3. Behind the scenes

At the beginning of 1919, the bellicose circles of the Entente and the revanchists of Germany, the White Guards and the ruling elite of the nationalist bourgeoisie of Finland and the Baltic States were engaged in preparing the campaign on Red Peter. The leading role in this reactionary alliance belonged to the Western imperialists. The governments of the United States, Britain and France officially declared their "non-interference" in Russian affairs and refused to send their troops to Russia, and US President W. Wilson, with the consent of D. Lloyd George, even sent a W. Bullitt mission to Moscow in February 1919 to probe the political basis of negotiations with Soviet Russia. However, this mission ended in the fact that V. I. Lenin's constructive response to the Anglo-American proposals on the conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Russia, which was brought to Paris, was never discussed at the Paris Peace Conference. The fact is that by the time Bullitt returned from Moscow in March 1919, the situation on the fronts in Russia had changed compared to January. Kolchak was advancing on the Eastern Front. On March 26, at Ust-Kovzh, he even managed to link up for a while with Miller's White Guard army advancing from the North. The situation on the anti-Soviet front was thus, as it seemed to the Entente, encouraging, and the imperialists hastily put aside the mask of" peacemakers " and preferred the bayonet to diplomacy. Wilson could now afford not to accept Bullitt and forbade the publication of the draft agreement he had brought, and Lloyd George could easily declare in the British Parliament that he "did not conduct any negotiations at all" with the Soviet government. 1 Meanwhile, the imperialists, secretly from their peoples, carried out not only the supply of the White armies, but also the organization of their military operations. The former Russian ambassador to France, V. Maklakov, had reason to write from Paris on March 6, 1919, to the White Guard government of the Northern Region that "the intentions of influential governments go much further in our (White Guard. - B. F.) favor (of supplying the armies. - B. F.), but this is not publicly announced." Under the guise of statements about "non-intervention" and the possibility of" recognizing the Bolsheviks", the interventionists increased their military forces against the Soviet republics of Russia and the Baltic States. So, in February-March 1919, the British unloaded about 5 thousand rifles and 200 machine guns for the white Latvian army in Libava (now Liepaja)2. In Estonia only from February 6 to May 14, 1919, 7 steamers with 3 weapons arrived from England . In April 1919, weapons and various kinds of equipment for the Finnish army were delivered to Finland (Bjorneborg) on 22 British steamships, accompanied by six counter-mine carriers .4 Entente warships operated in the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland 5 ,

Ending. For the beginning, see Voprosy Istorii, 1971, No. 1.

1 "History of Diplomacy", vol. III. Moscow, 1945, p. 64.

2 See V. Y. Sipols. Behind the Scenes of foreign Intervention in Latvia, Moscow, 1959, p. 109.

3 See O. Riess and A. Gronsky. US assistance to the White Guards in the attack on Petrograd. Voprosy istorii, 1951, No. 9, p. 122; Istoriya grazhdanskoi voyni v SSSR, vol. 4. Moscow, 1959, p. 22.

4 See M. Rybakov. From the history of the Civil War in the North-West in 1919, Moscow, 1958, p. 11.

5 See A. S. Pukhov. Petrograd should not be surrendered. Communists at the head of the defense of Petrograd in 1919, Moscow, 1960, p. 92; F. D. Volkov. The collapse of the British policy of intervention and diplomatic isolation of the Soviet State, 1917-1924. 92; "History of the Civil War in the USSR", vol. 4, p. 150.

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under the cover of which the local bourgeois-nationalist forces, together with the White Guards, led by allied missions, assembled troops in order to throw them on a march to Petrograd in a "favorable situation".

Second only to the Entente, the nationalist bourgeoisie, the landlord and kulak strata of Finland and the Baltic States were an external factor in the formation of the White Guard forces in the North-West. Using their pronounced anti-Soviet position, Yudenich established his headquarters in Finland, and in Estonia and Latvia the remnants of the white Northern Army, which were defeated by the Red Army at the end of 1918 near Sebezh and Pskov, found refuge. Yudenich hoped to bring them back together under his command. General A. Rodzianko in his memoirs admitted that in Riga he managed "without much difficulty" to obtain the consent in principle of the Latvian authorities to the withdrawal of the White Guards to Latvia .6 The Estonian bourgeois government, financed by the American-British imperialists, went even further and took the White Guard units under its command.

How did the internal political situation develop in the area that was supposed, according to Yudenich's plan, to become a springboard for the offensive on Red Petrograd? In Finland, the bourgeois-landlord circles, which had just suppressed the workers ' revolution, were hatching the idea of a union with Estonia. In January 1919, in Helsingfors, as contemporaries noted, "all the bourgeois parties, Finnish and Swedish, sympathized with it, and the press lived on this theme alone." 7 True, the Estonian bourgeoisie was wary of such an idea. But the idea of the union had a certain class-political background. It served, in particular, as a cover for Mannerheim's "volunteers" who participated in the suppression of the proletarian revolution in Estonia and in joint battles with the White Estonians against the Red Army .8 The real purpose of the Finnish troops ' presence in Estonia was then exposed by the Estonian Soviet Government. In a note to the Finnish government, it categorically stated that "Finnish troops illegally, without even a single formal reason or warning, interfere in the internal affairs of Estonia and in its class struggle" and that this is aimed at " suppressing the aspirations of the Estonian workers to free themselves from the yoke of capital and organize their lives on the principles of equality, fraternity..."9 . In the end, the Finnish-Estonian union was abandoned by its masterminds, and the" volunteers " of Mannerheim, who turned into looters, were forced to leave for Finland. However, the most reactionary circles of the Finnish bourgeoisie still sought not only to contribute to the attempts to suppress the Russian revolution, but even to lead an anti-Soviet campaign in the North-West.

One of those who was eager to share with W. Churchill the laurels of the organizer of the struggle against Bolshevism was Karl-Gustav-Emilius Mannerheim, a major general in the tsarist service, who had been in the retinue of Nicholas II since 1912. In the politics of Mannerheim, the then head of the Finnish state, there were quite clear tendencies to lead in anti-Soviet adventures. In February 1919, he tried to negotiate with the bourgeoisie of Sweden, Norway and Denmark on a joint anti-Soviet campaign. To this end, he went on a trip to these countries. On his arrival in Sweden, he was met with a unanimous demand from the workers: "No support for Mannerheim!". On February 10, 1919, impressive demonstrations were held in Sweden. The left-wing Social Democrats called for a general strike to protest the anti-Soviet collusion of the bourgeoisie. The newspaper Folkets Dagbladet Politiken published numerous resolutions of workers 'meetings protesting against the recruitment of" volunteers " and sending them to Estonia and Latvia to fight the Soviet regime. In one of the resolutions of the workers of the city

6 A. P. Rodzianko. Memories of the North-Western Army. Berlin. 1921, p. 12.

7 See G. Kirdetsov. At the gates of Petrograd (1919-1920). Berlin. 1921, p. 48.

8 In January - February 1919, Finnish troops, together with the White Estonians and White Guards, invaded the Petrograd Province. Significant forces of Finnish troops were concentrated on the Soviet-Finnish border, although the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, in a note dated February 14, 1919, called on the Finnish government to be prudent and prudent, because the Soviet government remained invariably "on the basis of recognizing the independence of Finland" ("Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR", Vol. II. Moscow 1958, p. 71).

9 "Northern Commune", 22. II. 1919.

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Malmo, for example, said :" It would be a black disgrace if the working class of Sweden allowed once again the robbers of the ruling class to go to kill our brothers who have joined the advancing world revolution. We must do everything in our power to delay this war of bourgeois reaction against the struggling proletariat... To do this, we must support the revolution in this struggle not only in words, but also in deeds. " 10 It became clear that Mannerheim would not achieve his goal. Moreover, he was forced to cancel a trip to Denmark and Norway. The campaign organized by the bourgeoisie of these countries to recruit volunteers for the anti-Soviet troops also failed.

There was a significant process of political disengagement in Finnish public opinion at that time. The Finnish bourgeoisie was not united in its actions against Soviet Russia. The interventionist trend of influential industrialists and merchants was strong. The action against Soviet Russia and the march on Petrograd were then becoming the basis of their foreign policy program. As a reward for this, the White Finns expected to receive territorial acquisitions near Murmansk and in Karelia. They also cherished the dream of being in a privileged position in the Gulf of Finland and on the Neva. The neutralist current also expected the death of the Soviet government, but hoped that the matter would "manage" without outside interference. The working people of Finland opposed the intervention. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland, in an appeal to Finnish workers, peasants and soldiers, wrote that Mannerheim was preparing a campaign against Petrograd against the will of the working people: "He wants to start a war with the consent of the British imperialists... If General Mannerheim begins his military operations, you, comrades in Finland, must respond at the same hour with the victorious cry: "Long live the revolution of the Finnish working people!" 11 Supporters of intervention could not ignore this. The Finnish ruling circles "were afraid of being in the position of a wizard who summoned a spirit from the ground and could not cope with it. By unleashing the furies of war against the proletarian republic, they would at the same time unleash internal revolutionary forces."12 Not daring to openly oppose the Soviet government, the interventionists launched a campaign of anti-Soviet lies and provocations on the Soviet-Finnish border. Hiding behind them, the Finnish reaction strengthened the army, created "volunteer" detachments. At the same time, Mannerheim stated that he could put up a 100-thousandth army in three days. Mannerheim's dream was to organize a campaign against Petrograd on his own.

As for the southernmost part of the proposed white bridgehead in the North-West - Latvia, the interests of the Entente imperialists and Germany clashed here: puppet governments of different orientations were overthrown one after another, and reactionary armies were formed. The warring factions were then not up to "military cooperation" with the former tsarist General Yudenich. So far, they have only used in internecine battles the very White Guard detachments that he claimed, and helped those of them who wanted to move to Estonia. Later, from July 1919, when the counter-revolution in Latvia temporarily won, the local bourgeoisie, under the leadership of the Entente, created a shelter in Riga for the White Guard recruitment bureau named after Admiral Kolchak and received representatives of Yudenich. In the same place, plans for a joint campaign against Soviet Russia were further coordinated and the directions of counter-revolutionary attacks were determined. But at the beginning of 1919, in the camp of the Latvian counter-revolution, which had retreated to the Libava region as a result of its defeat in the struggle against the Latvian workers and peasants, the contradictions became more acute. The pro-German barons and the pro-English bourgeoisie, instigated by the imperialists, were at war with each other. Germany was the first to take steps to strengthen its position, relying on von der Goltz's troops. The Germans first decided to replace the Anglophile Ulmanis government in Libau with a pro-German government. According to a secret plan to be executed by a German intelligence officer

10 "Petrogradskaya Pravda", 19. II. 1919.

11 Ibid.

12 A. L. Geronymus. Worker Petrograd and Yudenich. Krasnaya Letopis, 1929, No. 4 (32), p. 26.

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According to J. Stock, such a government was to be headed by the former Landmarschall von Stricken of Livonia .

But it so happened that Ulmanis received information about the intentions of the Germans. Anglophile kruti took their own measures, and the plot failed 14 . However, this did not stop the Germans. At the end of February, according to the plan of von der Goltz, adopted by the headquarters of the German high Command in Kolberg 15, their troops from the Libava area went on the offensive. In cooperation with Landwehr units, the Germans occupied Vindava (now Ventspils). On March 3, they launched a broader offensive in Courland and by March 19 captured Mitava (now Jelgava), forty kilometers from the capital of Soviet Latvia - Riga. Only now, in their rear, did the Germans decide to replace the former bourgeois Latvian government. On April 16, in Libau, a detachment of German troops under the command of Pfeffer and the Landwehr units of Baron Manteuffel called from the front dispersed Ulmanis ' office and disarmed his troops. Ulmanis himself had no choice but to take refuge in the British mission and then transfer to the steamer under the protection of the English ships. As a result of the coup, the Germans created their own baronial government ("Committee of Security"). The British demanded that the German government restore the situation in Libau that existed before the coup, but failed to seize the initiative. By that time, the policy of patronage of Germany by the United States, which aspired to leadership in the Baltic States, was quite clearly defined. And the Germans used it.

On April 22, the American mission in Libava received British and French representatives in its apartments to discuss the situation. The meeting was attended by the commander of the British naval forces in the Baltic Sea, Admiral Cowan, the commander of the French squadron, Captain 1st rank Brisson, the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England Watson and other 16 . A decision was made, the essence of which was reduced to the fact that von der Goltz was required to withdraw from Libava the units that participated in the coup. But there was also a compromise. At the suggestion of the head of the American mission, Green, the conference considered it possible to agree to the creation of a bourgeois-baronial government. Von der Goltz, who had observed the fluctuations in the Entente camp, continued to hold the initiative in his hands. On April 25, he summoned representatives of the German barons and ordered:: "A new government must be formed before lunch tomorrow." 17 The barons shuffled the composition of the government overnight, agreed to introduce some bourgeois candidates to it for the sake of England, leaving 4 out of 10 portfolios 18, but with the condition that the prime minister should be a Germanophile, Pastor A. Needra. The head of the American mission, Green, tried to reconcile Ulmanis with Nyedra. On April 30, he conferred with them for a long time. But the Premiers remained loyal to their original owners: Niedra to the Germans, Ulmanis to the British. On May 4, the British issued a note demanding that Germany remove von der Goltz. However, the German government rejected this note and in its reply of May 9 threatened to withdraw German troops from Latvia. After that, the government of Niedra, with the tacit consent of the Entente, remained the master of the situation in Courland .19 The German position was temporarily strengthened. As a result, Yudenich's access to their camp, to the White Guard troops in Latvia, was difficult. Thus, inter-imperialist contradictions left their mark on the course of events.

The situation was different in the Estonian part of the bridgehead, where England was, in fact, the undivided master of the situation. With British and American funds, the Estonian bourgeoisie managed to create a white army, first adding volunteers from the kulaks, landlords and bourgeois elements of the towns of 20, and then the PU-

13 The Germans intended to form a constitutional monarchy in Latvia and Estonia, subordinate to Germany.

14 See V. Y. Sipols. Op. ed., p. 121.

15 See A. Norden. Between Berlin and Moscow, Moscow, 1959, p. 269.

16 See V. Y. Sipols. Op. ed., p. 123.

17 Ibid., p. 124.

18 See A. Norden. Op. ed., p. 269; P. Stuchka. For Soviet power in Latvia. Collection of articles. Riga. 1964, p. 674.

19 See V. Y. Sipols. Op. ed., p. 125.

20 See "History of the Estonian SSR". Tallinn. 1952, pp. 351-352.

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all the more reason. In the end, three divisions and a division of armored trains were formed. Civil war broke out in Estonia. The reaction stifled the power of the working people. The landlords and the bourgeoisie were also preparing to engage in a major war - against Soviet Russia. Under the pretext of fighting for "democracy" and "independence", Estonia was drawn into anti-Soviet adventures. In principle, the Estonian landlords and the most militant representatives of the bourgeoisie were ready to fight even in alliance with the White Guards, with those who demonstratively sang "God save the Tsar!"in Revel restaurants.21 . Estonian Commander-in-Chief I. Laidoner was a particularly active supporter of cooperation with the White Guards. His "merits" in this field were later awarded such a British award as the Order of St. Michael and St. George. The order was awarded to him by the British military mission 22, which in its own way highly appreciated the vile role of this enemy of the working people.

At the beginning of 1919, the local bourgeoisie and landowners were actively fighting against the workers and peasants of Soviet Estonia, having quite powerful forces - the cover of the British squadron from the Gulf of Finland, their own troops, foreign legions numbering several thousand people, 23 and the White Guard corps. As a result of the winter battles, they managed to push back the revolutionary workers 'and peasants' detachments from Revel to the east. The presence of White Guard units in Estonia made this area very "promising", which was well understood by Yudenich, who was trying to gain a foothold here. However, he still continued to give "preference" to the Finnish bridgehead: Petrograd is close to the Estonian border, but closer to the Finnish one. In addition, the Finnish army consisted of more than 60 thousand soldiers and officers, that is, "significantly more than what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could put up together." 24 Yudenich also took into account the fact that in Finland there was a strong influence of France, whose official representatives were supporters of the course of "united and indivisible Russia". Moreover, he was not dealing here with the newly formed" independent " Republicans, as Prime Minister Pyate and his supporters considered themselves in Estonia, but with the "head of state", the former tsarist Major General K. Mannerheim: with him, General Yudenich hoped to speak as with a lower rank.

While in Finland, Yudenich decided to take over the leadership of the White Guard Northern Corps operating in Estonia. He began by recommending General E. Arsenyev to Estonian Commander-in-Chief I. Laidoner for the post of corps commander, with Mannerheim's consent. Arsenyev kept an open German orientation, did not agree with Yudenich in everything and schemed against him. Therefore, Yudenich wanted to kill two birds with one stone: in Helsingfors, get rid of a Germanophile rival, and in Estonia, acquire a dependent person. But this assignment was not easy. For the Russian officers of the corps, where Germanophilism continued to be held in high esteem, Arsenyev was quite acceptable, which was not the case with their Estonian partners. The pro-English government of bourgeois Estonia did not accept the candidacy of Arsenyev, who was "almost offered to go back" 25.

After this failure, Yudenich did not make any other serious attempts to get the Northern Corps at his disposal for a long time. It was not until March that a delegation from him arrived in Reval .26 She promised to "protect Estonian interests" in the future if the Estonians allowed Yudenich to manage the corps. But even this attempt did not lead to anything. Yudenich was still not directly rejected in Estonia, but also not recognized

21 N. Ivanov. About the events near Petrograd in 1919. "Civil War Archive". Issue I. Berlin, B. G., p. 21.

22 See M. Rybakov. Decree. op., p. 88. Johann Laidoner (1884 - 1942) served in the Tsarist army, participated in the First World War. In 1918-1920 , he was one of the leaders of the counter-revolution in the Baltic States, and later the leader of the fascist clique in Estonia.

23 See History of the Estonian SSR, p. 352. Some of the "volunteers" included people who were not experienced in the class struggle, who did not understand its meaning, and simply adventurers, white Finns, Swedes and Danes. Later, the French Legion, the American detachment, and the "Russian detachments" formed in England appeared (see M. Rybakov. Op. ed., p. 100).

24 "History of the Civil War in the USSR", vol. 4, p. 22.

25 See N. Ivanov. Op. ed., p. 21.

26 Consisting of S. G. Lianozov, V. M. Volkonsky and General M. N. Suvorov.

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in the role that he would like to play. First of all, it was important for the Estonian bourgeoisie to use the military force of the White Guards in the interests of the nationalist counter-revolution. Yudenich, on the other hand, sought to use the Estonian bourgeois nationalists for his own purposes and continued to sit out in a hotel room in Helsingfors. Occasionally, he appeared in civilian clothes on the streets, since it was unsafe to appear in the form of a tsarist general, and received reports from his right-wing cadet entourage from the "Special Committee for Russian Affairs in Finland", the chairman of the" Political Committee "A. Kartashov, and his"headquarters". Yudenich's main task in those days was to negotiate with the Entente. He conducted them through Russian representative offices in Stockholm, London and Paris. In Helsingfors, V. Kuzmin-Karavaev, a representative of the bourgeois "social element", who in tsarist times was called "a general among liberals and a liberal among generals", was most engaged in negotiations with the missions. He served as a diplomat in negotiations with the British and Americans on the supply of weapons, equipment, and food to Yudenich. Yudenich, on the other hand, never missed an opportunity to ask Kolchak to do the same. Yudenich's entourage also thought about forming a "Russian government". By early March, such a "government" led by Yudenich as dictator was mostly secretly formed. The naval agent of the White Guards in Scandinavia, Captain 2nd rank Weimar, reported to Omsk on March 7 and 12 that the financing of the" government " of Yudenich was supposed to be organized independently of Kolchak, through the London branch of the Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank.

4. In the spring of 1919

By the beginning of the spring of 1919, in northwestern Russia, Yudenich, as commander of the White Guard troops that did not yet exist, sometimes even became a hindrance to the interventionists. The British bourgeoisie hoped to organize an offensive on Petrograd without him-by the forces of the bourgeois-landowner armies of Finland and Estonia, together with the Entente fleet. In addition, the British were aware not only of Yudenich's precarious situation, but also of his plans to form a "Russian government" after the capture of Petrograd without the "supreme ruler" Kolchak. This did not suit the British, who had their own calculations regarding the ways to "return" Russia to the bosom of capitalism (as they argued in London, Yudenich was a Germanophile in the past, not quite an Anglophile in the present, and in the future he could again reorient himself to some other power). This, in fact, explained the appearance in London of intentions to remove Yudenich from Petrograd altogether, as the military representative of the Whites at the Entente Headquarters, General D. Shcherbachev, and the "ambassador" in Paris, V. Maklakov, reported to Omsk in their telegrams of April 30, 1919. The British planned to " transfer the forces of General Yudenich from Finland and Estonia to Murmansk and Soroki." However, this plan was not to be realized. The successes of the Red Army and the failures of the White Guards in various regions of Soviet Russia were hindered. On the other hand, the plan of the British did not suit either the French or the Americans, who did not want to strengthen the influence of England, or the White Guards, because it pushed them away from Petrograd and thus put them in unfavorable political conditions for the future. The White Guards hurriedly sent General N. Golovin from Paris to London for negotiations with instructions to get permission from the British to leave Yudenich on the spot. At the same time, Shcherbachev insisted that Golovin's mission should be supported from Omsk by the French General Janin and the British General Knox, who were under Kolchak. On May 8, 1919, Golovin telegraphed Yudenich: "On behalf of Sazonov and Shcherbachev, I have arrived in London to negotiate assistance to you and the provision of a base in Estonia. I received a promise of assistance, but for political reasons it should be kept strictly secret. One of these days, a special British military mission will leave for you to help you on the spot and provide the necessary influence. I'm staying in London for talks with the chief of mission. I believe that things are taking a favorable turn, but for greater success, it is necessary for you to repeat a declarative statement that you are completely subordinate to the supreme ruler, Admiral Kolchak. Only in this case will England help. ...I consider it my duty to warn you that in view of the fact that your case is nearing a favorable resolution,

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they want to join it, and then capture it, a number of people who are completely negative, pursuing personal and selfish goals. Therefore, extreme care should be taken when providing (dover) services.it authorities"27 . This document speaks for itself. Every line of it is an involuntary denunciation of the policy of the imperialists and their despicable puppets. Regarding the "base in Estonia", it turns out that it was necessary to negotiate in London and keep it "strictly secret". Secondly, London "recommended" which of the White Guards in Russia should depend on whom. They believed that after public declarations of submission to Kolchak, Yudenich should not make any claims to "Russian power". Third, Yudenich was warned from London not to allow "unreliable" people near him, so that no one could intercept him from the Entente. Finally, London was informed in advance that a "special military mission" would soon appear in the Baltic States with purely specific goals of supporting the White Guards. All these "details" across the English Channel were considered so significant that one of the political figures of the white emigration, K. Nabokov, when sending a copy of Golovin's telegram to Omsk for information, considered it necessary to preface it with a postscript: "Very confidentially. I suggest you tell the supreme ruler..."

So Yudenich stayed in Finland for the time being. Correspondence about the supposed "transfer" of it to the North has been preserved. From it, curious information about Yudenich's "military organization" is revealed. It turns out that in response to General Miller's request of May 6, 1919, about "the size of the organization, whether it represents ready-made combat units, and which ones," Yudenich telegraphed on May 17: "The organization consists of 1,000 people, half of them officers, no combat units, no weapons, no equipment." 28 And to another question from Miller - whether Yudenich was excluded from the possibility of launching military operations - he replied that "the question of the possibility of actions to Petrograd together with the Finns will be decided by about June 1; a negative decision will require the immediate dispatch of a steamer"29 , on which he could move to the North. So, the general who claimed to be "commander-in-chief" gathered only a thousand unarmed people during the five and a half months of his stay in the Helsingfors hotel. On May 17, four days after the start of the Northern Corps ' offensive in the Estonian sector of the front under the command of A. Rodzianko, 30 Yudenich expressed his readiness to withdraw to the North if the Finns did not act in concert with him. All this also speaks to the illusory influence of Yudenich in the spring of 1919. This "commander-in-chief" did not give orders to the troops about the offensive at that time and did not receive reports from them. He did not even know exactly when the Northern Corps had started fighting, and in his telegrams to Omsk, in one case, he called the date "May 12", in another - "May 14". He played his notorious role at Petrograd a little later.

The intensification of military operations against the Soviet Republic began. Yudenich was left on the spot, and England, as can be seen from General Golovin's telegram, took him under its care. Across the vast expanse from Karelia to Lithuania, five counter-revolutionary strikes followed one after another in support of Kolchak. The first attack was carried out by the White Finns in three columns of" volunteers " in the direction of Zvanka-Lodeynoe Pole - Petrozavodsk (April 19). From Estonia, the Northern Corps and two Estonian divisions, supported by the British and Estonian fleets from the Gulf of Finland, went on the offensive (May 13). In Latvia and Lithuania, the Germans were not far behind. After a two-month break, they considered it a good time to start implementing their aggressive plans in the Baltic States, launched an offensive on Riga and captured it (May 22). Almost simultaneously, Lithuanian bourgeois units occupied Panevezys (May 19). But, unable to withstand the pressure of the Lithuanian Red Army, the counter-revolution was forced to leave the city. Then the Germans vme-

27 "Red Archive", 1929, vol. 2 (33), p. 116.

28 TsGAOR USSR, f. 17, op. 1, d. 17, l. 50.

29 Ibid., l. 37.

30 A. Rodzianko assumed this position on his own, despite Yudenich. He announced this during the absence of the commander of the K Corps. Dzerozhinsky district. Later, Rodzianko tried to justify himself, referring to the fact that once the Estonian commander-in-Chief I. Laidoner "expressed a desire to see him at the head of the corps" (see A. P. Rodzianko. Op. ed., p. 31).

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They went into action and captured Panevezys themselves (May 26). Anglo-Canadian forces advancing by rail from Murmansk captured Medvezhya Gora station (May 23).

The change in the military situation immediately affected Yudenich's position. On May 24, Kolchak authorized him to "assume high command of all Russian forces in the Northwest"31 . The " supreme ruler "by this time already had recommendations to put Yudenich in a legally subordinate position, in order to paralyze his attempts to form his own"Russian government". These recommendations have now been implemented .32 At the same time, Kolchak repeated earlier statements that he considered the creation of a unified Northwestern White Guard front "expedient and subject to implementation" and that he had given "appropriate orders" regarding the provision of loans to Yudenich and the replenishment of his front with Russian prisoners of war from Germany. All this was part of the Entente's plans to launch the anti-Soviet spring-summer offensive of 1919.

Before Kolchak gave his "orders", representatives of the Entente in Berlin informed the head of the White Guard "Red Cross mission" Potocki about the allies ' intention to create a 200 - thousandth White Guard army from prisoners of war in Germany. In Paris, on May 14, the Council of Four decided to transfer prisoners of war to the Baltic States and southern Russia .33 And five days earlier, after discussing the memorandum of the American delegation on the Entente policy in the Baltic States, the" Council of Four " decided to create a special committee whose task would be to study in detail the question of organizing an armed anti-Soviet intervention in the Baltic States. The result was the decision of May 23, according to which the Allied military mission was sent there (Golovin knew about it already on May 8). It was to "advise the Governments of Estonia, Latvia ,and Lithuania on all matters relating to the organization, supply, and training of local forces and volunteers who could be recruited from other countries." 34 The Entente was not satisfied with the millions of lives of Russians, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians who were given for the interests of the bourgeoisie during the First World War. Now the allies "advised" to exterminate the working masses of these peoples because they dared to join the banner of the Bolshevik Party and begin to remake life on a new social basis.

With the direct participation of the Allied military mission, headed by the British Lieutenant General G. Gough and his staff, Yudenich in the summer of 1919 to a certain extent completed the unification of anti-Soviet forces in the North-West. Yudenich's move from Finland to Estonia, his entry into the command of the army, the anti-Soviet military operations in the North-West in the summer of 1919, the preparation of the autumn campaign on Red Peter - all this was the work of the Entente and its henchmen.

For world imperialism, this was a time of frantic preparation for a combined attack on Soviet Russia. The plans for the capture of Petrograd then concerned various aspects of international relations, and on this basis the most diverse political actions of international reaction were intertwined on the shores of the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland. On the muddy wave of these contradictions, the Yudenich region was formed. In the struggle against the socialist revolution, the imperialists were not averse to acting as a united front. At the same time, each of the Western powers sought to find its own puppet among the White Guards. If Yudenich had not offered his services to the Entente, its ambassadors might have picked up a different figure in the dustbin of history. And when Yudenich was defeated in the autumn of 1919, it was not because of his "personal qualities". The reactionary military-political action, which was led by a former tsarist general at the behest of international imperialism, collapsed under the blows of the heroic defenders of Red Peter, who stood up with their breasts to defend the gains of the socialist revolution.

31 See Kolchak's telegram to Yudenich dated May 24, 1919 (Red Archive, 1929, vol. 2 (33), p. 118).

32 Kolchak did not appoint Yudenich, but only authorized him to take command. The appointment took place on June 5, after receiving a telegram from General Golovin from London with a reminder of " Yudenich's unconditional submission to Kolchak." Yudenich signed the order on his assumption of office on June 23, 1919.

33 См. "Foreign Relations of the United States. Paris Peace Conference, 1919". Washington. 1940. Vol. IV, pp. 707 - 709.

34 Ibid., p. 762.

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