ПУБЛ., ВСТУП. ARTICLE AND COMMENT BY D. Y. ARAPOV

The Bolsheviks officially declared their benevolent attitude towards Islam and Muslims, the second largest confessional group in Russia (after the Orthodox), in the first days after they came to power1. This was done on November 20 (December 3), 1917, in an appeal "To all Muslim workers in Russia and the East", signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Russia V. I. Lenin and the People's Commissar for Nationalities I. V. Stalin. The beliefs and customs of Russian Muslims and their religious institutions were declared " free and inviolable." The document contained an impassioned appeal to all Muslims of the East to give the Bolsheviks "sympathy and support" in the struggle for the "liberation of the oppressed" of the whole world from social, especially imperialist, oppression [Decrees..., 1957, pp. 114-115]. In the same period of time, guided both by well-known, essentially purely educational principles, and by its specific political goals, the Soviet leadership promulgated a Decree of January 20 (February 2), 1918, according to which the church was separated from the state, and the school-from the church [Decrees..., 1957, p. 4. 373 - 374]. The last part of this legislative act has caused almost equally negative reaction among domestic confessional, including Muslim, communities. It should be noted, however, that in the difficult conditions of the civil war of 1918-1920 and the first years of NEP, the implementation of the "school section" of the 1918 Decree was extremely slow in the Islamic environment [Chebotareva, 2004]. A whole complex of internal and external circumstances largely determined the rather flexible and cautious policy of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet authorities, including its special services, in relation to Muslim spiritual circles and their flock. During these years, Islam and its ministers were, on the whole, undoubtedly in a much more favorable position than the Russian Orthodox Church, which was harshly and mercilessly persecuted by the new government [Tsypin, 2006, pp. 360-460].

Documents of state security agencies are of primary value for researchers of the history of Soviet "Islamic" politics in the first decade after October 1917. In February 1922, the ancestor of the Soviet secret services, the Cheka, was liquidated. Its main functions were assigned to the State Political Administration( GPU), which with the formation of the USSR in December 1922 was transformed into the United State Political Administration (OGPU) [Korzhikhina, 1986, pp. 135-136]. This institution was the strongest weapon in the hands of the Bolshevik party and, as the "punishing sword of the dictatorship of the proletariat", was supposed to protect the existing state system from all internal and external threats (Mozokhin, 2004).

The most important role in the "Oriental", primarily "Islamic", spheres of activity of the Chekists was acquired by the Eastern Department of the OGPU(VOOGPU), created on June 2, 1922 by the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The newly established division was supposed to accept cases from its predecessor, the Eastern Branch of the GPU2. In published as part of the implementation of the above

1 According to the outstanding Russian Islamic scholar, Academician V. V. Barthold, in the Russian Empire by 1917 (including the vassal states of Bukhara and Khiva), there were about 20 million inhabitants. muslims [SPFARAN, op. 1, d. 433, l. 1].

2 Unfortunately, the literature contains only the most general and very fragmentary information about the "eastern" direction in the activities of the early Soviet special services. This undoubtedly most interesting topic awaits its future researchers.

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The party's decision on the GPU noted that the Eastern Department was assigned the task of "combining all the work of the GPU bodies in the Caucasus, Turkestan, Khiva, and Bukhara."3, Kyrgyzstan4 of the Russian Federation , the Republic of Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the Crimea in terms of specific Eastern counter-revolution and Eastern espionage." The Eastern department of the OGPU was supposed to develop "off-line material" coming from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Tibet, China, Korea and Japan. In the structure of the Eastern Department, three branches were formed. The first of them was supposed to be in charge of "back-channel affairs" and "the fight against Eastern espionage", the second - to "combine all work" in Central Asia, the Volga region, the Urals and the Crimea, the third-to conduct business in the Caucasus [Lubyanka..., 2003, pp. 431-432].

The leading role of the "Islamic question" in the development of the Eastern Department of the OGPU was explained by a number of internal and external reasons. The main" super-idea "of the Bolsheviks was the goal of building a "new world" - the creation of a previously non-existent "socialist civilization". One of the indispensable conditions for the realization of this task was considered to be the achievement of the closest merger, first of all, of all the peoples of the USSR into a "single whole". This Soviet conglomerate of ethnic groups should have been "infused" with Russian Muslims. According to the Bolshevik leaders, the most important integration tool here was the Soviet general education school, which replaced Islamic primary educational institutions. While the Central Executive Committee's decree of June 9, 1924, allowed for a limited period of teaching the basics of the Muslim faith, the Soviet and Chekist authorities strongly emphasized that Sharia could only be studied by Muslim children from the age of 12 to 14, provided that they had previously received a Soviet "secular" education within the then first-level school5 The political and psychological calculation of this approach was based on the belief that the children's consciousness would absorb the preventive "materialistic" vaccination during their stay in the Soviet school. The Bolshevik plan was not original. In tsarist Russia, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, there was a project to include Muslims in the "unified state body" of the Russian Empire. The instrument of implementation of this idea was the "Russian-native" school. In the end, both the tsarist and Soviet plans for Muslim integration failed: Muslims for the most part, both before and after 1917, did not want to part with their image of spiritual and material life, to lose their traditional identity [Arapov, 2004, pp. 431-432].

A certain reconciliation of the Bolsheviks with Islam in the 1920s. it was purely tactical and temporary in nature. The program documents of the RCP(b) emphasized the inevitability of the future expulsion of all "religious remnants" from Soviet life, including Islam, and the creation of a society built on the principles of "scientific atheism". However, so far this was still quite far away, and there were a number of very complex problems in the "Muslim case". Thus, in Turkestan, a grueling war was being waged against the jihadist Basmachism, an armed anti-Soviet movement of a significant part of the Muslim population of Central Asia [Basmachestvo, 2005]. Information reviews of the OGPU for 1922-1929 constantly reported on numerous, merciless in their bloodiness, "clashes" between units of the special forces of the OGPU and the Red Army with Basmachian "gangs". The Chekist "secret" reviews stated that the "native" party and Soviet apparatuses, the local militia, which was formally responsible for order in Muslim areas, were entangled in clan and tribal ties, torn apart by tribalist strife, corrupt and very poorly capable6 In a similar situation, on

3 The Bukhara and Khiva republics were formally independent in 1922, but they concluded a whole series of diplomatic, trade, military-political treaties and agreements with Soviet Russia. The state security structures of these republics worked under the operational direction of the Moscow Center of the Cheka-OGPU.

4 This meant the Kyrgyz (later Kazakh) ASSR formed in October 1920, which was then part of the RSFSR.

5 For the contents of the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 9, 1924, see: [Central Committee OF the RCP (b)..., 2005, pp. 202-203]. According to the" Regulations on the unified Labor School " (October 1918), Soviet school in 1926 was divided into two stages: the first - five years, the second - four years of study.

6 On the situation in the area covered in the 1926 VOOOGPU note, see: [Top Secret, 2001, p. 41 - 43, 83 - 85, 107 - 109].

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In our opinion, it is not an exaggeration to say that in many remote "Islamic" territories, the interests of the Bolsheviks were actually protected only by a few employees of the GPU bodies, while the Soviet government existed there only nominally.

The" Islamic "policy of the VOOOGPU, as well as the entire Soviet state security service, was largely determined by the international significance of the"Muslim question". The latter circumstance once again confirmed the accuracy of S. Yu. Witte's assessment, which emphasized in 1900 that Russia's "internal policy on the Muslim question is an important factor in foreign policy" [Imperial Russia..., 2006, p. 254]. That is why the Soviet secret services, beginning in 1917, tried to behave rather cautiously in relation to Islam in the regions of inner Russia, especially in the Volga region and the Urals7 In the first years of their stay in power, the Bolshevik leadership hoped to use the "Islamic factor" in countering foreign circles and countries hostile to the Soviets. Thus, in 1920, at the Congress of Workers of the East in Baku, on the initiative of the representatives of the Comintern who conducted it, a call was made to Muslims for an anti-imperialist "holy war under the red banner of the Communist International"8 The purely opportunistic nature of such actions of the Soviet leadership was not hidden by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs G. V. Chicherin. In 1921, he wrote on this subject: "The interest of world politics has recently shifted to the East, and the question of relations with the Muslim world, which could become our ally, has become more acute... Will the Muslim world follow the path of a national movement against imperialism or defend Muslim traditions [against us. - D. A.], relying on your enemy the Entente?" [Goldin, 2000, p. 117].

Thus, a whole complex of internal and external circumstances, fears and expectations determined the flexibility and ambiguity of the course of the "Muslim" component in the policy of the OGPU in the 1920s. Conducting different actions in different regions of the country in relation to local Islamic circles, the OGPU bodies tried to use the methods of work of the tsarist political police adopted by them. The chekists thoughtfully applied such proven methods as splitting up Islamic spiritual centers through "intermediaries", recruiting agents and informants, spreading the right rumors, etc.9
When analyzing the Chekist documents on "Muslim affairs", it should be borne in mind that their authors were characterized by a noticeable subjectivism in the coverage of Islam and its realities. Such texts of the Soviet era bizarrely combined pre-revolutionary old and new - traditional Eurocentric statements like "a Muslim is a fanatic", anti-religious rhetoric, and vulgar-sociological interpretations of the events of the past and present existence of the Muslim world10.

Our attention was drawn to the "top secret" note "On measures to combat anti-Spirituality", which was part of a set of documents on Islam prepared by the Eastern Department of the OGPU in the second half of 1926. The appearance of these materials was stimulated by three important events in the life of Muslims outside and inside the USSR. The first two of them were held outside the Soviet Union - the Cairo and Mecca All-Muslim congresses, held in May and June 1926. The third of these events was the Congress of Muslims

7 In Turkestan, where half of the Muslims of pre-revolutionary Russia lived, the situation was more complicated. In 1918-1919, the local Soviet Russian (and Russian-speaking) leadership pursued a "great-power" policy towards the "indigenous" population. All this led to a sharp increase in anti-Russian sentiment and the mass spread of Basmachism in the region. Only after the intervention of Moscow and the skillful actions of M. V. Frunze and V. V. Kuibyshev, who were specially sent by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to Central Asia, did the interethnic tension between Europeans and the "native" inhabitants decrease to a certain extent.

8 For more details, see the "Appeal to the Peoples of the East"adopted at the Baku Congress [Communist International, 1920, pp. 3141-3150].

9 On the ways and forms of work of the Police Department of the Tsarist Ministry of Internal Affairs with political parties and social movements, see [Peregudova, 2000].

10 An example of such works is the widely advertised book by A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullina "Essays on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia".

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Inner Russia, Siberia and Kazakhstan, which was held in Ufa at the end of October 1926.11. The note, like the rest of the documents in this series, was drawn up no earlier than October 8, 1926, when, judging by the date of the accompanying order, the entire block was submitted by the Chekists to the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Archival materials that are adjacent to this case indicate that the agitprop structure for which the Note was intended, the Anti-religious Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), met and discussed this document on October 8, 1926.12.

The note is a concise document, but full of the most interesting analytical and policy-making information, in which the essence of the Soviet "Islamic" policy was frankly shown and the reasons for the tactical features of its implementation in various regions of the country were clearly justified. This text, written in the party-Soviet "Newspeak" that was characteristic of those years, was undoubtedly emphatically declarative and atheistic in nature: the chekists reported to the leading ideological party instance what they should and wanted to hear from them there. It seems that in reality, however, the pragmatists of the OGPU did not really believe in the effectiveness of influencing the Muslim masses with anti-religious pamphlets. But the punitive and repressive measures proposed by the OGPU against Muslim religious institutions and ministers of Islamic worship were well thought out and began to be implemented in practice especially effectively in the late 1920s.13
Apparently, the Note was prepared by analysts and operatives-personnel employees of the Eastern Department, and freelance experts in Islamic studies may have participated in the work on it. The first person to sign this document was the deputy chairman of the OGPU in March 1926 - October 1929, Meyer Abramovich Trilisser. A member of the Communist Party since 1901, an experienced revolutionary underground worker who served five years of tsarist hard labor in Shlisselburg, Trilisser worked in the Cheka from 1918. In 1922-1929, he headed the Foreign Department of the OGPU, while overseeing the" off-line " activities of the Eastern Department. Thus, in 1926-1929, Meyer Abramovich headed the work of Soviet foreign political intelligence both in the West and in the East. Then Trilisser worked in the party, and in 1935-1938 he was secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern [Lubyanka..., 2003, p. 292]. The second signature under the Note belonged to the deputy head of VOOGPU Nikolay Lvovich Vollenberg. An experienced chekist, Vollenberg took an active part in suppressing the revolt of the "left SRS" in Moscow in 1918, was chairman of the Bashkir GPU in the early 1920s, and later became a resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence service in Iran and the" free city " of Danzig (Gdansk) [Antonov and Karpov, 2003, pp. 92-93]. According to the evidence of archival documents revealed together with the Note, the chekist Petrosyan, who certified the text of its copy, temporarily served as head of the third (Caucasian) branch of the VOOGPU in October 1926.

The introduction to scientific circulation of the Note provides an opportunity to get acquainted with a first-class source on the history of the "Islamic" policy of the Soviet special services, conducted by them at the end of the first decade of the Bolsheviks ' stay in power. The document is published according to its certified typewritten copy, which is kept in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) in Fund 17 "Central Committee of the RCP(b) - Central Committee of the CPSU" and is located in case No. 171, listed under inventory 85 "Secret Department" (1926-1934). If possible, the features of its syntax and spelling were preserved for the publication.

11 Since 1917, the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Inner Russia, Siberia and Kazakhstan (CDU, CDUM) has been the successor of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly, which was located in Ufa (founded in 1788). Its leadership was elected at the Muslim Congress in 1920, and its charter was adopted at the Muslim Congress in 1923. [Islam..., 2004, pp. 362-365; Arapov and Alekseev, 2007].

12 The agitation and propaganda department of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) existed in 1921-1929. He was in charge of propaganda and agitation (including supervising anti-religious events), was responsible for work in the village and the activities of women's departments. In the structure of this department, there was an Anti-religious Commission headed by a well-known party figure and propagandist of "scientific atheism" E. M. Yaroslavsky.

13 On the conduct of large-scale anti-Islamic actions in the late 1920s, see [Minnullin, 2006; Yunusova, 1999].

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* * *

Top secret

To the Anti-religious Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

On measures to combat monospiritalism.1

I. A number of features, both in the grouping of forces within the clergy, and in the methods and forms of our influence, dictate the need for a division of the ICC. The border regions of the Union are divided into two groups, each of which can be considered as a single whole in terms of the fundamental formulation of questions.

From this point of view, the first group will include: Tataria, Bashkiria, Crimea, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakistan and the interior. provinces2. The second group will include Central Asia and the North Caucasus. Note: Transcaucasia is not considered at all.

II. 1) The first group of suburbs is characterized by the fact that the struggle between the reactionary and progressive clergy ended in the victory of the progressive wing3 Further, in the work of the already progressive clergy, we observe the following stages: the period of organizational registration of the victory achieved over the conservatives (organization of the CDU, BDU4, Crimea DU5, mukhtasibatov6 and consolidation of these organizational forms; a period of gradual gaining of authority, both among the masses of the religious population and before the local and central authorities; and already since 1925, a period of slow offensive movement towards expanding its activities beyond the existing legal provisions. Trends in this order were particularly pronounced in the second half of 2016 (pre-congress campaign)7
2) For a correct understanding of the upcoming events, it is necessary to take into account that the growing activity of the Muslim clergy is a consequence of the growing activity of the national bourgeoisie in general in the context of NEP (the commercial bourgeoisie in the city, the kulak in the countryside). On the other hand, the revival and growing activity of the peasant masses demanded a way out, which is due to the weakness and blockage of the lower Soviet apparatus, in the absence of a proper rebuff from the Soviets. organs and owls. It inevitably made it easier for the clergy in the Kulak bloc to direct peasant activity in a religious direction, and it was necessary to resist the attempts of the musdukhov clergy to interfere in the social life of the village.

3) The main legal base around which the religious movement unfolds is religious schools attached to mosques, which are authorized by the decree of the Central Executive Committee of 24 years. The quantitative and qualitative weakness of Soviet schools, the weakness of cultural and educational work in general, and in the countryside in particular, and the insufficient response of the lower Soviet authorities to specific cases of violation of the meaning of the decree of the Central Executive Committee on the doctrine of faith - created a number of favorable prerequisites for the growth of religious schools, often at the expense of As a result, the clergy was able to: organize a large number of legal and illegal schools of faith; mobilize large masses of the peasantry, both men and women, and focus their attention on the need to further expand the scope of the faith; interest the dark masses of the peasantry in training mullahs as teachers of faith, in expanding the production of religious books, etc.

4) At the same time, the clergy worked hard to win back their political rights and fight for influence on the grassroots Soviet organizations, to agitate against the Komsomol and women's departments8, krestkomov, registry offices9 There are also trends of m/a [of the Muslim clergy. - D. A.] strengthen their influence on the masses of believers by economic measures and attempts to bring a certain economic base under this work.

5) The anti-Soviet character of this activity of the m/a follows from the following points: the struggle for a religious school follows the line of the struggle against the Soviet school; the struggle for religion in general results in a struggle against the organs of Soviet power, against

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the struggle for influence over the masses results in a struggle against the co-operatives, the CCOV10 the struggle for the political rights of the clergy results in a struggle against the foundations of the soviets. the constitution, against the Decree on the separation of Church and state, and, finally, by agitating the masses at the moment of unification on a religious basis, the clergy thereby pulls the peasantry towards pan-Islamism11 and to its worst manifestations. Here it should be borne in mind that the struggle of the clergy against us is directed and fueled precisely by the pan - Turkist-pan-Islamic elite of nationalist organizations that oppose themselves in one form or another to the soviets. authorities on all the outskirts of our Union12.

6) The above points out quite definitely that we are dealing with a full-scale offensive of musduhovism in the block with bai13 in the village and the nationalist religious elements of the city. This offensive must be countered by an extensive front of work on the part of our party and Soviet organizations.

Our first task is to sharpen the attention of the party and Soviet organizations down to the village cell [the primary organization of the Communist Party. - D. A.] and the village council on issues of the religious front. First of all, it is necessary to confirm by a special resolution that the opportunities and rights granted by the decree of the Central Executive Committee of 24 years and the corresponding explanation of the NKVD are the limit and no deviation from them is allowed. It is necessary to establish control over the implementation of this directive on the ground.

7) On the ground, work should express:

A) In increasing attention to sov, school. The struggle for the quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of owls. It will be the best fight against the clergy, against religious schools.

B) Strengthening kulprosvet. jobs, especially in the countryside.

8) Strengthening anti-religious work: providing villages with anti-religious and natural-scientific publications in their native language; strengthening the work of the Bezbozhnik circles14 with the involvement of the grassroots intelligentsia, primarily rural teachers.

D) Fight against attempts by the clergy to interfere in the social life of the village.

E) Fight against attempts of the clergy's economic offensive in all its forms.

E) The struggle for an honest and uncluttered Soviet apparatus.

8) Only in parallel with these measures can give tangible results and measures of administrative pressure, which are reduced to the following::

A) Complete prohibition of opening religious schools for adults and courses for training and retraining Mullahs15.

B) Any inhibition of the opening of new religious schools.

C) Prohibiting mullahs from drawing up lists of believers who serve as tools for pressure on the masses.

D) Merciless persecution of mullahs who violate the law on the separation of church and state.

E) Reprisals against mullahs who violate the existing law on religious beliefs.

F) Disenfranchisement of muezzins and azanchays16, since it is through them that most of the influence of the Muslim clergy on the grassroots state bodies is carried out.

III. 1) All the points that indicate an excessive increase in the activity of the Muslim clergy, listed above, can be fully attributed to the outburst-

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We belong to the second group (Central Asia and the North Caucasus). The difference from the first group of suburbs here is as follows:

a) The dominant force in Central Asia and the North Caucasus is the conservative, reactionary clergy.

b) In this connection, the methods and forms of the m/a struggle against us in these suburbs are more sharply anti-Soviet in nature.

c) The clergy's bloc with christianity and with purely counter-revolutionary elements is more sharply revealed.

d) The progressive part of the clergy, in alliance with the Soviet government, are fighting the reactionary part of the clergy. Moreover, in Central Asia, the progressive clergy is already a more or less real force, while in the North Caucasus it is still extremely weak17
2) The measures of struggle referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this note retain full force and significance for the fringes of the second group, with one essential addition: all our work must be directed towards widening the gap between progressives and conservatives, on the one hand, and towards applying mass repressive measures against reaction. The latter is especially important in the conditions of the North Caucasus (Dagestan)18. In addition, in these areas, in the near future, it will be necessary to use to some extent the progressive part of the clergy, which in the conditions of Central Asia and the North Caucasus, in comparison with the reactionary sheikhs and ishan19, really still represents a progressive value20.

Deputy prev. OGPU: / Trilisser/

Deputy Head VOOGPU: /Vollenberg/

Correct: Petrosyan

RGASPI, F. 17. Op. 85. D. 171. L. 39-42. The text is typewritten. Copy.

comment

1 As you know, there are no institutions of the church, priesthood, or monasticism in Islam, so the definition of "Muslim clergy" is rather conditional. In modern Islamic studies literature, in our opinion, the most successful attempt is to compare the corresponding layers of "Christian" and "Muslim" societies and characterize the "clergy" in the world of Islam as "a social stratum whose functions include preserving the religious and moral leadership of the community of co-religionists" (Atsamba and Kirillina, 1996, p. 137)..

2 Kazakistan-the archaic name of Kazakhstan that existed in the 1920s; in 1926, the" inner provinces", whose Muslim population was under the jurisdiction of the CDU, meant the Penza, Samara, Saratov, Orenburg, Ulyanovsk, Stalingrad and Astrakhan provinces.

3 "Reactionaries" (kadima) - traditionalists who adhered to the old forms of Islamic school education and opposed "innovations" in Muslim life; Progressives (jadids) - supporters of the renewal of the spiritual and cultural life of Muslims, especially the creation of a "new-method" school using European teaching methods. In the 1920s, the OGPU strongly supported the confrontation between these Islamic movements.

4 In order to strengthen the division of Islamic spiritual circles, the Soviet and Chekist bodies strongly encouraged rivalry between the Bashkir Spiritual Administration of Muslims (BDU), which was mainly Bashkir in terms of its leadership, and the CDU, whose board members were Tatars [Yunusova, 1999, pp. 154-170].

5 The Crimean Spiritual Administration of Muslims (KDU) was the successor to the Crimean State Duma. muftiates (spiritual administration), which existed in the Crimean Khanate under the Khans Girei, and the Tauride Mohammedan spiritual administration of the Russian Empire (1794-1917). Unfortunately, information about the activities of the KDU is very fragmentary. According to modern Ukrainian historians, since 1923, the Crimean Central Muslim People's Administration of Religious Affairs was in charge of the affairs of the Muslims of Taurida, which was discontinued after 1928 [Bogomolov, Bubenok, Danilov, Radivilov, 2004].

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6 According to the charter of 1923, the territory under the spiritual jurisdiction of the CDU was divided into districts (muhtasibats). Their supervisors - muhtasibs - They were clerics responsible for local Muslims ' compliance with Sharia law and Muslim morality [Arapov and Alekseev, pp. 156-157].

7 This meant preparations for the Congress of Muslims of Inner Russia, Siberia, and Kazakhstan held in late October 1926 [Minnullin, 2006, pp. 178-181].

8 Women's departments served as centers of the movement for the emancipation of Muslim women ("Khujum") in Muslim areas of cities and Muslim villages. The activities of women's departments and their activists were met with fierce opposition from the conservative majority of the Muslim community.

9 Muslim clerical circles insisted on preserving the Islamic forms of registration of the system of marriage and family relations, and they perceived the secular structure of civil registry offices in the most negative way.

10 KKOV - Committees of peasant social mutual assistance (krestkomy). They existed in the 1920s, uniting mainly the poor and part of the middle peasants, and enjoyed the support of the Soviet authorities.

11 Pan-Islamism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries advocated the integration of all Muslims under the spiritual leadership of Turkish Muslims. suptans-caliphs. With the elimination of the caliphate institute in 1924 and Kemal Ataturk's rigid secular policy, Turkey's role as a potential leader of the Islamic world practically disappeared.

12 For information on the activities of such organizations, see [Arsharuni and Gabidullin, 1931].

13 Bai (Turkish) - a rich, noble man.

14 They were referring to the circles of the Union of Militant Atheists (SVB), a mass "atheist" organization that existed in the USSR in 1925-1947. E. M. Yaroslavsky (Konovalov, 1967) was the Chairman of the Central Council of the SVB from the moment of its foundation.

15 In pre-revolutionary and Soviet official documents, the term "mullahs" also referred to the entire set of Muslim clerics

16 The Muezzin (also known as: azanche) - a mosque attendant who calls for prayer. In the daily life of the Muslim community, muezzins often served as teachers of mosque primary schools (maktabov).

17 On the balance of power within Muslim spiritual circles in Central Asia at that time, according to Chekist data, see: [Arapov, 2006, p.308, 317-318].

18 On the situation in the Islamic circles of Dagestan in the 1920s, see [Bobrovnikov, 2002].

19 Ishans, sheikhs-leaders Dervish (Sufi)people fraternities. Both before and after 1917, Russian administrators and special services regarded Sufi leaders and members of Sufi fraternities with great suspicion, considering that they were anti-Russian (and anti-Soviet) and were agents of the influence of foreign Islamic circles.

20 Shortly after putting this text to the press at the Russian State Academy of Education, I discovered a new set of Chekist "Islamic" reports on the work of the Muslim congress in Ufa mentioned above. These materials are currently being prepared for publication.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

RGASPI - Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Moscow.

SPFARAN is the St. Petersburg branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

list of literature

Antonov V. S., Karpov V. N. Secret informants of the Kremlin-2. This is where exploration begins. Moscow, 2003.

Muslim clergy of Central Asia in 1927 (according to the report of the OGPU Plenipotentiary Representative in Central Asia) // Races and peoples. Issue 32, Moscow, 2006.

Arapov D. Yu. The system of state regulation of Islam in the Russian Empire (the last third of the XVIII-early XX centuries). M " 2004.

Arapov D. Yu., Alekseev I. L. "For the correct resolution of religious and theological issues". Charter of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims, 1923 // Scientific works of the Institute of Business and Politics. Issue 4. Moscow, 2007.

Arsharuni A., Gabidullin H. Essays on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia.

Atsamba F. M., Kirillina S. A. Religion and Power: Islam in Ottoman Egypt (XVIII-first quarter of the XIX century). Moscow, 1996.

Basmachestvo.

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Bobrovnikov V. O. Muslims of the North Caucasus: custom, law, violence. Essays on the history and ethnography of the law of Nagorny Dagestan. Moscow, 2002.

Bogomolov A., Bubenok O., Danilov S, Radivilov D. Muslim education in Crimea (1917-1939) //http://www.cidct.org.ua/uk/studii/5-6(2004)/7/.html

Goldin V. I. Russia in the civil War. Arkhangelsk, 2000.

Decrees of the Soviet government. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1957.

Imperial Russia and the Muslim world. Collection of materials. Compiled by D. Yu. Arapov, Moscow, 2006.

Islam in the European East. Encyclopedic dictionary. Kazan, 2004.

The Communist International. Moscow, 1920. N 15.

Konovalov B. N. The Union of militant atheists // Questions of scientific atheism. Issue 4. Moscow, 1967.

Korzhikhina T. P. History of state institutions. USSR. Moscow, 1986.

Lubyanka: Organs of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB. 1917-1991. Guide.

Muslim clergy and government in Tatarstan (1920-1930). Kazan, 2006.

Mozokhin O. Cheka-OGPU. The punishing sword of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moscow, 2004.

Peregudova Z. I. Political investigation in Russia (1880-1917). Moscow, 2000.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 85. d. 171.

Top secret: Lubyanka to Stalin on the situation in the country. Vol. 4. Part 1. Moscow, 2001.

SPFARAN. F. 68 "V. V. Barthold".

Central Committee of the RCP ( b) - CPSU (b) and the national question. Book 1. Moscow, 2005.

Tsypin V. History of the Russian Orthodox Church: Synodal and Modern Periods (1700-2005). Moscow, 2006.

Chebotareva V. G. Narkomnats RSFSR: light and shadows of national politics. 1917 - 1924. Moscow, 2004.

Yunusova A. B. Islam in Bashkortostan. Ufa, 1999.

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