Part of the combined campaigns of the White Guards and the Entente against Soviet Russia in 1919 was Yudenich's campaign against Petrograd. This action was one of the manifestations of the military-political activity of anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary forces. The primary role in its preparation belonged to international imperialism. Politically, financially, economically, and materially, it depended on the bourgeoisie of the United States, England, France, and Germany. Its point was aimed at the cradle of the socialist revolution. It is no accident that Soviet literature about Yudenich's campaign appeared during the Civil War, mainly in connection with the study of the heroic Petrograd defense. 1 Over the past half-century, many documentary sources, memoirs, and studies have been introduced into scientific circulation .2 However, most often the events of the end of 1919 are considered, that is, the final defeat of Yudenich's troops at the walls of Petrograd. The initial period of the actions of this tsarist general is covered in the literature incomparably weaker. Therefore, this essay focuses on this particular period, for which some little-known sources from the funds of the Central State Academic Administration of the USSR are used.
1. Node of contradictions
The workers of the Baltic States, with the support of Soviet Russia, established Soviet power in November 1918 - January 1919. However, the counter-revolution in the Baltic States was not completely defeated. The bourgeois - nationalist forces that started the civil war and grouped themselves in Estonia and Latvia around the bourgeois governments opposed the conquests of the workers and peasants. Pyats and K. Ulmanis), and in Lithuania-mainly around the military commandant's offices of the German occupation forces. The imperialists sought to stifle Soviet power in the Baltic States at all costs. After the end of World War I and the defeat of Germany, the ruling circles of Britain, France, and the United States focused all their military, economic, and political efforts on the struggle against the Soviet Republics of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic States. US President Wilson, before leaving for Europe to attend a peace conference, said that the allied powers "see Bolshevism as the only enemy against which they can be opposed."
1 N. Kakurin. How the revolution fought. Moscow-L. 1926; A. Geronimus. The Defeat of Yudenich, Moscow: L. 1929; N. A. Kornatovsky. The Struggle for Red Petrograd (1919). L. 1929; M. V. Rybakov. Heroic Defense of Petrograd in 1919, Moscow, 1957. From the history of the Civil War in the North-West in 1919, Moscow, 1958; A. S. Pukhov. Petrograd must not be surrendered! Communists at the head of the defense of Petrograd in 1919 M. 1960, et al.
2 " The Struggle for Petrograd (October 15-November 6, 1919)". Ptgr. 1920; " Valiant defense of Petrograd in October 1919 (based on the materials of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic)". Moscow, 1921; N. Podvoysky. Communards defend Red Petrograd. Moscow, 1920; d. Reliable. On the outskirts of Petrograd in the summer of 1919, Moscow, 1928; " 1919. The Great Defense of Red Petrograd. Memoirs of workers, working women, peasants, Red Army men, Red Navy men and cadets". L. 1929; "Documents on the heroic defense of Petrograd in 1919". Moscow 1941; "From the history of the civil war in the USSR". Vol. II. Moscow 1961, etc.
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which should be turned against"3 . So, having been defeated in the struggle against the Bolsheviks by its own soldiers, imperialism used the tactic of putting together a united anti-Soviet front. The decisive role was now assigned not only to the White Guards, but also to the bourgeois-nationalist troops of the countries bordering Russia. This policy was the basis for the idea of Foch and Churchill, known as the "campaign of 14 states". As V. I. Lenin said at the eighth All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b) in December 1919, the imperialists "used all methods of pressure, financial, food, and military, to force Estonia, Finland, and undoubtedly also Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, to force this whole cycle of states to go against us."4 .
In the autumn of 1918, the interventionist troops advanced near Arkhangelsk and in the Far East, advancing into the depths of Russia from Murmansk and from the east along the Siberian Railway. Squeezing the encirclement of the Soviet republics, the interventionists brought the navy into the Black Sea on the night of November 18; in the Baltic ports - to Libava (on the 9th), Revel (on the 12th), Riga (on the 18th) and Helsingfors (on December 31, 1918). At the same time, the Entente supported the internal counter - revolution with all its might, relying on "strong personalities" - military dictators. In the South, the imperialists helped Denikin in every possible way, in the North they actively supported the troops of General Miller, in the East - Admiral Kolchak. A "strong personality" was only lacking in the Northwest. Meanwhile, it was precisely in this sector, which was closest to Petrograd and Moscow, that the strategic and operational importance of the anti-Soviet front was, as the enemies of the revolution believed, most important. And, in addition, the appearance of large anti-Soviet military forces here, as the imperialists believed, would give them the opportunity to restrain the spread of the socialist revolution to the West.
The rulers of the former allied powers of Russia quickly forgot that Germany was their military opponent in the First World War. Marshal Foch, the commander-in-Chief of the Entente forces, thought at the time that, despite the German capitulation, the Allies "would lose the war if they could not satisfactorily resolve the Russian question."5 Therefore, he was ready to "accept German cooperation"6 . Churchill Leahy said that the conquest of revolutionary Russia is generally possible "only with the help of Germany." 7 The imperialists of Britain, France, and the United States expected that in the struggle against the proletarian revolution they would easily find common ground with the German militarists. They were not mistaken: Germany itself was moving towards the Entente in this matter. After negotiations on January 14, 1919 in Kassel between the new German government delegation and the German High Command, the Germans proposed that the Entente open a common front against Bolshevism. A little later, one of the leaders of the German high Command, General Ludendorff, through his agents "suggested that Clemenceau create a special German army to fight Soviet Russia." 8
The terms of the armistice concluded on November 11, 1918 by the allied powers with Germany concerned the evacuation of German troops from Belgium, France (including Alsace and Lorraine), Luxembourg, Austria-Hungary, Romania, Turkey, and Africa. Only with regard to Russia did the second part of article 12 of the Armistice agreement leave the question of the withdrawal of German troops still occupying part of its territory entirely to the Entente's discretion. The Allies were given the right to "decide" when the time came for such a withdrawal, taking "into account the internal situation of these territories." 9 With regard to the Baltic States, this provision was confirmed on December 24, 1918, in a note from the Allies to the German Government. In this case, too, Germany was ordered to keep its troops in the area until the Allies deemed it necessary .10 The Entente hoped that the "internal situation" in the occupied Russian territory would be acceptable to it.-
3 Pravda, 28. XI. 1918.
4 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 39, p. 348.
5 D. Lloyd George. The Truth about Peace Treaties, vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, p. 319.
6 Ibid.
7 V. Churchill. Mirovoi krizis [World Crisis], Moscow, 1932, p. 6.
8 "History of Diplomacy", vol. III, Moscow, 1945, p. 45.
9 " International Relations. 1870-1918". Collection of documents, Moscow, 1940, p. 390.
10 См. "Deutsche Tageszeitung", 2.I.1919.
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rhetoric will be formed under the influence of German troops. In practice, this meant using the German military machine to suppress the socialist revolution. The German bourgeoisie and the Junkers were well aware of this. A. Winnigel, the general commissioner of the German government in the Baltic States, when calling on the soldiers of the VIII German Army to fight Bolshevism, directly referred to the terms of the armistice. "Germany is obliged to defend the Baltic countries," he wrote in an address to German soldiers on December 30, 191812 .
However, in the Baltic States, the German troops were not just a simple tool of the Entente. The German militarists associated far-reaching plans with the Baltic States, hoping to turn Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into "an appendage of German imperialism." 13 Subsequently, one of the adherents of this aggressive concept, A. Winnig, did not even consider it necessary to hide that he "sought to achieve the annexation of the Baltic states to Germany"14 . German imperialism hoped to gain a foothold here in order to advance from there to Petrograd and Moscow, restore the monarchy in Russia, and try to change the results of the world War in alliance with it. Therefore, it was not by chance that the slogan "The fate of Germany lies in Russia" was popular among the German bourgeoisie at that time. The government of the right-wing Social Democrats, which replaced the monarchy in November 1918, assured the public that it had no military goals either in Russia or in the Baltic States. Meanwhile, anti-Soviet passions were being stirred up in the country, and "reports" about "Soviet border violations" were being presented to the German people one after another, fabricated by various bureaus of the anti-Bolshevik League and the government .15 Germany had a significant contingent of occupation troops in the Baltic States. Although many German soldiers, influenced by the revolutionary events, especially after the November Revolution, left the front, went over to the Red Army or went home, a fairly impressive part of the former Kaiser's army in Courland was still in the hands of the reactionary generals. The German troops were consolidated into an "Iron Division" and felt themselves masters of the situation. The right-wing social Democrat Gustav Noske, who became commander - in-chief of the Reichswehr after the defeat of the November Revolution in Germany, said of them: "Our troops in the Ostsee region clung to the idea that their mission was to create a bulwark against Bolshevism, which threatened all of Europe."16
In addition to their own troops, the Germans had in Latvia under their command, Russian White Guard detachments and military formations of the Baltic barons (Landwehr). Strong German influence still remained in the units of the former White Guard Northern Army, which was formed at German expense in the Pskov region in October-November 1918 and was credited with participating in the battles with the Red Army on the side of German troops. The first defeat of its units was suffered here on November 22 near Sebezh, the second-on November 25 and 26 in the Pskov region 17 .
11 August Winnig (1868-1956) was a German right-wing social Democrat and trade union leader in Germany. In 1918, he was appointed Commissioner of the German Government in the Baltic States. Later, as German ambassador to bourgeois Latvia, he collaborated with Latvian bourgeois parties to create an "independent Latvia" - a puppet state under German auspices.
12 "German-Soviet relations", vol. I. Moscow, 1968, p. 694.
13 A. Norden. Between Berlin and Moscow, Moscow, 1959, p. 261. In the borders of modern Soviet Latvia, by the beginning of the First World War, 91.3% of the land was owned by persons of German origin. 630 barons owned more than 2.6 million hectares, or more than half of all land. In Estonia, large landlords, who were 90% of German origin, had 57.9% of the land fund concentrated (ibid., pp. 259-260).
14 A. Winnig. Am Ausland der deutschen Ostpolitik. B. 1921, S. 50.
15 A. Norden. Op. ed., p. 280.
16 G. Sock. Notes on the German Revolution (from the uprising in Kiel to the Kapp conspiracy), Moscow, 1922, p. 150.
17 After the defeat near Pskov, parts of the Northern Army withdrew to Estonian territory. In Estonia, the army was transformed into the Northern Corps. According to the agreement with the corps command of December 6, 1918, the Government of bourgeois Estonia took the maintenance of the corps on its own account and officially transferred it to the Estonian commander-in-Chief, and in fact the corps became an integral part of the Estonian bourgeois army. However, although after the German capitulation, the corps officers sought protection from the Entente, the Germanophile orientation among them still took place (see "Civil War Archive". Issue 1. Berlin, p. 145).
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The situation in the Baltic States was different for the Entente. The Allies have so far "managed" here with teams of military sailors from ships that occupied the ports in Libava, Riga, Revel, Helsingfors. They hoped to get the armies of the local bourgeois governments of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland at their disposal, arm them, and at the same time take the White Guards from the Northern Army under their command instead of Germany, and then throw them all on a campaign against Soviet Russia. However, the organization of a united anti-Soviet front on the far approaches to Red Peter turned out to be more difficult than Foch and Churchill had anticipated in their plans. The real democratic policy of Soviet Russia, which recognized the right to self-determination of the Baltic peoples, was primarily an obstacle to the unification of anti-Soviet forces in the North-West. An important obstacle to the unification of opponents of Soviet power was the international labor movement, which actively supported revolutionary Russia. Finally, the unification of anti-Soviet forces in this area was hindered by contradictions in the interventionist camp. France, for example, sought to gain a foothold in Finland and Poland, but at the same time opposed the strengthening of the British position in the Baltic States. Therefore, at the Paris Peace Conference in early 1919, French representatives advocated the autonomy of Estonia and Latvia within the "united (capitalist )Republic of Latvia". Russia". Britain, true to its traditional divide-and-rule policy, favored granting "independence" to these countries in order to consolidate its economic and political dominance there.
The US imperialism, which had grown rich in the war and claimed world leadership, pursued its own plans in this area. The Americans, also trying to gain a foothold in the Baltic States, tried in every possible way to push their English competitor. While Britain insisted on recognizing Estonia's "independence", the American representatives in the Baltic States believed that "Estonia should not be recognized until it provides some guarantees that large landowners will be allowed to keep their homes and part of the land and that they will receive compensation for alienated property" 18 . The Americans used to their advantage, in particular, the policy of encouraging the privileges of German-Ostsee junkers. In the end, this demand was signed by the British heads of Allied missions in the Baltic States, General Gough and the French representative Bose, who, together with the American Lieutenant Colonel Dooley, handed an official letter to the Estonian bourgeois government on July 28, 1919 .19 The British were opposed to the influence of the Germans in the English "sphere of influence", while the Americans, on the contrary, agreed to make concessions to Germany there .20 The latter, of course, used it. And if later American diplomats admitted that in the Baltic States "in fact, the German was, depending on the circumstances, either an agent or a servant of the Allies,"21 they had in mind primarily the United States. To Anglo-French imperialism in the Baltic States, the last thing Germany wanted was to give up its position.
Thus, the foreign policy situation in the Baltic States was a knot of contradictions that most directly influenced not only the formation of Yudenich's army, but also the policy of the local bourgeois - nationalist counter-revolution. For the bourgeoisie and landlords of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the number one problem was the suppression of the socialist revolution in their countries. In this case, they could not do without the help of the imperialist powers and rushed in search of "patronage" from one imperialist power to another - from Germany to France, then to England, the United States, and vice versa. But the complexity of the historical situation in the Baltic States was not limited to this. The bourgeois-nationalist forces of Finland and the Baltic countries were not free from mutual claims against each other, nor from contradictions with the policy pursued by General Yudenich, who headed the counter-revolutionary forces in the Northwest in 1919.
18 "Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919" (далее - "Papers"), vol. XII. Washington. 1940, p. 157.
19 Ibid., pp. 222 - 223.
20 See V. Y. Sipols. Behind the Scenes of foreign Intervention in Latvia, Moscow, 1959, p. 140.
21 "Papers", vol. XII, p. 205.
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2. "Reorientation" and the beginning of the end
N. Yudenich, who graduated from the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff at the age of 27, quickly received ranks and promotions, but did not differ in the breadth of his horizons. He saw the world through the eyes of a "soldier of his Majesty", through the prism of an order. During the first Russian Revolution, Yudenich led a punitive expedition to Transcaucasia. In the First World War, already in the role of commander of the Caucasian Army and commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, he was known as the strangler of the local national liberation movement. Successful operations of Russian troops on the Caucasian front in 1917 brought Yudenich fame in bourgeois circles as the "hero of Erzerum". However, more knowledgeable people knew that the general's success was due primarily to the heroism of the Russian troops, as well as to the operational plans and energy of the chief of staff. After the February Revolution, Yudenich became quite a popular figure in the counter-revolutionary camp. The Provisional Government "removed" him from the post of commander-in-chief of the front for "resisting" government orders. This raised Yudenich's popularity with the extreme reaction. At the beginning of 1918, in Petrograd, Yudenich came into contact with German agents and became close to the Germanophile circles of the anti-Soviet underground. The counter-revolutionary pro-German "United Officers 'Organization" created in Petrograd even intended to put him at the head of an anti-Soviet conspiracy. However, such a plan soon had to be abandoned, since Yudenich's clearly monarchical views could scare off some part of the officers. However, beyond the demarcation line, in German-occupied Pskov, where the formation of the White Guard Northern Army was being prepared, Yudenich's name was mentioned by the Germans among those on whom German imperialism could pin its "hopes". Even before the surrender of Germany, the Germans and the Russian Germanophiles at a meeting in Pskov concluded an agreement on the formation of the said army, the 5th point of which read:: "Commander (N.-B. F.) the army, with dictatorial powers, is assigned a Russian general with a popular military name, preferably with the consent of General Yudenich, General Gurko, or General Count Keller. " 22 By the way, Yudenich already knew about the German plans to form an army in the North-West to capture Petrograd and Moscow: he and the notorious reactionary Duma deputy Markov 2 were informed about this long before the Pskov conference. The two right-wing conspiratorial centers of the counter-revolution that they represented (the monarchist and the officer centers )fully approved of the plans of the German command. 23
But the events of the end of 1918 made their own adjustments to the plans of the Germanophiles. The capitulation of the Austro-German coalition and the November Revolution in Germany forced the Germanophile bourgeois-landowner circles of Russia to seek a new master. Thus, as early as March 1918, one of the counter-revolutionary organizations, which later became known as the Right Center, did not reject the Entente orientation in principle. But its members still believed that it would be better to stick to the Germanophile direction .24 After the defeat of Germany, General Keller, a reactionary and Germanophile, was perhaps the first senior military official to take a step towards rapprochement with the Entente. He sent representatives to the Allied envoys in Iasi to ask for the" protection " of the Entente .25 However, in November 1918, Keller was killed by Ukrainian nationalists, and Yudenich continued his "initiative". From Petrograd, he moved to Finland in November and witnessed the withdrawal of German troops from there. From the near approaches to Petrograd, Von der Goltz's troops were leaving, with whom only recently Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich, Prince V. Volkonsky and former Tsarist Prime Minister A. Trepov discussed the conditions for a joint struggle against the proletarian revolution, timing the appearance of the White Guards from Finland and the beginning of anti-Soviet uprisings inside the country to the German offensive on Petrograd .26 Now these calculations of the right forces
22 See P. M. Avalov. In the fight against Bolshevism. Hamburg-Gluckstadt, 1925, pp. 70-71.
23 See N. A. Kornatovsky. Op. ed., p. 26.
24 See V. Vladimirova. The Year of Service of the "Socialists" to the Capitalists, Moscow, 1927, p. 237.
25 See A. I. Denikin. Essays on the Russian Troubles, vol. IV. Berlin, 1925, p. 20.
26 See N. A. Kornatovsky. Op. ed., p. 19.
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they were collapsing, and Yudenich intended to offer his services abroad to another "strong host". For this purpose, he went to Sweden.
On December 14, 1918, Yudenich presented his memorandum to the American envoy in Stockholm, A. Morris, in which he outlined in detail the plan for a future anti-Soviet campaign from the Finnish-Baltic bridgehead. This memorandum was telegraphed by Morris to Secretary of State Lansing in Washington on the same day . At the same time, Yudenich established contacts with the French. Later, in February 1919, he telegraphed his project to the Allied Commander-in-Chief Foch: "Mr.(Ospodin) Marshal, as soon as the revolution broke out in Germany, I left Petrograd for Finland in order to organize Russian forces for an active struggle against Bolshevism. At the beginning of December, I had a meeting with Mr. de Vaux, the French Ambassador in Stockholm... My plan was to conduct military operations against Petrograd and Moscow, using the shores of the Gulf of Finland and the territory of the Baltic provinces... Please meet the need for supplies of all kinds... " 28 .
At that time, the Russian White Guards wrote a great deal about the capture of Petrograd in the bourgeois press, and with proposals on this subject they beat down the doorsteps of the governments and parliaments of Western European countries. The thought of capturing Petrograd did not leave the Entente generals either. The head of the White Guard government of the Northern Region, N. Tchaikovsky, who worked in Arkhangelsk with diplomats and military representatives of the Allies and knew about their intentions, informed the former Russian ambassadors abroad on the fourth day after the German surrender that the Allies were preparing to occupy Petrograd. In a confidential letter addressed to V. Maklakov (in Paris) and K. Nabokov (in London), he reported on November 15, 1918, that "the allies set one of their immediate tasks in Russia as the occupation of Petrograd by their own forces." In those days, the White Guards were waiting for the capture of Petrograd and eagerly caught any news on this score and barely had time to refute them later. The same K. Nabokov, in one such refutation, reported: "Rumors about the capture of Petrograd by the Allies, or at least about the beginning of serious operations in this direction, at this moment completely do not correspond to reality."
It is clear that the Allies could not send their soldiers to such a risky operation "at this moment", because they were afraid of the influence of the socialist revolution. That's the crux of the matter. If Clemenceau in Paris on January 16, 1919, took the liberty of suggesting sending strong armies to Russia, Lloyd George said something different. He believed that "a military campaign against the Bolsheviks would make England Bolshevik and bring Advice to London." 29 The Entente could not send large contingents of new troops to Russian soil and therefore still hoped to carry out its plans mainly by someone else's hands. Therefore, in political and military terms, Yudenich's proposal to organize a North-Western Front seemed very tempting to the Entente. Only Yudenich himself did not at first understand which of the allies would ultimately lead the anti-Soviet military campaign against Petrograd. He initially offered services to the French and Americans. And in early January 1919, when he was in Stockholm, he turned to the British, who earlier than other partners in the intervention took the initiative in organizing an anti-Soviet front in the Baltic States. But they had their own plans for a candidate for the post of commander at that time. In particular, the British conducted negotiations on this issue with General V. Gurko, also popular among the White Guards. Gurko, as a true Germanophile and monarchist, agreed to such a proposal only depending on satisfactory answers to the questions: what political and economic goals do the British pursue in Russia? What funds will he have at his disposal? Will he have full power as commander-in-chief? There were no direct answers to these questions from the British, and then there was no continuation of the "private" negotiations .30
27 See M. V. Rybakov. From the history of the Civil War in the North-West in 1919, p. 8; "History of the Civil War in the USSR", vol. 4. Moscow, 1959, p. 21.
28 See Red Archive, 1929, vol. 6 (37), pp. 73-74.
29 M. Tanin. 10 years of Foreign Policy of the USSR, Moscow, 1927, p. 62.
30 A. I. Denikin. Op. ed., p. 24.
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Yudenich did not set any such conditions. He only repeated that he recognized the Entente, promised to fight the Bolsheviks, and asked for help. For the sake of disguise, to please the bourgeois democracy of the West, Yudenich insisted that he was neither a monarchist nor a Republican. He is not a "politician" at all and wants "only" to suppress the revolution in Russia. What is the policy in this, they say? "The Russian White Guard," he said in Helsingfors in February 1919, " has one goal - to drive the Bolsheviks out of Russia. It has no political program. It is neither monarchical nor republican. As a military organization, it is not interested in issues of political partisanship. Its only program is down with the Bolsheviks. " 31 This was exactly what suited the Entente, and therefore both the United States and France, and somewhat later England, hoped to use it as they saw fit. With his help, each of these countries hoped to eventually take the White Guard movement in the Northwest into their own hands. Their common goal remained the desire to unite all the White Guard forces (Yudenich, Kolchak, Denikin) to march on Moscow and Petrograd and overthrow the power of the working people.
At first, Yudenich as a political figure for the Entente was not such a big "find" that it immediately decided to bet on him. After all, in the past, he focused on the Germans. It was necessary to see if he could win over the right-wing Germanophiles who had fled to Helsingfors, and at the same time get along with the nationalist bourgeoisie of Finland and the Baltic countries. In Stockholm, Yudenich was received favorably. The strategic importance of the Northwestern Front was recognized by the Allies as indisputable, and Yudenich flattered himself with the hope of success of the enterprise. On January 3, 1919, on a steamer sailing to the Finnish skerries from Stockholm, he was full of importance. One of the passengers on this flight, once an employee of Birzhevye Vedomosti and Rech, G. Kirdetsov, recalled: "The passengers' attention was drawn to a certain gentleman of about 50, small in stature, stooped, broad-shouldered, with a bull's head and an excessively long mustache. He didn't talk to anyone at the communal table, but kept his eyes carefully hidden... He asked brief questions or made equally brief comments. " 32 Even before the complete defeat of Yudenich, on August 28, 1919, the notorious A. Guchkov said of him: "A very average general in terms of combat and other qualities, not suitable for any responsible business"33 . Professor G. Zeidler, who had worked in the counter-revolutionary camp, had said of Yudenich a few days earlier: "He is a rough provincial general, a clean technician, has no state outlook, has a weak general education, knows few people, does not trust them, is silent, thinks, and draws conclusions that are difficult to change. You can't be a political leader. " 34 Already after the defeat of Yudenich near Petrograd, the juror N. Ivanov remarked: "No one was infected with faith or even energy by this gloomy, distant old man, sometimes stingy in conversation, sometimes striking with childish remarks and questions." 35 Finally, the ideological mentor of the north - western counter-revolution, professor of theology and one of the ministers of the Provisional Government, A. Kartashov, concluded with disappointment: "Yudenich deceived us... We trusted him too much. " 36 To justify their defeat, so said everyone in the camp of the enemies of the Soviet government who made at least some bet on Yudenich. But in December 1918-January 1919, and even later, the Entente loomed behind the "roughly provincial general". His name was celebrated on the White Guard stage in Helsingfors, where he first settled, by industrialists and bankers who had fled Petrograd, retired dignitaries and bourgeois politicians. The lower-ranked generals also clung to him. Those who were overthrown by the revolution clutched at the name like drowning men clutching at straws. They supported him, recommended him for the role of the white military leader in the North-West; even the recognized bourgeois "authority" P. Struve agitated for him. At first, Yudenich under-
31 See Northern Life (Helsingfors), 19. II. 1919; N. A. Kornatovsky. Op. ed., p. 214.
32 City Of Kirdetsov. At the gates of Petrograd (1919-1920). Berlin. 1921, p. 5.
33 M. S. Margulies. Year of intervention. Berlin, 1923. Book 2, p. 266.
34 Ibid., p. 132.
35 N. I. Ivanov. About the events near Petrograd in 1919. "Civil War Archive". Issue 1. Berlin, p. 122.
36 Ibid., p. 102.
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the Germanophile A. Trepov, who tried to resist the transition of some of the Helsingfors Black Hundreds to the side of the Entantophiles, also held out.
Having offered the Entente his services in organizing an anti-Soviet front in the North-West, Yudenich was to start forming an army and receive political support from the "social element". Finland was a politically and operationally-tactically advantageous springboard for the White Guards. Industrialists, financiers, and tsarist dignitaries who fled to Finland had money and connections. They still have the old-fashioned reputation. Yudenich wanted to take advantage of all this, and at the same time subdue the Northern Corps, formed without him and having, on the one hand, a pro - German corps, and on the other, a pro-English Estonian command. Admiral V. Pilkin, who often communicated with Yudenich in those days, noted in one of his letters that Yudenich had to " find out his legal, so to speak, position, find funds, create a base and form a volunteer army."37
In Finland, before Yudenich, there was already a White Guard organization - the so-called "Russian Committee" of the monarchical sense, created in November 1918 under the auspices of the German troops and not without the participation of the Finnish reaction. After the Germans left, this " Committee "decided whether to continue the monarchist course under the banner of the struggle for" united and indivisible Russia "and continue to focus on German assistance, or to cede the political initiative to the" moderate " right-wing Cadet bourgeoisie and together with it go under the protection of the Entente. It was at this point that Yudenich appeared. Soon P. Struve and A. Kartashov also arrived there. The initiative in the" Committee " gradually began to pass to representatives of the big bourgeoisie. On January 14, 200 emigrants - industrialists, financiers, dignitaries and bourgeois intellectuals-gathered at the so-called Vyborg Congress held at the Hotel "Andrea" on the initiative of Boris Hessen, former director of the Petrograd Bank and Insurance Companies. The former openly pro-German course was revised. The participants expressed their support for the Entente orientation. Her supporters came to the leadership of the "Committee". At this congress, on the recommendation of P. Struve and with the support of A. Trepova's group of enterprising politicians recognized General Yudenich as the leader of the white movement in the Northwest with dictatorial powers. A. Kartashov became the chairman of the board in the "Committee", who later turned out to be the main ideological inspirer of Yudenich. Bourgeois "commissions" and "soviets" began to form around the general on a variety of issues - political, military, foreign, industry and trade, finance, etc.The White Guard leaders thus acquired a certain form of military-political organization.
Having enlisted support in the camp of the emigrant counter-revolution in Finland, Yudenich used the channels of diplomatic communication to make himself known outside of Finland. Through the former Russian envoy in Stockholm, K. Gulkevich, the" Yudenich military organization " was reported to Paris, London, Washington, Yekaterinodar, and Arkhangelsk. On January 21, 1919, Yudenich presented Kolchak with his first telegraphic report, recognizing the "supreme ruler" and outlining to him a plan for the upcoming deployment of anti-Soviet forces in the North-West of Russia . The plan was designed to support Kolchak. With the fall of Germany, Yudenich wrote, there was an opportunity to form a new front against Soviet Russia. This front, in his opinion, could be based on Finland and the "Baltic provinces". The convenience of communication with the Entente, the proximity of Petrograd and Moscow, plus a well-developed network of communication routes-these were the conditions that, according to the plan of the White Guard, were necessary for the deployment of military operations against Soviet Russia from the Northwest. In his report, Yudenich did not miss the opportunity to emphasize that after January 14, "all parties, from the Cadets to the right," united around him in Finland. As for the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, it promised him full financial support. Yudenich believed that he already had a real military force at his disposal, and at the same time he allegedly called the Northern Corps of 3 thousand people at his disposal. Among them, he ranked
37 "Red Archive", 1929. vol. 2 (33), p. 112.
38 A. I. Denikin. Op. ed., pp. 24-25; N. A. Kornatovsky. Op. ed., p. 206.
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another 3 thousand from the old Russian army, which he thought to recruit in Finland and Scandinavia. This was how Yudenich imagined the core of his future "volunteer" army, which he hoped would also include up to 30 thousand Russian prisoners of war from Germany.
"It is impossible to do without the help of the Entente," he wrote to Kolchak. It was necessary to influence the Entente on Finland so that it would not interfere with Yudenich's" undertakings". In addition, in his opinion, the outcome of military success depended on the Entente.: 1) the opening of the Finnish border, mainly to officers and defectors from Soviet Russia, Estonia and Latvia; 2) the provision of sufficient weapons, equipment and technical equipment, especially tanks and airplanes; 3) the provision of food, at least temporarily, until the junction with Kolchak. As for the Entente armed forces, according to Yudenich's initial calculations, they might not be needed at Petrograd, although their participation would "simplify and speed up", as he believed, the solution of the problem. For the time being, he expected the Entente to" secure " the ports in the Baltic for the White Guards. Yudenich asked Kolchak to support him in every possible way before the Entente. He also petitioned Denikin on January 30, 39 and Foch, Commander - in-Chief of the Allied Forces, on February 10 . In both cases, Yudenich considered the future North-Western Front as an integral part of the general front of imperialism against Soviet Russia. "I warmly welcome your work..." Kolchak telegraphed Yudenich without delay on February 2, 191941 . For the "supreme ruler" himself in those days, it was extremely desirable to establish a "connection and commonality of actions" with each new anti-Soviet center. He willingly took Yudenich under his care and said that for his part, he would support him in every possible way before the allies and would insist on providing him with "energetic assistance." Kolchak also said that he would immediately transfer to Yudenich's disposal "one million rubles for the most urgent needs." Even at that time, this amount was considerable. Together with 2 million Finnish mark 42 received by Yudenich in Finnish banks under the guarantee of the then-established White Guard "Council of Industry" in Finland , it provided financial support for Yudenich's anti-Soviet preparations. The reactionary circles of the Finnish bourgeoisie, on the other hand, hastened to recognize Yudenich as the "head of the Russian cause" in the North-West, and the bourgeois "Russian Leaf" in Helsingfors on February 9, 1919, rewarded them with every praise.
Yudenich's military and political plans for the anti-Soviet struggle were based on broad support from reactionary circles in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. To this end, he entered into negotiations with Finland and the anti-people governments of the bourgeois Baltic states, seeking to unite their forces for a march on Petrograd. At the same time, he also hoped that the Entente would force these states to present a united front with him. From sensitive conversations about their future, he either avoided, or dropped brief remarks that "everything will be settled in the future of Russia after the overthrow of the Bolsheviks." 43 However, more than one Yudenich claimed leadership in the White Guard camp in the North-West. First, the pro-German command leaders of the Northern Corps in Estonia were striving for "independence". Secondly, Reval was developing its own White Guard center almost parallel to the right Helsingfors center. In the future, it will compete with Yudenich, but in January - February 1919, the friction between these two centers was just beginning. The Revel counterweight dates back to November 1918, when local Russian bourgeois leaders, at the initiative of the elders of the Family Circle club, decided to form a temporary "Russian Council". This organization absorbed both supporters of the restoration of the monarchy and bourgeois democrats. It was not particularly politically active, but claimed independence from the Helsingfors group of emigrants. This became especially noticeable after a certain N. Ivanov, a Petrograd lawyer, publicist and publisher, appeared in Revel. In pre-revolutionary Petrograd, he owned a banking office on Sadovaya Street and was the founder of-
39 See A. I. Denikin. Op. ed., p. 25.
40 See Red Archive, 1929, vol. 6 (37), pp. 73-74.
41 "Red Archive", 1929, vol. 2 (33), pp. 89-90.
42 N. A. Kornatovsky. Op. ed., p. 206.
43 N. I. Ivanov. Edict op. p. 22.
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The head of the Industrial Supply Society, N. N. Ivanov, knew Yudenich from the 1918 anti-Soviet plot of the White Guard military organization in Petrograd and hoped to persuade him to move his center from Finland to the Estonian bridgehead, from where he considered it more profitable to prepare a campaign against Red Peter. After an unsuccessful meeting with Yudenich in Helsingfors, N. Ivanov took the path of rivalry with him in the struggle for political leadership in the White Guard camp. According to the plan of N. Ivanov and his supporters, a north-western government should be formed in Reval, which should recognize the independence of Estonia and Finland. Those, in turn, with the assistance of the interventionists, were to provide troops to participate in the anti-Soviet campaign. Thus, N. Ivanov assigned the role of a link between the various centers of counter-revolution to the emigrant north-western government. Revelsky "Russian Council" this is a proposal of N. V. Ivanov was accepted, and Yudenich visited again and recommended that he form not a government in the proper sense of the word, but a kind of directory in the form of a "civil-military north-west center of five persons", which would be a legal entity capable of "collecting funds, concluding contracts, forming detachments" and generally holding it in front of the " public"the answer for the fate of the White Guard movement 44 . After listening to N. Ivanov, Yudenich was indignant: "What a public! We'll reach democracy like that. Russia needs a military dictatorship. Nothing more."
After that, N. Ivanov decided to act independently in Reval. He became close to the ataman of the Kulak bandit detachment, Captain S. Bulak-Balakhovich, and in his person gained support from at least some military force. On February 11, 1919, he wrote from Revel to Kolchak: "With the Helsingfors group, headed by Yudenich and consisting of a handful of big capitalists..., we are always in contact, but our unification with them is slowed down by the reactionary sentiments of this group and its desire for a military dictatorship, with which one can only go inside Russia to repeat skoropadchiny and already Of course, without the help of Finland and Estonia. " 45 Not content with the support of S. Bulak-Balakhovich, on February 14, N. Ivanov officially asked for help from the headquarters of the Northern Corps, trying to interest his command with his proposals. "I inform the chiefs of staff," he wrote,"that if the troops recognize the' local state cell 'of the army, a base in Estonia, supplies, and military cooperation between Estonia and, probably, Finland will be provided, up to the capture of Petrograd." 46 He also promised financial assistance. But all this could only be provided by the Entente. It is also known that in expanding the anti-Soviet intervention, it followed the path of shifting the rifle from one shoulder to the other. It did not matter to her whether the rifle rested on the shoulder of Helsingfors or Revel, as long as it worked against the revolution and the Soviet government.
Despite the events in Reval, Yudenich continued to stick to the plan to strike at Red Peter from Finland. Her Government officially allowed him to form military units. He enjoyed the patronage of a large part of the Finnish reaction. True, the formation of White Guard units from Russian citizens was limited to the vicinity of Ekenes and stipulated that teams of no more than 250 people and without weapons could be located there at the same time. Nevertheless, these teams could easily cross to the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland. The headquarters created under Yudenich was engaged in registering those liable for military service, developing plans for operations to capture Petrograd and Moscow, and conducting intelligence.
44 Ibid.
45 V. Gorn. Civil War in the North-West of Russia. Berlin, 1923, p. 42.
46 Ibid.
(The ending follows.)
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