The difficulties of forming a new Afghan statehood determine the relevance of analyzing the political tradition of Afghanistan and the foundations on which it is based. In this article, for the first time in the Russian scientific literature, an attempt is made to consider the manifestation of tribal institutions in the political system. It will focus, in particular, on the local community, which is a combination of a clan and a clientele, and its role in the state. In addition, the author examines the institution of the khan and the role of the ruler, whose status in many ways resembled that of the khan. In addition, the article analyzes the direct borrowing of tribal institutions by the state, in particular the jirg, as well as the impact of tribal organization on the tax system and the armed forces of the country. The creation of the state by the Khans of the Afghan tribes led, in addition to preserving the tribal organization of all ethnic groups, except the Tajiks, to the spread of tribal institutions at the national level.

CLAN, CLIENTELE AND THEIR COMBINATION (KAUM) IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Power centers in tribes that exist independently of state power and in parallel with it are related communities, for which the French researcher O. Roy uses the word kaum - "tribe"," people " (Roy, 1986, p. 12). From our point of view, kaum is a specific Afghan community that combines the features of a clan and a clientele. It is with this group that a person primarily identifies himself. Even M. Elphinstone noted that the Afghans are devoted more to the community than to its head (Elphinstone, 1815, p. 166).

As O. Roy correctly pointed out, all three attempts to break with the past and form a state (the formation of a tribal federation in 1747, the coup of 1978, and the victory of the Mujahideen in 1992) were marked by a universal ideology (nationalism, Marxism, and fundamentalism), but the forms they took indicate the survivability of the groups formed by the Mujahideen. belonging to local communities [Roy, 1986, p. 9]. The state of Zahir Shah and Daoud also remained tribalist. "Kaum turned out to be embedded in state institutions, which implied not only the receipt of material benefits (posts, monetary, but also non-burdensome positions, exemption from taxes and military service), but mainly a guarantee of the immutability of the rules of local community management that will determine the functioning of the state..." [Roy, 1986, p.24].

These features of the kaum determine the features of such an important institution of power in the tribe as the khan institute, based on genealogy and patronage.

The importance of blood relations is shown by the fact that inheritance and paternal kinship affect many areas of the tribe's existence. Here are just a few rules and regulations. First, a person's status depends on their position.-

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rather than from economic positions. Any contender for high status and power must have a high-status ancestor. Second, the eldest son inherits more than the other brothers. He is recognized as a leader. Third, paternal inheritance means that women are rarely married off. Most of them marry within the clan, and almost all of them marry within the tribe. Fourth, the settlements of nomadic tribes are based on hierarchy and are tied to the dominant line of inheritance, whose representatives usually live in the center.

Thus, Kaum will accept only those whose ancestors were khans as khan. But this is not all. In addition to genealogy, power relations are also based on patronage, where prestige and power are proportional to the personal wealth distributed. This phenomenon is an integral property of the tribe and accompanies the latter throughout its existence. This is the essence of kaum. Since ancient times, in the Afghan tribes, the one who gains more influence and power gains more gives, distributes, distributes, or at least gives a part of what he received, and thereby gains more supporters-clients. "By his generosity and being useful to those who need him, the Khan should always show that he is the only person worthy of performing this function" (Elphinstone, 1815, p.23). Therefore, power is not necessarily given to a person for life. As the Afghan proverb says, "there is no khan without a dastarkhan" (without a tablecloth, that is, a set table). This is the essence of the most important provision of the Pashtun code of honor Pashtunwala (literally "Pashtunism", "status of a Pashtun"). - hospitality, which is the principle of organizing power. Each head of the family has a hujra, a guest house, which is a means by which the owner, in competition with other owners, seeks power and influence [Barry, 1989, p. 150].1 If his hujra is recognized, then he can become a khan. The latter should provide other partners, mediate their disputes and protect the interests of the community in the face of the State. It is clear, therefore, that the leader of a clan or tribe, the landowner, in the eyes of the peasants and pastoralists dependent on them, were not so much exploiters as natural protectors, protectors against any "outsiders" (other tribes, nationalities, the state, etc.) [Umnov, 1982, p. 247]. It is not surprising, therefore, that the land reform that began in December 1978 in the "tribal zone" was doomed to failure there: the peasants did not take the land, which is also "not given by God". Summing up the consideration of the khan's obligations, we note that in general, he performs the functions of a ruler and intermediary. Its task is to unite a number of family units of tribal society into a more or less unified social field (Anderson, 1983, p. 140).

The process of gaining power can be divided into four stages:: 1) accumulation of wealth; 2) accumulation of dependents; 3) accumulation of prestige and influence; 4) genealogical legitimation.

In the 19th century, the tribal leader was chosen from a certain clan (the eldest, or khan, called khan-khel, or sar-khel (cap - "head")). Therefore, the principle of patronage now serves as a basis for identifying those who seek influence that is not institutionalized. There may be several such khans in the same group.

As a result, in the 19th century the word "khan" acquired two meanings:

1) The head of the tribe (in this sense it is also used by the Tajiks);

2) An influential person in the tribe. The second meaning is more specifically expressed in the fact that among the Durrani people around Kandahar, any landowner is called a khan-

1 The author notes that in the 1980s this institution acquired a different meaning. Khujra supported the functioning of political parties, since there are a lot of people there, they are treated to tea, etc. As a result, ideology gives way to family and ethnic ties [Barry, 1989, p. 151].

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The Gilzais have a person whose authority goes beyond the boundaries of their economy [Anderson, 1983, p.133].

At the beginning of the 20th century, a new institution appeared - malik (in Arabic, "king"), or ayarbab ("lord"), which is a khan recognized by the state as the head of the tribe in the village and included in the state administration. Malik acts as an intermediary between the state and the village, his task is to represent the community externally, mainly in relations with other communities and the state.

Such a khan or Malik is the bearer of a public authority rooted in the community itself, different from the State. The unity of the tribe around such a center ensures its stability. Security and tranquility are achieved by the centripetal organization of all aspects of social life, in which connections within communities (kaums) and clans are important. As a result, social interaction tends towards such centers, which act as fragments of the socio-political fabric of society and within which relations of patronage of individual strong personalities capable of effectively protecting corporate interests develop. This network of relationships creates a support group around the leader, which acts independently of any political programs.

It is these relationships that form the basis of social organization: more than two-thirds of the population have some kind of tribal ties, and the remaining third of the inhabitants are united by family ties and family mutual obligations. Strong feelings bind Afghans to their family or clan (Plastun, 1995, p. 49). Moreover, loyalty to the clan and / or clientele is the very foundation of society mentioned above.

These circumstances largely determine the political and social climate in the country: the masses gravitate not to ideas, but to leaders. Strong personalities, in accordance with their prestige, inevitably form a field of attraction, as well as relations of dependence and loyalty, which leads to political rivalry. The population believes in such personalities. For example, A. Masud extended the influence of the Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan) by his personal authority in the high-altitude regions of the Hindu Kush (in Badakhshan, Tokhara, Kunduz and Baghlan). A group formed around a leader is characterized by unconditional submission to him or even reverence for him. Changing his views means simultaneously switching to one side or the other of all his people. Therefore, the position of local authorities has a strong impact on the situation in the country. They determine the attitude of the population of a particular area to any decisions and actions of the authorities or other forces on a national scale. Hence, it is clear that for the implementation of any political, economic or social initiatives of the central government, first of all, the support of local traditional leaders is needed.

Closed communities and clans with their own independent and specific foundations of everyday life traditionally represent the most serious obstacle to effective state-building in Afghanistan, since it is not political and similar factors that operate, but relations of kinship and patronage that corrode the state. Kaums permeate the political system and even society as a whole, pass through political parties and associations, turning them into just a superstructure above themselves.

Kaum is not going to give up his position. Moreover, it adapts to the changing situation. Thus, in the conditions of the constitutional period of 1963-73, the leaders of the kaum (khans) began to use new forms of activity that had just appeared - they became deputies of parliament and resorted to the creation of political parties, which opened up new sources of resources and new opportunities for obtaining funds.

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At that time, provincial deputies came to Kabul as representatives of their local kaum to receive benefits and privileges, because the state seemed to them a powerful force, at whose expense they should get as much benefit as possible. "The elections clearly reflected the lines of division within the society, in which there is only family loyalty, and patronage is still the most important factor. Loyalty was by no means directed at the state... Kaum's strategy was to establish favorable relations with the institutions of the state" [Roy, 1986, p. 24]. According to O. Roy, this explains, in particular, the struggle of various factions in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. "Networks of relationships based on patronage and personal connections remained strong, as if the most serious political differences did not exist: for example, the Communist Parcham (called the "royal communist party") was linked to the royal community" (Roy, 1986, p.25).

The lower house of Parliament, called the Wulusi Jirga (People's Assembly), which was elected on September 18, 2005, is hardly an exception. It is clearly fragmented in nature: leaders of many clans, groups, parties and factions who intend to protect their interests have become deputies. In particular, despite the unpopularity of the parties, 88 (35%) of the total number of 249 deputies turned out to be their members, and about a third of the deputies who are associated with the parties ran as independent candidates [Korgun, 2006, 25.01]. In total, more than 30 parties are represented in the Parliament.

V. G. Korgun used the candidates ' autobiographies to calculate the ethnic and religious composition of deputies in the lower house, presenting them in the following tables:

Table 1

Ethnic group

Number of seats in Parliament

%

Pashtuns

118

47.4

Tajiks

53

21.3

The Khazars

30

12.0

Uzbeks

20

8.0

Non-Khazarian Shiites

11

4.4

Turkmens

5

2.0

The Arabs

5

2.0

Ismailis

3

1.2

Pashai

2

0.8

Balochi

1

0.4

Nuristans

1

0.4

Total

249

100

Source: [Korgun, 25.01.2006].

With the exception of Uzbeks, all other ethnic groups do not share the same political positions:

Table 2

Ethnic group

Government

The opposition

Non-aligned countries

number of deputies

%

number of deputies

%

number of deputies

%

Pashtuns

47

39.8

16

13.6

55

46.6

Tajiks/Aimags

21

39.6

16

30.2

16

30.2

Hazara Shiites

8

16.5

28

68.3

5

12.2

Uzbeks

0

0.0

19

95

1

5.0

Other

5

29.4

5

29.4

7

41.2

Total

81

32.5

84

33.7

84

33.7

Source: [Korgun, 25.01.2006].

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About half (120) of the seats were awarded to traditional leaders represented by field commanders.

The institution of field commanders emerged in almost all ethnic groups in the late 70s of the XX century, when the civil war broke out, which lasted for more than 20 years. At that time, in the context of the weakening of the state, the leaders of the Kaum resorted to the creation of armed detachments, which were built on the principle of a clan and on the basis of a patron-client relationship. It is quite obvious that this could only be done by those who had funds and redistributed them in favor of their supporters. Field commanders were either the traditional leaders of the Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other ethnic groups themselves, or the commanders acting under their leadership. The institute of field commanders has perfectly blended into the traditional structure of Afghan society. Field commanders performed an important function of community self-defense in the face of the weakness of the state, which was unable to provide security on the territory of the country. The Mujahideen resistance was also divided into regional and ethno-regional groups. In the absence of a reliable central authority, tribes and communities were concerned with maintaining stability and protecting themselves from internal and external threats, ensuring their local interests and protecting territories. Of course, the protective functions of field commanders cease outside of "their" territory.

Field commanders received resources from outside, from both the Mujahideen parties and the PDPA regime, which created the basis for preserving the old and forming new kaums. By the end of the 1980s, Najibullah's Government had resorted to creating tribal and ethnic irregulars within the Armed Forces (the 53rd Uzbek Division, the 80th Ismaili Division, etc.). They eventually became the military backbone of their respective field commanders. In addition, field commanders became clients of Afghanistan's neighbors, providing them with paramilitary services in exchange for their financial, material, and information support. In the literature, this phenomenon is called the "war economy" (Rubin, 1999).

In the first half of the 1990s, in the context of the fragmentation of Afghanistan and the collapse of the state as a political institution, field commanders gained full power over the territories they controlled.

New sources of income for warlords have come from drug trafficking, which again is only possible in a weak state. They control the production of raw opium in almost all 28 drug-producing provinces( 34 provinces in total), organize the transit of drugs, distribute transportation routes among themselves, attract drug couriers from each other, and initiate attacks on drug caravans of competitors. It is often this factor that becomes the root cause of the armed clashes that are currently taking place in Afghanistan. Inefficiency in the fight against drug production is caused, among other things, by the fact that the reduction in financial revenues causes a negative reaction from field commanders, which affects the overall stability and situation of the population in the country.

The funds received by field commanders from outside are also quite large. The Americans began distributing money to them in October 2001 in order to enlist their support in the fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and use the Afghan armed forces for ground operations in order to minimize American losses. Currently, the goal of such a policy is to persuade traditional leaders to be loyal to the central government, as well as to create a favorable atmosphere among Pashtuns regarding the conduct of an anti-terrorist operation. The desire to prevent the actions of field commanders against the coalition forces and the government of H. Karzai is also caused by the failure to take measures against those of them who, according to information available to Western intelligence services, are involved in the production of weapons.

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drugs and drug trafficking. In particular, in response to the appeal of the Prosecutor General of Afghanistan to the international coalition to assist in the capture of field commanders involved in drug trafficking, the NATO command in Afghanistan issued a statement on June 19, 2007, according to which the detention of suspects in crimes related to corruption and drug trafficking is not included in the list of tasks of the North Atlantic the alliance. Such tactics, on the one hand, recognize the strength of field commanders, and on the other, strengthen them, which does not help to strengthen the positions of the central government. Warlords enjoy the political patronage of many high-ranking American politicians and military personnel, who feel indebted to them for their military support in the fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The very fact that field commanders participated in and won the parliamentary elections, despite all the accusations of war crimes, shows their strength and influence.

The most influential traditional leaders formed political parties in the 1960s and during the civil War. However, this activity reached its greatest peak in the period leading up to the 2004-2005 parliamentary elections. Thus, at the end of 2006, the number of officially registered political parties reached 85. The connection of parties with traditional leaders determines their personification and thus factionalism and splits. Parties are dominated by individuals, not ideologies or political programs. Thus, the country's largest party, the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, split into about ten factions and new parties that split from it.

After 2001, field commanders began to open their own television channels and radio stations. In 2006 alone, six new TV channels were launched. They do not forget about the radio. FM radio stations are a new and reliable media tool with multiple operational capabilities across the country. In other words, the struggle of warlords extends to the media sphere as well.

Thus, over the past 40 years, the institution of traditional leaders has taken on four new forms: kaum leaders have become deputies, field commanders, leaders of political parties, and media owners.

STATUS OF THE RULER

Like kaum, the Khan institution, which is so important for the tribe, began to characterize power relations in the entire society when the Afghans created the state. After all, the padishah is only the first among the equal khans of Durrani. Russian researcher I. E. Katkov correctly noted that considering the status of a tribal leader "makes it possible to judge the very peculiar status of an Afghan state ruler, because the role of the Afghan state before the events of 1978 in many of its manifestations can be described as the position of a tribal leader-khan, a self-financing public servant who uses his wealth and influence for the balance and interaction at a higher level between various social and ethnic groups on a national scale - largely using the historical experience of the Khan's leadership and its role functions as a temporarily delegated ruler over social groups and at the same time an intermediary between them" [Katkov, 1978, pp. 6-7].

Acting as a patron of various social groups within the country forced the Afghan leadership to become a client of foreign countries. It received material and financial assistance from outside and distributed it internally. As noted by American researcher Barnett Rubin,

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"the state elite acted as an ethnically stratified hierarchy of intermediaries between the powers that provided resources and the groups that received the patron's benefits. The resulting political fragmentation of both the population and the elite meant that the elite of the old regime had neither the political nor organizational base to fight back the opposition. The structure of the old regime imposed a model of ethnic stratification on heterogeneous and fragmented local communities" [Rubin, Writenet]. Constant external interference has led to the emergence of paternalism, the buying and selling of loyalty, and the formation of a political economy based on dependency and clientelism at all levels of Afghan society [Shah-rani, 2000].

According to Russian researcher Sergey Andreev, the Afghan state has been held together since its creation by Abdurrahman Khan largely thanks to foreign financial assistance, which allowed bribing regional elites, who nevertheless carefully guarded their independence. At the same time, all attempts at modernization (under Amanullah Khan, M. Daoud, and the PDPA) were met with uprisings and conspiracies. And at present, another modernization and state - building project is being imposed on Afghanistan by external forces - primarily the United States. For its implementation, America seeks to establish client relations with the Pashtuns. While the way out, from the author's point of view, should be sought in establishing a balance of ethnic and tribal groups, as well as regions [Andreev, 2004].

The gradual disintegration of the" Khan state " and the increasing opposition of the state apparatus and army to the tribes are associated, in particular, with the strengthening of the positions of the urban bourgeoisie, the strengthening of its influence on state power and the simultaneous weakening of the influence of the tribal organization on it. However, the social upheavals of the last quarter of the twentieth century not only brought things back to normal, but also strengthened the old order of things.

So, during the civil war, the patron-client relationship at the level of the country's leadership received a new development, since each of the warring parties had its own patrons. At present, the central authorities, ethno - regional elites, and field commanders act, on the one hand, as clients who receive resources from outside, and on the other, as patrons who distribute them. The Government depends on the help of the international community.

As for the ethno-regional elites, they are supported by neighboring countries. So, Pakistan is trying to strengthen its position among the Pashtuns. Saudi Arabia supports the leader of the radical Islamic Union of Afghanistan, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf. Missionaries from Saudi Arabia are active in the southeast of the country. Uzbekistan and Turkey have resumed cooperation with Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostom. Tajikistan is strengthening ties with the Tajiks of northeastern Afghanistan. As for Iran, its presence is most noticeable in the west of the country in Herat and in the Shiite Hazara regions of central and northwestern Afghanistan. Financial assistance to field commanders has already been discussed above.

BORROWING TRIBAL INSTITUTIONS

In the Afghan lands of the Durrani Empire, a feudal-bureaucratic apparatus could not immediately be created, and there was a gradual adaptation to the needs of the young Afghan state of the organs of the tribal system preserved by the Afghans, since the tribal nobility did not yet have enough power to destroy the socio-economic order sanctified by centuries-old traditions. Therefore the khans of the tribes transformed and adapted the old tribal institutions to the new conditions,

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by combining military organization, civil organization, and tribal principles in the forms that served their interests.

In particular, in Afghanistan, such a traditional tribal institution as the jirga is widely used. In the tribe itself, all important issues of its life, disputes, claims ,misunderstandings (personal, tribal), issues of war and peace are resolved by convening a jirga. The decision of the jirga is binding on all members of the tribe, and those who do not obey it will be punished to the point of exile.

Currently, the jirga institute operates on three levels: local, tribal, and national.

Local-level jirgas have existed in Afghanistan for a long time. They have a limited scope. Local jirgas are the most common governing body in the village and city block. Such jirgas are usually convened to deal with issues related to drought and local conflicts.

Tribal jirgas operate at the level of one or more tribes. They are called when tribal clashes or conflicts arise. Jirgas of a number of tribes or a combination of tribes of a particular region are quite widespread. They were convened both on the initiative of tribal leaders and the state. In particular, at the initiative of tribal leaders, the jirga of 961 tribal leaders, mentioned above, was convened in Peshawar in May 1980, which rejected the fundamentalist trend of Islam.

Here is another example. In the spring of 1992, a jirga of Pashtun tribal elders was held in Kabul, where participants expressed concern about the increasing role of representatives of northern ethnic minorities in the country's leadership and command [Lyakhovsky].

Not only Pashtuns hold jirgas. In the spring of 1992, Hazara groups also held a meeting. They called for the interaction of armed groups to ensure their participation in the division of spheres of influence in the capital and in the new authorities.

Quite often, the state resorted to convening jirgas of several tribes. This is especially true for the border tribes. Such jirgas were widely practiced under the PDPA regime.

They are also resorting to this proven method of normalizing the situation at the border at the present time. The fight against the Taliban has raised the question of the situation in the border tribal area. Therefore, during the meeting of the Presidents of the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan in Washington on September 27, 2006, H. Karzai proposed to hold jirgas of tribal elders located on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. On November 15, the Afghan commission for the preparation of the jirga of the oldest tribes from the border areas with Pakistan began its work. According to the presidential decree, Chairman of the upper house of Parliament S. Mojaddedi was appointed head of the commission. The commission included MP of the National Assembly M. Mohaqqek, head of the Ulema Council Shinwari and other state and public figures. The jirga was held on August 9-12, 2007.

The national Jirga, or Loya Jirga, consists of representatives of the elite of Afghan society, tribal leaders and public figures. It is convened in case of difficult situations in Afghanistan. It is the highest supra-parliamentary authority in Afghanistan. The Loya jirga forms an important element of the state system of Afghanistan from the time of the formation of the Durran state to the present day.

From the very beginning, the Loya jirgas were dominated by tribal leaders and elders. They were sent to the Loya jirga by local (regional) or tribal jirgas. However, the Loya Jirga institution gradually underwent changes. In particular, in the XX century, it included in addition to elders, ministers of worship and Muslim leaders.

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theologians included the educated stratum of Afghan society. Since the proclamation of the new Constitution in 1964, there have been some changes in the mechanism for selecting candidates and electing them to the Loya Jirga. It began to include members of both houses of Parliament, Cabinet ministers, the Supreme Court, and leaders of provincial consultative assemblies (jirgs). In addition, the monarch was granted prerogatives when choosing high-ranking government officials, prominent scholars, representatives from women, ethnic minorities or religious sects to join the jirga.

The quantitative composition varied and ranged from several tens to hundreds or even thousands of representatives. There was no permanent venue for the Loya Jirga. It was held in major cities of the country, but mainly in Kabul. It was also not limited by the time frame. The sessions often lasted several days.

The Loya jirga was called by the leaders of the country to resolve the most important issues related to the succession to the throne, the adoption of constitutions, the declaration of war, etc.However, the Loya Jirga was not periodic, but extraordinary in nature, i.e. its convocations were timed to coincide with any specific problem that required a joint solution.

Thus, the historic Loya Jirga was held in October 1747 in Nadirabad near Kandahar in the Shir Surkh mazar. It determined the fate of the new state of Afghanistan. The jirga met eight times, but could not reach a result due to contradictions between the khans of the tribes. When the jirga met for the ninth time, the authoritative Sufi Sabir Shah proposed to elect Ahmad Shah Sadozai as the ruler of the country. By a majority vote, he was elected Shah of Afghanistan.

On November 2, 1841, a Loya jirga was held in Kabul, which decided to start a tribal uprising against the British conquerors. It was attended by 12 people. The nephew of Emir Dost Muhammad Khan, Muhammad Zaman Khan, was elected leader of the uprising, and his deputy was Aminullah Khan Logari.

A jirga of 1879 was dedicated to the liberation of the country, but already in the second Anglo-Afghan war. After Sher Ali Khan was forced to flee to Mazar-I-Sharif, a jirga consisting of 3,000 representatives was convened to solve the problem of fighting against foreign invaders.

Several jirgas were devoted to foreign policy issues. So, in August 1914, a Loya jirga was held in Kabul, where the question of Afghanistan's position in the First World War was raised. The delegates decided to maintain the state's neutrality. Similarly, the two-day Loya Jirga in November 1941 decided that Afghanistan would remain neutral in World War II.

In the midst of the aggravation of the Afghan-Pakistani contradictions, the Loya Jirga was convened in November 1955, consisting of 371 delegates. She demanded that the Pakistani authorities grant the Pashtuns the right to self-determination. It was also decided to strengthen the armed forces by purchasing weapons, and from any source, which meant agreeing to purchase weapons from the USSR.

The Loya Jirga considered the succession to the throne (1865), the adoption of the Basic Law (1923, 1964, 1977, 1987, and 2004), and many other important domestic political issues. In particular, jirgas were convened twice by Emir Sher Ali Khan - in 1865 and 1873. The Loya Jirga of 1865 in Kabul was aimed at attracting the support of the general population. It was attended by 2,000 representatives. The Emir himself presided, seeking to declare his seven-year-old son Abdullah the heir to the throne.

The first constitution of Afghanistan, called the Nizamnama ("Regulations"), was adopted at the convocation of Emir Amanullah Khan in Jalalabad on February 27, 1923.

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Loya jirga with the participation of 872 (1504) representatives. After that, Amanullah Khan called the Loya Jirga twice more. At the Paghman jirga in July 1924 (consisting of 1,052 people) he was forced to abandon some of his reforms after a tribal uprising broke out in Khost, dissatisfied with his reforms. The Loya Jirga, held on August 28-September 5, 1928 in Paghman, gathered more than 1,000 delegates. Amanullah proposed new social and political reforms, which caused serious controversy among the delegates.

After the civil war of 1928-1929, Muhammad Nadir Khan, who came to power, convened a Loya Jirga in 1930, consisting of 301 representatives. The meeting discussed the draft Law on elections to the National Council, on the number of members and procedure for holding elections to provincial councils, on the restoration of orders and titles abolished by Amanullah, as well as other issues.

In September 1964, a Loya Jirga convened by King M. Zahirshah was held in Kabul. After a 10-day debate, 452 representatives approved the draft Basic Law. The Loya Jirga convened by M. Daoud in Kabul in January 1977 was dedicated not only to the adoption of the constitution, but also to the election of the President. M. Najibullah did the same in November 1987.

The extraordinary Loya Jirga held on June 10-21, 2002, determined the composition of the Transitional Administration headed by Hamid Karzai, who received presidential powers with the right to adopt legislative acts.

The Constitutional Loya Jirga, which adopted the Constitution of Afghanistan, was held from December 14, 2003 to January 4, 2004. According to article 3 of the Constitution, the Loya Jirga is convened to deal with the following issues::

1) making decisions on the protection of the country's independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and supreme interests;

2) making amendments to the Constitution;

3) if the Parliament, in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 69 of the Constitution, has brought charges against the President.

According to article 64, the President is responsible for convening the Loya Jirga.

TAXES AND THE ARMY

For the most part, the Afghan tribes in the Durrani empire were exempt from paying state taxes (or paid very light taxes), for which they were obliged, as under Nadir Shah, to send a rider from each plow to the troops [Reisner, 1959, p.86]. Detachments of these troops were made up of people of a certain clan and were under the command of their khans and leaders. The heads of clans commanded larger units, the chiefs of clan divisions commanded smaller units, and the Shah, who was also the supreme leader of Durrani, was considered the commander-in-chief of all Durrani forces. These troops, called the "Khan's cavalry", along with the Shah's own mercenary guards, represented the main force of the Afghan army, with only 30% of its strength coming from regular units (Gankovsky, 1958, p. 133). The khans ' squads and tribal militias, which made up the majority of the empire's armed forces, were never completely subordinate to the Shah's authority and were very loosely connected with each other.

In terms of paying taxes, the Durrani tribe was placed in a particularly privileged position [Elphinstone, 1815, p. 403]. It was exempt from the tribal tax, the cattle tax, the orchard tax, the vineyard tax, and the smoke tax, and apart from a small levy on the mills and on the maintenance of the mirabs and Kedhud, it paid nothing. This is largely true of other Afghan tribes as well.

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In some cases, individual tribes were required to pay a certain tribute to the Durrani shahs, but, as a rule,it was purely symbolic. For example, the Eastern gaduns sent the Shah a horse, one or two falcons, and a small amount of hard currency each year (Gankovsky, 1982, p. 40). But even in cases where the shahs levied a certain amount of money from the tribes as a tax, half of it was withheld in their favor by the khans. Sometimes the entire tax collected from the tribes and the entire area where the tribe lived was given as a jagir (grant) to the khans of the tribe for their service in the army or in the court of the Shah. Thus, the Mukhammedzai tribe at the end of the XVIII century numbered about 20 thousand families; the area where their settlements were located was charged 3 lakhs (300 thousand) rupees per year; this tax was given to their khan, Ghulam Mohiuddin Khan, who was close to Timur Shah [Gankovsky, 1982, p. 40]. In some cases, the collection of taxes in areas inhabited by Afghan tribes was assigned to local khans, who appropriated part of the taxes, and even to half of the Bannu, Marwats, and partly Yusufzais (Gankovsky, 1958, p. 4). 91]. Giving the khans the right to collect taxes from the tribe largely contributed to the transformation of the khans from tribal leaders into territorial lords.

The first attempt to transform the tax system was made by Sher Ali Khan (1868-1879). At the beginning of his reign, Afghanistan was divided among the Sardars. They collected all taxes, contributing only a small part of the revenues to the government, but were obliged to " maintain at their own expense the army needed by the state. In order to weaken the influence of his major vassals, the emir decided to take the sources of the country's finances out of their control and form one standing army"2. There is no detailed information about the implementation of tax reforms. The total amount of tax revenues under Sher Ali Khan increased approximately twice, which may partly be explained by the expansion of his possessions in the north [Masson and Romodin, 1965, vol. 2, p. 241].

Sher Ali Khan increased and strengthened the regular army, the total number of which reached 50 thousand. [Sobolev, 1882, vol. 1, p. 196], he also created the state police in Kabul.

Abdurrahman Khan (1879-1901), who created the administrative and police apparatus, achieved more regular tax revenues to the treasury.

Under Abdurrahman, the regular army was significantly increased [Babakhodjaev, 1966, p. 44-74], he forbade the khans to have permanent armed detachments, assigning them the duty only in case of war to provide him with mounted and foot militias. However, even at the beginning of the civil war of 1928-1929, the main defensive force of Afghanistan was the tribal union. By the beginning of the uprising, the combat readiness of tribal militias was not much different from the combat readiness of the Afghan regular army, but their number was immeasurably greater: if the Afghan army had about 23 thousand people in the state, and in reality the army did not exceed 10 thousand [Sokolov-Strakhov, 1931, p. 24], then the tribes, according to British estimates, they could put up 100 thousand people [Moberly, 1923, p. 61].

Emir Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) led a decisive offensive against the tribal positions, taking away the Khans ' right to collect taxes. This could not but provoke tribal resistance, which was one of the main causes of the crisis of 1928-1929. Moreover, a special role was played by the population of Khost, which consists of the Yusufzai, Mangal and Jadran tribes, who always supplied the flower of the tribal militia to the Afghan army, but at the same time unusually jealously defended their independence from the central government. So, in 1913, in response to an attempt to make a forced recruitment

2 Report of the Russian Ambassador to Iran I. A. Zinoviev to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of August 14, 1869 [cit. by: Khalfin, 1959, p. 76].

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the Khost tribes rebelled and managed to insist on fulfilling all their demands. The removal of tax breaks caused an uprising in Khost in 1924.

After the civil war of 1928-1929, some Afghan tribes were exempted from paying taxes. Nadir Shah announced in his program that "recruitment for the troops will be carried out on a tribal basis and on a voluntary basis" [quoted in: Stanishevsky, 1940, p. 72]. The strength of tribal armed formations is indicated, for example, by the fact that back in the 40 - 50s of the XX century, the population of Kunar twice smashed up government troops when they came to carry out the orders of Kabul.

Since the late 1950s, foreign financial aid has strengthened the army. "Military assistance to the Afghan army and air force," the Western expert notes, " for the first time created a situation in which the tribes no longer pose a real threat to the central government. Moreover, economic assistance provided through the Afghan bureaucracy has strengthened the government's control over the economy" [Afghanistan..., 1969, p. 160]. The strengthening of the armed forces, accompanied by important economic measures, made it possible to gradually displace tribal military formations. As a result, tribal unions that once opposed state power were fragmented, and their military formations were replaced by a regular army, which explains the cessation of tribal uprisings after World War II. This made it possible to deprive the tribes of tax immunity.

However, instability and the subsequent civil war led to the fragmentation of the country in the first half of the 1990s. The tribes isolated themselves from the central government and recreated their paramilitary formations. Tribal leaders and field commanders lead detachments of between 100 and 1,000 men in their areas. Ethnic minorities that have established their own political and military organizations also have armed groups. So, until recently, Ismail Khan had an army of 15-20 thousand people, A. Dust - 15-20 thousand people, and the Khazars had detachments numbering 15 thousand. Currently, there are more than 120 thousand people in such paramilitary formations, while it is only planned to create a 70-thousandth army and an 80-thousandth police force by 2008. Therefore, the military superiority of field commanders over the armed forces of Afghanistan is beyond doubt. All of the above makes it possible to understand why the institution of field commanders is so strong and stable and why it is so difficult to disarm illegal military formations. This means that not only the Pashtun tribes regained their independence from the central government, but also ethnic minorities and their constituent tribes began to claim autonomous status.

The strength of field commanders is also shown by comparing their ability to accumulate income with that of the state. While domestic revenues of the state in the 2003/2004 financial year amounted to $ 200 million. [finmarket.ru, 2003], the income of field commanders is several billion [Korgun, 21.03.2006]. The amount of taxes that can be collected in Afghanistan today is estimated at about $ 500 million, of which only about $ 80 million goes to the government budget. [Knyazev, 2006]. In 2002, only less than 10% of the revenue generated in the Herat and northern provinces went to the state treasury [Warlords..., 2002]. Lucrative activities such as drug production and trade and participation in cross-border transit trade and smuggling are concentrated in the regions. Intra-Afghan drug revenues are estimated at $ 2.6 billion a year, and the profit from smuggling is about $ 2 billion. dol. per year [Andreev, 2004, p. 59] 3. These amounts far exceed the budget of the Afghan Government.

3 According to S. Andreev, this is why regional leaders do not yet challenge the central government and do not claim to dominate Kabul, but they will not tolerate interference in their affairs.

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Thus, everything returned almost to what the Afghan state began with. The only difference is that in addition to the Pashtun tribes, ethnic minorities also claim a special position. At the same time, in an attempt to strengthen itself, the Afghan state has experienced almost all forms of political regime over the past 100 years - the absolutist monarchy of Abdurrahman Khan, the constitutional monarchy of Amanullah Khan, the parliamentary monarchy of Zahir Shah, the authoritarian presidential republic of Muhammad Daoud, the Soviet-style republic under the PDPA, the Islamic Mujahideen regime and the Taliban theocracy. At the moment, Afghanistan is undergoing the formation of a presidential republic based on the principles of democracy. However, it is unlikely that this time it will be possible to do without tribal institutions. At the very least, the current government's weakness is largely due to the fact that most of its members, apart from Ismail Khan and a few others, have lived abroad for a long time and do not have a foothold in traditional Afghan society.

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