The article examines various changes that took place in the political life of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the first decade of the XXI century, reflecting the transition of society and the state from the traditional to the modern state.

Key words: monarchy, modernization, conflicts.

POWER AND VIOLENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA AND EVOLUTION OF THEIR AIMS AND METHODS IN THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

The paper examines the particularities of the changes in the political system of Saudi Arabia in the last years and the evolution of the Saudi Kingdom from traditional to modern state.

Keywords: monarchy, modernization, conflicts.

Completion of the socio-economic modernization process in Saudi Arabia by the end of the 20th century. It has exacerbated the problem of the correspondence of the political system and the norms of political life to the significantly changed state of society and the socio-economic conditions of its existence. Over the past decade and a half of the twenty-first century, the Arab world has undergone major political changes, both due to internal political processes and the impact of external factors. Major changes are also taking place in the global system. All this could not but affect the political culture and political life of Saudi society and the Saudi state, which is encouraged to respond to the challenges of the time and adapt to the conditions of the modern world.

The modern Saudi state was created in the early 20th century. in the conditions and norms of a pre-modern society. Violence was a natural and rational tool of the Al-Saud family's power to form a centralized state in the early feudal society of Arabia (however, along with other tools - bribing the sheikhs of individual tribes or establishing matrimonial ties with them).

At the same time, one should not exaggerate the significance of this instrument as a purely "Arabian"one.

YAKOVLEV Alexander Ivanovich-Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor. Faculty of World Politics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Leading Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, aliv_yak@mail.ru.

Alexander YAKOVLEV - Doctor of Sciences (in History), Professor, Faculty of World Politics, Moscow State University; Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, aliv_yak@mail.ru.

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"The state, as well as the political unions that historically preceded it, is an attitude of domination of people over people, based on legitimate (i.e., considered legitimate) violence as a means," M. Weber noted. "Thus, for it to exist, the people who are under domination must submit to the authority claimed by those who now rule" (Weber, 1990, p. 646).

The concepts of "power", "violence" and "authority" at that time turned out to be equivalent. The level of political culture of the very diverse, but generally pre-modern, Arabian society was such that the Al-Saud family obtained the consent of the population of different parts of Arabia (subjects) to its rule by both coercion and free consent, and thereby gained legitimacy. Violence in one form or another became the main method of uniting the various tribes of Arabia around the Al Saud family, as it was in the era of early feudalism and in European countries. It could not have been otherwise in the conditions of relative economic independence of the population of different regions of Arabia, the preserved tribal way of life, and only the principle of absolute supremacy of royal power being established. The psychology of a noble Bedouin in relation to the Al Saud family, in my opinion, conveys the old proverb: "If you can't hit this hand, kiss it" [Aburish, p. 16].

The sphere of politics was initially closed to the people and society, political functions were delegated to tribal sheikhs, ulema and the commercial and usurious elite of the urban population. The functions of political parties were performed by family, tribal, community and religious communities and associations. Under the conditions of the formation of an absolute monarchy at the beginning of the XX century, the population remained in medieval times and recognized themselves not as tributaries of Ibn Saud, but as free members of the Ummah, submitting not only to the power of power, but also to the authority of the Sheikh of sheikhs. By the expression X. According to Armstrong, "Ibn Saud became the Lord of Arabia because of the strength of his personality and the strength of his weapons" (Armstrong, p. 291). This preservation of elements of tribal consciousness has become an important feature of the emerging new political culture of society.

Among the original features of Saudi political culture, it is necessary to distinguish as an obvious ideal the state of the first, "righteous" caliphs, based on strict observance of Sharia norms; tribal principles as a symbol of communal democracy; a rigid power vertical organizing a single centralized state; delegation of the majority of the population of their political rights to the top of society.

Thus, political power in Saudi Arabia, as in any other state, was associated with violence as a necessary and legitimate attribute of the state, which has a monopoly on its use. The use of violence was regulated and mitigated by the norms of Islam and tribal tradition. A special feature of the Saudi political culture and political system was a certain correlation of violence and consent developed in the 1910s and 1930s in order to preserve the political order, i.e., the stability of the socio-economic system and the reproduction of the existing regime.

But later, when the initial goal of creating a unified state under the rule of the Al - Saud family was achieved, the consolidation of statehood also took place with the use of violence. We can recall the suppression of tribal resistance in the second half of the 1930s, and the repression of workers in the ARAMCO oil fields in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The change in political culture in the kingdom is directly related to the modernization of society carried out by the authorities in the 1960s and 1970s. A natural part of this process was, on the one hand, the gradual development and complication of various state-legal institutions (the creation of the Ministry of Justice, Higher Legal Education, etc.).

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council), and on the other hand-more noticeable changes in the worldview and worldview of the educated part of Saudi society, included in the modern way of life. Graduates of Saudi and American universities could no longer fail to recognize the contradiction between the norms of the Western model of the industrial and democratic world of the second half of the twentieth century and the realities of Saudi Arabia with the dominance of the patriarchal way of life. Individual changes in the state apparatus did not affect the foundations of statehood - its authoritarian nature, direct connection with Islamic principles and tribal traditions.

The head of state - the king - was still perceived not so much as an analogue of the European monarch, but in a different capacity-the guardian of the two holy places of Islam, the imam and the sheikh of sheikhs. The monarch represented legislative, executive, and judicial powers, but " in practice, the king delegated these functions to State agencies, institutions, or individuals..."[Vasiliev, 1999, p. 514]. The absolute nature of the monarch's power was also limited by the norms of Islam in the form of Quranic precepts (for example, Sura 42, verses 36 and 38) and tribal traditions (a long-accepted consultative practice).

The political system in the 1960s and 1970s retained its character, and hence the ways and methods of its defense. Examples of this include the shooting of a demonstration against the creation of TV stations in Jeddah and Riyadh in July 1965, the brutal repression of participants in a military plot in 1969, the punishment of Princess Mishaa and her husband in January 1978, and finally the defeat of the rebels who seized the Great Mosque in Mecca in November 1979.

At the same time, the literal application of the concepts of "absolutism" and "authoritarianism" to political life in Saudi Arabia contradicted the norms of Sharia, according to which all people are equal before Allah, as well as the strong traditions of tribal democracy. Subjects swore an oath of loyalty to the king on the principle of "obedience is obedience" both in case of prosperity and in case of disaster. The open and direct connection between the supreme ruler and his people is expressed by the saying "the leader of the people is his servant". Any Saudi could address the King by name, and the King and Crown Prince set aside a weekly day to receive their subjects, who, however, could also submit a written request directly to the head of state.

In most Arab countries, the political systems that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century changed to a greater or lesser extent under the influence of both internal and external factors. While maintaining the forms of government and the type of state structure, political regimes had to respond to the challenges of a modernized Arab society that was becoming more educated and assimilating the norms of industrial bourgeois society. An external factor in the face of Western countries also had a certain impact on political processes.

Contradictions and conflicts that arose between the society and / or its active segments led to a change in the political balance in the society. However, in the political culture of Arab countries, contrary to the logic of modernization, along with the increasing activity of educated pro-Western youth, traditional sentiments were growing. This was all the more typical for the kingdom, despite the external features of westernization of public life.

In Saudi Arabia, there was no separation of politics and religion, since the entire public and state life of the kingdom is held together by the core of Islam. The main subject of political life was still the state, often the leader of the state, so the struggle for changing the balance of political forces unfolded around it. This is quite a specific feature of Muslim political culture-the preservation and recognition of the power of a charismatic leader sanctified by spiritual authority (the basis is considered to be the 42nd Surah of the Koran: "He answers

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those who believe and do good deeds... " and "He sent a Messenger and revealed to him what He willed according to His will").

At the same time, the traditional political institutions of Western culture (executive, representative, and judicial authorities) were less important, especially since there were no political parties, trade unions, or free media). Only one institution of statehood - the army-has remained and remains important in the political life of Arab countries and, most likely, in the kingdom.

In Saudi Arabia, as in the entire group of oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the form and basic type of statehood (absolute Islamic monarchy) are not questioned, but it should be noted that the new foundations of their statehood have significantly supplemented the traditional ones - the Koran, Islamic law and tribal way of life. This is primarily an act of constitutional significance - the Basic Law (Nizam), adopted in Saudi Arabia in 1992, and the Advisory Council, a body that formally performs parliamentary functions, created at the same time. These attributes of modern statehood have become a response to the growing pressure of the times.

Yes, the Kingdom remains an authoritarian state, but the authorities use violence selectively and only against opposition forces, real or perceived. Thus, in recent decades there has been a transition from "hard authoritarianism" to "moderate authoritarianism" [Zheltov, Zheltov, pp. 290-295]. This transition corresponds to the level of consciousness of the inhabitants of the modernized kingdom and the changed political culture.

In the modern industrial bourgeois society created over several decades, new social forces were formed: the middle urban strata - the small, medium and large bourgeoisie, the national intelligentsia, a wide layer of bureaucracy and employees, hired workers and technicians, and military personnel (see below).

Formal indicators of social development are quite positive. A typical indicator - the number of cars per 1 thousand people-in Saudi Arabia is 472 cars (for comparison, in Belgium - 483, in Sweden - 466). An unexpected consequence of modernization was a change in the diet of yesterday's Bedouins, which gave rise to an abrupt increase in the number of people suffering from obesity: in Saudi Arabia, 23.0% of the population, in Kuwait - 29.6%, in the United Arab Emirates - 24.5% [Mir v tsifrakh, 2013, p.62, 77].

The results of modernization in Saudi Arabia are evidenced not only by the figures of GDP and oil revenues, but also by modern infrastructure and a high standard of living for the majority of the population. It is noteworthy that in terms of such an indicator as the human development index, the kingdom ranks quite worthy of 54th place (77.0) between Mexico and Panama [World in Numbers, 2013, p.18].

Young people are required to receive free primary and - most of them-secondary and full secondary education, more than half-higher education [Annual Report, 2010, p. 202]. At the initiative of the Crown Prince, later King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, a complete computerization of the national education system was carried out at the end of the 20th century. The training program has been changed: it provides for an increase in hours spent studying exact sciences and the possibility for students to choose courses based on their own interests. This directly contradicts the traditional teaching method, which was based on rote learning and obedience.

However, solving old problems inevitably creates new ones. Due to the economic downturn and fluctuations in oil prices, unemployment in the country has exceeded 10% and has been growing in recent years due to young people with mainly secondary and higher education and seeking to get a job in the civil service. The long-standing disdain of the kingdom's indigenous Bedouin nomads for "dirty work"also plays a role. In 2009, the total number of unemployed people was 463 thousand, including 161.1 thousand. had secondary education, 258.7 thousand-higher education [Annual Report,

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2010, p. 221]. Meanwhile, foreign workers continue to fill vacant positions at hundreds of industrial enterprises and infrastructure facilities.

The roots of this attitude to technical professions and work in material production lie in the memory of Saudi society about despised slaves and artisans engaged in manual labor. In 2010, out of the total number of students and postgraduates of higher educational institutions and colleges - 706.9 thousand people-only 86.7 thousand people. They were trained in technical specialties [Annual Report, 2010, p. 204, 380]. This was one of the reasons for the permanent existence of millions of foreign workers (engineers, technicians, workers) in the oil monarchies of Arabia, which make up the majority of those employed in the industry (except oil), housing and utilities and infrastructure of these countries. In 2010, 18.5 million indigenous people and 6.8 million foreigners lived in Saudi Arabia, while the ratio of the amateur population was 4.3 million Saudis and 4.3 million foreigners, respectively [Annual Report, 2010, p. 204]. The high level of social security for all indigenous residents of the kingdom due to oil revenues, as well as the ability to easily (until recently) get a job in the civil service, prevent the labor market from meeting the demand for indigenous technical personnel. For example, in the industrial enterprises of the private sector of the kingdom in 2010, the ratio of Saudis to foreigners was (thousand people) in agriculture and fishing-8.4 and 527.4, manufacturing - 83.4 and 649.0, construction-184.2 and 2,692.4, trade-180.2 and 1,377.7 [Annual Report, 2010, p. 225]. Emir Naif bin Abdulaziz, as Minister of the Interior, said::

"We can't just blame businessmen for the slow pace of Saudization [of the labor force]. Our young people should also bear some of the blame. Young people should prepare themselves for any job. Their desire to work for even a small fee will encourage employers to cherish them and raise their salaries" (cit. by: [Filonik, Vavilov, p. 118]).

At the same time, there have been qualitative changes in the state and administrative apparatuses, and the quality and efficiency of work have improved. This is evidenced by the data of world organizations for Saudi Arabia. The indicator " level of business environment "(corruption, red tape) for 2011 decreased and it now takes only five days to register a new company, just like in Canada and Portugal [Mir v tsifrakh, 2013, p. 55].

However, statistical indicators of success only cover up negative trends in the socio-political sphere: the problem of unemployment among educated indigenous youth can potentially turn into a "youth revolt", as it happened in the Arab countries in the spring of 2011. Thanks to oil revenues, the government can mitigate discontent for a long time, while maintaining a sufficient level of material consumption, and stop the manifestations of social discontent, but only for the indigenous population. Another threat remains: the eight million foreign workers who are in the kingdom on a permanent or temporary basis and who pose a potentially permanent threat, which will require a "stick" rather than a "carrot"to eliminate.

The kingdom's repressive apparatus includes the police, security service, Army, National Guard and border troops. In contrast to the situation in the 1960s, when there were cases of extrajudicial repression, the authorities now use the judicial authorities to suppress open opponents and opponents.

In order to minimize violence against foreign workers in the 1980s, detailed standards of their stay in Saudi Arabia were developed, later some forms of their independent activities were allowed, and the publication of print media in English (as an appendix to Saudi newspapers) was started.

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At the same time, there are ideological reasons for discontent in Saudi society itself. Ideology in its Western sense, as a holistic system of views and ideas that express the interests of certain segments of people and offer the goal of their socio-political activities, now plays an insignificant role in the Arab world in general and in the Saudi Kingdom in particular.

But political power cannot be built and maintained only by relying on violence. Along with coercion, the authorities seek to increase the consent of their subjects, their voluntary submission. An important function of the state was to assert its hegemony in public life by convincing people of the need to support it. This task is solved by a kind of "ideological apparatus of the state", which includes religious institutions, the education system, the media and cultural institutions (festivals of traditional culture, charitable and other public associations).

The role of ideology is played by politicized Islam, partly by the emerging Saudi patriotism and Arab nationalism, sometimes identified with "Arab (or) Islamic socialism". The religious activity of the state authorities and the religiosity of the society itself perform the functions of politics in society. Following the path of "catch-up modernization" according to the Western model, the countries of the East "missed" the Reformation and secularization, which are fundamentally important for the modern model of Western society, in which religion has become a marginal phenomenon. Thus, the ideas of justice and equality in Western political life were based on socialist teachings, while in the Arab-Muslim world these ideas remained an organic part of the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.

A specific type of ideology in the modern Arab world has become the "ideology of consumption", the essence of which is" the exchange of political rights for economic stability " (V. A. Kuznetsov). The "ideology of consumption" is based not only on normal conservatism, the deep commitment of the Saudis to their traditions, but also on "increased self-esteem, which grew on the basis of the created social and individual welfare..." [Filonik, Vavilov, p.15]. However, man is not only a material being. He has moods, beliefs, certain ideas, and in the conditions of modern society, he often wants to show his activity. This potential social pressure is palpable in the kingdom.

A large part of educated Saudis are no longer ready to be content with seeing the formal official facade of the monarchy, while the real mechanism of statehood is still traditional in essence tribal and religious institutions. The Basic Law (Nizam) of 1992 (see: [Saudi Basic Acts]) states that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab Islamic state, the religion of which is Islam, the constitution is the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet, and the language is Arabic (Article 1). The system of government in Saudi Arabia is monarchical, with a ruling dynasty, established by King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud, headed by his sons ' sons (Article 5). The source of the regime's power is the Qur'an and Sunnah, which must comply with other laws (Article 7). Power in the kingdom is based on the principles of justice, consultation and equality, which are declared by one of the articles of the Basic Law. According to it, the Majlis (council) The King's and Crown Prince's Majlis will be open to all subjects, so that everyone can use their right to discuss any issues with the authorities (Article 43).

The main subject in the political life of the kingdom remains the ruling family of Al Saud, within which there are various groups and clans. Within this political and economic corporation, its parts (clans, groups) enter into relations with each other, based on their own interests, but they are ready to come to an agreement based on the highest interest - the preservation of the power of the Al Saud family. However

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The less active part of Saudi society is ready to take back the right to political participation that it gave to Kings Ibn Saud and King Faisal and use it for themselves.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Advisory Council's activities, the expansion of its composition and powers, the activation of public (business, women's, cultural and student) public organizations, as well as the establishment of the Center for National Dialogue (dialogue between Government and society) in 2003 at the initiative of the Crown Prince, later King Abdullah, and the holding of free elections to local authorities they indicate reasonable political reforms (see [Kosach, 2007]). The government is making changes that society is already ready for, but which at the same time do not pose a real threat to the dominance of the Al Saud family in the political life of the kingdom.

Al Saud's right to rule is not openly questioned in the Kingdom these days. The new goals of the dynasty are to increase and strengthen its social support, reform certain institutions of statehood in accordance with the changed conditions in the country and the increased independence of new social forces in society - the national bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and employees. These new social forces, on the other hand, seem to be committed to the principles of the existing political culture and so far do not claim power, but only to participate in power.

Thus, in the new century, the goals of the government and society in political life change, the political culture of society changes, but the principles of the political system remain unchanged. These circumstances and, to a lesser extent, the influence of an external factor (Western states and human rights organizations) influence the correlation between the methods of violence and consent used by the authorities. The space for violence is still narrowing.

This is not to say that the authorities did not respond to the growing challenges. King Faisal once disparagingly called parliament "a crutch for a weak ruler", but his younger brother King Fahd created an Advisory Council in 1992. Over the past twenty years, this body has gained some significance, turning into a proto-parliament with committees, commissions, hearing reports from ministers, making recommendations to the king on many issues of the country's life. At the same time, this body of legislative power is perceived by society not as a borrowed political institution of the Western model, but as a completely traditional institution of governance based on the principle of deliberativeness, which arose during the reign of King Ibn Saud and went through various stages of development in 1924-1952, 1953-1969, 1970-1991 (see: [Al-Malik Saleh, p. 6-32]).

At the beginning of the XXI century, in the context of globalization, the emergence of the world information space and the intensification of people's mobility, King Abdullah realized that the consent of subjects to submit to it was becoming increasingly important for the authorities in the kingdom. The time has passed when this consent was initially implied in the conditions of an archaic tribal community that recognized the primacy of Ibn Saud. Now it has become necessary for the authorities to legitimize this consent.

Of course, the traditional authority of the ruling Al-Saud family, the authority of the traditional system of values, the habit (stereotype) to the existing political order that is understandable to the population, as well as the high material standard of living that the authorities provide (using bribery, for example, in the midst of the "Arab Spring" in 2011) are still very important.

The state-administrative apparatus, which is formed partly according to the criteria of loyalty to the authorities, also works to preserve the traditional dominance of the Al-Saud family. In Saudi Arabia, the bureaucracy is subordinate to the monarch as head of state and head of government. This subordination is patrimonial in nature. In fact, we can talk about the formation of a trend of corporatism: two large alliances of interests (factions within the Al Saud family and a huge bureaucratic one).

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administrative staff) are incorporated into the mechanism of state power, while maintaining autonomy in relation to the state in the political and economic spheres. At the same time, these powerful conditional corporations, determined by the interests of their participants and their own practices, remain true to the fundamental values of Saudi culture.

But the world is changing, and for a formally absolute monarchy, it becomes necessary to meet the challenge of the times. According to M. Weber, this is the preservation of the already achieved dominance, but already " by virtue of legality, by virtue of faith in the obligation of legal establishment and business "competence", based on rationally created rules, i.e. orientation to submission in the implementation of established rules..." [Weber, 1990, p.647].

At the beginning of the twenty-first century in Saudi Arabia, fear and habit as motivations for political behavior of people noticeably weakened. When it is impossible to simply reproduce the existing political order, a certain adaptation of the political system takes place, but traditional violence prevents the establishment of effective communication between the authorities and their subjects, and without such feedback, the authorities lose their effectiveness.

King Abdullah has begun to increase the powers of local self-government bodies, whose elections are already held according to modern standards, moreover, women are allowed to participate. Thus, although the principle of democracy has not become the leading one in the country's political life, elements of democracy, both traditional tribal and modern Western, are clearly present there. And just as in the case of ideology, the genesis of the principles of democracy and equality lies not in the Westminster model, but in the norms of tribal society that have not yet been outlived.

In Saudi Arabia, as in a number of neighboring countries of the Arabian Peninsula, a specific type of statehood has been formed - neo-absolutist. Its appearance was caused by the need for the Saudi dynasty to fit in with the realities of the twentieth century, as well as the rapid oil modernization, which resulted in a leap from a semi-feudal state to an industrial, bourgeois society.

The normative model of capitalist society, in which, according to M. Friedman, "for a free person, the country should be a collection of its constituent individuals, and not some higher authority" [Friedman, p.25], was not implemented in Saudi Arabia due to other civilizational foundations of the Arabian society. Moreover, M. Friedman's conviction that " economic freedom is a necessary means to achieve political freedom "[Friedman, p. 31] also completely failed to materialize in the kingdom. "Capitalism in Arabia" is of a different nature. In Western countries, its development was carried out democratically (from the bottom up), with mass support in the face of representatives of the small-capitalist system, which can be called the "stalagmite type of development". In the Eastern countries, under conditions of accelerated development with the active participation of the state ("revolution from above"), the new system was immediately built at the level of the medium - and large - scale capitalist system, and this is a different "stalactite type of development". Traditionally, the dominant strata (the Al Saud family, sheikhs, top merchants and moneylenders) gained economic superiority under the conditions of capitalist management. The modernizing society has not developed an equally competitive environment, which has given rise to the proverb: "Not all our merchants are emirs, but all emirs are merchants."

Socio-economic processes have far outstripped socio-cultural processes, and many structures and elements of traditional Bedouin and Islamic society have not been eliminated. Therefore, the monarchical system, even in its absolutist form, largely meets the level of consciousness of the majority of the population and the tasks that a modernized society is designed to solve, as well as the challenges generated by the external world.

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It seems that Saudi neo-absolutism has played its necessary role as a social arbiter of old and new social forces, but it has not exhausted its potential. Hence, in the current political life, the emergence of heterogeneous tendencies - to preserve authoritarian principles and promote democratic principles. Both generally fit into the logic of traditional Bedouin thinking and the Muslim way of life.

The constraints on the democratization of political life remain not only the reluctance of the Al Saud family to weaken its monopoly on power (in fact, this process is already underway), but also the unwillingness of educated society and the masses to adequately perceive such institutions of the Western democratic model as free elections, the activities of political parties and the parliament as a real authority. All this is too alien to traditional norms and values of social life, in which loyalty to the tribe is more important than loyalty to the state, and elements of tribal democracy largely meet the needs of ordinary residents of the country. An attempt to consolidate the status quo was King Fahd bin Abdulaziz's address to the nation in 1992, in which he pointed to "a long tradition of love, mercy, justice, mutual respect and loyalty" in Saudi society, where "there is no ruler or subject. All are equal before the law of the Lord, all are equal in love of the motherland... " (quoted in [Kosach, p. 26]).

Thus, the tribal traditions and principles of Islam were not challenged in the process of modernizing Saudi society, but, on the contrary, were preserved at the heart of its social structure and modified statehood. This circumstance, as well as the preservation of the neo-absolutist nature of Saudi statehood, was assessed in a peculiar way by international human rights organizations, placing the kingdom at the end of the list in the world democracy rating (1.77) after Iran (1.98) and the Central African Republic (1.82). For comparison, this list is headed by Norway (9.8) and Iceland (9.65) [World in Numbers, 2013, p. 29], although in terms of "providing the greatest multilateral and bilateral assistance" in % of GDP, Saudi Arabia is in the honorable 6th place (0.77) after the Netherlands (0.81) and before Belgium (0.64) [World in Numbers, 2013, p. 35].

Meanwhile, public activity is also evident in Saudi Arabia itself. There are about 200 charitable organizations (27,000 members) in the kingdom, and large international organizations such as the King Faisal Foundation and the King Abdulaziz Foundation are active, providing financial support to various scientific projects, paying special attention to projects in the fields of natural sciences and medicine [Saudi Arabia, p. 224-225].

The authorities ' response to criticism of the undemocratic regime in the kingdom in the Western media was a propaganda campaign to explain the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia to the world community. During this campaign, Saudi lawyers and theologians showed the fundamental differences between the entire system of Western law and the Islamic system of law based on the Koran and Sharia. "All Muslims, from the moment they convert to Islam, must release their will, so that it is not subject to anyone but Allah-He is Great and Powerful... Sharia law organizes the spheres of this freedom and defines its concept, conditions and limits of its application...", - wrote the Minister of Islamic Affairs Dr. Abdallah ibn Abdel-Muhsin Al-Turki [Turki, p. 47].

But at the beginning of the XXI century, serious changes began in the world. The events of the "Arab renaissance" in 2011-2013 in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, as well as in Bahrain, and especially in the fall of 2014 and spring of 2015 in Yemen, directly affected the political situation in Saudi Arabia. Law-abiding, or rather, reverence for the principle of obedience, weakened among some young people by the beginning of the new century, but for the time being it resulted in minor hooligan incidents, and in acts of resistance in the Eastern (Shiite) province.-

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of power. Now, with the development of new forms of mass communication, there are new opportunities for expressing one's beliefs and moods, as well as for self-organization. There, and earlier in large cities, police armored cars were parked at intersections and near important political and social objects. The events of the "Arab Spring" in 2011 led to an increase in the regime's rigidity. Control over large contingents of foreign workers, as well as the Shiite minority in the Eastern Province of the kingdom, was strengthened. In addition to the "stick", a "carrot" was also used: in the spring of 2011, by the decision of King Abdullah, considerable payments were made to all subjects.

At the same time, it turned out that control over electronic communications is no less important than maintaining order on the streets. According to the index of free press, non-freedom in the field of mass media, censorship, pressure and monopoly position in the UK were identified at 83.25, along with Uzbekistan (83.0), closer to North Korea (141.0) than to the UK (2.0) [Mir v tsifrakh, 2013, p. 87].

There are no political parties in the country, and Western-style political activity is still banned, although the recent municipal elections were an important indicator of evolution. The main subject of political life remains the ruling family of the Saudis, in the depths of which there is a struggle of various clans and factions based on different groups of the national bourgeoisie, bureaucracy and intelligentsia. The power of the Internet seems to have created a formal basis for dissent outside the ruling family.

Here are some typical events. In the spring of 2014, a young Saudi man was sentenced to 10 years in prison for criticizing the authorities on Twitter. He called for protests against the existing government in the kingdom, and previously served time in prison. Another Saudi citizen who signed a commitment not to criticize the authorities online was still sentenced to eight years. At the same time, atheism, propaganda of atheistic ideology by any means, and opinions that cast doubt on the Islamic faith were declared a crime [CNN, 03/11/2014].

At the same time, liberal political radicalism is rejected by a significant part of Saudi society, including its materially modernized part, which remains faithful to the norms and values of traditional political culture and does not want to give up a high level of material security for the sake of uncertain and dubious political benefits. "We are not able to assess how powerful the inertia of traditional values can be," L. Harrison stated with regret in the book "The Main Truth of Liberalism" [Harrison, p. 105].

The Kingdom has established a Communications and Information Technology Commission, whose functions include monitoring websites that contain information that is offensive to the ideological and moral foundations of society. By the way, among its 25 employees there were quite a few graduates of leading Western universities. And every day the Commission receives more than 1 thousand messages from residents of the kingdom about "harmful" sites and links. This increases the effectiveness of censorship, and the authorities inform the user why a particular site is blocked. E. Morozov gives an example of a highly professional government attack on the independent site "Tomaar", created by Saudis discussing public problems [Morozov, 2014, p.144, 147-148].

In January 2015, Saudi Internet activist Raif Badawi was sentenced by a court to 1,000 canings. The punishment was carried out in public in front of a mosque in Jeddah: he received 50 blows, and the punishment will last on Fridays for 20 weeks. (A mobile phone video recording of the execution of the sentence was posted on the Internet.) He previously served one year in prison after setting up the Free Saudi Liberals website in 2008, despite protests from Amnesty International.

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In 2013, he was also brought to trial. The activist's wife and children live in Canada [CAW, 9.01.2015].

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Saudi authorities found themselves in a difficult situation. The simplified division of the outside world into a pro-Western, Jewish-communist or atheist one and a single Eastern, Arab-Muslim one is a thing of the past. New ways and methods of controlling political life must now be found within the immutable parameters of statehood.

Saudi Arabia's refusal to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2013 was caused not only by foreign policy considerations, but also by domestic political calculation: a decrease in the level of the Islamic wave in Saudi society itself. However, the emergence of the Islamic State (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in early 2014 is already directly threatening Saudi Arabia itself.

In neighboring Jordan, on October 1, 2014, mass riots took place in the capital: thousands of people took to the streets of Amman to express support for the pan-Arab movement of the Islamic State. In July 2014, the UAE authorities arrested several dozen people on charges of supporting an " Islamist conspiracy." It is more than likely that there are many supporters of the ideas of the Islamic State in Saudi Arabia. In the fall of 2014, arrests were made in the country: The Interior Ministry arrested 88 people involved in a secret terrorist network [CNN, 03.09.2014].

According to Western observers, the ruling regime in late 2014 tightened its domestic policy in response to attempts by Islamic radicals of various kinds to undermine and weaken the existing norms of political life. First of all, through the adoption of "anti-terrorist laws", all attempts to create an alternative center of political power to the ruling Al-Saud family are suppressed [The Financial Times, 26.03.2014].

At the GCC Heads of State meeting in December 2014, despite obvious differences between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and other Council States, the general negative attitude towards terrorism was shared. Unlike Qatar, the Saudi authorities and the rulers of other oil monarchies seek to localize the "revolutionary bacterium" generated by the "Arab spring" of 2011, which uses exclusively violence and terror against the existing Arab regimes. According to Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, "Afghanistan was a primary school for terrorists, and Syria and Iraq became a university for them" [The Straits Times, 08.12.2014].

The brutality of international terrorism demanded an adequate response. It is worth recalling the words of King Abdullah, who stated back in 1989 that

"Islam rejects violence in all its forms and forms, and allows murder to be committed only with justice. Islam is a religion of mercy, compassion and equality of all nations and nationalities. Muslims are innocent of what is done in the name of Islam by those who claim to represent Islam, but in reality only disguise themselves as Islam, serving those who are interested in undermining the authority of Islam and Muslims." by: [Shukiyainen, p. 81]).

The events in Yemen in the spring of 2015 led to the victory of forces belonging to the traditional political culture, but also to a different branch of Islam. This not only destabilizes the political situation in the kingdom, but along with the activities of ISIS, it openly challenges both the ruling regime and the state itself. The result of the Saudi army's military operations against Yemeni rebels, which began in late 2014 and intensified in March 2015, will be a tightening of the political climate in the country, strengthening state control over the manifestations of activity in public life.

There are many reasons to conclude that the ruling regime in the kingdom is undergoing a transition period. This is also a generational change in the Saudi dynasty, where

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the youngest of the sons of the founder of the state, Abdel Aziz, is already over 80 years old. This is also a change in the worldview of a large generation of young and educated Saudis. These are challenges from a number of Arab States, where the activity of society has found its formal framework, as well as the diverse influence of the era of globalization that the world has entered. The authorities do not lose sight of the potential threat of millions of foreign workers permanently present in the country.

The emerging trend towards the democratization of the political system and the creation of even small opportunities for social activity, along with the active existence of an Advisory Council, suggests the possibility of avoiding a revolutionary coup. The authorities, even if belatedly, react to the changes. A peculiar act of "democratizing absolutism" was the creation in 2006 of a new state body - the Swearing-in Committee consisting of representatives of various clans of the Saudi dynasty, whose function was to determine the next candidate for the throne, which was previously the exclusive prerogative of the king. The possibility of transforming Saudi statehood from neo-absolutist to a constitutional monarchy cannot be ruled out.

King Salman bin Abdulaziz, who succeeded his older brother Abdullah on January 23, 2015, is likely to continue his policy of situational gradual changes in political life.

The authorities can not ignore the noticeable changes in the world, the ongoing "change of milestones". "Today, in the era of the triumph of globalism, the crisis of state sovereignty, the decline of parliaments and party representation," states the Italian political theorist D. Zolo [Zolo, p. 8], the complexity of world development is a challenge for the Western democratic tradition itself, and the previously recognized model of Western democracy and the national state is questioned. "In recent decades, the' pathos of nation-states ' has somewhat diminished," V. V. Naumkin noted, "and it is being replaced by globalization, regionalism, and the era of ethnicity" [Naumkin, p.18]. In the modern world, both traditional actors of international relations and completely new non-State actors, free from sovereignty, such as ethno - confessional movements and terrorist organizations, for example, the Islamic State (ISIL) and the Houthi movement in Yemen, still operate. New challenges have demanded a response from the Saudis, and this is due to the appointment in the spring of 2015 of new persons, representatives of the younger generation, to the posts of heir to the throne and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the same time, the previously mentioned objective features of social and economic development still largely determine the parameters of political life, political culture and political system in Saudi Arabia. Political culture is developing, but only what is already present in society can fully develop, otherwise there is an imitation of development, the use of decorative elements of the Western political system.

In general, the political culture and political system of Saudi Arabia were significantly modernized, based on the logic of internal development, while experiencing influence, but avoiding formal borrowing of Western-style political structures. In the political life of the kingdom, one can see a bizarre combination of both traditional Arab and Islamic, and borrowed Western features, norms and elements. This can be seen in the combination of elements of the egalitarian type of culture, which aims to jointly protect the usual way of life, and the hierarchical type of culture, the main thing in which is the stability of the political system and national security (see: [East and Politics, pp. 54-92]).

The Kingdom has so far managed to avoid revolutionary cataclysms without abandoning its traditional Islamic and tribal foundations. At the same time, the increasing complexity of economic life and the steady social development are generating in the Saudi community-

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There are new problems and contradictions that need to be resolved by political means, which is impossible without a certain reform of the political system, possibly of religious life and religious institutions in the kingdom. Such processes are already underway. It can be assumed that a specific model of Saudi statehood, combining the beginnings of tribal democracy and enlightened monarchy, elements of the political system of industrial and pre-industrial societies, and a certain Arabian version of post-modern "authoritarianism of development"will be formed in the future through symbiosis or synthesis.

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Weber M. Izbrannye sozdaniya [Selected Works], Moscow, 1990.
The East and politics. Political systems, political cultures, political processes / Edited by A. D. Voskresensky, Moscow, 2011.

Dzolo D. Democracy and Complexity. Realistic Approach, Moscow, 2010.
Zheltov V. V., Zheltov M. V. Politicheskaya sotsiologiya [Political Sociology], Moscow, 2009.

Kosach G. G. Saudi Arabia: internal political processes of the "stage of reforms", Moscow, 2007.
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Morozov E. The Internet as an illusion. Reverse Side of the Network, Moscow, 2014.
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Sukiyainen L. Korol Fahd ibn Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud-the head of the state, whose constitution is the Book of the Most High Allah and the Sunnah of his Messenger / / Korol-reformator, Moscow, 2002.
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Filonik A. O., Vavilov A. I. Saudi Arabia: search for inner harmony, Moscow, 2007.
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Harrison L. The Main truth of Liberalism, Moscow, 2008.
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