D. A. FAYZULLAEV

Doctor of Economics

EurAsEC Keywords:, Customs Union, WTO

The current stage of formation of the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is crucial for the future of the organization, its configuration and development prospects.

This is due to the most important decisions taken by the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation in Minsk on November 27, 2009 at a meeting of the Interstate Council of the EurAsEC, the supreme body of the Customs Union (CU) of this organization. According to these decisions, the single customs tariff within the Union entered into force on January 1, 2010, and by July ¹, 2011 it is planned to complete all procedures for the formation of the Customs Union1.

As noted by the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev, these documents will also be taken into account in negotiations on the accession of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus to the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time, there are 2 possible ways: "...the first option is the entry of the Customs Union itself, which already exists, in fact, no longer on paper, but in the mode of a really concluded contract. And the second option is when the countries will join taking into account the agreed position, I mean Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia separately. Both are absolutely comfortable for us. If we feel at some point that collective entry is difficult during this period, we will reach an agreement with our partners and will carry out this work separately, but ultimately we will enter into agreed positions. Who will do it faster is more of a technical question. We have the spirit " ².

The task of integrating the EurAsEC Customs Union into the world economy and the international trading system as a major regional organization by joining the WTO has come to the fore.

The main activity of the WTO is the liberalization of international trade, which implies unhindered access of goods from one country to another and the weakening of protectionist policies of states. More than 80% of the CU countries ' exports are consumed outside the organization, and the main trading partners of the CU members are the United States, the European Union (EU), and China.³ Therefore, the CU states constantly face the problem of restricting access to the markets of their main trading partners, even for goods of the primary stage of raw material processing, i.e. they find themselves in an unequal position in trade and economic cooperation.

There are different ways of joining the WTO. Most States have joined this organization independently. At the same time, a number of States that have formed a customs union or a free trade zone have the right to join it as a single organization under the same conditions.

The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is an international economic organization with functions related to the formation of common external customs borders of its member states, the development of a common foreign economic policy, tariffs, prices, and other components of the functioning of the common market. The Community was formed on the basis of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia established in 1995.

In addition to these States, on October 10, 2000, Tajikistan participated in the signing of the Treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Community^. In 2006, Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Community, but in 2008 it suspended its membership. Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia participate as observers in the activities of the Eurasian Economic Community.

In October 2007, it was decided to create the EurAsEC Customs Union consisting of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan .

KYRGYZ"SQUIGGLE"

The Eurasian Economic Community has previously considered the possibility of joining the WTO as a single organization by creating a free trade zone on the territory of the Community states.

However, this option was complicated by the hasty and uncoordinated accession of Kyrgyzstan to the WTO in 1998. It not only blocked the entry of the community into the WTO as a single form-

However, it also had a negative impact on mutual trade within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community, as there was a possibility of uncontrolled penetration of goods from third countries into the community through Kyrgyzstan.

And Kyrgyzstan's high commitments to the WTO, especially in the area of liberalizing access to its markets for goods from third countries (see Table). 2), complicated the course of negotiations with the WTO of other EurAsEC partners, as they created a precedent. The fact is that there are no uniform rules for joining the WTO. For each of the subsequent acceding countries, the conditions of accession may not be less, but, most likely, more stringent than those that joined earlier.

Considering Kyrgyzstan's accession to the WTO in 1998, it is necessary to take into account the difficult socio-economic circumstances in which the republic found itself by the mid-1990s, when the accession negotiation process was initiated.

Due to the unfavorable development of the country's economy after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the structure of its economy changed markedly: it acquired a pronounced raw material orientation. This has defined a new structure of Kyrgyz exports, most of which are raw materials. Only a small segment of exports is represented by products of the processing industry, which mainly go to Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Precious and non-ferrous metals, as well as agricultural raw materials, are exported to WTO member countries.

The Kyrgyz foreign trade regime was already quite liberal even before joining the WTO. The Republic had a single import tariff rate (10%) regardless of the type of goods. Exceptions were made for developing countries - 5%, for CIS countries and least developed countries-0%⁶. In the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan did not have any export subsidies and almost no budget support for agriculture (less than 1% of the total cost of agricultural production)⁷.

The active provision of financial assistance from international organizations (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank), as well as the United States, Japan, Germany, Switzerland and other countries was also important for the country's accession to the WTO.

Thus, by the time Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO, it had nothing to defend on the domestic market, so it was not required to make significant concessions,

Table 1

Key macroeconomic indicators of the Kyrgyz Republic (as a percentage of the previous year)

Source: International Statistical Committee of the CIS. CIS in numbers. Macro indicators for selected CIS countries: Kyrgyz Republic - http://www.cisstat.com

and the liberal regime of Kyrgyz foreign trade and the raw material orientation of exports did not give grounds for serious concern to WTO members.

Moreover, Kyrgyzstan made significant concessions when discussing its obligations on trade in goods and services, which were not formally binding. Thus, a commitment was made not to raise the import tariff rate above a certain level. Non-residents were granted access to almost the entire market of services, with the exception of public education, domestic air transport, electricity supply, legal and patent services.

Bishkek managed to complete the WTO accession negotiations in a record time of 2.5 years (1996-1998).

At the same time, Kyrgyzstan remained a member of the regional trade association - the Customs Union, which, as noted above, was later transformed into the EurAsEC. This was contrary to WTO practice, since countries that are members of a regional trade union usually join the organization as part of it. In addition, such dual membership carried an internal contradiction - the Customs Union assumed the establishment of a preferential trade regime for member countries with significant restrictions on goods and services originating from other countries, and WTO rules do not allow such restrictions for member countries.

Representatives of the WTO, of course, found an explanation for this legal conflict, saying that the Customs Union could hardly be called a really functioning trade association. It was largely a nominal entity and pursued political rather than economic goals.

However, the very precedent of Kyrgyzstan's accession, when WTO representatives allowed Bishkek to violate its own rules, only emphasized the large role played by political considerations of individual WTO members, in particular the United States. All this was shown later in the course of negotiations on the accession to the WTO of other EurAsEC members, in particular, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

The consequences of Kyrgyzstan's accession to the WTO are still difficult to assess unambiguously. In general, WTO membership has been a rather modest incentive for the development of the Kyrgyz economy, although it can bring significant dividends in the long term.

According to the International Statistical Committee of the CIS, in 2008 the volume of exports increased to $1,642 million ($781 million to the CIS countries), compared with $511 million in 2000, in 2009 exports decreased to $1,170 million, including $471 million to the CIS countries.⁸

The volume of foreign direct investment in 1998-2008 increased from $136 million to $653.2 million ^{in 2008.9}

However, according to the current interim government of Kyrgyzstan, the country's economy is in critical condition, and the state treasury is empty. The country is experiencing a new escalation of internal political instability.

A PROCESS THAT GOES ON FOREVER...

The process of any country's accession to the WTO is almost always quite lengthy and complex. Moreover, as already noted, there is no clear algorithm or uniform rules for joining the WTO. In each individual case, the negotiation process is a painstaking discussion of a huge number of details and nuances of including a given state in the functioning of the world trade system within the WTO.

For many years, the EurAsEC member states have been conducting individual negotiations on WTO accession, and this process has not been easy.

Russia, as well as Belarus, made an official application to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993. In accordance with the current procedures, a working group on Russia's accession to the GATT was established, which was transformed after its establishment in 1995. of the World Trade Organization to the Working group (WG) on the accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO ¹⁰. The Working Group received the right to study the trade regime of Russia and develop conditions for its participation in the WTO.

The negotiation process for Russia's accession to the WTO began in 1995.Starting in 2000, negotiations began to have a full-scale character, that is, to cover all aspects of the process of Russia's accession to this organization. By February 2007, Russia had completed bilateral negotiations with all members of the WG on access to the goods and services market. The main stumbling block was the multilateral negotiations on systemic issues, i.e. measures that Russia should take in the field of legislation and its application in order to fulfill its obligations as a future WTO member.¹¹

Kazakhstan received observer status in the WTO in 1996, initiating the procedure for joining the organization. In 1996-2002, the information period of the entry process and the initial organizational and procedural work took place. Since 2002, negotiations have been underway to determine the terms of Kazakhstan's accession to the WTO.

The working group on Kazakhstan's accession to the WTO includes 36 member countries of the organization. Of these, 16 countries expressed their desire to hold individual negotiations with Astana. Among them are the EU, USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, etc.

Kazakhstan has identified the following objectives for its WTO accession::

- recognition of Kazakhstan as a country with an open market economy integrated into the World Economic Organization-

most-favored-nation treatment in relations with all WTO members;

- acquisition of additional transit routes for their goods;

- attracting investment, first of all, in the manufacturing industry and in the development of high-tech industries;

- the possibility of resolving trade and political disputes within the framework of WTO procedures on a more equitable basis;

- creation of conditions for improving the quality and competitiveness of national products as a result of expanding the presence of advanced technologies, goods, services and investments on the domestic market, as well as the introduction of international quality standards;

- get access to an expanded range of products at lower prices ¹².

The specific structure of Kazakhstan's foreign trade is that Kazakh exports are dominated by raw materials, while imports are dominated by finished goods. This creates an unfavorable price ratio and leads to the loss of significant amounts of revenue due to anti-dumping proceedings in relation to many commodities in Kazakhstan.

The non-primary sector of the republic's economy is still quite weak and needs significant state subsidies in the form of tariff incentives and protective measures. For Kazakhstan, this is especially true for agricultural products and the food sector.

In order to protect the Kazakh producer, there was a need for more active use of such tools as increasing tariff rates adequately to the degree of processing of imported products, as well as coordinating the list of hypersensitive goods, the import of which into the republic is almost impossible. This list also includes agricultural products, since 43% of the republic's population lives in rural areas and is associated with agricultural production.

By 2004, Kazakhstan had defined tariff proposals for access to the republic's commodity market and formed lists of obligations for access to the services market. It was proposed to set the initial rate of the weighted average tariff at 19.5%, and the final rate at 14% at the current rate of 8.2%. For industrial goods, the initial weighted average rate was offered at 16.3%, and the final rate was 11.7% at the current rate of 7.8%. For agricultural products, the initial weighted average rate was set at 30.5%, and the final rate was set at 21.7%, with the current rate of 10.5% ¹³.

Indicators of the current tariff rates indicate that the degree of openness of the Kazakh economy is quite high, and the existing customs tariffs do not protect the domestic market well.

The main feature of the negotiation process between Kazakhstan and the WTO WG is that the package of proposals of Kazakhstan is not characterized by an aggressive export policy and is mainly focused on liberalizing access to various segments of its markets and protective tariff measures.

The results achieved over 16 years of negotiations by Belarus are minimal in comparison with the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, which is explained by the long-term tension in its relations with Western countries.

In general, the process of accession of CU members to the WTO has obviously been delayed.

A paradoxical situation has developed with Russia, which in 2007-2009 was at the final stage of negotiations. On the one hand, the signing of the final agreement seemed to be in a constant waiting mode. On the other hand, it gradually became obvious that Russia is not approaching, but moving away from signing it due to the delay in the negotiation process by WTO representatives, mainly the United States.

Speaking in April 2010 at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D. A. Medvedev said the following on this occasion: "... we should have been in the World Trade Organization a long time ago, because we are standing

it has been on its doorstep longer than other economies, even large ones like China. To put it bluntly, it seems to me that the issue of Russia's accession to the WTO is very much politicized. They made a "carrot" out of the WTO, which they hung in front of us and said: "You behave decently, and then we will accept you to the WTO." This is not true. Because the fact that Russia will be in the WTO will benefit not only Russia, but also the world economy " ¹⁴.

Moreover, in recent years, the process of Russia's accession to the WTO has begun to constrain integration processes in the former Soviet Union. Russia and other EurAsEC countries were waiting for its accession to the WTO, including in order to start forming a single customs tariff of the EurAsEC based on Russia's obligations to this organization.

However, when it became clear that Russia's accession to the WTO could be delayed indefinitely, the countries participating in the Customs Union began to lean towards more realistic prospects for economic integration within the CU.

But there was a question about whether the CU members are ready to sacrifice many years of negotiations and certain achievements on the path of individual accession to the WTO.

TWO PATHS TO THE WTO: INDIVIDUAL ...

The country's accession to the WTO is a multi-faceted process that involves changing the rules of economic and trade relations in the country. The consequences of joining the WTO are always ambiguous, both for the state itself and for the regional economic associations to which this state is a member.

It is assumed that the accession of the EurAsEC countries to the WTO will contribute to a more precise implementation by the community partners of their obligations towards each other, ending the practice of unilateral introduction of protective measures in mutual trade. In general, it seems that joining the WTO will have a "disciplining" effect on relations within integration associations in the post-Soviet space, bring them in line with the requirements of this organization and allow them to develop on a more stable legal basis.

Initially, the CIS countries, which later became part of the Customs Union, and then the EurAsEC, chose the option of individual accession to the WTO. This was largely due to the fact that at the time of the start of negotiations on WTO accession, the above-mentioned regional organizations either did not exist yet, or they were only institutionally established. Subsequently, joining the WTO within the framework of the Customs Union or EurAsEC became impossible, since one of the members of these associations - Kyrgyzstan-joined the WTO independently.

Nevertheless, the individual way of joining the WTO predetermined the emergence of a number of serious problems for the future fate of the EurAsEC.

Members of the community, seeking to become WTO members, at the same time preferred to maintain preferential trade relations with their partners in the Eurasian Economic Community. However, non-simultaneous accession of countries to the WTO implies that the entire existing system of trade within the community and the CIS would undergo significant adjustments, since bilateral direct agreements, which are an organizational and legal mechanism for coordinating interests and making decisions in the CIS, are not recognized by the WTO as the basis for preferential trade relations.

However, in accordance with Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO, it is possible for WTO members to have preferential treatment in trade for participants in agreements on the creation of a free trade zone or customs union.¹⁵

The decision on the possibility of applying such a regime is made by the WTO on the basis of information provided by States on the nature, scope and status of obligations of States in terms of agreements on the customs union with the EurAsEC states, especially on the formation of a single external tariff.

Prior to 2006, the most important preferences that existed within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community were free duty-free trade (with some exceptions) on the basis of bilateral agreements and lower prices for most fuel and raw materials (oil and natural gas) than in trade with other countries. The last named prefetch-

Table 2

Weighted average customs duty rates of some EurAsEC member states (current and expected) upon WTO accession (in%)

Sources: Mogilevsky R. Should we join the WTO? (Experience of Kyrgyzstan) // Pro et contra, volume 7, 2002, N 2, p. 50; On the main results of negotiations on access to the markets of goods and services in the framework of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization / / Materials of the Department of Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, October 2007. - www.wto.ru; Primbetov S. D. EurAsEC and World Trade Organization / / Kazakhstan-Spectrum, 2004, N 3 (29), p. 7.

rents are considered as subsidies in the WTO. In this regard, one of the conditions for Russia's negotiations with the organization was to bring prices for fuel and raw materials products within the framework of the EurAsEC and the CIS in line with world prices. In 2006-2007. Russia has managed to meet this WTO requirement.

The formation of the common economic space of the Eurasian Economic Community is the most important condition for maintaining and developing trade and economic ties between its participants. The markets of the community countries are necessary for each other as markets for a significant part of their goods and services, the export of which to the markets of other countries meets serious difficulties.

In Russia, this applies to highly processed products. For many branches of Russian industry (primarily electrical engineering), export to the EurAsEC and CIS countries is the most important channel for product sales, as well as a condition for maintaining technological chains that make Russia a full-fledged industrial power, and not just an "oil and gas" state around the transit pipe.

The rejection of preferential treatment in trade with the EurAsEC and CIS countries would lead to a noticeable reduction in trade volume, making most of the mutually supplied products uncompetitive, and exacerbating the imbalance of mutual exchange.

Complete and simultaneous rejection of existing preferences and settlement specifics in relations with the EurAsEC and CIS countries (barter, trade at domestic prices, netting) It could lead to a reduction in the volume of exports from Russia to these countries by about 1/3, and from the community and CIS countries-by 50% ¹⁶, as prices for finished products from near and far abroad will converge, which will lead to consumers and exporting enterprises preferring goods of higher quality and technical level produced by more developed countries.

The liberalization of trade and economic relations between the EurAsEC member states and third countries upon their accession to the WTO would lead to the elimination of the current discriminatory regime for goods from the community countries.

However, the lack of competitiveness of most of the production facilities of the EurAsEC countries, combined with the rapid opening of their domestic markets, is fraught with a significant increase in the expansion of commodity producers from third countries to the detriment of national producers and the development of mutual economic ties within the Community. With the individual accession of the EurAsEC countries to the WTO, an accelerated reduction in duties on goods from non-CIS countries would lead to a deterioration in the competitive positions of the community countries in each other's markets.

Each of the states has its own interests, which are not always compatible with each other's interests, since the EurAsEC states compete with each other in some types of products. At the same time, the WTO does not seek to offer synchronized conditions for the entry of Community members into the organization. This is clearly seen even in the most preliminary indicators of weighted average customs duty rates.

In addition, serious difficulties would arise with the compliance of agreements concluded within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community with the norms and requirements of the WTO. It would be necessary to review all existing agreements on trade and economic cooperation between the countries in order to ensure their compliance with these standards.

Thus, the individual path of the EurAsEC member states ' accession to the WTO entails many serious problems that significantly complicate the implementation of all integration projects in the post-Soviet space.

...AND COLLECTIVE

In comparison with individual accession, the collective option of joining the WTO seems to be more preferable from the point of view of integration of the EurAsEC Customs Union.

Coordinated WTO accession by a single organization will avoid a complex and lengthy process of subsequent harmonization of the community's legal framework for its compliance with both WTO norms and the conditions for each country's accession. In addition, the EurAsEC Customs Union will be able to establish internal (between CU members) customs duties, tax holidays, and subsidies for agriculture. The WTO allows only international organizations to apply such measures.

However, the decision to suspend negotiations on joining the WTO and on possible accession to this organization within the framework of the EurAsEC Customs Union was ambiguously perceived by a number of Russian experts. Their concern is that the Russian Federation is abandoning Russia's rather significant achievements in the WTO negotiations, and in return it is getting rather unclear prospects for collective membership in this organization, which is much more difficult in organizational terms and, consequently, longer.

To initiate the accession process, it is necessary that the EurAsEC Customs Union should not be a formal association that exists only on paper, but a real functioning organization. According to the signed agreements, the formation of the Customs Union should be fully completed by July 1, 2011. Thus, the process of joining the WTO within the CU can be launched no earlier than the end of 2011 or the beginning of 2012.

The members of the EurAsEC Customs Union are at different stages of the negotiation process for joining the WTO. If Russia completed the negotiations by 90-95%, Kazakhstan - by 75%, then Belarus - only by 50-60%¹⁷. The head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs A. Shokhin expressed concerns about the upcoming definition of the general economic regime of the CU of the Eurasian Economic Community. This indicator is likely to be determined "by

closing", i.e. for the country with the lowest level of market transformation. In the EurAsEC CU, such a country is Belarus, which means that after it, the CU's economic regime as a whole can be qualified as non-market ¹⁸. This status entails serious obstacles on the way to the WTO and the practical impossibility of resuming negotiations with the WTO on behalf of the CU, but on the basis of Russian groundwork in the negotiation process, as the CU participants and, above all, the Russian side would like.

Having chosen the path of collective entry, the CU participants will have to start from scratch. And, as practice shows, the longer the process of joining the WTO is delayed, the more difficult it is to become a member of this organization. This is due to the ongoing process of trade liberalization within its framework, the adoption of new documents regulating this process. Updated and more stringent requirements apply to candidates. Russia's failure to participate in the development of new WTO regulations in the field of energy services, investment policy, and the environment may cause particular damage to Russia.

The legal procedure for joining the WTO by the EurAsEC Customs Union may also be a serious problem. In justifying their decision, representatives of the Community referred to the fact that, firstly, such a precedent in the history of the GATT/WTO already existed. We are talking about the accession of Switzerland and Liechtenstein to the GATT in 1966 within the framework of the customs union. Secondly, article XII of the 1995 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO stipulates that "any State or individual Customs territory that has full autonomy in the conduct of trade policy may join the WTO under conditions to be agreed between that country/territory and the WTO" ^.19

However, in the 14 years since the agreement was adopted, the WTO's functions have been expanded to regulate services, public procurement and intellectual property, and these issues are not within the competence of the customs union.

The functions of the WTO are much broader than the powers of any customs union. Consequently, if the members of the EurAsEC Customs Union insist on joining the WTO within the framework of the CU, they will have to join the WTO collectively on some issues, and individually on a number of positions. And this is the first time in the history of the WTO that States intend to choose such a difficult path to join the organization from a legal and organizational point of view.

Of course, the question of the readiness of the CU economies, including the Russian one, to compete with imported goods on the domestic market under the WTO terms, has not been removed from the agenda. But that's a different topic.

* * *

Speaking at the Brookings Institution, Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia seeks to join the WTO, " only it needs to be done quickly, without any new requirements." He noted that Russia's accession to the WTO " ... does not contradict our other obligations, including the creation of a Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, because these processes can be fully harmonized, and everyone benefits from this."²⁰

According to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Russia intends to join the WTO at the same time and on equal terms with Kazakhstan and Belarus, and the terms of entry will depend on the position of the CU partners. The presidents of the 3 countries intend to discuss the tactics of joining at their meeting in Astana on July 5, 2010. ²¹

¹ Official website of the Customs Union Commission. Interstate Council of the Eurasian Economic Communities. Decision No. 18 of 27 November 2009, Minsk. On the Common Customs and Tariff Regulation of the Customs Union of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation - http://www.tsouz.ru/Docs/Pages/mgs5.aspx

² Official website of the Customs Union Commission. Answers to journalists ' questions. 26.11.2009 - http://www.tsouz.ru/Docs/Pages/stenogramma271109(2).aspx

^{Primbetov S. D.} 3 EurAsEC and the World Trade Organization / / Kazakhstan-Spectrum, 2004, N 3 (29), p. 3.

⁴ For the text of the Treaty Establishing the Eurasian Economic Community of October 10, 2000, see: official website of the Eurasian Economic Community - http://www.evrazes.com/about/history

⁵ Treaty on the Establishment of a Single Customs Territory and the Formation of the Customs Union of October 6, 2007 - http://www.tsouz.ru/MGS/mgs-gg3-06-10-2007/Documents/Dogovor%20o%20edinoi%20ta mozennoi%20territorii%20i%20formirovami%20tamoz.%20souza.doc

^{Shurubovich A.} 6 CIS Countries in the WTO: Problems and Consequences / / Financial Director, 2006, No. 10.

^{Mogilevsky R.} 7 Should we join the WTO? (Experience of Kyrgyzstan) / / Pro et contra, 2002, N 2.

⁸ Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. CIS in numbers. Annual data for the CIS as a whole: export / import - http://www.cisstat.com

^{Shurubovich A ..} 9 Edict op.; Official website of the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic - http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/tematika/CTpoHT/Kbiprbi3CTaH%20B%20цифрах/инвест1.pdf

¹⁰ On the progress of negotiations on Russia's accession to the WTO // Materials of the Department of Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, December 2006. - www.wto.ru.

¹¹ On the main results of negotiations on access to the markets of goods and services in the framework of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization / / Materials of the Department of Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, October 2007. - www.wto.ru

¹² Goals and objectives of Kazakhstan's accession to the WTO - www.wto.kz

^{Primbetov S. D.} 13 Decree. op.

¹⁴ Official website of the President of Russia. Meeting with representatives of public, academic and political circles in the United States. 14.04.2010 - http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/7454

¹⁵ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (GATT-1994) - www.wto.ru

¹⁶ Ibid.

^{Shokhin A.} 17 The Customs Union should be created on the basis of WTO membership, 25.06.09 - www.wto.ru

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1995 - www.wto.ru.

²⁰ Official website of the President of Russia. Meeting with representatives of public, academic and political circles in the United States...

²¹ ITAR-TASS, 15.04.2010; RIA Novosti, 15.04.2010.

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