The main pathos of the article under discussion is the desire to prove the theoretical and practical inconsistency of the neoliberal mainstream in the modern world economy, including by contrasting it with more effective approaches to the development of the neoliberal economy.-

45 This article was prepared with the support of the RGNF under project 11-21-09002a/Vie

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From the authors ' point of view, the Chinese development model is quite different. If the statement of the thesis about the failures of the mainstream was not very difficult due to its obviousness, then the promotion of the Chinese model as an alternative turned out to be, unfortunately, too difficult for the authors. The reason for this is that the Chinese model is viewed from a purely ideological, anti-liberal position, without a thorough analysis of its actual pros, cons and dynamics. Therefore, in this publication, we will focus on the last points.

The confrontation between the Chinese model of development, on the one hand, and the theory and practice of global liberalism, on the other, has attracted wide attention of the world's expert and journalistic community in recent years. This attention is fully justified, because it follows from a natural desire to understand the origins of the strikingly different economic and social efficiency of the two models, including and especially in the context of global crises.

According to the calculations of the famous Chinese publicist Ma Licheng, at least a hundred books devoted to the Chinese model have been published recently in China and abroad. Their authors do not question its specificity, but define the main characteristic features of the phenomenon under study in different ways.

One of the first Western analysts who announced the emergence of a special Chinese model and gave impetus to its subsequent discussions was J. Ramo, a consultant to the largest American investment company Goldman Sachs and a professor at the prestigious Tsinghua University in China [Ramo, 2004, p. 79]. He called the Chinese model the " Beijing consensus "in contrast to the neoliberal" Washington consensus", which discredited itself in the 90s of the last century when trying to adapt the economies of developing and transition countries to the expansion of Western capital. Rameau did not try to identify the driving forces of evolution according to the Chinese model, but proceeded from its most characteristic feature, from his point of view: a focus on innovation, on sustainable, balanced and high-quality development, on equality and self-determination.

Later publications by Western and Chinese scientists reflect different interpretations of the modern Chinese model and different assessments of it - both mostly positive and negative. The latter often comes not only from the right, from the liberals, but also from the left, from the defenders of Maoist socialism. But the positive perception is also dictated by different motives-depending on one or another interpretation of the degree of closeness or, on the contrary, the opposite of the Chinese and liberal models, their specificity or, on the contrary, universality. The discussion around the Chinese model of development and its correlation with the Western, liberal model, as well as their own views on this subject, are reflected in a number of domestic publications (see, for example, [Berger, 2009, p. 40-66; Borokh and Lomanov, 2005, p. 20-39; Karneev, 2007, p. 47 - 65 et al.]).

The work under discussion, as already mentioned, also proceeds from the opposite of the Chinese and neoliberal models, but its authors, ignoring their predecessors-Chinese, Western, and domestic-propose to perceive their judgments as ab ovo, as it were. This circumstance not only does not contribute to the solution of the problem, but in many cases leads away from understanding its essence.

The authors do not offer any comprehensive definition of the Chinese model. Perhaps the little that can be extracted from the text of the article in this respect is its qualification as an investment one. "By becoming a' world workshop ' and the world's largest lender," it says, "China has implicitly adopted an investment development model that is fundamentally different from the 'mainstream' one." In principle, it would be difficult to object to such a characterization if it meant that it was, first, far from complete and, second, historically limited and transitory. In other words, this definition is insufficient, static, and lacks perspective.

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The expansion of the investment component of economic growth in China began in the 1990s and took on a particularly impressive and unprecedented scale at the beginning of this century. But then the inferiority of this orientation became more and more obvious.

As the impact of investment on GDP growth increased, resource efficiency began to decline. The emphasis on capital-intensive industries reduced opportunities for solving other important development tasks, such as ensuring optimal employment of the population and limiting the growth of energy consumption. In addition, the increase in excess production capacity in the industry led to an increase in inventory and a decrease in the profitability of enterprises.

But, most importantly, investment actually began to displace consumption, which usually happens in conditions of limited resources when certain scales of capital investment are reached. According to Liu Wei, a well - known Chinese economist and vice-rector of Peking University, in a 10 percentage point increase in the global economy, 3 percentage points are usually provided by investment, and 7 by consumer demand. In China, the ratio is reversed (Liu Wei, 2011). In China, according to Liu Wei's calculations, if investment in fixed assets increases to 23.5% for every percentage increase in investment demand, consumer demand growth slows down by about 0.6 percentage points. With a further increase in the dynamics of fixed capital investment growth by 1%, the growth rate of consumer demand decreases by about 0.9%, i.e. approximately in the same proportion. And the increase in demand for fixed capital investments by more than 30% leads not only to a slowdown in the growth rate of consumer demand, but to its absolute negative growth.

The perception of the Chinese model as an investment model raises at least two more questions. First, it is not clear why the palm tree in the approval of such a model is given to China. Investment was the main driver of economic growth in the West during the period between the two industrial revolutions, from the end of the 18th century to the end of the 19th century. Not to mention the Soviet Union during the first five-year plan.

Nor do the authors mention that China is actually guided by the idea of " three chariots "("there is Jia mache"), which calls for a balance between the three driving forces of economic growth - investment, net exports, and domestic consumption - and thus has its roots in Keynesianism. The current Chinese model could just as easily be called export-oriented. But even in this case, China would not be a pioneer, but would only follow in the wake of Japan and the "four small dragons of Asia". It is clear that if we are talking about the autochthonous nature of the Chinese model, then its foundations should be sought in something else.

The article presents, although just as fleetingly, some other characteristics that can be perceived as an attempt to characterize the originality of the Chinese model. The statement of some of them is partly legitimate in principle. Others give rise to serious doubts and perplexities.

There is no objection, for example, to the thesis about "heterogeneity and multi-structure of the economy with the leading role of the public sector and the center". But it is difficult to agree with the panegyric about a certain "peasant view of economic development", presented as"one of the secrets of the success of Beijing's strategy". It is impossible to understand how this view combines "the desire for planning and calculation, for relative price stability, and a collective approach to solving major problems." The peasant view of the world is proclaimed universal, in contrast to the narrowly professional - urban one. Moreover, it is associated with hopes for the future transformation of the planet into a "rational, economical and therefore eco-friendly world".

It is hardly necessary to prove that such an attitude to the peasant worldview is far from reality, utopian and anachronistic. It is possible to refer the authors to numerous works on peasant studies, where it is enough to consistently find out-

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It is concluded that peasant psychology and ideology are an obstacle to modernization. If we talk about modern China, then most Chinese researchers are inclined to believe that the patriarchy of small producers contributes to hierarchy and particularism, which give rise to topical problems of bureaucracy [Liu, 1981, p.296].

The main thing that causes dissatisfaction is the patchwork, fragmented ideas about the Chinese model, which do not add up to a single picture that has historical significance.

The Chinese model, which has provided huge positive results of economic development over the past three decades, is based on two main pillars. These are, firstly, the maintenance and use of strong state power and, secondly, the progressive expansion and deepening of market relations in the economy. The prototype of such a model can be considered the policy of NEP, but if in the Soviet Union, as a result of total statisticization, they quickly came to a deficit economy (according to Kornai), then in China, on the contrary, after a long period of state dominance, they returned to what is called the initial stage of socialism and is associated with a certain limitation of the role of the state in the economy and the progressive expansion of market regulation.

The symbiosis of two heterogeneous and multidirectional principles in one complex system has both its undoubted advantages and certain weaknesses. The latter are determined by the fact that each of these principles tends to unlimited expansion at the expense of the other. A strong and legitimate government can determine long-term national goals of socio-economic, political and cultural development, mobilize society to achieve them, ensure internal stability and favorable external conditions for the implementation of strategic tasks. At the same time, such authorities and the forces behind them tend to concentrate in their hands not only necessary and sufficient, but also sometimes excessive resources, try to avoid any public control, and are inherently fraught with bureaucracy and corruption. The presence of sufficiently powerful non-state sectors of the economy, driven by market mechanisms, optimizes the use of productive forces, all factors of production, and promotes external openness of the economy and society. At the same time, market forces objectively and subjectively seek to subjugate the entire social sphere, areas of the economy that are vital for national sovereignty, and State power itself. Therefore, fine-tuning the balance between power and the market at each stage is the first condition for success.

Thus, the Chinese model should be considered as a dynamic model that is constantly being improved. This is an extremely important circumstance. It is no coincidence that some prominent Chinese economists (for example, Li Yining) refuse to use the concept of a model at all, perceiving it as a kind of established, static construction, and prefer to use the concept of a path. In any case, the bottom line is that over time, at different stages, some important characteristics of the model change, including the leading mechanisms of development, while its basic structures, such as the state system (in China, they often talk about government) and the market principles of economic functioning, are transformed more slowly. But all other changes depend on the ratio of the two main system-forming factors.

The state interacts with the market at two different levels and, accordingly, in two different guises. The central government acts as a macro-regulator of market relations and as the owner of a limited number of large companies and enterprises that make up the backbone of the Chinese economy. Regional and local authorities often go much further, becoming subjects of far from equal competition in the market. Moreover, it can even be said that the country's economic success, especially in its eastern and southern regions, is at an early stage of the reformist period.

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they were very much provided with competition from local authorities, including, first of all, in attracting investment. At the same time, if the economic functions of the central government are criticized by the external and internal mainstream, mainly due to the excessive dominance of state monopolies, then the entrepreneurial activity of local authorities is unacceptable for it in principle, as such.

In the early stages of the reformist course, when moving away from the omnipotence of the state in favor of strengthening market regulation, the main growth dynamics were provided, as already mentioned, by investment and exports. Such an economic mechanism played a decisive role in the formation of social relations. Accordingly, the share of capital in the income distribution system was overestimated and the share of labor was underestimated. High employment was provided due to low wages. Accumulation far outweighed consumption. High growth rates were achieved due to savings in social expenditures. The early stage of the model was also characterized by a high foreign trade surplus, large gold and foreign exchange reserves, excessive resource consumption, and heavy environmental pollution. As a result, the domestic market was significantly less developed, and domestic consumption played a much smaller role as an engine of growth than in many other, more developed countries.

Up to a certain point, the use of the belt-tightening model was forced and necessary for quantitative accumulation of growth factors. But back in the 90s of the last century, the Chinese leadership recognized the need to update the development model. Subsequently, the direction of the desired transformation was clarified as certain problems appeared and worsened. At first, it was about switching from an extensive path of economic growth to an intensive one. This thesis was then supplemented by an emphasis on innovation. Thus, greater importance was attached to improving labor productivity, scientific and technological progress. Finally, the impact of the global financial crisis on the capacity of foreign markets for Chinese goods has exacerbated the need to reduce the economy's export dependence by adopting a policy of developing domestic consumption. The situation in which inflation eats up the hard-earned foreign exchange reserves has made the formation of a new development model particularly relevant. This task is at the forefront of the 12th five-year plan (2011-2015).

Despite a slight increase in the role of domestic consumption as a driver of economic growth, especially due to the stimulus measures of the government's anti-crisis program, it is still far from sufficient. The structure of aggregate demand is still dominated by investment and net exports.

Despite the progressive increase in the cost of labor and the aging of its population, China intends to maintain the positions in the international division of labor that it has achieved during its course of reform and openness to the outside world for at least another 10 to 15 years. First of all, we are talking about maintaining the role of the "world factory".

The policy of expanding the capacity of the domestic market in China has far-reaching geo-economic and geopolitical consequences, eliminating the global imbalance of consumption and accumulation, which some Western experts are sometimes inclined to hold responsible for the crisis processes in the global economy. In fact, China aims to be not only the world's factory, but also the largest consumer of global production of goods and services. Potentially the most capacious market in the world should become one in reality. By 2015, its share will grow from 5.4% to 15.6%, and it will become the second largest in the world after the United States.

Moving away from the focus on quantitative GDP growth in favor of improving its qualitative characteristicsis not only an economic task, but, first of all, a social and political one. The process of updating the development model will take no more than

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less than 10 years old. As they say in China, this is both a decisive assault and a long positional war. Optimization of the development model can be achieved not by individual modifications of economic policy, but only by systematic, mutually linked decisions, deep reforms covering the economy.

In the "Report on the reform plan for the 12th five-year plan", prepared by the Hainan Institute of Reform and Development on behalf of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, it is noted that the main direction of transformation will be to change the development model, which will be aimed at reforming the structures of the economy, society and administration. Its most important task is to smooth out too large differences in the amplitude of socio-economic and political development and ensure, if possible, its long-term and smoother course, which is especially important in the context of the global crisis.

In particular, it is necessary to further optimize the functions of the state and the market, which should increase the role of the latter in the allocation of resources. Often, government bodies, especially local ones, still seek to manage the economy by administrative methods, and interfere in the economic activities of enterprises: they act as guarantors for obtaining loans, grant land plots free of charge, arbitrarily exempt from taxation, claim to be an arbitrator in economic disputes, and even act as leading investors in areas that are open to market competition and closed or semi-closed to private entrepreneurs. Under these conditions, many state-owned enterprises, relying excessively on the support of the authorities, do not become full-fledged subjects of market relations.

Along with this, there are many gaps in the macro-regulatory activities of the state: in tax, credit and financial, budget, environmental protection, investment policy, and social security. These gaps are revealed in the growing polarization of society, in the presence of "bubbles" in the real estate market, in high inflation, in waves of social protests and rampant corruption.

Some prominent Chinese economists with a liberal-market orientation (such as Wu Jinlian) believe that a thorough transformation of the development model is impossible without giving up state monopoly in vital sectors of the country. This approach borders on a complete rejection of the regulatory role of the state in the economy and a transition to a mainstream position.

The ultimate triumph of the Chinese model is far from certain. It is likely that its continuous improvement will eventually allow China to become a world leader not only in terms of GDP, but also in terms of the level and quality of life of the population, in terms of innovation, and in terms of its impact on the formation of global values and standards of behavior. At the same time, it is possible that the PRC's entry into the ranks of middle-income countries in 2010 will close it, like a number of other countries, in this vicious circle. A number of prominent Chinese economists warn about the dangers of such a "middle-income trap", including those who generally deny the existence of a specific Chinese development model.

list of literature

Berger Ya. M. Economic Strategy of China, Moscow, 2009.

Borokh O., Lomanov A. Hu Jintao's National Socialism and the modern ideology of the PRC / / Pro et contra. Vol. 3. Moscow, 2005.

Karnsev A. N. China and Globalization through the prism of discussions of Chinese scientists. The Rise of China: the significance for global and regional security / / Collection of articles of the International Scientific Conference, Moscow, 2007.
Liu Wei. Zeyang indui "shier'u" jian jingji fazhan mianling du tiaozhan [How to respond to the challenges faced by economic development in the period of the 12th Five-year plan]. 9.05.2011.

Liu K.C. World View and Peasant Rebellion: Reflection on Post-Мао Historiography // The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol.40, No 2. February 1981.

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