculture, industry, defense, science and technology) required educated people and capital.

The Chinese leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping, was well aware that to implement a policy of economic reform and openness, financial and scientific and technical resources were needed, which were then lacking in the country.

The example of Taiwan has shown that emigrants do not just leave China forever, but are ready to cooperate on the condition of mutual benefit and preferential policies on the part of the historical homeland. Thus, the necessary scientific and technical personnel could be foreign Chinese, many of whom left the country in the 60s and 70s. (they still had an attachment to the PRC.)

Their gradual "gathering" began.

In 1977, Deng Yingchao, Zhou Enlai's widow, visited Burma and met with the Guiqiao fugitives.²¹ Foreign Chinese were once again called "part of the Chinese nation", "broad patriotic united front", and"brothers and sisters" ²² even if they were granted foreign citizenship.

Now Beijing has begun to call on its compatriots to preserve and strengthen their cultural identity and oppose assimilation, especially in Southeast Asia. He insisted that the authorities of foreign countries "protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign Chinese, respect their national traditions and customs." ²³ And Huaqiao himself was recommended to " comply with the laws of the host countries."

Under the 1978 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (article 54), the State is bound to protect not only the "proper and legitimate rights and interests of Chinese people living abroad", but also "their family members living in China"²⁴. The last current Constitution of the People's Republic of China in 1982 also added a clause on "protecting the proper rights of Chinese who have returned to their homeland." ²⁵ And in 1990, the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Protecting the Rights of Guiqiao Re-Emigrants and Qiaojuan Relatives" was adopted, which finally consolidated their rights.²⁶

In May 1978, the Huaqiao stores were reopened. Their relatives and re-emigrants were allowed to use money transfers from abroad to buy goods in these stores (radios, televisions, bicycles, sewing machines). Huaqiao visiting relatives were given the opportunity to bring a TV and radio set as a gift ²⁷.

The Huaqiao investment company, closed in 1966, began its work, inviting investors to invest in the Chinese economy in return for receiving 7% per annum.²⁸

Since 1978, the activity of all committees and associations of re-emigrants has also been resumed. Although these organizations were declared non-governmental, it is significant that they were headed by Liao Chenzhi, Chairman of the State Council's Huaqiao Affairs Office, and Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, attended the first meeting of the Guaqiao Affairs Commission in Beijing. At this meeting, the idea of engaging with Huaqiao for the peaceful return of Taiwan was first raised.²⁹

Associations for working with Huaqiao were equated with such public structures as youth, scientific and cultural associations, the women's movement and the workers ' movement. If earlier the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of this work, now it is directly under the leadership of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

Despite the improvement in the situation of re-emigrants, many of them continued to leave the country, complaining of discrimination: they were not accepted for service in the army, the Komsomol, the CPC, the best universities in the country, etc. Many were not hired, and others simply did not like the living conditions, especially in small, remote cities and villages. On the other hand, indigenous Chinese people intermarried with Guiqiao more frequently, as this made it easier for them to leave the country.

After Deng Xiaoping's visit to Southeast Asia in 1978, the issue of Huaqiao's citizenship came up on the agenda, which was exacerbated by the Sino-Vietnamese military conflict in 1979 and numerous repressions against ethnic Chinese in Cambodia and Indonesia.

By then, however, it was clear to Beijing that most foreign Chinese already considered themselves citizens of their host countries. In particular, such an authoritative statesman as Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew spoke about this with Deng Xiaoping:" ... not all ethnic Chinese are Huaqiao " ³⁰.

After their meeting in Singapore in 1978, the term huazhen began to be used along with huaqiao, and since 1984, the PRC has officially begun to distinguish between huaqiao and huazhen. The difference between them is that Huaqiao are Chinese citizens who permanently reside abroad, and Waiji huazhen (literally, "Chinese with foreign citizenship", abbreviated form-huazhen) are foreigners of Chinese origin, i.e. Huaqiao or their descendants who received foreign citizenship and therefore automatically lost their Chinese citizenship.

Taking into account the interests of promoting market reforms in China, the focus is now on the more educated and qualified Huaqiao and Huazhen living in the United States and Europe.

Thus, according to the US Bureau of Statistics, about 3.6 million ethnic Chinese lived in the United States in 2008 (more recent data are not available).³¹. This is the largest community among Asians.

According to Zhao Haosheng, an American professor of Chinese origin, the most valuable people for the PRC are Chinese people over the age of ⁵⁰ who have the necessary experience and skills to successfully conduct business32. They came to study in the United States after the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945. Although most of these Chinese people accepted American citizenship, they retained a strong emotional connection to their homeland and were eager to visit friends and relatives in China, and some were ready to return to their homeland permanently.

Multinational corporations initially also preferred to work with China through Huaqiao as carriers of the Chinese mentality.

An important task of working with the diaspora was to attract capital and scientific and technical knowledge. For example, in the mid-1990s, the PRC ranked second in the world and first among developing countries in attracting foreign capital and investment, of which ⁶⁰% were from China33. In 2009, the amount of money transfers of foreign Chinese to the PRC reached $47.6 billion.

In the initial period of reform, the PRC actively applied Taiwan's experience in integrating foreign Chinese into its society and political decision-making.

The active phase of this policy in Taiwan began in 1961 and lasted until 1972 from 1973 to 1980. It is characterized by its rapid development, from 1981 to the present day - a stable character. In the initial period (1950-1960), Huaqiao was invested in Taiwan in imports, then in trade. During the active period, they invested in export industries (textiles, food processing, toys, etc.), and during the period of rapid growth (from the mid-1970s to the present) - in heavy industry, and later - in high-tech industries and financial assets.

Borrowing foreign experience, especially Taiwan's, the Chinese leadership acted pragmatically during the period of market reforms, without focusing on the dogma of its policy. Tactically, a situational approach was used, and the policy was implemented gradually, "step by step". Many laws were adopted on an experimental basis, i.e. according to the principles of "go - not go" and "proceed from practice in everything".

There has been a global transformation of foreign Chinese "from cheap coolies to global entrepreneurs."

Beijing's cooperation with them brings it not only economic, scientific and technical benefits, but also a significant foreign policy effect. This is evidenced by the protests after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO aircraft in 1999, speeches against anti-Chinese statements in foreign media, demonstrations in support of the peaceful return of Taiwan to the "bosom of the Motherland", etc.-

tuy initiated by embassies and consulates of the People's Republic of China.

HELPING YOUR NATIVE VILLAGE

The new state policy (since the mid-1990s) changed the slogan "return to the homeland to serve it" to the credo "serve the nation", meaning that it is not necessary to return to the homeland: a successful Chinese abroad will still keep in touch with the PRC, send money transfers and arrange relatives in China, will help introduce new foreign technologies and will remain a carrier of Chinese culture abroad.

The Huaqiao Development Assistance Program launched in March 2008, developed by the Huaqiao Affairs Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China, is indicative in this regard. It encourages foreign compatriots, as well as Chinese in Macau and Hong Kong's Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, as well as repatriates and relatives, to help China implement the Sannong program (agricultural sector, rural areas and peasants), develop a "new village", and modernize agriculture.

In 2010, the Huaqiao Affairs Office prepared "Comments on some issues related to the implementation of the Huaqiao Native Village Assistance Program".

According to this document, 1,864 aid projects and investments worth more than 1 billion 440 million yuan* were planned, covering 1,715 villages with a population of more than 7 million people. ³⁴ It is planned to build 760 construction projects, implement 486 projects to improve educational infrastructure, 193 projects to improve medical infrastructure, and 171 projects to improve cultural infrastructure. These activities include charitable donations, investments, scientific and technological innovations, and the development of highly productive agricultural products.

So, in the next two years, it is planned to invest 300 million rubles. in the provinces of Zhejiang, Hubei, Guangdong, Shandong, and the cities of Ningbo and Jian ³⁵.

Cambodia's Huaqiao Hong Cunlin donated more than $ 1 million. RMB for the construction of roads, bridges and cultural centers in the city of Lishui in Zhejiang Province. Zhang Zhihao, a compatriot from Hong Kong, subsidized the education of more than 3,000 students in backward western and border areas and the construction of more than 80 schools.

The Futan Charitable Foundation (Hong Kong) provided financial assistance for the construction of hospitals and health centers in villages in Inner Mongolia. Huaqiao's foreign companies, such as the Australian Jinghui Corporation (Golden Light), the Thai Zhengda Corporation, the French Landee and the American Xinshiji (New Century), provide financial assistance.

The Huaqiao Mianyang enterprise in Sichuan Province has involved more than 5,000 farms in the firm-land-farmyard project, increasing their income by 8 million yuan annually. The Tang Zhongying American Foundation implements the "fund investment + high technology + advanced technology training in backward areas" model, turning these areas into high-tech and advanced cities.

It is also planned to expand the programs of cultural exchanges and interaction ³⁷.

TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN COMMUNITIES

Existing and newly emerging diasporas, while increasing in size, have an increasing influence on the economic and political life of the countries of settlement, thus contributing to the expansion of China's sphere of influence.

Thus, the article by V. Ya.Portyakov, Doctor of Economics, quotes Luo Gan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee of the 16th convocation, who "repeatedly spoke at meetings of the Politburo and the State Council of the People's Republic of China with a proposal to encourage Chinese citizens to settle abroad, of course, avoiding overt propaganda of the policy of stimulating emigration."³⁸

In the 1990s, the process of active institutionalization and centralization of associations of foreign Chinese people began.

If in the past they were local organizations interested in establishing business ties, then with the beginning of reforms they are transformed into large-scale associations for diaspora relations with their "native villages" or "native land of emigrants" (qiaoxiang).

And if earlier these organizations were connected only by family, community or clan ties, now there is a tendency to unite Huaqiao under a single regional leadership. Thus, the Association of European Chinese holds annual congresses, and in 1995, the Association of Chinese Schools in the United States was established, which brought together 150 schools from 33 states and 40 thousand schoolchildren and teachers.

Organizations vary in their goals and objectives, but centralization occurs at all levels and on all continents where the Chinese community lives. More than 30 Chinese-language newspapers are published in Europe, and there are many TV channels and radio stations covering events in China and abroad. Every New Year's concert on CCTV Central Beijing, which is watched by most foreign Chinese on the eve of the Spring Festival, begins with the words "congratulations to the people of China, Taiwanese compatriots, Huaqiao and all foreign Chinese."

There are also organizations of expatriates who are critical of the PRC's policy, in particular in connection with the persecution of followers of the Falun Gong religious movement, the issue of Taiwan's unification with the mainland, etc.**

* $1 is equal to approximately 6.47 yuan (approx. ed.).

** For more information, see: Leksyutina Ya. V. PRC-USA and Freedom of Religion / / Asia and Africa Today, 2011, No. 2 (ed.).

South-East Asia, North and South America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand remain the main areas of expansion of the Chinese diaspora.

The Chinese diaspora in Canada is growing especially rapidly, as in some cities they are the largest "visible minority", i.e. a group that can be distinguished from the indigenous population by external characteristics (the cities of Richmond, Vancouver, Toronto). There are a million of them in the country, and the number of "chinatowns" in the Canadian provinces is second only to the United States. Louise Clarkson, an ethnic Chinese native of Hong Kong, became the 26th Governor-General of Canada.

The example of the United States is also illustrative, where there are mayors, congressmen, and ministers among ethnic Chinese. A number of Chinese - Americans hold senior positions in the Obama administration. Among them: Secretary of Energy Stephen Chu, Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke, former Governor of Washington State (1997-2005), who actively developed trade cooperation between this state and China, White House Secretary of Staff Lu Peining, head of public Relations of the US Presidential Administration Cheng Yuanmei, legal adviser to the Ministry of National Security Fang Fuyu. The American media calls these five "experts in China"³⁹.

Such a political phenomenon is associated with the rapid growth and strengthening of China's power and the attraction to the authorities of those who have something in common with the Middle Kingdom and are quite familiar with this country.

It should be noted that in 2002, the New Zealand Government apologized to the Chinese community for the persecution in the early twentieth century, when almost all English-speaking countries adopted "Exclusion Acts", according to which any Chinese immigration and/or naturalization of Chinese already living in this country was prohibited.

And in 2006, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper formally apologized to Chinese Canadians for the poll tax imposed on their ancestors in 1885 and for the "Law on the Expulsion of Chinese" adopted in 1923. In his speech on the occasion of the 2010 Chinese Lunar New Year, he congratulated the ethnic Chinese living in Canada: "This is the moment (waiting for the New Year)... It is symbolic of Canada's recognition of the important contribution of ethnic Chinese, as well as the role that more than a million ethnic Chinese in Canada have played in strengthening relations between our country and China, as well as the rich heritage of their ancestors."⁴⁰

(The ending follows)

^{Poloskova T. V.} 1 Diasporas in the system of international relations, Moscow, 1998, pp. 6-7.

² Ibid., p. 8.

³ Da Qing guoji taole ("Citizenship Law" of Qing China). Daqing fagui daquan, vol. 2, Beijing, 1909.

⁴ The Jakarta Post. 31.05.2011.

⁵ US Department of State. Background Note: Malaysia -http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm

⁶ General Program of the CPPCC of the People's Republic of China (Article No. 58: Zhonghua ren-min gunghego zhengfu ying jini baohu gowai huaqiaodexzhendang quanli) - http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/07/content_2304465.htm

⁷ Cit. by: Chinese ethnic groups in Southeast Asian countries. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1986, p. 247.

^{Mao Zixiong.} 8 Zhongguo qiaowu falui fagui gaishu (huaqiao Laws and Regulations). Beijing, Huaqiao chubanshe, 1994, p. 305.

⁹ Code telegram of Mao Zedong to I. V. Stalin (Filippov) on the supply of natural rubber to the USSR from the PRC. November 23, 1950. RGASPI, N 27213.

^{Fitzgerald C.P.} 10 The Third China. The Chinese Communities in South-East Asia. London, 1965, p. 58.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 63.

^{Fitzgerald S.} 12 China and Overseas Chinese. A study of Peking's changing policy 1949-1970. Cambridge, 1972, p. 61.

¹³ The 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China - http://law.lawtime.cn/d656694661788.html/pos=5

^{Suryadinata L.} 14 Beijing's Policy toward the Overseas Chinese. China and the ASEAN States: The ethnic Chinese Dimension. Singapore University Press, 1985, p. 63-78.

¹⁵ Constitution of the People's Republic of China 1954...

¹⁶ Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 1975 - http://www.chinal-awedu.com/news/1200/21752/21753/2006/2/ma53621912541 62260024560-0.htm

^{Fitzgerald S.} 17 Op.cit, p. 60.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 61.

^{Zhuang Gotu.} 19 Huaqiao huazhen yu zhonggode guanxi (Overseas Chinese and China). Guangzhou, 2001, p. 378.

^{Suryadinata L.} 20 China and the ASEAN States: The ethnic Chinese Dimension. Singapore University Press, 2004, p. 117.

^{Suryadinata L.} 21 Ethnic Relations and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ethnic Chinese. Singapore, 2004, p. 113.

^{Ren Guiyang.} 22 Huaqiao huazhen yu guogong guanxi (Foreign Chinese and the Communist Party). Wuhan, 1999, p. 252.

²³ Ibid., p. 233.

²⁴ The 1978 Constitution of the People's Republic of China - http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/gj/21/14_6.html

²⁵ Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 1982 - http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1300/12/21721/2006/4/li2091496192460021044 - 0.htm

²⁶ Zhonghua Renmin Gunghego guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohu fa (Law on Protection of the Rights of Re-Emigrants and Relatives-qiaojuan in China) - http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node5/node9/userobject7ail272.html

²⁷ Ibid., p. 255.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 261.

^{Tang Wei.} 29 Huaqiao quanide falui baozhang jizhi (Huaqiao Legal Rights Guarantee Mechanism). Shandongsheng shehui choubanshe, 2006, p. 263.

³⁰ Cit. по: Suryadinata L. China and the ASEAN States.., p. 111.

³¹ Asian Americans According To The U.S. Census - http://www.op-papers.com/essays/Asian-Americans-According-To-The-U-s/383142?t opic

^{Suryadinata L.} 32 Ethnic Relations and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia.., p. 238.

^{Galishcheva N. V.} 33 Indian migration: ties with the Motherland are preserved //Asia and Africa Today, 2010, No. 9.

³⁴ Website of the Huaqiao Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China -http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2010/0416/19137.shtml

³⁵ Website of the Shandong Provincial Administration's Huaqiao Affairs Office - http://www.sdqb.gov.cn/sqxx/201004/235c4b43-fcec-425a-9107-f63cl9f61345.htm

³⁶ http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2010/0416/19137.shtml

³⁷ http://www.chinanews.eom/zgqj/z/2011qbzrhxc/quanwen.shtml

³⁸ Cit. according to: Portyakov V. Ya. New Chinese migrants / / Problems of the Far East, 2004, N 3.

³⁹ EuropelChinacom. Gary Faye Locke: 'Potential Stock' of Sino-US Relations - http://www.europelchina.com/en/observe/2009060723391184.htm

⁴⁰ XINHUANEWS. Russian.news.cn 16.02.2010-Prime Minister of Canada S. Harper published a congratulatory speech on the occasion of the Chinese Lunar New Year -http://russian.news.cn/culture/2010-02/16/c_13176759.htm

Permanent link to this publication: