The head of the Main Directorate of Combat Operations, Colonel-General Anatoly Golovnev, answers questions from Orientir magazine about the training of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Anatoly Golovnev was born in 1942 in the Smolensk region. He graduated from the Moscow Military University in 1963, the Frunze Military Academy in 1975, and the General Staff Military Academy in 1980. He served in various command and staff positions. He was the head of the Main Department of Combat Training of the Ground Forces, then the first Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SV.

Since May 1998-Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

- Comrade Colonel-General, more than a year has passed since the formation of the Main Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. What conclusions can be drawn about the expediency and effectiveness of the created structure? What adjustments have been made to improve its effectiveness?

- The Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has existed since January 1, 1998. It was created to develop the main directions of operational-tactical and combat training of the Armed Forces, improve its system, coordinate the combat training of types of Armed Forces, branches of troops and special forces, military educational institutions and monitor its implementation in the troops, manage the combat training of the Ground Forces, develop statutory and program documents and other tasks. However, after structural changes in the Armed Forces, clarification of the functions of military command bodies and the order of their subordination, there was a need for a partial revision of the scope of activities of the GUBP of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In addition, over the past time, both positive and negative aspects in the work of the new central board have been clearly identified.

The undoubted advantage is that for the first time in many years, a real attempt has been made to coordinate the combat training of the Armed Forces, branches of the Armed Forces and special forces in the interests of performing common tasks for conducting combined-arms combat. The recently conducted joint tactical exercises of the Air Force and Airborne Forces "Air Bridge-99", which were attended by Russian Defense Minister Marshal I. Sergeev, convincingly proved the correctness of the chosen strategic course.

As for the gaps, in a little over a year it became obvious that there are units in the GUBP of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation that perform tasks similar to those of other central military command bodies. At the same time, a number of problems of combat training of troops (forces) were out of our field of view.

Experience has shown that functionally and structurally, the GUB of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is mainly focused on the Ground Forces, while specific and interspecific issues of combat training are still insufficiently covered. At this stage, we do not have any units that can effectively influence the content and organization of combat training in the branches of the Armed Forces, branches of the armed forces and special forces.

It seems to us a serious omission that, being the direct organizer of training personnel on training facilities (TCB) and their operation, we do not participate in the development of policies for the development of areas and planning the development of promising TCB, as well as orders for their production.

Finally, today we are actually suspended from the work on recruitment, training and placement of personnel. Appointments to senior positions in combat training bodies are made without approval from the leadership of the GUBP of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Interaction with the military education authorities in terms of clarifying the training programs for future officers in higher military educational institutions is not organized. Cadets in military schools receive a large amount of knowledge without taking into account the actual needs of the troops.

Thus, there is an objective need for further improvement of the organizational and staff structure of the GUBP of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

- The initial stage of reforming the Armed Forces is almost passed. Can we talk about any positive achievements today in comparison with 1997-1998?

- Unfortunately, there is no need to say anything about positive changes in the combat training of the troops today. All the efforts of the combat training bodies in the current training period were aimed at maintaining the existing level of training of military personnel, formations, units, divisions, and control bodies and their ability to perform tasks in accordance with their intended purpose. The main focus is on low-cost forms of combat training.

Right away, I would like to note that the most serious problem in organizing combat training for commanders of all degrees is the problem of providing fuel. Of course, "walking on the machine" or "on the tank", shooting from a standstill, without moving-these are also elements of learning. But they don't give you real training.

In general, the staffing of the troops with personnel, weapons and military equipment makes it possible to conduct combat training activities in full. However, due to the lack of fuel and lubricants, practical exercises are conducted with significant simplifications. Shooting from tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, conducted from the spot, using external power sources allows you to maintain the skills of trainees in actions when arming combat vehicles only at the minimum permissible level. Combat vehicle driving classes are conducted mainly on simulators, and practical training for drivers and driver mechanics is virtually curtailed.

For the same reason, only 33 per cent of the planned regimental, 55 per cent battalion and 69 per cent company tactical exercises were conducted in 1998. At the same time, 30 percent of battalion and 59 percent of company tactical exercises, as well as 59 percent of platoon live-fire exercises, were conducted "on foot by machine", that is, without the withdrawal of equipment.

Here we deceive ourselves, creating the appearance of well-being. At the same time, military personnel do not acquire the necessary knowledge and skills, commanders lose their skills in organizing combat on the ground and managing a unit in battle, and divisions, units and formations do not reach the required level of coherence.

In this regard, I would like to point out such a problem as the objectivity of assessing the essence of the events being held. The current guidelines define the procedure for organizing and conducting various forms of combat training, as well as minimum standards for the withdrawal of equipment, weapons, ammunition and other material resources. These standards were developed over decades, and their adjustment was carried out only as equipment, weapons and tactics improved. It has long been known that for the training of any specialist, division, or unit, there are scientifically based programs and norms, the clear and complete implementation of which allows you to achieve the desired result. And if the equipment is not used in tactical exercises, combat firing of platoons, then these are not tactical exercises and combat shooting, but other forms of combat training. Call a spade a spade. Trying to pass off wishful thinking does nothing but harm.

- For a long time, the Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation regularly reported on the financing of the Armed Forces through the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda. The column "combat training" was full of dashes. Meanwhile, exercises were held, classes were organized at various levels. Please tell us how the commanders, commanders, and officials got out of this situation.

- Financing is the most sensitive issue. The trend of reducing the cost of combat training remains: in 1998, we received only 6 percent of the necessary funds for this period, while this year we received only 5 percent.

But combat training must be carried out. Therefore, commanders, feeling responsible for maintaining combat readiness, solved this problem by redistributing funds from other items of the Ministry of Defense budget with their subsequent restoration. In addition, they increased the number of low-cost activities carried out, as well as by simplifying existing forms of combat training.

At once I want to make a reservation that the simplistic behavior, for which we used to strictly ask, is not their fault, but our common misfortune caused by the current circumstances. Commanders are ready to work day and night, they themselves are oppressed by stagnation in this issue. But if you are supposed to spend 22 shooting, and resources are allocated only for 10, then here, as they say, you can not jump above your head.

The solution to this problem is beyond our competence. We have exactly as much as we are allocated. I think that in the current military-political situation in Europe, the country's leadership will make a decision aimed at improving the level of combat training of the Armed Forces. And the sooner this is done, the less losses, including political ones, will be expected if any tension arises both near our borders and directly on our territory.

- Anatoly Andreevich, in the old days, the initiators of the competition were under close attention, there were units and formations that achieved excellent results. What does the picture look like today?

- The competition, in my opinion, served as a fairly serious incentive to improve the combat training of troops. Of course, there were costs involved, but the benefits were undoubtedly much greater than the harm. The struggle for high performance in combat and political training stimulated the opening of significant reserves, mobilized additional psychological resources of military personnel. I remember how we worked, leaving time only for sleep, so that the division, part, and connection would be among the best. And when everything worked out, it was very satisfying.

Now the situation has changed. The old moral guidelines are quietly "buried", and new ones have not yet been created. Therefore, it is necessary to find other incentives that meet the requirements of the time and can raise and inspire people.

However, this is not to say that everything is bad in this matter. Now also excellent divisions, units, ships are determined, military personnel participate in competitions for the title of the best specialist, the best by profession are determined. However, this happens on an incomparably smaller scale and, as a rule, is limited to a part, a connection, and occasionally it is possible to reach the district level.

Until recently, we practiced holding all-army competitions of specialists, crews, and commanders. It was a real celebration of martial arts. Unfortunately, now due to the lack of funds, holding such events is very problematic.

Now for the excellent connections and parts. At the end of last year, one regiment of the Strategic Missile Forces and 12 ships of the 1st rank of the Navy became excellent. Good results were achieved by Land Forces formations under the command of Major General D. Bugaev (North Caucasus Military District) and Major General I. Gritskov (Far Eastern Military District). We can mention the brigades and regiments commanded by Colonels S. Derepko, X. Kaloev, S. Semenov, B. Belikov, V. Melnikov, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Pavelko.

At the same time, 60 percent of divisions, 86 percent of military equipment storage bases, 65 percent of brigades, 55 percent of regiments and 46 percent of 1st-rank ships received only satisfactory ratings. As you can see, the results are not impressive.

It should be noted here that last year the vast majority of connections and parts were checked without the active participation of the central office. Oddly enough, the GUBP of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was actually suspended from participating in the final inspection due to lack of money for travel expenses. Previously, "militant" officers spent 150-200 days a year on business trips, and for the period of control and final inspections, the central command generally "died out". Today, we go on business trips to check the progress of combat training much less often, and if we go, then, as a rule, to formations and units stationed near Moscow. A trip to remote counties is quite an event. Therefore, when summing up the results, we mainly rely on information provided from districts (fleets).

- At what stage is the formation and establishment of full-fledged combat training in units and formations of constant combat readiness?

- When I was talking about the organization of combat training, I first of all had in mind the formations and units of constant readiness, since special attention is currently being paid to them. I don't think it's worth repeating. As for the compounds and parts of the reduced composition, the situation there is even more complicated.

- In the current conditions of financing the Armed Forces, the emphasis should probably be placed on organizing training using training facilities. Please provide data that compares the cost of training at the TCB and the organization of classes in a real-world environment on the ground.

- The problem of training troops with the help of modern training facilities is more relevant today than ever. Its solution will increase the effectiveness of combat training, save significant material and financial resources.

The GUBP of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has developed a concept for training the Armed Forces with the maximum use of training equipment. Its essence lies in the development of military personnel, units and units up to 80 percent of combat training tasks with the help of modern TCB. However, its implementation comes down to a nagging problem - the lack of money.

I have already given an example of the indisputable economic benefits of using simulators in combat training.

In order for the crews of a tank battalion to perform a test firing exercise once in the field, it takes two days of time and:

125-mm shells - 200 pcs.;

7.62 mm rounds - 23400 pcs.;

smoke grenades ZD6-67 pcs.;

tank mileage - 500 km;

car mileage - 1000 km.

To do all this, you need 636 thousand rubles.

On the TKNT-ZB tank battalion simulator, this exercise is practiced in class conditions for 5 hours without consuming ammunition and motor resources. The cost of the simulator itself is 350 thousand rubles and its service life is 7 years.

The benefits, as you can see, are obvious.

If we talk about the state of the existing base of simulators, training grounds and training equipment, then the picture is as follows. At the Ground Forces training grounds, there are practically no material resources left that are necessary for organizing the educational process. Even urgent, planned priority combat training activities were put at risk of disruption.

In the Strategic Missile Forces, 38 percent of simulators have reached their planned service life and require additional maintenance costs. 15 percent of military firing ranges are missing in the launch and control units of spacecraft and in rocket and space defense formations.

In the Navy, the staffing of the training material and technical base with weapons and military equipment for the main basic projects of ships is 87 percent, but mostly outdated models, and in a number of areas (modern submarine missile systems, power plants) it lags behind the fleet equipment for 5 years.

In the Air Force, especially in the radio engineering troops, the situation in this regard is simply critical.

Training with the help of educational and training tools gives a visible economic effect. By the way, this has long been understood and implemented in the NATO countries. Our situation is complicated by the fact that savings are expected only in the future, and money for creating a new training base and maintaining the existing one is needed now.

- Anatoly Andreevich, often in the speeches of high-ranking chiefs there are contradictory conclusions: "The plans are mostly fulfilled, but the state of affairs in the troops is steadily deteriorating." So said Lieutenant-General A. Gerasimov, speaking in the "Red Star" on February 16, 1999.

"There is no contradiction here. We demand that the plans be realistic, that is, based on the available opportunities. And they, as you understand, are very limited. Why plan activities when you know in advance that you won't be able to complete them?

For example, earlier in the Land Forces, divisional tactical exercises were planned and conducted once every two years, now with the deterioration of logistics and funding, they are not planned at all, regimental TU were planned once a year, now - once every two years.

Already in the first quarter of the current academic year, only one of the three planned regimental tactical exercises was held. The other two were postponed to a later date due to fuel shortages and lack of funds.

An old truth: in order to learn to fly, drive, shoot, you need to fly, drive and shoot. The law of the transition from quantitative changes to qualitative changes is objective, and it cannot be abolished by decree or order.

There are fewer activities, although plans are being implemented, and the results are correspondingly lower.

- The Russian army has not had any major exercises for a long time. Will the current year change the situation?

- Indeed, large-scale exercises in our army have not been held for a long time. However, when company and battalion tactical exercises are disrupted due to a lack of material and financial resources, there is no need to talk about conducting strategic exercises.

As for major command-and-staff exercises and war games, they are planned and held on time. But these are already operational tasks, but not combat training.

Summing up the above, we can draw the following conclusion: the recent events in Yugoslavia have convincingly proved that Russia has only one reliable defender left - this is its army, which needs to be well dressed and fed, equipped in a timely manner and intensively trained. Of course, this requires a lot of money. But it is no longer possible to save on the army, because, as you can see,it is still premature to" hide the sword in the scabbard".

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