The thirty-day war in Iraq in May 1941, which ended with the second, so-called peaceful occupation of the country by British troops, has received many interpretations in the scientific literature. Researchers identify a whole range of reasons that led to the rapid and unconditional military triumph of Great Britain: This is its military, political and moral superiority, a series of tactical mistakes of the Iraqi military command, weak military training of the Iraqi army, limited and belated assistance of the Axis powers to the regime of R. A. Gailani, etc. The role of German participation in the events under consideration should also be identified in this context.
On April 1, 1941, a coup d'etat took place in Iraq, as a result of which the nationalist opposition led by R. A. Gailani came to power. The coup was driven by a crisis in Anglo-Iraqi relations, the dominance of nationalist groups in Iraq's political and military elite, and the threat of World War II expansion to the Middle East in light of Germany's military successes in North Africa and the Balkans. The current situation forced England to act quickly and harshly. Most authors agree that the decision to send troops to Iraq was not motivated solely by the desire to remove the Gailani regime and restore the regent's power. First of all, Great Britain was guided by the principles of its military strategy, in which it sought to strengthen the security of the air base and port in Basra, as well as protect the oil fields of Iraq and Iran [Silverfarb, 1986, p. 125-126; Shikara, 1987, p. 190-196; Kirk, 1952, p. 68 Hirszowicz, 1966, p. 144; Warner, 1974, p. 90, 110; Schroder, 1975, p. 141, etc.].
The materials of the British archives fully confirm this point of view. As follows from interdepartmental correspondence that allows you to trace the decision-making process of the British military cabinet, it was planned to organize a rapid transfer of troops through Basra between Egypt and India or India and Palestine (in case of loss of British control over Egypt) without transit through the Suez Canal, which could be blocked by the enemy. The Basra Air Base hosted military aircraft delivered directly from the United States for British military operations in the Middle East. From here, Britain also intended to provide support to Turkey if it had to resist the German army, prevent an attack by Germany or the USSR on Iran, and also carry out air raids on the oil regions of the Caucasus in order to stop Soviet oil supplies to Germany. The British command attached no less importance to the defense of a large modern port in Basra.
One of the main elements of the UK's strategic alignment was a plan to protect oil fields in northern Iraq and southern Iran, as well as an oil pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea. Before the war, Iraq's oil production was more than 4 million tons per year; crude oil was transported by pipeline to Haifa and Tripoli (Lebanon), from where it was delivered to Europe. In June 1940, after the surrender of France, which was the British co-owner of oil concessions in Iraq, the Tripoli branch of the pipeline was closed. Iraq's oil exports decreased to 800 thousand tons per year, up to
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the level of oil needs of the British Navy, which was based in the Eastern Mediterranean and received petroleum products in Haifa. Iran produced about 10 million tons of oil per year, most of which was processed locally. The Abadan complex supplied high-quality fuel for British ground operations and large quantities of valuable aviation fuel for military aviation. If the Abadan oil fields were lost, the British army would be drained of blood. In other words, if Iraqi oil was essential for naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, then Iranian oil was vital for protecting Britain's imperial position in the Middle East as a whole. Therefore, with regard to the Iraqi oil sources, England has taken a course to preserve and dismantle them [PRO, FO 371/27064, E1456 / 1 / 93; FO 371/27066, E1609/1/93, E1623/1/93; FO 371/27104, E3973/1627/93; WO 201/1325; AIR 23/5853].
The establishment of military control over Iraq allowed the British military authorities to start implementing relevant measures and act without delay. Germany was preparing approaches to seize Iraqi and then Iranian oil, relying on the support of anti-British political groups led by Gailani in Iraq, the French administration of the Vichy government in Syria, and, as suggested in London, even neutral Turkey. An example of a military campaign of this kind was already available - the capture of Romanian oil by Germany in September 1940. According to a number of influential British politicians, in particular Prime Minister W. Churchill and his adviser Professor Lindemann, the destruction of the Iraqi oil fields will force Germany to abandon its advance into Iraq and focus its efforts on seizing Caucasian oil. The destruction of the Iraqi oil industry, in fact, could have contributed to drawing Germany into the war against the USSR [PRO, AIR 8/497; CAB 79/11, COS(41)153; CAB 80/27, COS(41)270].
From the very beginning of the Anglo-Iraqi war, both sides considered Iraq's oil facilities to be extremely valuable trophies. On April 29, Iraqi forces took control of them in Hanekin. On May 2, in the first hours after the start of hostilities between British and Iraqi forces, Gailani's army units seized oil fields, factories and equipment in Kirkuk, Gailyar and Ain Zala, pumping stations on the Iraqi sections of the pipeline and cut off the oil supply to Haifa. At the same time, the British state of oil companies was arrested. Their European and American staff, along with their families, were evacuated to Basra and Palestine at the end of April; the escaped arrest staff, supported by the local population, were able to reach Baghdad, where they took refuge in the British and American embassies. The arrested British managers and engineers were subjected to heavy pressure from Iraqi officers to help ensure the smooth operation of oil wells and factories in Khanaqin, Kirkuk and Gailyar. A week later, the detainees were taken to an internment camp in Western Baghdad. Since the British staff of oil companies refused to cooperate with the Iraqi military authorities, representatives of the Iraqi technical intelligentsia, who sympathized with the anti-British ideas of the Gailani movement, were involved in the work. However, due to the lack of specialists, the work of most oil fields was still suspended, and only a few oil rigs remained in operation. Oil purification in small quantities was carried out only at the Alwandi plant, which supplied the Iraqi army with fuel [PRO, FO 371/27074, E2764 / 1 / 93; FO 371/27079, E4631/1 / 93; AVL RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, l. 119, 157, 160, 167-168, 186; d. 13, l. 75, 84, 105, 112; RGASPI, f. 495. op. 14, d. 383-B, l. 51-52; Longrigg, 1955, p. 118-119; Longhurst, 1959, p. 104-105].
Gailani's cabinet decided to take control of the oil facilities for security reasons, in order to avoid their destruction as a result of British sabotage. Availability of days-
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The presence of existing oil fields guaranteed the interest of the Axis powers in events in Iraq, and increased the likelihood of the latter providing assistance to Baghdad. On May 5, the Iraqi Ambassador in Tehran informed the German diplomatic mission that the Iraqi army had taken control of the oil facilities and arrested British personnel. He also reported that all the facilities were in good condition and, referring to the threat of British air raids, requested that a group of German fighters be sent to patrol and protect the oil fields [ADAP, Bd. XII. 2, 1969, S. 596-597; Grobba, 1967, S. 230]. The fears of the Iraqi authorities were quite justified: the British Ambassador to Iraq, K. Cornwallis, officially informed Gailani that in the event of an escalation of the armed conflict, Britain would launch aerial bombardments of Baghdad, completely block the port of Basra, and destroy dams and pumping stations [PRO, FO 371/27069, E2104 / 1 / 93, E2110/1 / 93].
During the war in Iraq, the world press was full of detailed articles about the history of the development of Iraqi oil, its position on the world market and its strategic importance in the war. The Axis press agreed that British policy in the Middle East had led to the creation of a chain of oil concessions along the route to India, the establishment of a British monopoly on the world's largest oil sources, and the delay in the development of the entire region's oil potential. In this regard, there were calls to eliminate inequality in access to raw materials and it was noted that Germany had already taken the first step towards European oil independence when it created the Continental Oil joint-stock company with the participation of German government and private capital on March 27, 1941. The new oil bloc aimed to liberate European states from the domination of the Anglo-Saxons, including through the accelerated development of fields in Iraq, Iran and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12. l. 105, 120 - 121, 212 - 213, 259 - 260; RGAE, f. 413, op. 13, d. 3602, l. 36-37; d. 3724, l. 84-85; d. 3738, l. 294-295]. "The Iraqi army has a small chance," the German Information Bureau said in its May 7, 1941 issue.: he can lay his hands on very valuable sources of fuel for the British Mediterranean fleet, as well as on the oil pipeline. If necessary, all oil fields can be quickly disabled" [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 13, l. 105]. In this regard, Deutsche Zeitung called the seizure of oil facilities by Iraqi troops "the most important act of the Gailani government" [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, l. 117].
Iraqi oil has also been the focus of Allied news agencies ' attention. "Iraq produces a large quantity of heavy lubricating oils, which Germany has a particularly acute need for," wrote the London Times in its May 18, 1941 issue. "Germany's seizure of Iraq would reduce its concerns about fuel supply" [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, L. 59]. The New York Times called the war in Iraq "the first phase of the German movement towards Mosul oil and the gateway to India" [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, l. 174]. The famous English columnist G. Frazer very accurately formulated the consequences of Gailani's victory in the war with England: "Hitler will have the oil sources of Iraq. This will mean the beginning of a new stage in the World War, Hitler's exit from Europe and Germany's breakthrough of the British blockade " [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, l. 139].
In turn, Berlin officially stated :" We are far from overestimating the importance of Mosul oil... As a result of the events in Iraq, England faces not only the loss of the "oil reservoir" that provides its fleet in the Mediterranean. It may lose its Middle East bridge to India and a valuable flank position to protect the Suez Canal " [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, l. 115]. On the eve of this statement, the British Ambassador to Turkey told the Foreign Office that the German and Italian military attaches in Ankara "are clearly upset by the war in the Ira."-
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"They understand that they must help Iraq in order not to lose their prestige in the Arab world and preserve the opportunities to get Iraqi oil," the ambassador continued. "Currently, this assistance is only feasible from the air, but from a technical point of view, there are a number of problems. In particular, Germany does not want to bomb oil fields, because it hopes to capture them soon; it fears their total destruction... " [PRO, FO 371/27068, E2016 / 1 / 93].
The relatively restrained reaction of the Axis powers to the events in Iraq was due to a number of factors. While supporting the Iraqi nationalists as a potential ally in crushing British dominance in the Middle East, Berlin and Rome were nevertheless unprepared for large-scale intervention in Arab affairs. Hitler, in addition, was skeptical about the combat capability of Gailani's army and doubted the need to provide Baghdad with military aviation assistance. The prospect of losing military equipment and ace pilots, especially in demand in connection with the start of the offensive operation in Crete, as well as the unclear situation with the availability of aviation fuel in Iraq determined Hitler's generally uncertain position on the Iraq issue. At the same time, the war in Iraq could distract British forces from other theaters of war and make it easier for the Axis powers to advance in North Africa and Greece. If Gailani won, England would undermine its authority in the region, as well as lose control of important communications and oil sources. Germany could also get Iraqi oil. But the main motivation of Hitler and his entourage to intervene in the Anglo-Iraqi war was to maintain Germany's prestige in the Arab world. In other words, from the point of view of long-term economic and military-political prospects, the risk was justified. At the same time, Berlin's calculations were based on very optimistic assessments of the situation in Iraq: Ankara and Baghdad reported a significant numerical superiority of the Iraqi army, its solid armament and fuel supply [ADAP, Bd. XII. 2, S. 570-574; Grobba, 1967, S. 212; Schroder, 1975, S. 94; Hirszowicz, 1966, p. 40 - 41, 86 - 94, 154, 165].
On May 3, Hitler approved all the preparations of the leadership of the Foreign Ministry, OKW* and Abwehr. German diplomacy has begun negotiations with the Vichy government to provide Germany with air bases in Syria and help transit military supplies to Iraq. That same evening, F. Grobba, the former German ambassador to Iraq, was ordered to fly to Baghdad. His mission included diplomats, an archaeologist, representatives of the Abwehr, military aviation, the Wehrmacht and the SS, as well as four specialists in the field of oil. Grobba was not informed about the specific tasks assigned to the oil experts. They left at an intermediate landing in Palmyra, then moved to Beirut, from where in mid-May they were taken to Baghdad, then to Kirkuk and Haditha. The fact that their movements were supervised by military intelligence indicated that the German leadership had well-defined plans for Iraqi oil. Grobba reasonably believed that their duties included organizing the operation of oil fields in the event of a Gailani victory or destroying them in the event of the British occupation of Iraq [Grobba, 1967, p. 233-234].
On May 10-12, Germany sent two squadrons of 21 fighter and bomber aircraft from the Italian base at Rhodes to Iraq. They landed to refuel in Syria, then arrived at a military base in Mosul and on May 13 engaged the British Air Force. Another 16 aircraft maintained constant communication between Greece, Syria and Iraq. Following Germany, Italy sent a squadron of 12 aircraft to Iraq.
When the German Air Force arrived, it turned out that the bases in Mosul and Aleppo did not have the necessary fuel. In addition to the fact that the reserves of petroleum products in Iraq and
* OKW - The Supreme Command of the Ground Forces.
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Sales were very limited, the available aviation gasoline was not suitable for the quality of German equipment, which used fuel only with a 100-octane rating. German aircraft were not designed for operations in the tropics: the engines were quickly clogged with sand, and the machines failed, the fuel and engine cooling system did not correspond to the climate, rubber for wheels, etc.The low qualification of ground handling personnel at airfields in Iraq and Syria also often caused numerous breakdowns and accidents. Some oil storage facilities were destroyed during British air raids or damaged as a result of sabotage [Grobba, 1967, S. 241-242; Schroder, 1975, S. 94, 120, 122, 126].
In fact, the German military leadership was initially disoriented by Grobba and Gailani's reports that fuel was available in sufficient quantities in Iraq. Grobba knew that aviation fuel was imported to Iraq from Iran, but he mistakenly believed that large quantities of it were stored in oil fields and British air bases. As it turned out in practice, Iraq did not have stocks of aviation gasoline and lubricating oils. The fact that the Gailani government, despite the high probability of a military outcome of a political confrontation with Britain during April 1941, did not provide its army with fuel was a serious tactical mistake and created problems with the oil supply for both German aviation and Iraqi motorized units.
The German representative in Syria, R. The Russian Academy of Sciences managed to provide German pilots with 30 thousand liters of gasoline from limited French reserves, but there was no more fuel in the country. The Russian Academy of Sciences asked Berlin to arrange the delivery of jet fuel and began negotiations with the French authorities in Damascus on the use of available fuel trucks to transport oil products to Mosul, which Germany decided to supply by sea from Rhodes. At the same time, Grobba in Baghdad urged Gailani to use the Tripoli branch of the pipeline. The German military and diplomats also made efforts to restore the oil refinery in Tripoli that burned down "under unclear circumstances", move the fuel available on Iraqi military bases to safer storage locations, establish a railway connection between Iraq, Syria and Turkey, and obtain Ankara's consent to the transit of German military cargo [PRO, FO 371/30149, R5332/5332/44; ADAP, Bd. XII.2, S. 657; Grobba, 1967, S. 238, 240 - 242; Schroder, 1975, S. 110 - 113, 121 - 122]. The British government, for its part, has asked the Turkish government to block the flow of oil and military supplies through Aleppo to Tel Kotchek. In this regard, Whitehall did not even raise the question of the reasons for the concentration of Turkish troops on the Iraqi border. The fact that "Turkey has its own interests in Iraq" played into the hands of British military plans in the current circumstances [PRO, FO 371/27071, E2417 / 1 / 93].
On May 19, Grobba reported to Berlin about the fuel crisis and asked for its urgent delivery from Iran or Romania. Due to the neutrality of Iran and Turkey, this was impossible, and the attempts made by German diplomats on May 22-24 to get Ankara and Tehran to agree to the transit of petroleum products did not work. At the same time, Gailani turned to Tehran with a request for fuel supplies. The Iranian government refrained from negotiations, citing the threat of economic and military restrictions from Britain, which would regard Tehran's actions in support of Gailani as hostile. Citing the need to maintain neutrality, Iran also rejected the offer of Berlin and Baghdad to mediate in the purchase of aviation gasoline for Iraq from the USSR. So the Iraqi diplomats in Ankara contacted the Soviet embassy directly. However, Moscow refrained from providing assistance to the Gailani regime, although shortly before that, on May 16, 1941, between the USSR and Iraq, there was a conflict between the two countries.-
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Initially, diplomatic relations were established [ADAP, Bd. XII. 2, S. 710-711, 730-731; WUA RF, f. 93, op. 26 p. 3, d. 13, l. 146; WUA RF, f. 93, op. 26 p. 3, d. 14, l. 9].
Due to the current circumstances, the German command made an attempt to resolve the fuel problem on the spot, in Iraq. As noted above, in mid-May, a secret German mission consisting of four scientists led by a well-known geologist, Colonel Geissmann, arrived in Baghdad. The appearance of this remarkable figure in Iraq was very symbolic: in most of the German military campaigns, Heissmann led a special group responsible for the immediate commissioning of captured oil fields. At the end of the Anglo-Iraqi war, at the initiative of oil companies and with the support of the British special services, the director of the chemical laboratory of the Ministry of Economy of Iraq, I. Hawkins, conducted work among Iraqis, employees of the Ministry and its research units, in order to collect information about the activities of the German mission. His detailed report included a wide range of questions, but the main focus was on describing the latest technologies used by German specialists. In his cover letter, Hawkins noted that "this is the first time we have received this kind of information," and recommended that Cornwallis immediately forward it to London and Abadan [PRO, FO 371/27096, E4079/227/93].
The mission's mission was to establish the production of aviation fuel with an octane rating of at least 87, so in Baghdad, German experts were completely absorbed in working in the Industrial Research Laboratory of the Ministry of Economy of Iraq. Here, a device was put into operation to determine the detonation resistance of fuel (octane number). This plant was purchased in the mid-1930s, when the Iraqi government was planning to build an oil refinery. British advisers to the ministry refused to provide the accompanying technical documentation for this installation, but the Germans assembled it and put it into operation without any instructions in just one day. The German mission also brought the equipment and reagents needed to test the fuel on site. At the same time, the Germans used the latest method, which made it possible to obtain a detailed and accurate analysis of petroleum products in the period from two minutes to two hours. This method of conducting a rapid test was unknown to the British, so its description in the Hawkins report is given a significant place.
German specialists were very successful in mixing all types of fuel, which was found in small quantities in Baghdad and in the oil fields of Kirkuk. The resulting fuel with an octane rating of 92 generally allowed refueling of German military aircraft, but the Iraqi command did not have the necessary volumes of initial petroleum products. High hopes were pinned on the products of the Naft-Khana field, but the results of testing were disappointing: the structure and quality of Khanakin oil was not suitable for the production of aviation gasoline.
The best Iraqi chemists were involved in the work of the German mission, but not all of them agreed to cooperate. According to the Hawkins report, the Germans highly appreciated the competence of Iraqi specialists, but did not take any research indicators for granted. Their attitude toward the Iraqi scientific staff was neither arrogant nor familiar; they behaved in a way that was common in the scientific community, which greatly surprised their Iraqi colleagues. The Iraqis were also very impressed by the high professionalism of German scientists, their scrupulousness, pedantry and accuracy. It is interesting to note that the Germans did not allow Iraqis who were educated in Germany to work. The latter were considered to be poorly qualified, since the training was mainly for propaganda purposes; but the Germans were willing to communicate with them outside of working hours. Failure of the ve series-
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The refusal of Iraqi specialists to provide any information was extremely delaying the mission's work. German experts were unable to obtain important reports with the results of recent studies conducted in Baghdad, the United States and England [PRO, FO 371/27096, E4079 / 227 / 93].
Thus, the efforts of the German mission could not save the catastrophic situation with a lack of fuel. Due to the depletion of fuel reserves, the Iraqi command was unable to extract the maximum benefits from the participation of military aircraft of the Axis powers in combat operations against Britain in Iraq. It should also be noted that by the time the German Air Force arrived on May 13, British units had already seized the strategic initiative. Italian planes arrived only on May 29, when the Iraqi army was almost defeated. Historians note that the Axis powers could not have acted faster, but the time factor played an important role in the rapid victory of England in Iraq [Hirszowicz, 1966, p. 171-172; Playfair, vol. 2, 1956, p. 188; Shikara, 1987, p. 184; Warner, 1974, p. 102, 115; Simon R., 2004, p. 146 - 147]. The American researcher D. Silverfarb also believes that assistance to the Gailani regime would have been much more significant if Germany had launched air raids on Abadan, which is vital for British military operations in North Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean; thus, significant British forces could have been diverted from Iraq to the Persian Gulf zone [Silverfarb, 1986, p. 133]. Meanwhile, Berlin was considering such a scenario, and in addition to Abadan, the leaders of the OKW and the Foreign Ministry proposed bombing oil refineries in Haifa and Suez, as well as blocking the Shatt al-Arab River in order to create problems with oil supply for England. But such actions would have meant the opening of a new theater of military operations in the Middle East, which the Wehrmacht command was not prepared for, especially in light of the latest preparations for an attack on the USSR [Schroder, 1975, p.113].
At the same time, the withdrawal of Rommel's Afrika Korps to the borders of Egypt created favorable conditions for strengthening the subversive work of Hitler's diplomacy and propaganda in the countries of the Arab East. In order to systematically deploy this activity and supplement it with military means, on May 23, the OKW issued the famous directive No. 30 "Middle East". To coordinate German military and political activities in the region, a special headquarters "F" was created under the leadership of General Felmi. Directive No. 30 was already outdated at the time of its introduction due to the changing military situation in Iraq, and this indicated Berlin's lack of awareness of Middle Eastern affairs. The operations planned in it were made dependent on the implementation of the general strategic plans of the OKW for 1941 and the Barbarossa plan. This circumstance confirms the version that Hitler was hardly sure of the possibility of establishing himself in Iraq at the moment [Schroder, 1975, p. 129; Grobba, 1967, p. 234-236, 244-245; Warner, 1974, p. 113-114].
On May 29, on the eve of the British offensive on Baghdad, the Felmi mission arrived in Athens. Due to the lack of fuel, the German officers left for Aleppo only three days later. Grobba continued to ask for military air support and weapons supplies, even though Gailani and his entourage were already leaving the country. The Felmi group estimated that Germany and Italy should have sent at least 72 warplanes and delivered significant amounts of fuel to hold Baghdad, which would have taken at least a week. German military experts expected that British troops would first start destroying the pumping stations in the Haditha area, where the oil pipeline split into two branches - Haifa and Tripoli. Taking into account these factors, Felmi recommended that the Iraqi command leave Baghdad and take up defensive positions near Mosul; the German air squadron was ordered to relocate from Iraq to Syria [Grobba, 1967, p. 240-241, 246; Tillman, 1965, p. 242, 246].
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According to information agencies of the Axis powers, Gailani and his associates assumed that all of Iraq would be occupied by British troops, and in this case they were ready to destroy oil facilities in the north of the country [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, l. 10, 29; WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 13, l. 105]. Statements of this kind, in our opinion, were groundless. Gailani could hardly have ordered the destruction of Iraq's oil industry, since he planned to restore his regime with the help of Germany and Italy, and the key to his success was largely the functioning oil fields.
The rapid and successful offensive of the Anglo-Indian forces did not allow the German military mission to blow up oil facilities in Iraq. An OKW order issued on May 24 required officers based in Kirkuk to investigate the possibility of destroying oil wells and equipment. German experts came to the conclusion that all conditions were available for carrying out explosive operations, but the corresponding order was not received from Berlin [Schroder, 1975, p.134]. It can be assumed that the leadership of the Wehrmacht, developing plans for a military campaign in the Middle East after the completion of Operation Barbarossa, considered it inappropriate to destroy their potential property.
On May 31, when the armistice was being signed in Baghdad, a request came from Berlin to assess the possibility of holding Northern Iraq with the existing forces of the Iraqi army, with the prospect of supporting them with German and Italian military aircraft. Grobba replied that this was no longer possible, including because there were no fuel reserves in Mosul and Kirkuk, and the oil fields themselves were under threat from British aerial bombardment. On the same day, British forces captured Kirkuk and Mosul and advanced on Baiji, effectively establishing control of Northern Iraq. Grobba left the country with the entire German mission [ADAP, Bd. XII.2, S. 770, 776, 794; Grobba, 1967, S. 247].
After the signing of the armistice, the remnants of the Gailani army under the command of Captain Fawzi al-Qawaji, continuing to resist, left north of Ramadi in anticipation of German support. Along the way, the partisans partially destroyed two pumping stations lying in their path. Control of most sections of the pipeline in Iraq was restored in mid-May by the Arab Legion, under the command of Major Glabb, and they also continued to patrol the pipeline and its pumping stations. During May, as a result of sabotage by Arab nationalists, the pipeline was also damaged on the Syrian and Jordanian routes. Of all the oil facilities in Iraq, the Alwandi plant suffered the least damage during the Anglo-Iraqi war, as its operation was interrupted only for a short time and its products were required for the Iraqi army. In the Kirkuk oilfields, sabotage did not cause serious damage to equipment, but offices and residential complexes where Iraqi troops were stationed during the war were seriously damaged; in addition, all vehicles, food supplies and industrial goods disappeared. The greatest damage was found at oil refineries in Kirkuk and Gailyar and some pumping stations. Iraqi forces have removed almost all equipment, supplies, food and industrial supplies from the Gailyar and Ain Zala oilfields. Equipment was also stolen from a camp near Basra, where a geophysical party was preparing to conduct exploration drilling [Longrigg, 1955, p. 119; Schroder, 1975, p. 141, 146].
Since the beginning of the war in Iraq, leading publications in Britain and the United States have called for the destruction of Mosul's oil facilities. In particular, the English Daily Herald argued that "the loss of Kirkuk oil does not paralyze the actions of the British fleet in the Mediterranean," while for Germany this source of oil is extremely important. The American press, in turn, claimed that
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The United States will help make up for the lost volumes of Iraqi oil, and the British should immediately destroy the Iraqi oil fields [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, l. 129, 150, 245].
The British command in the Middle East was ready for air raids and sabotage operations on the oil fields of Kirkuk and Khanekin, as well as the pumping stations of the pipeline. On May 24, at the height of the battle for Iraq, General Abel was ordered to immediately prepare for the destruction of four pumping stations on the Tripoli branch of the oil pipeline, three of which were located in Syria, and the plant in Alwandi. These facilities were not particularly valuable to Britain at that time: pumping stations had not been used since June 1940, when the Tripoli line was closed, and petroleum products for British ground troops were supplied from Abadan. For Germany and its allies in Iraq, these objects could become a vital trophy [PRO, CAB 80/28, COS(41)323; CAB 79/11, COS(41) 18; AIR 8/497; FO 371/27074, E2764/1/93].
At the same time, the British military authorities planned to successfully complete the military campaign in Iraq at the end of May. In addition, according to British intelligence, Germany was preparing a large-scale invasion of the USSR. These factors significantly reduced, but did not completely eliminate, the threat of a German attack on Iraq. Whitehall also feared that the collapse of the oil industry would provoke a serious conflict with Iraq's pro-British political elite, whose representatives were to replace Gailani's cabinet. For this reason, during the Anglo-Iraqi war in May 1941, oil facilities were not attacked by the British Air Force. When developing defense measures, the British command took into account that the protection of oil fields can only be carried out by ground forces, since aerial bombardment will lead to the irrevocable destruction of oil facilities [PRO, FO 371/27073, E2737/1/93; AIR 8/497; WO 201/1325]. Information about air raids on the oil fields of Iraq, which periodically appeared on the pages of the press of the Axis powers [WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 12, l. 83; WUA RF, f. 93, op. 2, p. 3, d. 13, l. 107, 109], was rather propagandistic in nature.
On June 2, 1941, shortly after the end of the Iraq War, the British Consulate in Mosul transmitted to the Foreign Office secret information received from Iraqi army officers that "Germany is preparing a springboard in Aleppo and Tel Kotchek for an offensive in Iraq with the aim of capturing the Mosul area, Baiji and Haditha" [PRO, FO 371/27074, E2764 / 1 / 93]. In this regard, on June 6, the General Staff ordered the British command in the Middle East to put on full combat readiness specialized military units for the destruction of oil facilities in Iraq. These included the destruction of productive wells and drilling equipment, oil storage facilities, factories, pipelines and pumping stations, power, stabilization and high-voltage installations [PRO, CAB 69/2, DO (41)39; WO 201/1519]. On June 10, General Abel received instructions to launch total destruction of oil facilities in the event of a surprise German attack, without waiting for an order from London [PRO, AIR 8/497]. At the same time, the oil fields began to be restored in order to resume the supply of Kirkuk oil to Haifa for the British fleet and meet the internal needs of Iraq. During June, the European staff of oil companies returned to work, the oil pipeline to Haifa was restored, oil production resumed in Kirkuk and Hanekin, and the Alwandi refinery was launched at full capacity. But in the event of a sudden German threat, all active objects were subject to destruction [PRO, FO 371/27096, E3374/227/93; WO 201/1519].
In an effort to prevent the possible advance of the German army into Iraq or Egypt via the Levant, on June 8, British troops launched combat operations in Syria with the aim of overthrowing the French administration of the Vichy government. July 10 after
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After heavy fighting, Britain celebrated its military triumph, and Syria entered the Allied camp. During the Syrian campaign, Germany attacked the USSR.
The main reason that led Britain to occupy Iraq was due to concerns about the German threat to that country and the Middle East in general. After June 22, 1941, these concerns were somewhat eased, as a significant part of the German troops were involved on the Soviet front. Nevertheless, until the end of 1942, Britain built its policy in the region taking into account the possible defeat of the USSR in the war with Germany, which would directly result in the expansion of the theater of military operations to the Persian Gulf. In addition, although the fall of the Vichy administration in Syria, and then the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran reduced the likelihood of a German invasion of the region, the British command did not rule out the possibility of a German offensive in Iraq through the Caucasus or Turkey with the tacit consent of Ankara, as well as through Palestine in the event of a breakthrough of the German army in Egypt. To repel a possible German attack, Britain has concentrated a large contingent of armed forces in Iraq [Ibid. FO 371/27104, E 3923/1627/93; WO 201/1325; AIR 23/5853].
Whitehall knew that he was hurting the vital interests of Iraq, but in the face of war, in the light of the military victories of the Axis powers, the surrender of France and the creation of an immediate threat to British positions in the Middle East, England was guided by its own strategic calculations. Britain and Iraq had different "weight" categories, and it is quite natural that the British government regarded Iraq, which refused to declare war on Germany and limited itself to declaring neutrality, rather as an outsider, who at best should have been informed about the decisions made in London, rather than as a loyal ally with the right to vote. The British government used the oil factor as a tool of its overall foreign policy and military strategy, which irritated Iraqi leaders, fueled the idea of the collapse of British influence in the country and the elimination of foreign control over oil - the main asset of Iraq.
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Grobba F. Die Manner and Machte im Orient. Göttingen, 1967.
Hirszowicz L. The Third Reich and the Arab East. L., 1966.
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Tillman H. Deutschland Araberpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin, 1965.
Warner G. Iraq and Syria 1941. L., 1974.
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