Libmonster ID: U.S.-1414
Author(s) of the publication: A. KOSHKIN

The beginning of the 80s of the last century was marked by the deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations, which was mainly due to the strengthening of the military-political confrontation between the United States and the USSR. The US administration has demanded that its Far Eastern ally tighten its policy towards Moscow. The reason for launching a large-scale offensive against the USSR was the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

On December 29, 1979, Japanese Foreign Minister S. Okita issued a statement of support for Washington's policy of curtailing the detente process. The Japanese Foreign Ministry developed a secret report stating that Japan should join sanctions against the Soviet Union and build up its armed forces in order to more evenly distribute the" defense burden " of the Western world1 . It was stated that Japan's role in the global military strategy of the United States would increase.

In solidarity with the US administration, the Japanese government reduced political contacts with the USSR and decided to curb the development of economic cooperation, cultural and tourist ties. Following the United States, Japan refused to participate in the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

One of the Japanese Sovietologists, H. Kimura, recognized: "Even if the Afghan events had not occurred, sooner or later Japanese-Soviet relations would have reached a dead end, because the positions of Japan and the USSR, as before, were radically different: the USSR demanded the conclusion of a" Soviet-Japanese treaty on good-neighborliness and cooperation " without any restrictions. The only thing that made sense for Japan was to negotiate a "peace treaty" on the condition of the return of the four northern islands... The fact that Afghanistan itself, which had concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, was the object of military intervention by the USSR, helped strengthen Japan's determination to finally abandon the conclusion of the "Soviet-Japanese Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation"...2 Thus, the Afghan events were used by the Japanese ruling circles as a convenient excuse for implementing a planned course to toughen their position towards the USSR.

At the same time, the campaign "for the return of the northern territories"was intensified. After the official establishment of the "Northern Territories Day-February 7" in the country in 1981, this propaganda campaign acquired the character of a state one .3 "Prefectural councils for the return of the northern territories" were established everywhere in the country, and trips to inspect the "northern territories" by members of the Cabinet of Ministers and even the Prime Minister of Japan became more frequent.

These were clearly provocative actions of official Tokyo. On February 16, 1981, a statement issued by the USSR Foreign Ministry drew the attention of the Japanese Government to the fact that the campaign of territorial claims against the Soviet Union "has recently acquired a character bordering on hostility towards our country" and that such steps by the Japanese government "can only be qualified as deliberately aimed at worsening Soviet-Japanese relations."4 Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. Tikhonov said: "We have repeatedly stated, including at the highest level, that there is no such topic in our relations as the supposedly unresolved "territorial issue"... Such actions by the Japanese side do not bring the prospect of reaching an agreement on a peace treaty any closer. " 5

In this regard, it should be noted that Moscow did not refuse to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries. Even in the joint Soviet-Japanese statement of October 10, 1973, an agreement was made to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty.

However, in the first half of the 1980s, the position of the USSR government was that there was no "unresolved territorial problem"in Soviet-Japanese relations. Therefore, Tokyo's minimum task was to encourage the Soviet leadership to recognize the existence of the territorial issue and go to its discussion. To this end, the principle of "inseparability of politics and economy" was declared in Japan, according to which the development of Japanese-Soviet economic relations was directly dependent on the "resolution of the territorial issue". Such a link between business and politics has led to stagnation in bilateral relations.

On the other hand, the Americans began to openly demand that Japan expand the framework of the military alliance with the United States and strengthen the Japanese armed forces. The idea of creating a military-political alliance uniting the United States, Western Europe and Japan was born in order to "block" the USSR. The right-wing forces in the country, which had plans to bring Japan's military power in line with its economic power, enthusiastically embraced this idea. Describing this policy, an ethnic Japanese professor at the University of California, Ts. Hasegawa noted:"...When Japan needed to increase its military power in line with its status as an economic power, the "Soviet threat" was chosen as a convenient excuse to do so without risking a split in public opinion... The deterioration of relations with the USSR corresponded to Japanese national interests. The Japanese have chosen this strategy on their own. " 6

Nevertheless, Moscow did not stop its efforts to try to" tear " Japan away from the United States and encourage it to pursue a more independent foreign policy, including, of course, in the Soviet direction. The Soviet Union proposed that the Japanese Government jointly develop confidence-building measures, conclude a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force, and establish a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region. Moscow has expressed its readiness to guarantee the non-use of nuclear weapons against Japan under the CO-

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storage of the three non-nuclear principles " - not to produce, acquire or deploy nuclear weapons on its territory.

However, the Japanese government supported Reagan's nuclear strategy and approved the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe. Thus, for the first time in the post-war period, Japan supported a decision directly directed against the USSR .7

In 1983, the trade turnover between the two countries decreased by 18.5% compared to 1982 - from 3.7 billion to 3 billion rubles, and in 1984 it amounted to 2.9 billion rubles .8 Exports of industrial equipment from Japan to the USSR fell by 25.6%. As a result, Japan, which occupied the second place in the USSR's trade with industrially developed capitalist countries in the 70s, ended up in fifth place.

Only cooperation in the traditional and very important area for both countries - fishing-could be positively assessed. After the introduction of 200-mile economic zones in the world in 1977, the intergovernmental negotiation process on fisheries in the 1980s became even more important and, one might say, turned out to be the main and most stable one in the entire complex of Soviet-Japanese relations. Intergovernmental negotiations on mutual fishing in the 200-mile zones and the Japanese salmon fishery in the Northwest Pacific began to be held annually. It was significant that in 1980-1984 cooperation in the field of fisheries expanded not only at the governmental level, but also at the level of private firms and organizations. A new form of bilateral cooperation has emerged - in the form of joint expeditions to fish and seafood in the 200-mile economic zone of the USSR.

In 1981-1986, the Soviet government, in response to appeals from Japanese fishermen who were supported by members of the Japanese Parliament, gave permission for the extraction of seaweed (kombu) in the area of Signalny Island (Southern Kuriles). The Hokkaido Association of Fishermen was a partner of the USSR Ministry of Fisheries. All this contributed to the growth of sentiment in favor of Japanese-Soviet cooperation.

At the same time, a very negative impact on Soviet-Japanese relations was exerted by the incident that occurred on September 1, 1983, as a result of which a South Korean passenger airliner was shot down in Soviet airspace. In the United States and Japan, all the blame was laid on the Soviet side. It even came to the termination of air communication between Japan and the USSR.

The military component of Japan's anti-Soviet course was most clearly manifested in 1983. Nakasone, during his first official visit to the United States, said that the concept of the Japan-US alliance also includes a military alliance. Nakasone called his country an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and announced his intention to " block the three Straits." There was no doubt about who these steps were directed against.

The proclamation of the" Nakasone Doctrine " meant a further increase in Japan's role in the military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Since 1982, the number of joint Japanese-American military exercises has increased. If earlier they were limited to the Air Force and Navy, then since 1983 the land forces of Japan have also been connected to them. The main enemy during these exercises was the Soviet Union. US Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger openly stated that Japan will henceforth occupy the same place in the US global military strategy as the NATO countries. 9

Such a clear military blockade of Japan with the United States forced the Soviet leadership to strengthen the country's defense capability in the Far East - in response to the deployment of American F-16 fighter-bombers in the north of Japan, air defense facilities in the Kuril Islands were strengthened, and the Novorossiysk aircraft carrier was included in the Pacific Fleet.

In Japan, these forced measures were interpreted as " confirmation of the strengthening of the Soviet threat." In the early 1980s, an ideological campaign was launched in the country aimed at instilling in the Japanese population, primarily young people, an awareness of the alleged "historically determined inevitability of confrontation between Japan and the Soviet Union." One of its aspects was the introduction of anti-Soviet concepts of the history of World War II in school textbooks, which referred to "the constant threat that Japan experienced from the overwhelming advantage of the Soviet army", etc. Special emphasis was placed on accusing the Soviet government of "violating the neutrality pact with Japan." On the basis of such statements, it was proved that it was impossible to conclude any political agreements with the USSR." On the other hand, the task was explicitly set to "educate Japanese children in the spirit of understanding the territorial problem." The Japanese Ministry of Education has issued school maps where the southern part of the Kuril Ridge is designated as Japanese territory, and the southern part of Sakhalin is left unpainted as "disputed territory".

The escalation of anti-Soviet sentiments in Japan still failed to completely block public relations between the two countries and prevent cultural exchange. In the first half of the 1980s, bilateral relations between trade unions, friendship societies, and twin cities were actively developing. Connections were established between the regions (territories) of the USSR and the prefectures of Japan. A movement to create Houses of Japanese-Soviet Friendship sprang up in Hokkaido, and the island's ties with the Sakhalin Region were strengthened.

Famous Soviet ballet, drama, circus troupes, and folk ensembles toured the Japanese Islands every year. Although slowly, the tourist exchange increased. All this, to a certain extent, weakened the intensity of the political confrontation.

Mikhail Gorbachev's coming to power in the USSR in March 1985 did not lead to serious changes in Soviet-Japanese relations. In Japan, the emergence of a new Soviet leader was initially perceived as an event of domestic scale.

The establishment of Soviet-Japanese relations in those years was hindered by Tokyo's willingness to unconditionally follow in the wake of US military policy, which was reflected in the support of the American Star Wars program - the so-called "strategic defense Initiative (SDI)". In a statement issued by the USSR Foreign Ministry on October 11, 1986, it was emphasized that Japan's participation in the SOI "does not agree with the country's defensive military doctrine declared by Tokyo... and it indicates the further involvement of Japan in the military-strategic plans of the United States, which cannot but have a negative impact on Soviet-Japanese relations."

It is impossible not to take into account the role that Japan objectively played in implementing the program of economic exhaustion of the USSR in the arms race imposed on it. In it, the Soviet Union was opposed not only by the United States, but also by the economically powerful countries of Western Europe and Japan. So, in one of the

page 19

works of recent years are indicated:"...Japan's military contribution to the" containment " of the Soviet Union was determined by its participation in the security system with the United States, its own armed forces, and the provision of Japanese territories for the deployment of American bases... The Soviet Union had to respond to all this, i.e. only the "Japanese" part of its military expenditures was supposed to amount to approximately $ 12-15 billion annually in the early 1980s. This is not counting the "American part" in the Far East " 10 .

To reduce the level of military-political confrontation in the Far East, Moscow decided to resume direct political dialogue with Japan. In January 1986, the new Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze paid an official visit to Tokyo. The Japanese Foreign Ministry generally positively assessed the agreement of the Soviet side to discuss the issue of concluding a peace treaty. At that time, the Gorbachev leadership still held the same position regarding the Japanese government's claims to the South Kuril Islands. Thus, while receiving the Japanese parliamentary delegation, Shevardnadze stated:: "As for the so-called 'territorial issue', the Soviet side considers this issue resolved on the appropriate historical and international legal basis. The Soviet Union has a large territory, but we don't have any extra land."11 This was a repetition of the well-known statement of A. Gromyko.

In Japan, such statements caused disappointment and irritation. Refusing to discuss the territorial issue, the new leadership of the USSR took steps to improve relations in other areas. The Japanese were again allowed to visit the burial sites of Japanese prisoners of war who died in camps on Soviet territory, agreements on cultural cooperation were signed, the commission on scientific and technical cooperation was resumed, etc.

The Soviet side proposed a number of specific economic projects: the participation of Japanese firms in the development of forest resources along the BAM highway, the development of asbestos deposits and the reconstruction of a number of enterprises built with the participation of Japanese firms. As a result, the Soviet-Japanese trade turnover increased slightly. However, in general, the volume of trade and economic cooperation could not be considered satisfactory - in 1986 it was just over 3 billion rubles, which, of course, did not correspond to the potentials of such powers as the USSR and Japan. The Kremlin was looking for an opportunity to encourage the Japanese government to move away from the principle of "inseparability of politics and economy."

Speaking in Vladivostok in July 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "The objective situation of our two countries in the world is such that it requires in-depth cooperation on a healthy realistic basis, in an atmosphere of calm, unencumbered by the problems of the past." 12

In Japan, the conciliatory tone of this "message" was captured; there the idea was born to take advantage of the Kremlin's interest in receiving Japanese economic assistance. In Tokyo, it was believed that Gorbachev would not be able to improve the situation in the USSR, and he would be forced to make concessions to the West in order to receive economic assistance. For the Japanese, the main concession was the "return" of the Kuril Islands .

Therefore, Japan was in no hurry to expand trade and economic relations with the USSR, waiting for Gorbachev to "ripen" to the decision to make concessions to Japan on the territorial issue. Moreover, in April 1987, with the participation of the Americans, the official Tokyo initiated the so-called "Toshiba case" around the supply of certain types of equipment to the USSR, which was classified as prohibited by COCOM. This provoked another stage of cooling of bilateral relations.

In his first years in power, Gorbachev did not bargain over the Kuril Islands. Moreover, he was annoyed by the assertiveness with which Japanese politicians who often visited Moscow demanded territorial concessions from the USSR as a manifestation of "new thinking" in the Japanese direction. Once he even angrily threw one of the Japanese guests: "And why, in fact, does Japan present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union, since we did not lose the war to it?"

However, in 1989-1990, when the economic situation of the USSR deteriorated sharply, Gorbachev's entourage became increasingly tempted by the idea of getting a "good price"for the Kuril Islands. Moscow was also being pushed to do this by its new G7 partners. So, in 1988, during a visit to Moscow, the US President R. R. Tolkien wrote: Reagan strongly "advised" Gorbachev to meet Japan halfway in the territorial dispute. This position was shared by Shevardnadze.

Under pressure from Washington and his closest associates, Gorbachev became inclined to cede the South Kuril Islands to Japan. In 1990, apparently not without agreement with Gorbachev, his assistant for international affairs told the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR S. Edamura that "in his heart, Gorbachev does not rule out the possibility of transferring the islands", but "we need to create an atmosphere for resolving the issue" 14 . This was a hint that Moscow is interested in "economic compensation" for the islands. In Japan, such compensation was immediately called a "camphor poultice that resuscitates the dynamism of perestroika" 15 .

Japanese politicians began to quickly develop a plan to exchange the Kuril Islands for financial assistance, and in fact, "buy out" the islands. The estimated amount of such a buyout was estimated at $ 26-28 billion. According to Japanese sources, this proposal was made to Gorbachev through his closest associates and "was considered in the Central Committee of the CPSU" .16

However, the plan for the actual sale of the Kuril Islands became known to a part of the deputy corps. In particular, the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and a well-known businessman Artem Tarasov publicly accused Mikhail Gorbachev of intending to hand over the Southern Kuril Islands to Japan in exchange for economic support. In the midst of the scandal, Gorbachev did not dare to consider the corresponding Japanese proposal, voiced at the end of March 1991 during a conversation in the Kremlin by the General secretary of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, I. Ozawa.

Although official Tokyo was quick to dissociate itself from Ozawa's probe, and Gorbachev called Tarasov's statement a "lie," in reality the idea of "buying out" the South Kuril Islands was seriously discussed. It is enough to recall the statement made in 1990 by one of the leaders of the LDP, S. V. Kanemaru, who publicly said that " Japan, after all, could buy the islands from the Soviet Union."

While persuading Gorbachev to recognize Japan's sovereignty over the South Kuril Islands, Ozawa transparently hinted at the possibility of a deal, saying that in this case the Japanese side is ready to provide "significant economic assistance to the Soviet Union." Gorbachev rejected Ozawa's attempt at direct bargaining.

page 20

I Didn't Smoke. According to an assistant who was present at the conversation, he rather sharply stated that "the' give - and-take ' approach is completely unacceptable, not only between Japan and the Soviet Union, but also in general."

At the same time, Gorbachev expressed readiness to discuss the entire range of issues, including the peace treaty and, in its context, the border issue .17

It was Gorbachev who was the first in post-war history to recognize the existence of a" territorial issue " with Japan and expressed readiness to discuss it in official negotiations. He agreed to include in the text of the "Joint Statement" signed after his visit to Japan (April 1991), a wording favorable to Japan that the parties "held thorough and in-depth negotiations on the entire range of issues related to the development and conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR, including the problem of territorial demarcation, taking into account the fact that positions of both sides on the ownership of Habomai and Shikotan Islands, Kunashir and Iturup."

In Japan, the entry made in the "Joint Statement" on the territorial issue was regarded as a limited success. The Soviet recognition of the existence of a territorial problem and the designation of the four disputed islands of the ridge allowed the Japanese side to defend its point of view more harshly. As an achievement, Gorbachev's promise to establish a visa-free regime for visiting the four South Kuril islands by Japanese citizens, as well as to reduce the number of Soviet military personnel stationed on these islands, was also perceived in Tokyo.

Although Gorbachev called the results of his visit a "draw," in reality it was a major concession, a departure from the Soviet Union's previous position in the territorial dispute with Japan. And this was a consequence of Gorbachev's conscious decision. Subsequently, having lost all his posts, he complained: "If I had stayed in my post, the issue of the northern Territories would probably have been resolved long ago." 18

Japan also complains about this: "He [Gorbachev] should have said: "I'm going to return the four northern islands of Japan and get a long-term low-interest loan in return... However, the four days spent by Mikhail Gorbachev in Japan in April 1991 clearly showed that the nature of his leadership has already changed, turning from "innovative" to "representative". They also showed that Gorbachev has sunk to the level of a politician who thinks only about how to stay in power... " 19 .

One of the reasons why Gorbachev could not make the Kuril Islands deal for loans was Boris Yeltsin's position. The latter sought to seize the initiative in negotiations with the Japanese government, not to allow the resolution of the territorial dispute to be associated with the name of Gorbachev. It was not about defending Russia's rights to the Kuril Islands, but about ensuring that Japanese financial assistance was received not by the allied, but by the Russian leadership. We should agree with the opinion expressed in one of the books devoted to the "Kuril problem": "The Democrats, who were then fighting to take power away from the CPSU, were in dire need of any major breakthrough in any area of the struggle, carried out by them in defiance of the Communists. The Japanese direction seemed to them extremely promising. Much suggests that the Democrats, especially their radical wing, were then inclined to accept Japanese demands for the so-called "northern territories"in one way or another... They hoped that Japan would respond with strong financial support that would help the democrats come to power and solve the difficult economic difficulties facing the country. " 20

In other words, Yeltsin and his team's plans for the Kuril Islands were almost identical to those of Gorbachev and his supporters. Both of them intended to turn the Kuril Islands into an object of bargaining with Japan. The only difference was that Gorbachev was trying to get Japanese help as soon as possible to save Perestroika, while Yeltsin was trying to persuade the Japanese, by providing financial support to Russia, to wait to get the islands. This is exactly what the so - called "Yeltsin five-stage plan" was aimed at, according to which the territorial dispute was supposed to be resolved in favor of Japan after 15-20 years. The meaning of Yeltsin's plan was as follows. At the first stage, it was proposed to move away from the position taken by the USSR and recognize that there is a territorial problem between the two countries. This was supposed to contribute to the formation of a corresponding public opinion in the USSR. Then-in 3-5 years (the second stage) it was supposed to declare the islands free for Japanese entrepreneurship. The third stage is the demilitarization of the islands within 5-7 years. At the fourth stage, the parties must sign a peace treaty. As for the fate of the South Kuril Islands, the fifth stage was allocated for its determination. At the same time, the following options for resolving the territorial dispute were proposed:: 1. The islands will be under a common protectorate of the two countries; 2. The islands are given the status of free territories; 3. Transfer of the islands to Japan 21 .

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government has been leaning toward reaching an agreement with Tokyo on the Kuril Islands as soon as possible, counting on Japanese assistance. In the depths of the Russian Foreign Ministry formed from "democrats", the formula"two plus alpha" was born. According to this formula, the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge - Habomai and Shikotan - were immediately transferred to Japan, and negotiations were offered for the other two islands-Kunashir and Iturup. The Russian Foreign Ministry intended to implement this formula during the official visit of the Russian President to Japan scheduled for September 1992. However, a widespread protest movement in Russia against Japan's unjustified territorial concessions forced Yeltsin to cancel the visit.

I think, not the last role in

page 21

An open letter sent to Yeltsin and published in the press by Russian experts on Japan, who warned that the concession of the Kuril Islands would not lead to large-scale Japanese assistance to Russia, played a role in making this decision. Scientists have written: "A deep delusion imposed on the leadership of our country by Japanese propaganda is the idea that territorial concessions or promises of concessions in the future... they will lead to heavy rainstorms in our country: Japanese banks and business firms do not obey Tokyo politicians and diplomats and will never go to altruistic, charitable financial and economic operations. " 22

The complication of the political situation in Russia in 1993 forced Yeltsin to take into account the mood of the people. Therefore, his visit to Japan, which took place after the tragic events in Moscow in the autumn of 1993, could no longer lead to any immediate radical decisions. The "Tokyo Declaration" contained only the recognition by the Russian government of the existence of a "territorial problem" and stated the intention of the parties to look for ways to solve it.

Although such language was intended to demonstrate Yeltsin's intention to "resolve the issue," in fact, it did not go beyond declarative statements. Moreover, the Russian side, despite the insistence of the Japanese, avoided including in the text of the document confirming the validity of the paragraph of the Soviet-Japanese joint declaration of 1956, which referred to the possibility of transferring the Habomai and Shikotan Islands to Japan after the signing of the peace treaty.

Thus, the position of the Russian government in the Japanese direction was inconsistent. The Russian Foreign Ministry was inclined to meet Japanese demands. However, more pragmatic politicians believed that this should not be done. So, Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin stated: "Russia is not going to give up the Kuril Islands to anyone. We don't want anyone else's, but we'll keep our own." In November 1994, in an interview with the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri, he stressed that he did not intend to make the islands a subject of conversation, and he had no intention of returning these territories to Japan .23

Once again, illusions and false hopes were generated by the so-called "meetings without ties" between Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister R. Hashimoto. During these meetings, Yeltsin unexpectedly announced his intention to sign a peace treaty with Japan no later than 2000. This was perceived as a decision to give in to Japanese demands for the" return " of the South Kuril Islands. However, Tokyo soon realized that the Russian president's unofficial promise could not be taken seriously. The Japanese newspaper Mainichi was not without sarcasm: "It seems that only Yeltsin in Russia believes that the territorial problem can be solved before 2000." 24

Yeltsin's attempt to suggest that Tokyo sign the "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation"first, without resolving the territorial issue, was also unsuccessful. This proposal was immediately rejected by the Japanese side, for which the satisfaction of territorial claims is the main (and in fact - the only) goal of concluding a peace treaty. In the end, under strong pressure from the Russian public, demanding strict compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on the integrity and inviolability of the state's territory, Yeltsin and his government were forced to abandon attempts to force the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

The position of the Russian government was voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who stated:"...It is absolutely clear in what framework the search for a possible solution should be conducted. It should be mutually acceptable, not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, meet our national interests, be based on existing realities, receive broad public support, and be approved in accordance with the established constitutional procedure by the highest legislative bodies of both countries."25

According to Ivanov, Boris Yeltsin conveyed to the Prime Minister of Japan in November 1998 the proposals of the Russian side on the future treaty between the two countries and on its division concerning territorial delimitation. These proposals were drawn up based on the conviction that any options that would mean Russia's renunciation of sovereignty over the Southern Kuril Islands are unacceptable.

Thus, despite the fact that Gorbachev and Yeltsin showed a propensity to make territorial concessions to Japan for the sake of expected economic benefits, they eventually could not ignore the position of the Russian public and opposition forces that strongly opposed such concessions.

As a result, neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin dared to oppose the will of the majority of the people, and at the last moment chose to avoid getting involved in an ugly deal over the Kuril Islands.

Tokyo's mistake was that it made the main bet on the possibility of a single solution to the Kuril problem by one or another Russian leader. A negative role was also played by the fact that the leaders of the two states resorted to outdated methods of "secret diplomacy", hiding their intentions and the content of the negotiations. However, times have changed. The period of intense confrontation in the late 80's and early 90's over the fate of the South Kuril Islands convincingly demonstrated the increased role of public institutions and the strengthening of the political influence of patriotic forces.


1 "Nihon Keizai shimbun". 17.08.1982.

Kimura H. 2 The Kuril problem. History of Japanese-Russian border negotiations. Kiev, 1996, pp. 147-148.

3 Ibid., p. 150.

4 Cit. by: Latyshev I. A. Attempt on the Kuril Islands. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 1992, p. 50.

5 "Pravda". 17.02.1982.

Hasegawa Ts 6 "Hoppo redo" to senso 50 nan ("Northern Territories" and 50 years after the war) "Chuo koron", 1995, October, p. 179.

Kushakov L. N. 7 Moscow-Tokyo. Essays on Diplomatic Relations 1956-1986, Moscow, 1988, pp. 177-178.

8 "Problems of the Far East". 1984, N 2, p. 16.

Kutakov L. N. 9 Edict. soch., p. 241.

Arin O. 10 Russia in a Strategic Trap, Moscow, 2003, pp. 113-114.

11 "Pravda". 8.05.1988.

12 "Pravda". 29.07.1986.

Nasu K. 13 Yaburedashita soren teikoku. Peresutoroyka wa hokai no hajimari (The Collapsed Soviet Empire. Beginning of the collapse of perestroika). Tokyo, 1988, p. 94.

14 "New and recent history". 2000, N 3, p. 146.

Kimura H. 15 Edict. op., pp. 169-170.

Hasegawa Ts . 16 Hoppo redo mondai to nichiro kankei (The problem of the Northern Territories and Japanese-Russian relations). Tokyo, 2000, pp. 210-211.

17 "New and recent history". 2000, No. 3, p. 149.

18 Milestones on the way to the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia. Trans. from yap. Moscow, 2000, p. 142.

Kimura H. 19 Edict. op., p. 170.

20 Kuril Islands. Islands in the ocean of problems, Moscow, 1998, p. 318.

21 Cit. by: Latyshev I. L. Edict. soch., p. 109.

22 Russian Kuril Islands. Istoriya i sovremennost ' [History and Modernity], Moscow, 2002, p.193.

23 "Izvestia". 9.11.1994.

24 "Mainiti". 20.11.1998.

25 Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 23.02.1999.


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Create and store your author's collection at Libmonster: articles, books, studies. Libmonster will spread your heritage all over the world (through a network of affiliates, partner libraries, search engines, social networks). You will be able to share a link to your profile with colleagues, students, readers and other interested parties, in order to acquaint them with your copyright heritage. Once you register, you have more than 100 tools at your disposal to build your own author collection. It's free: it was, it is, and it always will be.

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