E. N. KORENDYASOV

Candidate of Economic Sciences

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Russia-Africa, African arms market, military-technical cooperation (MTC), national armies

For Russian partners in military-technical cooperation, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is becoming increasingly attractive.

During the period from 2000 to 2013, the export of weapons and military equipment (IWT) to the SSA countries amounted to $13.5 billion. (including $244 million in 2000 and $717 million in 2013)¹. For example, in 2013-2014, contracts were signed with Nigeria (supplies of 6 MI-35 and 6 MI-17 helicopters) and with Namibia (supplies of small arms, mortars, vehicles and ammunition), as well as with Angola^.2

The factors that determine the desire of States in this region of Africa to build up their military capabilities are becoming long-term. They are related to the growing threats of revision of state borders inherited from the colonial era, the aggravation of separatist ethnic and religious conflicts, and changes in the balance of power between African countries.³

On the other hand, with the growth of the SSA countries ' development rates, their financial capabilities are expanding - after all, out of the 21 African oil-producing countries, 16 are located in this region, where about 300 million tons of oil are produced per year4.

Currently, Russia supports military-technical cooperation with 25 SSA countries out of 39. Rosoboronexport has permanent representative offices in Uganda, Ethiopia and Angola, and intergovernmental agreements on military-technical cooperation have been signed with most States. Our largest partners include Angola, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia.

ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, SUDAN

Angola. Angolans have been familiar with Soviet weapons since the 1960s, when they opposed the Portuguese colonialists. During the struggle against South African aggression and the civil war that followed the declaration of independence in 1975, for the period from 1980 to 1990. The Soviet Union supplied Angola with $5.3 billion worth of weapons and military equipment.⁵ Then supplies were reduced.

In 1991, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on the Angolan Government and the rebel forces of the UNITA opposition group to prevent an escalation of the internal conflict. However, already in 1992, the arms embargo on the official authorities of Luanda was lifted. The Government of the country appealed to the government of Boris Yeltsin with requests for military assistance, but they were only partially met.

Angolans began to look for other opportunities and established contacts with various intermediaries. The Angolan Ambassador of those years in Moscow, R. Monteiro, recalls: "There were personalities from different countries who had the opportunity to purchase weapons in Slovakia or in the CIS countries. Then we started importing weapons from Belarus at the interstate level. The weapons were Russian-made and bought through intermediaries. At the time of the escalation of hostilities, we did not care much about who these operations were carried out through. " ⁶

In 1993, 21 BMP-1 armored vehicles were delivered from Belarus to Angola, 29 BMP - 1 and 24 T-62 tanks from Bulgaria, 7 BMP-2s from the Czech Republic, 52 BMP-2s from Poland (1994-1995), 9 APCs from Slovakia, etc. ⁷ In 2000-2013 Moldova (according to SIPRI) sold $200 million worth of military products to Angola.⁸ Some "autonomous" Russian structures also joined in, selling 30 T-62 tanks, 169 BMP-1s, and 14 M-46 artillery systems to Angolans in 1993-1994.

In the early 2000s, there was a slight increase in the Russian-Angolan military-technical cooperation: the volume of Russian military-technical equipment exports to this country in 2000-2002 reached $96 million (in 1990 prices), which accounted for 30% of the total volume of Angolan arms imports over these years9. From 2003 to 2013, SIPRI notes the absence of Russian exports of military and technical equipment to Angola. Meanwhile, the Angolan government purchased $157 million worth of weapons in 2005-2013 alone, including $33 million in Brazil, $48 million in Belarus,and $65 million in Slovakia. ¹⁰

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa today. 2015, N 9.

These facts indicate that military-technical cooperation between the two countries was subject to significant fluctuations. An important step towards achieving a coordinated strategy in this area was outlined in 2013, when, following the results of negotiations in October of the same year, a three-year program on military-technical cooperation was signed between the Russian government delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and the Angolan authorities. It is assumed that a VTB Bank loan granted to Angola a year earlier will be used to implement the agreement. Contracts for the supply of SU-30K aircraft, MI-24P and MI-171 helicopters worth $1 billion have already been signed ¹¹.

In general, favorable conditions are emerging for the promotion of positions in the Angolan market. Since the end of the civil war in 2002, the country's economic development has accelerated. The extraction of oil, diamonds, and other natural resources is developing dynamically. The country does not hide its claims to the status of a sub-regional power. Angolan military contingents have participated in military peacekeeping operations in the Republic of the Congo (RC) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The Angolan army is mainly equipped with Russian (Soviet) military equipment. Russian military consultants and teachers took part in the military training of personnel. The established traditions and ties of mutual interest remain an important driving force for military-technical ties.

Ethiopia. Ethiopia is also ^one of the five largest Russian exporters of military equipment to Africa. During the Soviet years (1970-1990), $5.2 billion worth of weapons and military equipment was supplied to this country13 (see ^Table 1). After the collapse of the USSR, the scale of military-technical cooperation decreased. The growth of trade operations was observed, as a rule, only during the years of aggravation of conflicts with neighboring states - the war with Eritrea (1998-2000) and military operations in Somalia (2006, 2011). In 1998-1999, 6 SU-27 UB fighters, 4 SU-25 attack aircraft, and 4 MI helicopters were delivered to Ethiopia-24 and 10 MI-17s, 10 self-propelled guns-2SZ "Acacia", artillery systems, MANPADS and other equipment.

A total of $245 million worth of weapons and military equipment was delivered to Ethiopia in 1998-1999. The second peak occurred in 2003-2004: the volume of deliveries was $407 million, followed by a break. SIPRI registered deliveries of Russian military-technical equipment to Ethiopia in 2010 alone in the amount of $⁵⁴ million (see Table 1).

Meanwhile, external threats to the country's security are not abating. On its borders there are zones of active ethno-confessional, Islamist and pirate activity. Ethiopia plays a key role in the distribution of water resources in the region. Currently, the country is completing the construction of a cascade of hydroelectric dams "Vozrozhdenie", covering the largest river Abay (Blue Nile), which provides more than half of the Nile's flow. In Egypt, this caused concern, which, in particular, is associated with its intentions to modernize its fleet of French Mirages-2000 with financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and purchase Rafale bombers from France.¹⁵ Both countries, however, managed to reach a compromise on controversial issues.

Sudan is the largest importer of weapons on the African continent. In terms of the amount of purchases of military equipment in 2001-2013 ($1.8 billion), it ranked 5th on the continent (see Table 2). Russia is its largest supplier. With the volume of purchases for 2000-2013 - $1065 million - it was the third among the African clients of Russia. Supplies from our country account for 60% of the total volume of Sudanese imports of weapons and military equipment. Russian arms exports to Sudan account for 70-80% of combat aircraft, helicopters, and armored vehicles.¹⁶

Table 1

Russian exports of weapons and military equipment to Ethiopia in 1970-2013 ($million, constant 1990 prices)

Author's calculations by: SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database.

Table 2

Russian exports of weapons and military equipment to Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan in 2001-2013 ($ million, constant 1990 prices)

Source: SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database.

A sharp jump in Sudanese purchases of weapons and military equipment in the 2000s was associated with the growing threat of the country's disintegration.

South Sudan, which became independent in 2011, has accelerated the development of military-technical cooperation with foreign partners. In total, during the period 2009-2013, it purchased weapons worth $145 million. The volume of Russian military-technical equipment supplies amounted to $61 million, or more than 40% of the total amount.¹⁷

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Uganda is the first major victory of the war that began in 2000. Rosoboronexport's "offensive" on the military-technical equipment markets of the SSA countries. According to SIPRI, the total volume of arms supplies to this country (before deals with Russia) in 2000-2010 amounted to about $160 million. But in two years - 2011-2012 - Russia delivered military equipment worth $596 million. ¹⁸ In 2010-2012, 6 SU-30 combat aircraft were delivered to Uganda. The latest tanks and other military products are also delivered.

Uganda accounts for 22% of our IWW exports to the SSA countries. 74% of the weapons imported by this country in 2000-2013 were from Russia19 (see Table 3). The success of the Russian arms business is facilitated by the provision of loans by Russian banks to the Ugandan state.

The example of the development of the Russian-Ugandan military-technical cooperation serves as an important incentive to step up efforts to enter the arms markets of other SSA states. New significant steps have already been taken: the volume of transactions in 2000-2013 in Ghana - $68 million, in Chad - $21 million, in Kenya - $20 million, in Nigeria - $67 million ²⁰. But to talk about a large-scale breakthrough of Russia into the SSA markets, it is necessary to achieve significant progress in the markets of the DRC (the total volume of arms purchases abroad in 2000-2013 was $384 million), Tanzania - $351 million, Zambia - $140 million, Equatorial Guinea - $309 million, Botswana - $118 million^..

Table 3

Russian exports of weapons and military equipment to Uganda in 2000-2013 ($million, constant 1990 prices)

Source: SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database.

* * *

This brief overview confirms that instability and the high probability of sudden changes in the domestic and foreign policies of African countries continue to have a significant impact on the dynamics of their military-technical cooperation with Russia. With the exception of Algeria, Sudan, Uganda, Angola, Ethiopia and, more recently, Angola, Russian-African cooperation has not yet acquired a stable systemic character, and sometimes one-time deals dictated by market conditions prevail.

OUR COMPETITORS

In the late 1990s and 2000s, weapons and military equipment from the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries flowed into Africa in a large flow. Often dumping, these new arms suppliers quickly gained popularity in low-budget countries on the continent. In 2005-2012, new partners in the SSA countries delivered weapons worth $535 million, only slightly behind Russia - $777 million.²²

For 16 African countries, which account for 80% of Russia's military-technical equipment exports to the continent, exports from the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries accounted for 25% of Russia's exports between 2000 and 2013. In a number of countries, these competitors far outstripped Russia: for example, in Angola-by almost 3 times, in Nigeria - by $10 million.²³

China is becoming an increasingly impressive system competitor. It has already gained a fairly large niche in the African military-technical equipment market. The rapidly growing potential of the Chinese military-industrial complex on a modern technological basis creates favorable conditions for the continuation of China's military-technical expansion.

In 2005-2012, Chinese shipments totaled $994 million, or ^12-13% of total African imports of IWT24. In a number of countries, the Chinese have taken a dominant position. In Zambia, China accounts for almost 80% of shipments in 2000-2013; in Zimbabwe, for more than 50%; in Tanzania, for 90%; in Namibia, for more than 70%; and in Nigeria, for almost 30% ^.25 China offers its military products, as a rule, at low prices, "recouping" on the supply of spare parts and services at high prices.

However, the most important condition for the successful operation of Chinese arms exporters is that more than 2.5 thousand Chinese companies are active in Africa. By combining and coordinating various areas of business cooperation, encouraging the interaction of Chinese business structures operating in Africa with the interests of exporters of military products, the Chinese side gets the opportunity to practice a variety of mutual settlement schemes, various types of package transactions, cooperation, licensing and other operations based on modern technologies of investment and credit and financial business.

NATO countries also significantly expanded their military ties with the continent in the 2000s. In 2007, Washington created the U.S. Military's Africa Command for Africa (Africom), which became the focal point for all U.S. military efforts on the continent. Special emphasis is placed on training African military personnel. Since 2009, the Americans have trained more than 250,000 African soldiers and officers for the OPM and the African Union Permanent Readiness Force, at a cost of $892 million.²⁶

Table 4

Actual exports of weapons and military equipment to the SSA countries by individual categories of weapons and the rating of supplier countries ($ million, at current prices)

Source: International arms trade. 2012, N 9.

At the same time, the Americans are creating their own military infrastructure in Africa. There are about 10 bases and strongholds of US special forces operating on the continent. The largest of them are the Lemonnier base in Djibouti (2 thousand people), military strongholds in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia (Camp Gilbert), South Sudan, Kenya, etc. Joint exercises are regularly held as part of military cooperation programs. The last ones were held in 2014 in Niger. They were attended by 1 thousand military personnel from the United States and European countries, a total of 18 countries, including 8 African ones. At the end of 2014 The United States has established an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) base in northern Niger. In the capital of this country - Niamey, a US Air Force base is already functioning.

France is in no hurry to implement its plans to reduce the number and number of personnel of its military bases in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African Republic and Djibouti. Their equipment with weapons and military equipment is constantly being updated, and their sphere of responsibility is growing. French troops were directly involved in military operations in Chad, Ivory Coast, Mali and the Central African Republic. In December 2014, the establishment of a new base in Niger (Madama)²⁷.

Attention is drawn to the expansion of military cooperation between African states with Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden. From 2005 to 2012, the volume of IWW supplies from 11 Western countries (including Israel, Turkey and Switzerland) to the SSA region increased from $400 million to $700 million (at current prices), i.e. by almost 70%. The share of these countries ' supplies to the SSA states (in total arms supplies to Africa in 2005-2012) was 65%, or in monetary terms - $4.85 billion.²⁸ By $9.8 billion. Western countries have supplied weapons to North African countries, mainly Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Libya.²⁹

As part of Operation Barkhan, which France deployed in 2014-2015 (instead of Operation Serval) According to official data, 3 thousand military personnel, 20 helicopters, 2 transport aircraft, 6 fighter jets, 4 unmanned aerial vehicles are involved in the Sahara-Sahel zone.³⁰

In the trade of weapons and military equipment with the countries of the continent, Western firms mainly rely on complex and modern high-tech categories of weapons. The supply of such weapons determines the long-term military-technical cooperation and provides advantages in the fight against the main competitors - Russia and China.

In 2005-2012, Sweden took the 1st place in terms of exports of military aircraft and UAVs to the SSA countries ($1.8 billion, or 46.3% of the world's exports of this category of military equipment to the region); in terms of naval equipment - Germany ($0.9 billion - 60.3%); in terms of helicopters-Italy ($374 million - 35.9%). Russia took 1st place

for armored vehicles and tanks, ³¹ (see Table 4).

The African policy of Western countries in recent years has been characterized by an increase in its militaristic aspects. Under the banner of fighting totalitarianism and promoting democracy, their military operations on the continent have become more frequent. Large-scale programs of training and retraining of military personnel, the introduction of NATO standards in combat training and military construction in general are being advanced. The military-organizational and military-technical infrastructure is being expanded.

With the activation of radical Islamist forces, primarily represented by the terrorist organization "Islamic State" (IS), the threat of reformatting the situation in the Greater Middle East on an anti-Western basis is growing. In these circumstances, the buildup of the military presence becomes an important lever to influence the course of events and deter impending changes.

WHY COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA IS MORE PROFITABLE

In terms of the price-quality ratio, Russian weapons have a significant advantage on the African continent. French researcher E. Lakhil notes in this regard that the capabilities of the Russian defense industry are determined " ... not only by its production and technological achievements. More importantly, Russia's value-for-money offerings are aligned with the military needs and financial capabilities of its African customers."³² However significant this circumstance may be, it should not be overemphasized. Today, other factors are also at the forefront of ensuring the success of the arms trade. First of all, after-sales service.

The life cycle of modern weapons systems is 20-30 years. It is extremely important to have such an after-sales service system that would ensure the combat capability and effectiveness of weapons throughout their entire life cycle. The US has been doing this since the 1970s.

Russia is also embarking on this path. A helicopter service Center organized jointly by Russian Helicopters Holding and the South African company Denel was put into operation in South Africa in 2013. Negotiations are underway to create similar centers for servicing aircraft, tanks and armored vehicles.

The continent currently operates about 770 helicopters, thousands of tanks and armored vehicles of various types, and hundreds of Russian-made combat aircraft. In the early 1990s, the share of Soviet-made military equipment and armaments in African armies was up to 70% for tanks, 40% for airplanes,and 35% for helicopters. ³³

In Algeria, Egypt and Ethiopia, there are 5 service companies, and it is planned to create 3 more for the repair of MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-22 aircraft, as well as helicopters. Sukhoi Aviation Holding and a number of other companies have been granted the right to independently provide after-sales services.

In the short term, the most important direction for increasing the volume of military-technical cooperation with African countries is the modernization of previously delivered military equipment. Until recently, this segment of Russian business was out of the scope of proper attention. Meanwhile, it arouses increased interest among African partners, as it allows them to achieve an increase in military potential with more modest military expenditures. At the same time, it makes it easier for the Russian side to promote its positions in African markets and create new forms of cooperation. In 2011-2013, Rosoboronexport negotiated with Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia and other countries on the repair and modernization of the Pechora air defense system, S-125, radar-12, P-18, T-55, T-62, T-72, BTR-60 tanks, and Acacia self-propelled howitzers, "Carnation", etc.

With the growth of the industrial and human resources of African countries and the strengthening of their credit and financial institutions, there are opportunities for joint production of military equipment. So far, these opportunities are small, but they are rapidly expanding.

Currently, weapons and ammunition are produced in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Algeria, Egypt and South Africa have an impressive military-industrial complex.

In the Republic of South Africa, there are 700 military-industrial enterprises, which employ 13.7 thousand people. workers and specialists. The largest plants are controlled by Denel, which owns 20% of the capital of the British company BAE Systems³⁴. According to reports provided by the South African Government to the United Nations, South African weapons are supplied to 50 countries for a total amount of up to $1 billion.³⁵ South Africa delivered $111 million worth of weapons to the SSA countries in 2005-2012.³⁶

Egypt has the most powerful and developed military-industrial complex on the African continent. Its military factories employ about 80,000 people. Most of the enterprises were created with the participation of Western companies. The Egyptian military industry largely meets the needs of the national Armed Forces in certain types of missile, aviation and armored vehicles, as well as in air defense systems, artillery weapons, small arms and ammunition. At the expense of its own production, 90% of the army's communication needs are met. The production of radar systems and electronic warfare equipment is being mastered ³⁷.

Algeria's military industry produces boats, light ships, some types of armored personnel carriers, and repairs military equipment. Russia and Algeria are implementing projects to create joint ventures for the production of weapons and military equipment, as well as a post-warranty service center for submarines built in our country.

In Angola and Ethiopia, it is planned to build enterprises for the production of ammunition, mortars, and light weapons.

EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL DEALS

The most important role in expanding our military-technical cooperation with Africa is played by the development of modern mutual settlement schemes. So far, in practice, traditional approaches prevail here. Meanwhile, credit-banking, financial and marketing technologies and tools have been significantly transformed in recent years. They go beyond the framework of classical accounting, involving various intermediaries in mutual settlement schemes, creating consortia with the involvement of domestic and foreign business structures for a particular large project.

Speaking at a meeting of the Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries in April 2014, President Vladimir Putin called on Russian companies to "learn how to use modern financial and marketing tools in order to effectively implement the planned programs for promoting Russian military-technical equipment in foreign markets.":

- government and commercial loans to long-standing and reliable partners;

- deliveries for repayment of external debt;

- export based on various offset transactions " ³⁸.

Several years ago, Russian partners returned to the practice of providing commercial loans. In particular, Vneshtorgbank provided loans for the purchase of weapons to Uganda. The signing of a three-year military-technical cooperation program with Angola in October 2013 was also accompanied by a $3 billion commercial loan from Vneshtorgbank.

Other modern market schemes are also being developed. Thus, cooperation between Russian exporters of weapons and military equipment and Russian companies already operating in African countries, operating, in particular, in the use of natural resources, seems promising.

An interesting attempt was made in relations with Mali. To pay for military purchases in Russia, the Malian authorities offered a choice of four gold exploration and production concessions. The idea of creating a joint Russian-Malian intermediary financial and banking company was also discussed, where the Malian government would transfer a certain percentage of income from its shares in the capital of gold mining companies operating in the country to pay for purchases of military products. Such schemes are a flexible and profitable mechanism for offsetting payments. But they are not yet widely used in Russian practice.

The signing of "package agreements" on the supply of Russian weapons played a crucial role in achieving breakthrough success in the military-technical cooperation with Algeria and Libya (before the overthrow of Gaddafi). This agreement with Libya, due to NATO aggression, was not implemented. The profit lost by Russian structures amounted to $4.5 billion ³⁹.

Offset-based deals are difficult to move forward ⁴⁰. An offset transaction is a type of compensation transaction for the purchase of imported products, the condition of which is to set counterclaims for investing part of the funds from the contract amount in the economy of the importing country. The seller undertakes to reinvest part of the proceeds from the sale of weapons in the economy of the importing State.

The cost of an offset package varies from 30% of the amount of the main import contract in the civil sphere to 100% for purchases of military equipment and aircraft.

Developing countries actively use these channels in order to obtain additional financial and technical and technological resources for the development of their own economies. Today, an offset package is a necessary condition for entering into any major transaction (over $10 million). an arms deal with African countries. It is considered together with the main contract at the tender auction. And, sometimes, its volume and content play a crucial role in deciding on the winner of the tender.

Rosoboronexport has already accumulated some experience in compensation transactions. In the period from 2005 to 2010, he implemented two defense contracts with India under these conditions (modernization of MiG-29 fighters of the Indian Air Force and sale of 20 transport helicopters). The sum of both main contracts was 88.1 billion rubles. Rs, and offset - 27.2 billion, or 30.7% ⁴¹.

The role of offset transactions is ambiguous, sometimes they serve as a cover for various types of corruption schemes. However, in the African context, offset becomes an integral component of the arms business and an effective lever for promoting military products in the markets of this continent.

The arms trade has an important feature - it is quite politicized. This is also reflected in the fact that all more or less important decisions in this area are made with the participation of top state leaders. Breakthrough solutions to the problems of military-technical cooperation with Algeria and Libya were achieved as a result of intensive personal talks between President Vladimir Putin and the President of the Russian Federation.

A. Bouteflika and the Libyan leader M. Gaddafi, which ended with agreements on the "exchange of debts for the purchase of weapons and military equipment."

Another feature is related to the presence of a rather significant component of dual-use machinery and equipment in military-technical products: vehicles, road construction and other engineering equipment, communications equipment, etc. But military medical institutions, military-technical schools, cadet schools, mechanical repair enterprises, and communication systems (not just space ones) are still often overlooked. The use of this lever to promote military-technical cooperation has a great impact on the formation of competitive advantages.

WORK IN A NEW WAY IN NEW CONDITIONS

Thus, it is obvious that Africa is becoming a significant player in the global market of weapons and military equipment. The continent accounts for up to 10% of global arms exports. If in 1990-1999 military supplies to African states amounted to $6.4 billion, then in 2000-2013 - almost $20 billion.⁴² According to the growth rate of military spending - 5.9% - in 2014, the continent took the 1st place in the world. From 2005 to 2014, spending by African States increased by 91% to $ 50.2 billion in 201443^.

Russia, which has extensive experience in military-technical cooperation with foreign (and African in particular) countries and produces all categories of weapons and military equipment at the level of world standards, has every chance to use new opportunities for developing military-technical partnership with African states. However, in order for these opportunities to become real contracts, considerable efforts will be required to adapt to African realities and strengthen business activity in the military-technical sphere.

A number of new areas for improving the effectiveness of military-technical cooperation with African partners are currently being considered. First of all, we are talking about developing a modern strategy for military-technical cooperation based on comprehensive marketing studies of the peculiarities of African markets and taking into account Russia's foreign policy and economic interests.

African states are very different in terms of territory, population, level of development and ability to pay, as well as in terms of geopolitical potential. Each country has its own scale of military threats, terrorist, separatist, criminal and cross-border challenges, which require different military-political and military-tactical ways to counter them. In view of this, it is necessary to formulate adequate and attractive proposals on the nomenclature, tactical and technical characteristics and volumes of military products offered for delivery.

Today, air defense systems are most in demand in Tropical Africa (especially after the NATO aggression in Libya): combat and transport helicopters, medium-range military transport aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, armored vehicles and off-road armored personnel carriers, medium and light tanks, naval vessels for protecting maritime borders and suppressing pirate activities, border control and technical intelligence equipment, military engineering equipment, equipment for training centers and training grounds, and also military educational services.

It is also necessary to expand the participation of the Russian military in peacekeeping operations conducted on the African continent by decision of the UN Security Council.

A more systematic nature of military-technical cooperation with the countries of Tropical Africa can be given by the transition to 3-5-year cooperation programs. First of all, this applies to States with a significant market capacity and with more or less secured solvency. These include oil and gas producing countries, as well as countries with rich deposits of non - ferrous metals. From these positions, promising partners are::

- In North-East Africa-Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti;

- In East Africa-Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda;

- In West Africa-Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania;

- In South-West Africa-Angola, Namibia, Botswana;

- In South and South-East Africa-South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe;

- In Central Africa-Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo.

Systematic cooperation links have already been established with individual countries on this list.

Military-technical contacts with the African Union, as well as with sub-regional integration associations, through which the AU implements the strategy of strengthening security and combating terrorism, should play an important role. From this perspective, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are of the greatest interest. It is these associations that have made significant progress in creating a sub-regional security system and forming a permanent readiness force. They also have a significant potential to participate in military peacekeeping operations within the framework of African Union peacekeeping missions. ECOWAS and SADC are in dire need of military-technical equipment for joint military formations, their means of delivery to the place of operations, and material and logistical support. In the framework of cooperation with them, there are UAVs-

favorable opportunities for using leasing and leasing of complex weapons systems.

It seems promising to create mixed structures involving the capital of companies from China, India, Brazil, South Africa and other countries for the modernization and repair of previously delivered equipment. This will reduce the cost of African partners to upgrade weapons and will allow them to expand, under certain conditions, access to the markets of countries that are in the sphere of influence of the BRICS member countries. The same scheme is possible for the development and production of military equipment specifically for Africa (the "African line" of weapons) by joint efforts, but in one of the BRICS member countries.

We have already mentioned that one of the most difficult problems in the arms trade is the problem of determining mutually acceptable and mutually beneficial settlement schemes for contractual obligations. The solution, apparently, should be sought by creating credit and financial consortia based on combining public-private structures and combining the interests of the seller with the interests of Russian companies operating in the buyer country. It is important to establish good partnership relations between Russian and foreign financial and industrial groups with assets in African countries, as well as to expand the use of state credit and other support mechanisms for exporters of military products.

The use of the so-called offset system is becoming an increasingly effective way to stimulate the export of weapons and military equipment and solve the problems of mutual settlements. Rosoboronexport already has some experience in this area. However, in relations with African countries, this practice is used to a limited extent, and the opportunities available here are not fully used.

You can also go more boldly to the organization of joint ventures with African partners( JVs), which could produce individual parts and spare parts for weapons, assemble aircraft or individual components of weapons and military equipment. The system of military training based on Russian military schools and academies of army technical specialists of African states needs to be expanded somewhat.

The problem of working out mechanisms for accepting licenses for exploration and production of natural resources in African countries, as well as licenses for catching seafood, for providing services when Russian naval vessels call at ports, and for landing combat and military transport aircraft, is acute.

At the same time, in any case, a reasonable balance is important between the country's foreign policy and economic interests, as well as between the interests of the state and private business.

¹ SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database - http://www.sipri.org/datascs/armstransfers/background

² http://www.arms-expo.ru/news/avia-salony-vistavki/rosoboronek...

^{Fituni L. L.} 3 Africa: Resursnye voiny XXI veka. M., 2012. (Fituni L. L. 2012. Afrika: resursnye voiny XXI veka. M.) (in Russian)

^{Abramova I. O., Fituni L. L.} 4 Perspektivy razvitiya TEK Afrika i interesy Rossii [Prospects for the development of the Fuel and energy complex in Africa and the Interests of Russia]. 2014. N 11. С. 3-12. (Abramova I.O., Fituni L.L. 2014. Perspektivy razvitiya TEK Afriki i interesy Rossii // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 11) (in Russian)

^{Dyukov A.} 5 Return to the Tropical market: Russia's Military-technical Cooperation with the Black African countries - http://a-diukov;Livejournal.com/1266446. html

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database...

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ http://www.arms-expo.ru/news/avia-salony-vistavki/rosoboronek...

¹² See S. V. Mezentsev's article " Ethiopia: Stagnation or stability?" in this issue of the magazine.

¹³ International arms trade. 2012, No. 9. pp. 7-12.

¹⁴ SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database...

¹⁵ Military-industrial courier. No. 25, July 16-22, 2014.

¹⁶ SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database... (author's calculations).

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Author's calculations based on SIPRI data.

²⁰ SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database...

²¹ Ibidem.

²² Nezavisimaya Gazeta (hereinafter - NG). Military app. 9.11.2012.

²³ SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database...

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ IIP Digital / Departemen d'Etat des Etats Unis. Fiche d'information sur le soutien des Etats Unis au maintien de la paix en Afrique. Wash. 2014, 6 aout. P. I.

²⁷ http://www/ka-croix.com/Actualitйs/Monde/Afrique/Madamaposte...

²⁸ NG. Military supplement (based on the materials of CAMTO). 9.11.2012.

²⁹ According to SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database...

³⁰ http://www.la-croix.com/actualite/Monde/Afrique/Madamaposte...

³¹ NG. Military app...

^{Lahille E.} 32 Le retour de la Russie sur le marche des armements: un choix strategique. Revue "Recherches internationals". P. 2007. N 78. P. 25.

³³ Mir i politika [World and Politics], Moscow, January 11, 2013, p. 48.

^{Hartford M.} 34 De l'Afrique а l'Afrique: le traffic d'armes. P. 2010. P. 5.

^{Hartford M.} 35 Op. cit. P. 21.

³⁶ NG. Military application (CAMTO calculations)...

³⁷ Phyto Center. Military industry of the Arab Republic of Egypt - http://fito-center.ru/armija-i-konflikty/17715-voennaya-promyshlenn...

³⁸ Website of the President of Russia. April 25, 2014

³⁹ Assessment of CAMTO (NG. 9.11.2012).

⁴⁰ The word "offset" was first used many years ago in an agreement between the United States and Germany, under which Germany was obligated to purchase goods from the United States for an amount equal to 80% of the cost of the United States maintaining American troops in Germany. The first offset agreement was signed in 1973 between the United States and Australia: The United States pledged to purchase Australian goods worth up to 25% of the cost of American weapons and military equipment purchased by Australians. Gradually, offset transactions went beyond the limits of military-technical cooperation. author's note).

⁴¹ Military-industrial courier. N 8, 27.02.2013.

⁴² SIPRI. Report 2014 / Arms Transfers Database...

⁴³ Ibidem.

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