Libmonster ID: U.S.-1880

The Orthodox Church is a complex geopolitical reality, and it does not constitute a homogenous block. On the contrary, the rise of irredentism during the 19th century has created the basis for constant territorial fragmentation throughout the 20th century. Surprisingly, the worldwide Orthodox population continues to increase. The convergence of these two phenomena is a starting point for a reinvestigation of Orthodox power in international affairs, as well as a profound strategic change affecting the communion of the fourteen local Orthodox Churches. This article examines how Orthodoxy, through the process of convening a Holy and Great Council, has responded to geopolitics by developing new approaches and new Orthodoxy identities; how the territorial changes affected their strategies in the Diaspora; what was their role in new international conflicts. The first part of the article deals with an epistemological approach to place Orthodoxy in the context of geopolitical studies, while the second part highlights the persistence of a bipolar paradigm opposing the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow. Finally, the paper considers geopolitical challenges for Orthodoxy created by today's politico-religious crisis in Syria.

Keywords: Orthodox Church, Pan-Orthodox council, geopolitics, identity, territory, Diaspora.

Introduction

The ORTHODOX Church is a complex geopolitical reality and is by no means homogeneous. On the contrary, the wave of Irredentism created, during the nineteenth century, the basis of

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for its constant fragmentation in XX. A chain of historical events reduced the territory of Orthodox communities, forcing the local population to emigrate to the West, which led to a transformation of the map of Orthodoxy. Such events include the Great Russian Revolution (1917), the population exchange between Greece and Turkey (1923), the massacres of Orthodox Serbs by the Croatian Ustashe (1942-1944), the establishment of communism in the Balkans (1945), the beginning of modern conflicts in the Middle East (1948), the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the partition of the country (1974The Civil war in Lebanon (1975), the Balkan conflicts (1991-2000), the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the invasion of Iraq (2003), the independence of Kosovo (2008), the Russian-Georgian war (2008), the Arab Spring (2010), and the Syrian crisis (2011). then the conflict in Ukraine.

It is all the more surprising that the Orthodox population continues to grow all over the world. According to Antoine Arzhakovsky, head of research at the Bernardine College in Paris, " during the 20th century, the Orthodox population doubled from 124,923,000 to 274,447,000 adherents, according to 2010 data."1. The combined effect of these two factors - territorial fragmentation and population growth-serves as a starting point for reassessing the influence of Orthodoxy in the context of international relations, as well as for studying the profound strategic changes affecting the community (federation) of the fourteen local Orthodox churches.2
In the twenty-first century, Orthodoxy has become an effective player in the international arena and a real geopolitical force. In a world that is experiencing the consequences of the Cold War and the events of September 11, Orthodox churches are able to respond to new global and geopolitical challenges by implementing strategies unique to each of the autocephalous (independent) churches. The specific features of different contexts depend on time, historical, migration, and cultural factors.

1. Arjakovsky, A. (2013) Qu'est-ce que l'orthodoxie. Paris: Gallimard.

2. According to the protocol, the Orthodox Church unites the following communities: the ancient Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, as well as the "new" patriarchates of Moscow, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and other autocephalous churches: Cyprus, Greece, Poland, Albania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. There is currently a disagreement between the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow over the recognition of the Orthodox Church in America. Autocephalous status was granted to it by the Russian Church in 1970.

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and the ethnic background that has developed in each of these communities. In the general framework of state diplomacy, the Orthodox churches follow their own geopolitical agenda.3 But the center of gravity of Orthodoxy is now shifting beyond its traditional borders, thereby creating new geopolitical conditions and new points of tension between the churches.

In this context of redefining the international balance of power, the convocation of a Pan-Orthodox Council seems absolutely necessary in order to mark the unity of communion between the Orthodox Churches. The idea of the "Holy and Great Council", as it is also called with reference to the First Council of Nicaea (325), was formed in the first decades of the XX century. The first Pan-Orthodox Congress was convened in Constantinople in 1923; in the same year, a population exchange was carried out between Greece and Turkey in accordance with the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Later, in 1930, a conference was held in the Vatopedi Monastery on Mount Athos with the participation of several Orthodox churches. However, it is only under Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras (1886-1972) that the process of preparing for the convocation of a Pan-Orthodox Council is gaining momentum.4 In 1961, the First Pan-Orthodox Conference was held in Rhodes, which officially marked the beginning of the pre-council process. Various topics that could be included in the council's agenda were suggested, including relations between the various Orthodox churches.5 As a result, ten topics were selected during the First Pan-Orthodox Pre-Conciliar Conference in 1976 in Chambesy (Switzerland) .6 At the same time, the preparation of materials for the council begins: various texts were compiled on each topic, taking into account the position of each local Orthodox Church. These texts were the result of intensive negotiations conducted in a search for a unanimous agreement.

3. For a comprehensive study of various political and religious models in the Orthodox world, see in an important scientific publication: Fokas, E. (2014)" Pluralism and Religious Freedom in Majority Orthodox Contexts", Working Paper 49 (Athens: ELIAMEP).

4. Clement, O. (1976) Dialogue avec le patriarche Athenagoras. Paris: Fayard.

5. Mahieu, P. (2012) Paul VI et les orthodoxes. Paris: Cerf.

6. These ten topics are: 1. Orthodox Diaspora. 2. The method of granting autocephaly. 3. The method of granting autonomy. 4. Diptychs (the order of honor of local churches). 5. Church calendar. 6. Canonical obstacles to marriage. 7. Posts. 8. Relations with non-Orthodox christians. 9. The Ecumenical movement. 10. The role of Orthodoxy in strengthening peace, brotherhood and freedom.

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the decision made. The Ecumenical Patriarchate presided over and managed secretarial work during the preparation of the council. So far, five Pan-Orthodox pre-conciliar meetings have been held (1976, 1982, 1986, 2009, 2015). An acute crisis broke out between the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow in the 1990s over the autonomy of the Estonian Orthodox Church, which led to the suspension of the pre-conciliar process from 1996 to 2008.7 Since 2008, the Orthodox primates, headed by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (born in 1940, Ecumenical Patriarch since 1991), have been unanimously calling for the council to be held soon. In March 2014, the Synaxis of Primates of Orthodox Churches at the Phanar (Istanbul), the center of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, decided to organize a special (ad hoc) meeting of Primates of the Orthodox Churches. an inter-Orthodox commission to adapt or edit some texts that needed updating before the council was held. The "Holy and Great Council" is to take place in Crete in June 2016, on the feast of the Holy Trinity.

In a message published shortly after March 2014, Synaxis highlights the interdependence between the preparation of the Pan-Orthodox Council and the complex geopolitical reality of Orthodoxy, focusing on two particularly sensitive issues: Ukraine and Syria. The document reads: "First of all, Synaxis considered the situation in the Middle East and recent events in Ukraine, as well as the continuing uncertainty regarding the fate of the bishops of Aleppo, Metropolitan Paul and Metropolitan John Ibrahim, who were abducted and held for a long time by unknown persons," the statement said.8. This is followed by a general statement:

The Gathering of Primates provides us with a blessed opportunity to strengthen our unity through communion and cooperation, and we reaffirm our commitment to conciliarity as a principle of paramount importance for the unity of the Church. We confess, as St. John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople, taught, that " the name of the Church is the name of unity and concord, not of division." Our hearts are filled with hope for the long-awaited Holy Day.

7. Kaluzny, T. (2012) "The History at the Present Stage of the Preparations for the PanOrthodox Council", Studia Oecumenica 12: 153-160.

8. Synaxis of Primates of Orthodox Autocephalous Churches. (2014) "Communique", Orthodox Christian Network [http://myocn.net/ecumenical-patriarchate/, accessed on 30.12.2015].

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and the Great Council, which will be a testimony to the unity of the Church and her concern for the modern world 9.

However, the manifestation of Orthodox unity may be threatened by the current geopolitical balance of power, which affects inter-church alliances and challenges the relationship between faith and politics. In this article, I will examine the Orthodox response to geopolitics through the development of new approaches, focusing on the dialogue between Orthodoxy and ethnic identity, how territorial changes affect the strategies of Orthodox Churches aimed at preserving their power over communities in the Diaspora, and their role in the context of conflicts. In other words, can we say that in the post - cold War era of multipolarity - or "apolarity" - in international relations, a new map of Orthodox geopolitics is emerging?10 To answer this question, this article will present a three-part analysis. The first part uses an epistemological approach that allows us to place Orthodoxy in the context of geopolitical studies when considering the dialectic of the sacred, identity and territory. The second part will highlight the persistence of the bipolar paradigm, in which there is a confrontation between the patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow, as well as the problems of the religious diaspora. The final part will address the geopolitical challenges that Orthodoxy faces in the current religious and political crisis in Syria.

1. Understanding Orthodox geopolitics

The study of the geopolitical dimension of Orthodoxy began in the field of political science, primarily in France, with the beginning of the Yugoslav wars (1991-2000). Violent conflict in South-Eastern Europe, which gave rise to the term "Balkanization" to refer to territorial fragmentation based on

9. Synaxis of Primates of Orthodox Autocephalous Churches.

10. Hass, R. (2008) "The Age of Nonpolarity", Foreign Affairs. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/age-nonpolarity, accessed, 15.12.2015].

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on ethnoreligious clashes, he quickly destroyed hopes for the Hegelian "end of history".

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History, predicted a reduction in ideological conflicts in favor of a global interaction in which liberalism and capitalism would function as regulators of conflict.11 However, the bloody Yugoslav wars shattered these arguments, and Samuel Huntington, author of Clash of Civilizations, was quick to refute them. The story did not end in the early 1990s, as blood continued to be shed, not only in the Balkans, but also in Rwanda (1994). In a famous article published in Foreign Affairs (1993), Huntington argued that ideological conflicts were indeed over with the collapse of Marxism as an alternative to liberal capitalism, but that vast regions of the world would continue to clash along cultural and, more broadly, religious borders. Huntington proposed a list of different civilizations: Western, Latin American, Orthodox, Eastern world, Muslim world, sub-Saharan Africa; in doing so, he prioritized religious solidarity within vast cultural areas. Religion has become a new ideological backdrop for global conflicts. Huntington's position was clear: a call for the West (the US and Europe) to unite under American leadership in order to counter the Islamic threat or, worse, the unlikely "Islamic-Confucian" alliance. It should be noted that, according to Huntington, the Orthodox bloc-including the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Croatia and Slovenia), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Romania, as well as Armenia, despite the fact that the majority of its population are adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church - is more likely to stand in solidarity with Islam in its opposition Western Christianity, although this "union" itself is split along the line that crosses south-eastern Europe, which explains the Yugoslav war.
11. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The end of History and the last man. New York: The free press.

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1. 1. Orthodox civilization

According to Huntington, civilizations are differentiated by the principle of otherness:

First, the differences between civilizations are not just real. They are the most significant. Civilizations differ in their history, language, culture, traditions and, most importantly, religion. People of different civilizations have different views on the relationship between God and man, individual and group, citizen and state, parents and children, husband and wife, and have different ideas about the relative importance of rights and obligations, freedom and coercion, equality and hierarchy. These differences have developed over the centuries. They will not disappear in the foreseeable future. They are more fundamental than the differences between political ideologies and political regimes. Of course, differences don't necessarily imply conflict, and conflict doesn't necessarily mean violence. However, over the centuries, the most protracted and bloody conflicts have been generated precisely by differences between civilizations.12
Most often, the object of criticism directed against Huntington's theory is the idea of the homogeneity of blocks of civilizations. Even a cursory glance at the composition of Orthodox churches reveals the diversity of cultural - not to mention ethnic-contexts that form this block and form characteristic civilizational areas: Greek, Slavic, Georgian, Arabic, etc. But this quite adequately reflects the role of religion in a kind of international division of the world, to which Orthodoxy has not remained absolutely alien. Indeed, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow is known to use the expression "Orthodox civilization". This is not only a patriotic concept that defines the cultural foundation of the Slavic world, but also the recognition of religion as a " matrix... which supports the main ideological trends promoted by political power and prevailing over communal and collective identity... On the international stage

12. Huntington, S. (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign Affairs (Summer) [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations, accessed on 08.12.2015].

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The Church defends the model of coexistence and dialogue of civilizations that opposes the unipolar world, and also defends the state's foreign policy. " 13
At the same time, religion should not be reduced to its purely ideological dimension as the only factor explaining any modern conflict. One might even wonder whether the theory of civilization is at all applicable to the context of Orthodoxy. According to the French philosopher and Orthodox theologian Jean-Francois Colosimo, "this theory does not seem obvious. It seems to be overly influenced by Spengler's West-centricism. "14 Oswald Spengler15, a German philosopher of the early twentieth century, inspired not only Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations, but also George Florovsky's concept of "pseudomorphosis", which defined the theological boundaries of the Orthodox Church as opposed to Western influence, beginning with XVI century 16. According to Spengler, civilizations cannot interbreed with each other. The process of growth and development of a civilization ensures its internal homogeneity. However, the "Orthodox bloc" experienced a breakdown before it emerged again: from 1991 to 2001, new Balkan wars seemed to restore the border line running from Riga to Split, which had separated Ottoman-Byzantine Europe from Frankish-Latin Europe since the eighth century. At the same time, Russia was unable to prevent either the secession of Kosovo from Serbia or the integration of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union, which finally put an end to the Yugoslav and pan-Slavic ideas of "pan-Orthodoxy"17.

1.2. Orthodoxy, Space and Identity

In the literature, the conversation about the geopolitical reality of Orthodoxy in the framework of an interdisciplinary approach, at the intersection of political science and geography, was first started by Francois Tual.

13. Rousselet, K. (2013) "Secularisation et orthodoxie dans la Russie contemporaine: pour une hypothese continuiste?", Questions de recherche 42:16.

14. Colosimo, J.-F. (2010) "Metamorphose du divin", Le Debat 160:84.

15. Spengler, O. (1918-1922) Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Vienna/Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck.

16. Florovsky G. Puti russkogo bogosloviya [Ways of Russian theology]. Paris, 1937.

17. Colosimo, J.-F. "Metamorphose du divin", p. 84.

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Until the 2000s, he and Georges Prevelakis, professor of Geography at the Pantheon Sorbonne University (Paris I), were the only scholars to study Orthodoxy as a key component of the geopolitical distribution of power in the Balkans in the 1990s and as a constant force factor during the last years of the communist period in Russia. In this sense, their approach focused on the interaction between faith, identity, and territory. Tual remarks: "The geopolitics of the Orthodox world has shown us that religion, as a source of national ideology and collective legitimation, serves as a matrix of geopolitical ideas on which the world is ultimately built." 18
If we assume that Orthodoxy is a geopolitical reality, it is precisely because it is a religion deeply rooted geographically. The territory is an essential element of both the administrative structure of the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox ecclesiology of communion. Orthodox autocephalous churches are territorial units formed on the basis of historical administrative networks. Some of them date back to the Roman Empire period. From a theological point of view, the development of the "ecclesiology of communion" during the twentieth century reinforced the importance of territorial boundaries as the canonical limits of communities united around one bishop - the guarantor of the only legitimate Eucharist celebrated in one limited area - the diocese.19 The territory is significant not only as a canonical space - it gradually became a pillar of religious, ethnic and national identity.20
The decline of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century led to a revision of religious identities. Traditional communal symbols have served as the basis for modern nationalist and Irredentist claims. The official status of the millet (ethno-religious community) enjoyed by the Rumi-Orthodox Greeks of the empire did not call into question the universal dimension of evangelical proclamation, so

18. Thual, Fr. (1993) Geopolitique de l'orthodoxie, p. 121. Paris: Dunod.

19. Afanasiev, N. (1975) L'Eglise du Saint-Esprit. Paris: Editions du Cerf; Zizioulas, J. (2001) Eucharist, Bishop, Church - The Unity of the Church in the Divine Eucharist and the Bishop During the First Three Centuries. Boston: Holy Cross Orthodox Press.

20. Prevelakis, G. (1994) Balkans. Cultures et geopolitique. Paris: Nathan.

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The Patriarchate of Constantinople remained an element of unity in the Ottoman Balkans until the rise of Greek national consciousness. However, the growing political role of the Patriarch of Constantinople as Millet Bashi (ethnarch) changed the purely spiritual nature of his office, while at the same time weakening the unifying nature of his authority in the Orthodox world, which contributed to the emergence of a multiplicity of increasingly recognized ethnic identities. The spread of such ideals in the circles of the Greek-speaking intelligentsia, which was increasingly polarized on the issue of territorial separation, influenced the self-representation of the Orthodox Church. These nationalist movements involved religious symbols in the process of forming national identities. This overlap is clearly evident in King Otto's decision to make the day following the anniversary of Greece's independence a national holiday, so that it coincides with the feast of the Annunciation-March 25. During the same period, Orthodoxy became the cornerstone of nationalist ideologies not only in Greece, but also in Serbia and Bulgaria. The administrative structure of the Orthodox Church successfully fit into the nationalist program. According to Victor Rudometof, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Cyprus, "although the institution of territorial autocephaly is part of the Eastern Orthodox tradition, the establishment of national churches in the Balkans served not only ecclesiastical purposes, but also provided the material and ideological infrastructure for the growth of the national consciousness of the masses." 21 Along with the process of forming national identities, we can observe a similar religious phenomenon, which can be described as church building, which led to the creation of modern autocephalous Orthodox churches (in Greece-1833, Bulgaria-1870, Romania-1885).

Much more problematic than the founding of the Greek Orthodox Church (1833) were the separatist tendencies of the Bulgarian exarch in Istanbul, who, being dissatisfied with the fact that his community was located on the canonical territory of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, considered ethno-religious configurations.-

21. Roudometof, V. (2011) "The Evolution of Greek Orthodoxy in the Context of World Historical Globalization". in Roudometof V., Makrides V. N. (eds.) Orthodox Christianity in 21st Century Greece, p. 26. Farnham: Ashgate.

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In other words, racism) is more important than the spiritual unity of the universal proclamation of the Orthodox Church. The Council of Constantinople officially condemned this trend in 1872.22 Despite this condemnation, the spread of Orthodoxy as the main symbol of identity was not limited to Greece, but established itself as a paradigm throughout Southeastern Europe. This is not to say that Orthodoxy carried some rudiments of nationalism - such a generalization would be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it seems that the "criteria" developed by the Orthodox Church allow it to answer the question of collective identity, exploiting its commitment to nationalist ideals based on ethnicity.

These territorial reconfigurations have led to the formation of certain trends, as well as transnational and even transcontinental networks. They are accompanied by the strengthening of identities formed in the context of the "diaspora", that is, outside the borders of the canonical territories of local Orthodox churches (Western Europe, America, Asia and Australia). The "deterritorialization" of Orthodox churches is perhaps the most significant sign of the sustainability of ethno-religious synthesis in the context of current globalization23. Orthodox churches continue to protect the interests of their states, acting as relays of influence. The Orthodox Church is considered the "soft power" of such states, especially at the international level, which emphasizes the connection between religion, state and nation. Francois Thuile once said that "the specifics of Orthodoxy are a symbiotic fusion between the national state and the religious sphere." 24 The geopolitics of Orthodoxy is obviously influenced by the same "fusion."

22. Sardes, M. de (1975) Le Patriarcat œcumenique dans l'Eglise orthodoxe: etude historique et canonique. Paris: Beauchesne.

23. Kazarian, N. (2012) "Orthodoxie et mondialisation, une resistance en mouvement: Etude des paradigmes grecs et russes", in Massignon, B., Grannec, C. (eds) Les religions dans la mondialisation: entre acculturation et contestation, p. 125-146. Paris: Editions Karthala.

24. Thual, Fr. Geopolitique de l'orthodoxie, p. 115.

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2. Multiplicity and the bipolar paradigm

The review of the Orthodox world shows the constant tension that exists - within the framework of the preparation of the Pan-Orthodox Council-between the Patriarchal sees of Constantinople and Moscow on the issue of the Diaspora. However, the causes of this stress and the strategies used differ significantly, despite the commonality of the area. The existence of Orthodox communities in the "diaspora", that is, outside the canonical territory of local churches, has led to new challenges for the Orthodox churches. The first is to structure communities in the diaspora. This is especially true for Greek-American Orthodox Christians who are served by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In the same perspective, one should understand the growing authority of the Moscow Patriarchate in Western Europe and its efforts to regain ownership and management rights of historical Russian possessions outside of Russia.

As Vassilios Pneumatikakis notes in his doctoral dissertation, the special geopolitical study of diasporas began after 200025. There are several possible reasons. On the one hand, this is the increased number of publications about religion after the September 11 attacks. On the other hand, interest in this topic has increased due to the entry of Orthodox figures into the international arena due to the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate and the fact that traditionally Orthodox countries-such as Cyprus (2004), Bulgaria and Romania (2007) - have joined the European Union.26 "As soon as the Orthodox Church became an object of study in the Western world, outside the traditional Eastern context, it was found that its geopolitical configuration was changing: the balance of power, ideological identifications, and cross-cutting symbolic themes became different,"he said27.

25. Pnevmatikakis, V. (2014) La geopolitique de la diaspora orthodoxe en France: territoire, pouvoir, identite. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Paris 8.

26. Massignon, B. (2005) "Les representations orthodoxes aupres de l'Union europeenne: entre concurrence inter-orthodoxe et dynamique d'europeanisation", Balkanologie 9 (1-2): 265-287.

27. Pnevmatikakis, V. La geopolitique de la diaspora orthodoxe en France, p. 14.

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2.1. Ecumenical oxymoron

The Ecumenical Patriarchate is an example of such a change. As primus inter pares ("first among equals") in the community of Orthodox churches, he seeks to overcome the situation in which he finds himself: a situation of obvious oxymoron. The primordial Orthodox Church has a very limited territory (Istanbul, most of Turkey, Mount Athos, Crete, part of northern Greece, the Dodecanese) and virtually no political support, with the exception of Greece, whose diplomatic capacity is limited by the economic crisis. The situation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey is even worse. Its congregation there is vanishingly small, and its legal status has been denied for decades. The Halki Theological Seminary has been closed since 1971. The" Great Church of Constantinople " is treated as a marginalized minority of Turkish society, despite the church's attempts to promote Turkey's integration into the European Union.28
The Ecumenical Patriarchate responded to this de facto weakness with a legitimation strategy designed to strengthen its spiritual authority over the entire Orthodox world, and above all through the establishment of spiritual jurisdiction over the Diaspora. Since the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople extends mainly to the Greek diaspora, all its initiatives are carried out outside its canonical territory, defined by the Council of Chalcedon (451). The claims of the Ecumenical Patriarchate are primarily related to its status as protos (first), enshrined in the 28th canon of this council, which gives the patriarchate the right to act outside its canonical territory.

Thus, the Church of Constantinople seeks to unite multiethnic communities and take root in those parts of the world that are located outside the territories of individual Orthodox churches. However, the problem of the diaspora is not limited to the integration process, but marks a much deeper shift in the spiritual vocation of each of the local churches. The universal message of salvation is being globalized, while theological and cultural particularities are becoming more common.-

28. Anastassiadou, M., Dumont, P. (2011) Les Grecs d'Istanbul et le patriarcat œcumenique au seuil du 21e siecle: une communaute en quete d'avenir. Paris: Cerf.

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A number of different forms of identity are scattered all over the world. Churches address the bearers of these symbols without distinguishing between religion and ethnicity. This transition from the universal to the planetary is due to the ethnization of religious symbols. Therefore, Orthodox churches with a strong national identity seek to go beyond their canonical territories in order to better express themselves on a global level. As for Orthodox diasporas, it seems that inter-Orthodox relations outside the traditional canonical territories are regulated by motivations based on ethnic identities. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus introduced a clause in its Charter (1980, Article 2), according to which its jurisdiction extends not only to the entire island territory - which created a problem of religious governance in the northern part of the island under Turkish control - but also to all Cypriots by origin. This clause was never actually applied, as it directly contradicted the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the issue of jurisdiction over the Greek-speaking diaspora, especially in England.29 Ethnically conditioned responses appear to be compounded by the loss of their own territory: communities emphasize their constitutive symbolic elements to counter any loss of identity.30
The Ecumenical Patriarchate asserts its dominant position in the Diaspora through the organization and functioning of the episcopal assemblies established by the Fourth Pan-Orthodox Pre-Conciliar Conference (Chambesy, 2009). These temporary structures are presided over by representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in various Western countries31, which makes it possible to use their national networks to voice the claims of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and confirm its primacy as representing the entire Orthodox world. The Greek American Community and the Church of Constantinople continue to maintain close ties through the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese centered in New York (since 1931) and through the Association of Archons of the Ecumenical Pa-

29. Cyprus was under British rule until 1960, so the Greek diaspora in England is widely represented by Greek Cypriots (Editor's note).
30. Mammerli, M., Mayer, J.-F. (eds.) (2014) Orthodox Identities in Western Europe: migration, settlement and innovation. Farnham, Surrey; Burlington: Ashgate.

31. Kazarian, N. (2015) "The Orthodox Church in France facing French secularism ('laicite')", Religion, State and Society 43/3: 244-261.

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the triarchy, which puts pressure on American politicians to preserve the Patriarchate in Turkey. In addition to providing significant financial assistance, the archons also engage in international lobbying, primarily in European institutions, to ensure that the issue of religious freedom in Turkey is considered as part of the overall strategy for the protection of human rights. Their goal is to perpetuate the Patriarchate's presence in Turkey, using, among other things, the requirement to reopen the theological school on Halki Island, which was closed by the Turkish authorities in 1971.

2.2. Opposition to the West and unification of the Russian Diaspora

The Moscow Patriarchate, in addition to the missionary spirit forged by the experience of the nineteenth century, directs its pastoral efforts to the formation of a collective spiritual identity - no longer purely Russian, but Slavic. A double process of "deterritorialization" is being put in place: not only by developing activity outside the Russian state, but also by giving special value to iconography (which is not so much ethnic as general cultural in its overstepping of borders), as well as to "Orthodox civilization" opposing the West. Katya Rousselet observes: "The Church not only does not accept the narrowing of its borders, but also carries out its mission within the framework of regional integration, granting "spiritual citizenship" to millions of Russians now located outside of Russia, or protecting the territory under its jurisdiction. " 32 This ability of the Moscow Patriarchate to extend its influence beyond the borders of both the Russian state and its own jurisdiction is an advantage that the country's political authorities not only do not try to minimize, but even explicitly support, entrusting the Patriarchate with the management of property that constitutes the state's religious architectural heritage outside of Russia. Legal disputes over the ownership of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral in Nice and the construction of a Russian Orthodox spiritual center in the heart of Paris should be considered in the light of the current situation. Political issues

32. Rousselet, K. (2001) "Globalisation et territoire religieux en Russie", in Bastian, J.-P., Champion, F., Rousselet, K. (eds.) La Globalisation du Religieux, p. 194. Paris: L'Harmattan.

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both spiritual spheres overlap and interact for the benefit of common interests, although their relations remain ambiguous.

The territorial reconfiguration of Orthodoxy, associated with political instability and migration flows, is accompanied by symbolic changes, and communities are alienated from each other, when they should be united. This was the situation in the Russian diaspora in France. Geopolitical upheavals during the Russian Revolution of October 1917 and the First World War shaped the Orthodox landscape of Western Europe. Many Russians fled to France from the revolution. This migration flow can be explained both by the traditional relations between France and the Russian Empire, and by the increased need for labor resources in the 1920s. According to figures provided by the League of Nations, 400 thousand Russians settled in France at that time. Previously small parochial communities grew in Paris and in major industrial areas such as Lorraine and the Northern Alps. Orthodox intellectuals have united around the St. Sergius Theological Institute in Paris.

However, opposition to communism continued to complicate the map of Orthodox jurisdictions. The increasing rigidity of the Soviet regime contributed to the emergence of schisms in the Russian Church of the Diaspora. Metropolitan Evlogy, the head of the Russian Diaspora, broke off relations with the Moscow Patriarchate and submitted a petition for the transfer of the Russian diaspora to the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the status of an exarchate. The exarchate united two-thirds of Russian emigrants, and its main centers were the St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Paris and the St. Sergius Institute. Only a small group remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate for ecclesiological reasons, denying the Patriarchate of Constantinople the right to govern the entire Orthodox diaspora. In addition, in 1926, the Russian Orthodox Church abroad was established with its center in Sremski Karlovci (Yugoslavia), but in France the presence of this conservative church was marginal.

Vasilios Pneumatikakis, following Nikolai Zernov, sees " the fragmentation of the Russian Orthodox Diaspora into three different jurisdictions as a result of the crystallization of three different approaches to the church and its relations with the state."-

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as a gift " 33. These three approaches were reduced to two in 2007, when the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Church Abroad signed the Act of Canonical Communion. This was a manifestation of the view that the authenticity of the Russian Orthodox identity is determined through an organic connection with the Moscow Patriarchate. For the Russian Orthodox Church, this connection is vital. However, from the point of view of the exarchate, ecclesiastical identity cannot be conditioned by national identity. To interact with this deterritorialized organization, the Moscow Patriarchate has a special department for external relations, which is directly responsible for contacts abroad. The current Patriarch Kirill headed this department for many years, which is vital for structuring the diaspora and its participation in international affairs.

3. Challenges of the Council: A map of Orthodox Geopolitics in the Middle East

The Middle East is undoubtedly the area where changes in Orthodox geopolitics are most noticeable. This region is a hub of many contradictions affecting the life and presence of Orthodox Churches, the traditional ties they have established over the centuries, and the political alliances they have built to ensure their existence.

3.1. Severance of communion between the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East has warned that it does not agree with holding a "Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church" until its canonical conflict with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem is resolved. Despite the fact that representatives of the Patriarchate of Antioch attended the Meeting of Primates of Orthodox Churches in Istanbul in March 2014, they did not sign the final document due to the continuing canonical conflict in Qatar.

33. Pnevmatikakis, V. (2013) La territorialite de l'Eglise orthodoxe en France, entre exclusivisme juridictionnel et catholicite locale (Carnets de geographes 6), Carnets de Geographes [http://www.carnetsdegeographes.org/carnets_recherches/rech_06_04_Prevmatikakis.php, accessed, 15.12.2016].

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The dispute began in March 2013, when the Synod of the Jerusalem Patriarchate elected Archimandrite Makarii Mavroyannakis as Archbishop of Qatar. By this act, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem created a new diocese on the canonical territory of the Patriarchate of Antioch, which includes the Archdiocese of Baghdad, Kuwait and the Arabian Peninsula and its dependent dioceses. Despite protests from the Patriarchate of Antioch, the Jerusalem Patriarchate consecrated Archimandrite Macarius six days later. At the request of Patriarch John X of Antioch, the issue was submitted for pan-Orthodox consideration. The Patriarchate of Antioch used it to put pressure on the See of Jerusalem by banning its bishops in the Diaspora from participating in local episcopal meetings. For example, during this period, Metropolitan Ignatius Al-Khushi was absent from regular meetings of the Assembly of Orthodox Bishops in France. At the extraordinary session of the Holy Synod of the Church of Antioch (April 29, 2014 The following decision was made: "The Patriarchate of Antioch is forced to ask the primates of the Local Orthodox Churches, in accordance with the requirements of ecclesiastical canon law, to help as quickly as possible in resolving this conflict that threatens Orthodox unity."34
Official negotiations between the two Patriarchates under the auspices of the Greek Foreign Minister and the Ecumenical Patriarch resulted in an agreement in June 2013, which, however, was not respected by the Jerusalem Patriarchate. This situation forced the Patriarch of Antioch in June 2015 to suspend " ecclesiastical communion with the Patriarchate of Jerusalem until a special decision is made." The Patriarch of Antioch insisted "on the principle of unanimity at all pan-Orthodox meetings when making decisions by all Orthodox sister churches, "and also stated that in practical terms"it becomes impossible for all clergy of the Church of Antioch to participate in any divine service led by or performed with the clergy of the Jerusalem Patriarchate." Meanwhile, the Jerusalem Patriarchate claims that its presence in Qatar dates back to the late 1990s and allows for the creation of a local community, as was previously the case.-

34. Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East (2014) "Communique", Orthodoxie [http://www.orthodoxie.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Communiqu%C3%A9Sessio nExtraordinaireSaintSynodeDuPatriarcatGrecOorthodoxeAntiocheAvril2014.pdf., accessed on 09.12.2015].

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issued in a communique on 10 July 2015 35. The Patriarchate of Antioch responded in August 2015 with a new Communique that drew attention to the extreme complexity of the situation. 36 The situation is currently frozen.

The Church of Antioch is at the center of tensions affecting Christians in the Middle East today, and it has also been partially affected by the Syrian conflict.37 The events described above reveal profound changes in the strategy of the Church of Antioch, which is strengthening its alliance with the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian authorities. Despite its traditional proximity to Constantinople and its openness to the Greek sphere of influence (both linguistically and politically), the geostrategic shift towards Russia and the Moscow Patriarchate highlights the weakness of Greek diplomacy as a mediator and patron state of the Greek Orthodox in the Middle East. 38 It should be noted that the designation "Greek Orthodox" means "Greek Orthodox"."in this context, it has nothing to do with citizenship or ethnic identity. It is used according to a cultural tradition left over from the Ottoman era, and refers in a broader sense to the Orthodox Church as a whole as a "Greek" (rum) community. The Greek state's diplomatic weakness is one of the consequences of the financial crisis. Greece no longer supports Orthodox churches financially. As a result, churches in this region are looking for new financial sources that can support their existence. One of these opportunities is to expand its influence in the Arab world - for example, through the establishment of new diplomatic ties with Jordan and Qatar. This opens up opportunities, among other things, for the growing influence of Russia and the Russian Church in the Middle East.

35. Patriarchate of Jerusalem (2015) "The position of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem on the interruption of communion by the Patriarchate of Antioch", Jerusalem Patriarchate Official News Gate [http://www.jp-newsgate.net/en/2015/07/10/15575, accessed on 09.12.2015].

36. Patriarchate of Antioch (August 2015) "Communique", Orthodoxie [http://orthodoxie.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Com_Antioche_Qatar.pdf, accessed on 09.12.2015].

37. Colosimo, J.-F. (2015) Les hommes en trop. Paris: Fayard.

38. Prevelakis, G. (1997) Geopolitique de la Grece. Bruxelles: Ed. Complexe.

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3.2. Moscow Patriarchate in the Middle East

The Syrian conflict that erupted in March 2011 highlighted this policy of expansion. Syrian Christians - of all denominations - fear that the end of Bashar al-Assad's regime will lead to the dominance of political Islamism and that the result will be even greater marginalization. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the overwhelming majority of Christians in the country are cared for by the Greek Orthodox Church of Antioch and All the East, whose patriarchal see is located in Damascus. There is a danger that a change in the political regime in Syria will not ensure the protection of Christians. At the very beginning of the conflict, Patriarch Kirill, referring to the example of Iraq, did not hide his rejection of external interference that destabilizes the situation of minorities in the country, especially Christians, and expressed concerns about possible persecution.

The Patriarchates of Antioch and Moscow have a long history of mutual relations. Among other things, it is associated with a strong flow of Russian pilgrims to the Holy Land, in particular, to those places that are under the jurisdiction of the church authorities of Damascus, and not Jerusalem. This is partly due to the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, which was founded in 1882 and strengthened ties between the two churches.

The stalemate of the conflict and incessant fighting forced Patriarch Ignatius IV of Antioch to break his silence and issue the following press release on August 1, 2012::

"Christians had to flee their cities, leaving everything they owned, and our priests were forced to leave their churches... We now appeal to the United Nations to understand our beloved country, respect it, and work together to achieve peace and stability in Syria." Patriarch Ignatius IV died a few months later. A new Patriarch, John X, was elected on 17 December 201239.

A collection of humanitarian aid was organized in Russia, and the change of primate did not call into question the religious union between Damascus and Moscow. However, two events that happened soon contributed to drawing Christians into the existing world order.

39. Kazarian, N. (2014) "Orthodox Diplomacy" of Patriarch Kirill", in Dubien, A. (ed.) Russia 2014: The View from the Observatoire Franco-Russe, p. 398-407. Paris: Cherche midi.

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conflict. The first was the abduction in April 2013 of Metropolitan Paul of Aleppo (brother of Patriarch John X of Antioch) and Syro-Jacobite Metropolitan John Ibrahim of Aleppo; the second was the massacre in the Christian village of Maaloula by a group of rebels in August 2013. These events served as a sign for Christians, foreshadowing their fate in the event of the overthrow of the Assad regime.

The main phases of our review relate to what Antoine Sfeir calls "parallel diplomacy": it is not limited to Syria, but also constitutes a global strategy for the Middle East.40 According to the editor-in-chief of Cahiers de l'Orient, the Moscow Patriarchate's care for Eastern Christians was made possible by the withdrawal of France from its traditional responsibility, as well as by the pragmatic position of the United States, which wanted an exodus of Christians from the region, which would ensure the uniformity of its ethnic landscape. At first glance, the Russian Church's geostrategic approach to the Syrian issue is fully consistent with the Kremlin's diplomatic position. Nevertheless, the Moscow Patriarchate, and even more so Patriarch Kirill, undoubtedly have resources and influence that go beyond traditional ties, which allows Russia to once again exert serious influence in the eastern Mediterranean, especially with the start of Russia's military operations against the Islamic State in September 2015.

Conclusion

The Orthodox Church itself is a geopolitical reality. This fact has an impact on the preparation of the Holy and Great Council, which is scheduled for June 2016. Will this be the last chance for the fourteen Orthodox churches to ensure their unity? Various political agendas, as well as the growth of Orthodox communities in the Diaspora, are factors that regulate inter-Orthodox relations. Obviously, these factors are not sufficient to contain the centrifugal forces that affect them. Thus, the Ukrainian conflict and the crisis in the Middle East are just two of the many challenges facing the international community.-

40. Sfeir, A. (2011) "La France ne defendant plus les chretiens d'Orient, la Russie a pris le relais", Atlantico, November 21.

page 122
the glorious Church collided in the first decades of the third millennium. We will note other key geopolitical issues that remain outside the scope of this article:

* Official recognition of the Ecumenical Patriarchate by the Turkish authorities and opening of the Halki Theological School;

* Compatibility of the West and the Russian Orthodox Church;

* Transition period from communism to EU membership in Romania and Bulgaria;

* The process of Serbia's accession to the European Union and the situation of Orthodoxy in Kosovo;

* The Orthodox Church's place in Greece during the economic and political crisis;

* The ongoing division of Cyprus.

Obviously, this is not a complete list, but it highlights the fragile position of the Orthodox Church as it seeks to define itself as a community. These very specific geopolitical aspects and the associated strategic changes create conditions for maintaining bipolar tensions, reminiscent of the situation we faced during the Cold War. The differences between the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow boil down to the traditional geopolitical tension between authority and power: authority is based on the ability to mobilize symbols; power implies the ability to concentrate not only symbolic, but also human, financial, political and territorial resources in certain areas. The Pan-Orthodox Council will show how authority and power relate. During the XX century. The Orthodox Church has shown genuine flexibility with regard to political contexts, from the status of a State religion to the oppression of official atheism. Changing geopolitical paradigms is a long and complex process that continues to influence the mosaic picture of Orthodox spirituality, accelerating changes related to faith, identity, territory, and politics.

Translated from English by Maria Khramova

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