In the last third of the XIX century. The British Empire reached its apogee. British colonies were located on all five continents, and the British navy controlled the main sea and ocean communications, ensuring the security of the entire empire and its individual colonies. India was both the jewel and Achilles ' heel of the empire, a land of great wealth and a center of attraction for Britain's rivals. The main strength of the empire, the navy guaranteed the security of the coast of India, but could not protect its long northern border in the face of increased expansion of Russia in Central Asia, and France in Southeast Asia.

The task of securing the northern borders of British India was complicated by the fact that Afghanistan was located on its north-western "front", and Burma was located on the north-eastern one. These countries were politically unstable, had limited raw material resources, and their populations were less able to pay as buyers of British manufactured goods, so they were not valuable as objects of colonial expansion. The security of the Indian border could only be ensured by taking control of the surrounding territories. So the problem of the Indian frontier arose - a zone in which there was no stable state power and there were constant armed clashes between British troops and the local population. On the frontier, the British regular troops faced resistance from the unorganized population and were therefore forced to abandon wars according to European rules. Based on the experience of these colonial wars, the British military developed special tactics for military police operations.

Keywords: British Empire, Burma, Afghanistan, colony, frontier, tribes, military-police operation.

British expansion in South Asia after the annexation of Punjab in 1849 was aimed at seizing new sources of raw materials and markets, protecting previously annexed territories and controlling communications connecting British India with neighboring states. The expansion took place in remote areas of the highlands (north-west) or in tropical jungles (north-east), inhabited by peoples at the tribal stage of development or in territories that were not under the control of neighboring Asian states (Afghanistan and Burma, respectively). In such territories, the British colonial administration traditionally used indirect control methods, using a strategy of bribery to ensure the loyalty of local elites. British political agents acted as subjects of indirect tribal control (Kozlova, 1972; Temirkhanov, 1987; Bogomolov, 2010).

At the same time, in various parts of the Indian frontier, the British administration solved diametrically opposite tasks. On the Indo-Afghan border.

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The tasks of controlling the Khyber, Kurram and Bolan mountain passes were, firstly, to ensure the security of British administrative districts from the raids of Pashtun (Pathan) tribes, and secondly, to create a defense system against a hypothetical invasion of Russian troops from Central Asia. On the Indo-Burmese border, British administrators and military personnel were engaged not in defense, but in offensive tasks, trying to create reliable communications to reach the markets of the Chinese province of Yunnan and further into the Yangtze basin.

In the conditions of constant political instability, unstable trade relations, high crime rates, and regular armed clashes, the British could not delineate and demarcate the northern border of India as a "line" (border. - S. B.), and it naturally acquired the character of a "frontier" (frontier. - S. B.). A. Rieber created a theoretical model of the northern border of India. the construction of the frontier, using the classic work of F. J. Turner's "The Frontier in American History" (1920). He believed that "unlike linear borders, frontiers are transition zones in which interaction occurs between two or more different cultures or political structures" (Rieber, 2004, pp. 199-203, 214-215).

According to Turner, A. Rieber concludes, the border of the British colonies in North America is "an advancing line of settlements, whose inhabitants are mainly engaged in agriculture or are involved in a mixed economy, coexisting with the surrounding nomadic population and/or a population less technologically developed." Unlike the migrating colonies, India's northwestern frontier was "the only contact zone where the positions of British colonial expansion and semi-nomadic populations were roughly equal." The Indo-Afghan frontier is a classic military frontier, where sporadic military outbreaks occurred, trade and smuggling flourished, and uncontrolled population movements were carried out [Rieber, 2004, p.218].

The Imperial Frontier is not a geographically fixed line, but a zone of contact between different peoples and cultures, where it is impossible to separate peaceful relations and armed conflicts, trade and plunder, merchant and soldier. Imperial troops on the frontier faced not an organized enemy, but an armed population, always ready to defend their lives and property with weapons in their hands. Therefore, the British generals were forced to conduct not ordinary, but "police wars".

R. Svetlov defines "police wars" on the basis of the "opium wars" that Great Britain and its European allies waged against China in 1840-1842 and in 1856-1860 as "a type of military conflict where the goal, at least externally, is not the destruction or direct subjugation of any country (or part of it), a show of retribution to its leadership for the damage caused to the "model states" "[Svetlov, 2002, p. 358].

On the frontier of British India, such military-police operations were also not intended to destroy tribes or annex their territory. The British military sought to punish certain tribes for raiding British territory, killing British subjects, or looting trade caravans in order to prevent future hostile actions.

MILITARY REFORM IN INDIA

The transition from wars against Indian princedoms to wars against border tribes coincided with the military-technical revolution and required a radical reorganization of the Anglo-Indian army. After the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the British army emerged from the state of stagnation in which it had been since the Napoleonic Wars. The transition from smoothbore to rifled weapons, the mechanization of means of transport and communications required a change in the organizational structure, strategy and tactics of the royal troops. "Scientific armaments" replaced "medieval heraldry". W. Hannah considers

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Paradoxically, " the Victorian era was a time of peace for Britain, but its army was constantly in action." It should be clarified that the Victorian era was for Britain a time of active imperial expansion and the British army fought in the colonies, and above all on the imperial frontiers. It was the commanders of the colonial troops, J. R. R. Tolkien. Wolseley and F. Roberts did not make their careers in parades in the metropolis, but "in the serious and sometimes bloody business of imperial adventure... among the reed swamps of Burma and the desert hills of the frontier "[Hannah, p. 13-17].

If Wolseley fought his main wars in Africa, Roberts gained fame in the second Afghan War of 1878-1880, after which he received the official title of Count of Kandahar and the unofficial nickname "Bobs ' savior". It was these military leaders who became the "locomotives" of military reform, overcoming the resistance of the commander-in-chief of the British army, the Duke of Cambridge, until his resignation in 1895.

On July 8, 1885, F. Roberts was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India. At the first review of troops in Gurgaon, at a training ground 25 miles from Delhi, the general was dissatisfied with the poor physical and rifle training of Indian soldiers. Only in 1870 did the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Napier, begin to conduct field maneuvers of Anglo-Indian troops instead of parades, but the soldiers had difficulty mastering new tactics and weapons. Roberts immediately took extraordinary measures to improve their combat readiness: the Anglo-Indian army was divided into two corps - the northern, with headquarters in Umballa, and the southern, with headquarters in Gurgaon. The troops were withdrawn from their barracks to training camps in Umballa, Rawalpindi, Lucknow and Meerut. "Realistic combat training has dramatically raised tactical standards... from the level of picturesque anachronism to the standards of a modern formidable combat vehicle "[Hannah, p. 115-116].

In the course of military reform, Roberts took into account the lessons of the Sepoy rebellion of 1857-1859 and the Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-1880. He doubled the number of British troops and reduced the number of Indian (native) units by a third. Roberts was able to convince the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, of the need to demobilize regiments made up of " questionable material... the feminine peoples of the south... the Sepoy Hindus of Bengal, the Tamils and Telugu of Madras, and the so-called Marathas of Bombay." The creation of a pan-Indian network of railways and telegraph lines rendered unnecessary the "principle of equilibrium" - the maintenance in all parts of the uniform representation of Indian soldiers from different castes and ethnic groups.

Improved transport facilities made it easier to quell possible internal rebellions, but increased the risk of external invasions. Therefore, Roberts considered it necessary to form native troops from those nationalities who can be trusted and who are able to fight with European soldiers in the difficult natural and climatic conditions of the Indian frontier. He chose the representatives of north-west India: "I believe in them and admire the Gurkhas, Sikhs, Dogras, Rajputs, Jats and selected Muslims, I highly appreciate their soldier qualities and will be proud to lead them against any European enemy."

The condition for the combat capability of the Anglo-Indian troops was the skillful command of British officers. Roberts argued that " Indian soldiers, like soldiers of other nationalities, need to be led; history and experience teach us that the Eastern races (fortunately for us) are brave and accustomed to war, but do not possess the qualities of leadership in relation to other people, and [therefore] native officers will never be led." they will replace the British ones." During the reform, the situation of British officers was significantly improved: the period of service required to receive a pension was reduced, and the fee for service outside India was increased. Roberts gave officers more rights, but at the same time increased their duties. They were required to know the languages of the soldiers they commanded, while the natives were not required to speak English. In addition, British officers were required to know the areas where their soldiers were recruited in order to better understand the "native character" (Roberts, 1900, p. 533-534).

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In the course of the military reform, the regime of racial discrimination was not eliminated, which was especially noticeable to an outsider. Colonel of the Russian General Staff V. F. Novitsky, during his trip to India in 1898, noted that " the living conditions of the British and native troops in India differ in all respects. For the former, almost nothing is spared, for the latter, they do not always do what is necessary." This also influenced the behavior of the British: "English soldiers... they behave extremely badly on the streets and in public places... an English soldier, being unsympathetic and in a decent state of sobriety, becomes positively disgusting when drunk and unbridled. A mixture of haughtiness and disdain for everyone around them, and for the natives in particular, with the swagger and rude jokes of a drunk, make an extremely unpleasant impression on these well-fed, smug, rude Britons, who resemble drunker butchers than soldiers of a great power " [Novitsky, p. 76, 97-98].

UPPER BURMA: 1885-1889

The accelerated pace of military reform and Roberts ' extraordinary measures to improve the combat capability of the Anglo-Indian army were fully justified. Already in 1885, the situation in Upper Burma sharply worsened, where the troops of Lord Kandahar had to pass the first test.

On December 20, 1852, after a successful military campaign, Ch. Alain, secretary to the Governor-General of India, Dalhousie, signed a proclamation in Rangoon annexing the province of Pegu. This territory in the lower reaches of the Irrawaddy formed the province of British (Lower) Burma. The Konbaun dynasty moved from Rangoon to Mandalay, which became the capital of Upper Burma. On October 1, 1878, Minji (monarch) Mindon died, after which his sons ' bloody struggle for power began in Upper Burma. In February 1879, one of the princes, Thibault, executed in the palace about 70-80 competitors - his brothers, along with their wives and children. The British resident in Mandalay, R. B. Shaw, demanded an end to the executions, and then left the Burmese capital in protest. Together with him, Princes Nyaunyang and Nyaunyo were taken on a British steamer down the Irrawaddy to Calcutta. But that didn't stop the bloodshed. In September 1884, by order of Thibault, the remaining representatives of the dynasty who were a danger to him were executed [Kozlova, 1972, pp. 199-202].

But the destruction of his rivals could not make Thibault's power stable. In the economy of Upper Burma, crisis phenomena were growing, which were accompanied by increasing pressure from outside. British businessmen demanded that the Viceroy remove the Burmese state monopoly on foreign and domestic trade as the main barrier to the Chinese market. This was accompanied by an increase in anti-Burmese sentiment in Anglo-Indian society. An anonymous British author in the Fortnightly Review identified the entire Conbaun dynasty as ordinary "bandits" who, since coming to power in 1752, could not fulfill the duties of protecting the lives and property of their subjects. This "country is rich and fertile," but " banditry was the favorite pastime of his people."

During his travels in Upper Burma, the author has repeatedly observed a very strange division of responsibilities for a European in local village communities. "Among primitive races, women work when men fight. Among the Burmese, women work while men rob. The country has always been teeming with gangs of outlaws, brought together by skilled and enterprising local leaders, who in many cases are removed from the scene of their crimes." After completing an "adventurous career of bloodshed and murder", they returned to their native villages and began a respectable life as peaceful peasants. Every descendant of the reigning monarch considered himself a legitimate contender for the throne and sought to gain an armed foothold in such a criminal environment. "During the time of the native kings, there were always 1-2 applicants

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those who were in a state of open rebellion against the actual sovereign " [Conservative, 1887, p. 376-377, 380-381].

For the British, Upper Burma was a degraded eastern despotism, a land of political anarchy, mass executions, and widespread crime, which inevitably turned into an object of expansion and division between European powers. On June 25, 1885, the High Commissioner of British Burma, Charles Bernard, informed Viceroy Dufferin of Thibault's negotiations with the French Consul, Fr. Haas in Mandalay, during which an agreement was reached to establish a banking syndicate and grant concessions to French companies for the extraction of rubies and for the construction of the Mandalay-Taupe railway. On June 29, Dufferin relayed this information to the Prime Minister of Salisbury. On August 4, the Viceroy reported on the interception of a secret letter to Thibaut from French Prime Minister Ferry about the planned supply of weapons and ammunition through the French Port.

The immediate reason for the annexation of Upper Burma was the prohibition of the Bombay-Burma Trading Company to export teak forest from the Ninjan region on the border of Upper and Lower Burma in excess of the amount determined under the contract with the Khludo (Supreme Council) of Thibaw. On November 13, 1885, Lord Dufferin gave orders to Major General G. Prendergarst with a 10,000-strong corps to launch an offensive on Mandalay. On November 28, the Burmese capital was taken. Thibault abdicated and was exiled to India. On February 26, 1886, Upper Burma was annexed to British India as a province.

Regular Anglo-Indian troops easily defeated the Burmese army, but faced massive resistance from Burmese guerrillas, whom the British called Dacoits (bandits). Even under Thibault, the farmers of the lowlands of Upper Burma (the Ahmudans) fled to the forests from tax collectors, who in their methods differed little from robbers. After the end of hostilities and the collapse of the army in the autumn of 1885, Burmese soldiers left with weapons to their native villages, where they received comprehensive assistance from fellow villagers with food, transport and information about the movement of British troops. At the beginning of the movement, the popular resistance received quite qualified leaders in the person of the heads of the local administration (Myotuji). In Chausha, In the" rice granary " of Upper Burma, Thibault's 17-year-old brother, Prince Myintzain, managed to unite the princes of the Konbaung dynasty and organize political opposition to the British administration [Kozlova, 1972, pp. 220-231, 242].

British generals spent less than a month and less than 150 thousand pounds on the conquest of Burma, and more than four years and more than 1 million pounds on its "pacification". " Dispersed soldiers in the East are always a source of danger to society. They have to live on something, and they naturally turn to robbery as the only possible way to get a living. Princes of the royal blood, whom our humanity has delivered from captivity... they became leaders of scattered soldiers and Dacoit parties, led by members of the royal family, who more or less seriously asserted their claims to sovereign power, scattered through the jungle, attacking any village in which there was something to plunder" [Conservative, 1887, p. 378, 380].

The situation of the British was complicated by the fact that in June and February, during the rainy season, the flat part of Burma turned into a continuous swampy rice fields with completely impassable dirt roads. Therefore, during the rainy season of 1885-1886, counter-guerrilla operations of British troops, as a rule, ended in failure. In February 1886, after the end of the rains, most of the partisans returned to their native villages, and relatively small groups of" irreconcilables", 200-300 people each, took refuge in the inaccessible jungles of the Shan Highlands in the north-east of the Arakan and Chin Mountains, in the south-west of Upper Burma. These territories were virtually unknown to the British military, who had neither maps nor reliable guides.

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The situation was complicated by the constant conflicts of British soldiers with the population. The Russian traveler I. P. Minaev wrote in his diary: "... the Madras army is again being criticized. In general, the behavior of the English soldiers, drunkenness, and insolent treatment of the natives arouse great discontent... The authorities catch and shoot Dacoits several times a day, and the bodies of those executed are carried around the streets to frighten the population" [Minaev, 1955, p. 167]. Such acts of intimidation had the opposite effect and only increased resistance. On April 19, 1886, the partisans held their most high-profile action - under the pretext of celebrating the Buddhist New Year, they made their way to Mandalay, captured the royal palace, and retreated only under the onslaught of British troops and police [Kozlova, 1972, pp. 235-239].

According to the "Conservative" (anonymous war correspondent), the British commander-in-chief of troops in Burma, Lieutenant General G. McPherson, underestimated the complexity of establishing order in this country. Appointed local officials were more afraid of the partisans than the British, and were extremely unreliable. The number of military posts on the roads was insufficient, and the pursuit of small groups by military detachments in the jungle was extremely ineffective. The rigid discipline of martial law that had prevailed during the conquest was replaced as soon as possible by the soft institutions of regular civil administration, but their staff was too small and inadequate to do the enormous work that was required in the disorganized state of the country. The "deadly nature of the climate" required military operations to be conducted only during the "cold and healthy season" (Conservative, 1887, p. 378-379).

In September 1886, McPherson died of a fever and was replaced by F. McPherson. Roberts: On November 9, the new commander arrived in Rangoon. He told Charles Bernard that he clearly underestimated the difficulties and the need to strengthen the British troops. Roberts ordered the transfer of five regiments of paramilitary police from India, who have the skills to conduct military operations in the swampy jungle. In the autumn of 1887, the occupation corps in Burma was increased to 53,000 men, of which 48,000 were active in Upper Burma. The new troops were used for two tasks. First, it was necessary to place permanent military posts on roads, river crossings, and mountain passes in order to deprive the partisans of freedom of movement. Secondly, mobile columns were organized to pursue and destroy the partisans in the jungle. In 1886-1887, the number of military posts was increased from 99 to 141. The naval brigade, consisting of gunboats and boats, eliminated piracy and contraband trade on the Irrawaddy [Zhuravleva, 1967, p. 100].

Roberts adequately assessed the complexity of the situation. "The establishment of law and order in a country almost as large as France, where Dacoitanism is an honorable profession, does not look like an easy task even in Europe; but when a country has a deadly climate for several months of the year, for a large part covered with jungle without signs of roads, this task increases in gigantic proportions. In Upper Burma, garrisons were able to keep communications open only along the Irrawaddy, but further complicating the situation, unrest is spreading in Lower Burma and in an unknown area between Upper Burma and Assam" [Roberts, 1900, p. 508-516].

On November 20, 1886, Roberts gave the column commanders instructions on how to deal with the partisans. Before moving troops into the jungle, it is necessary to organize warehouses with food and pack transport. At the same time, Roberts demanded the use of horses for cavalry and mountain ponies for infantry, because of their lack only in emergency circumstances, during accelerated marches in pursuit of Burmese detachments. The column commanders were responsible for choosing places to put the soldiers to rest. Therefore, the columns had to leave the swampy places where the soldiers were easily infected with malaria as soon as possible. During parking in any place to avoid diseases

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the soldiers were not to be placed on the ground, but on special bamboo platforms under awnings.

For fast and accurate movement in the jungle, the command provided officers with accurate maps of the area and guides. The commanders were supposed to lead military columns, observing complete secrecy, providing constant reconnaissance with the help of an" effective guide service " and maintaining interaction with neighbors.

Roberts considered it impossible to eliminate "Dacoitism" by purely military means, without creating an effective civil administration. Under the Local Government Act of 1887, village wardens (tudeks) were appointed to assist British political agents, and in exchange for tax relief, they ensured that law and order was maintained, forcing the former administration out of local government. In dealing with the population, Roberts suggested alternating methods of"carrot and stick". Peasants were fined for harboring and supplying "bandits" with food, and executed for storing unregistered weapons. Relatives of partisans were arrested and expelled from their native villages, but ordinary resistance members were promised amnesty for their voluntary surrender. The commander demanded that British officers "develop friendly relations with the residents" and win their trust. Naturally, the soldiers were strictly forbidden to rob peaceful Burmese and insult their religious feelings. Only if these conditions were met did Roberts consider it possible to disarm the peasants and stop their aid to the partisans.

The general demanded to distinguish between political leaders, professional criminals and peaceful peasants who were forcibly forced to join a "gang"among the prisoners. To this end, the military detachments should include civilian officials who imposed differentiated punishments. In the absence of civilian representatives, the military had the right to punish only minor offenses with up to two years ' imprisonment or corporal punishment of up to 30 lashes.

At the same time, Roberts demanded that armed resistance be resolutely suppressed. When detecting "gangs", the troops should not just push them back from their positions, but surround them and fight in order to cause maximum losses to the enemy. The cavalry was assigned the task of bypassing the "bandits" from the flanks and blocking possible escape routes. Roberts warned that "in the nature of warfare in which we are now engaged, where nocturnal surprises and ambushes are terrible enemy tactics, the greatest concern should be given to the safety of the camp at night." If the column was ambushed, he recommended that the main forces guard the baggage train and the wounded, and that two mobile detachments bypass the ambush from the flanks. However, he made a reservation that all the past experience of the British "wars with Guerilla" indicates the need for constant changes in tactics depending on circumstances [Roberts, 1900, p. 572-575; Kozlova, 1972, p.248-251].

At the beginning of the resistance, the partisans received all-round help from the Buddhist clergy: monasteries became places for storing weapons, food, recreation and secret meetings. Roberts demanded to establish cooperation with the monastic community. "The lack of fanaticism among Burmese people and their cheerful happy natures made it easier for us to get along with them... Due to the fact that education, both secular and religious, is inherent in these monks, and every man from a king to a simple peasant was required to enter a monastery and wear a saffron monk's robe at a certain period, the clergy had a huge influence among the Burmese. There are no hereditary chiefs or nobles in Burma, and the monks are the advisors of the people and the center around which the native society revolves." On the recommendation of Roberts, the new High Commissioner Ch. Crosthwaite began paying a monthly stipend to the heads of the Buddhist Sangha in Mandalay. In January 1887, he ordered the withdrawal of troops from the monasteries, the repair of damaged premises, and compensation for the damage caused to the monks.

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In the spring of 1889, an organized guerrilla movement in Upper Burma was suppressed. The political leaders of the Dacoits were killed or captured. Amnestied and disarmed members of the resistance returned to their villages, and the economic and political situation in Burma was stabilized [Conservative, 1887, p. 382-383; Roberts 1900, p. 518; Kozlova, 1972, p. 235].

"BAND OF TRIBES": 1897-1898.

Unlike north-eastern India, its north-western part bordered not with the state, but with mountain potestar societies. After the second Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-1880, the "band of tribes" was under the nominal control of Emir Abdurrahman Khan, who could not, and did not want to prevent the constant looting of trade caravans and Pashtun raids on the territory of administrative districts of British India.

In December 1888, Lord Lansdowne, a consistent proponent of the forward policy, became the new Viceroy. Under his pressure, Abdurrahman Khan agreed to accept Sir M. Durand's mission in Kabul. On October 5, 1893, negotiations began, and on November 12, a treaty was signed establishing the "Durand Line" - the first border between Afghanistan and British India, which divided the territory of the Pashtun tribes. If after the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-1842, the British annexed the Baloch lands on which the Bolan Mountain Pass was located, now the other two communications that connected India and Afghanistan were under British control. The Kurram Pass passed through the territory of the Wazirs, and the Khyber Pass passed through the lands of the Afridi. So the foundation of the future conflict was laid. Already on November 2, 1894, the religious leader of the Wazirs, Mullah Paivand, demanded that British troops withdraw from Waziristan and stop demarcating the Indo-Afghan border. The British refusal led to the Wazir revolt, which was suppressed by the troops of the commander of the Punjab Army, General W. Lockhart [Temirkhanov, 1987, pp. 79-84].

The" forward policy " of the Viceroy of Lansdowne (1888-1894) and Lord Elgin I (1894-1899), who succeeded him, led to a constant increase in anti-British sentiment among the Pashtun tribes. The apogee of this "forward policy" was the establishment of a British protectorate in the Principality of Chitral in April 1895. Francis Younghusband, a captain of the 1st Guards Regiment and Royal Dragoons, and also an officer of the intelligence department of the Anglo-Indian Army, arrived in the principality as a political agent [Novitsky, 1901, p. 166; Hopkirk, 2004, 524-578].

The Chitral River valley was the north-eastern border of the tribal band, separating it from Badakhshan (Pamir). In 1895, a road was built from Peshawar to Chitral, which the leaders of the Yousafzai tribes who inhabited the Swat Valley undertook to protect, providing the British garrisons at the posts of Malakand and Chakdara with food and fodder. The British monetary subsidy and payment for the supply of troops went into the pockets of Aslam Khan, Inayatullah Khan, Sharif Khan and Sarboland Khan, while the withdrawal of extremely scarce fertile land in the mountains undermined the well-being of all Pashtuns. The strengthening of British power led to an increase in trade operations and increased exploitation of mountaineers through unequal exchanges with Indian merchants from administrative districts.

Mullah Saadullah Khan, the religious leader of the Swat and Buner Yusufzais, expressed the resulting social tension. He established contacts with other Pashtun leaders-Mullah Paywand of the Wazirs, Najm ud-din of the Momands, and Akhunzada Aga Khan Tirahi of the Afridi. The military and spiritual leader of the Pashtuns was Najm ud-din, who was born in the village of Hadda and was therefore often referred to as Hadda Mullah. As early as 1895, he led the Momand militia and participated in battles with Anglo-Indian troops defending Chitral [Temirkhanov, 1987, pp. 96-97, 106-108; Churchill, 2004, pp. 18, 56].

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Sir L. Griffin, the secretary of the Punjab Administration and part-time president of the Border Militia Committee, noted that without a declaration of jihad, the tribes are divided and "their mutual suspicion destroys all possibilities for joint action." L. Griffin was a personal friend of Akhunzada Swat Abdul Ghafoor, "a fine old gentleman", and was convinced that mullahs "in quiet times are very interesting and pleasant people", whose duties are reduced to making marriages and dividing property between heirs. "But when questions of war and especially jihad arise... when the vital principles of Islam are attacked, the mullahs initiate riots, religious zeal, and even religious madness" (Grriffin, 1897, p. 504-506).

The Muslim clergy overcame the main weakness of the tribes - their fragmentation, ensuring interconnection and coordination of actions. Murids (students of religious leaders) under the guise of dervishes and wandering fakirs, they carried out communication between tribes, propagandized jihad in mosques and hujras (guest houses). The slogans of restoring social justice were easily transformed into slogans of jihad: "Those who fall will become saints, those who survive will gain wealth. Looting, coupled with the bliss of heaven, was too much of a temptation... Any Ghazi who falls in battle will sit above the Kaaba at the very foot of the throne, and in this exalted position, all his sufferings will be compensated by the contemplation of the heavenly beauties in double measure. Hadda Mullah made even more specific promises. For those who rush at the enemy, the barrels of the enemy guns will be plugged. Bullets will not harm them, because they will be invulnerable" [Churchill, 2004, p. 56, 94].

The Highlanders began to prepare purposefully for the uprising and therefore sought to get modern weapons: Martini rifles, Enfield rifles, Lee Metford rifles, Snyders rifles and Winchester carbines. Weapons and ammunition reached the Pashtuns in the following ways. First, it was the most valuable trophy during armed clashes with British troops, which the Highlanders categorically did not want to return when concluding peace agreements, while the British generals just as categorically demanded to return. Secondly, Indian traders (British subjects) legally purchased weapons and ammunition in Muscat and other ports of the Persian Gulf, and then smuggled them through Iran and Afghanistan. At the same time, the price of the rifle increased from 50 to 600 rupees. Third, the Pashtuns stole them or exchanged them for alcohol from soldiers at military posts. Fourth, they exported weapons from India that were decommissioned in arsenals. Old rifles were branded by the British government and cut into three pieces, but in the mountains they were rebuilt by Pashtun blacksmiths, although they were often more dangerous to the shooter than to the enemy. Finally, Pashtuns often deserted the British Army with their own and / or stolen rifles. Martini rifles were supplied to the Anglo-Indian troops at the state price of three pounds, and when delivered to the tribal band, they already cost 30 pounds (500 rupees). To prevent this, the British Punjab Army command charged all native soldiers two rupees a month as compensation for stolen weapons, and 500 rupees were withheld from those responsible for stealing or losing a rifle [Churchill, 2004, pp. 47-49; Temirkhanov, 1987, p. 111; Younghusband, 1898, p. 253].

On June 10, the Wazirs attacked a British political agent with an escort of 300 soldiers in Upper Tochi. An Indian official, Honda Rama, was killed in an armed clash. The British agent demanded a fine of two thousand rupees, in response to which Paivand and Najm ud-din called for a general uprising of the Pashtuns. On the night of July 27, 1897, the highlanders laid siege to the British fortified posts in the Malakand Basin. The rebels were joined by 2,000 Yousafzais from the Peshawar Valley, who were armed with Enfield rifles received from the British administration to repel mountain raids [Temirkhanov, 1987, pp. 112-113].

Only on August 2, the approaching regular troops were able to unblock the forts of Malakand and Chakdara. In Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar, about 100 thousand Anglo-Indian troops were concentrated. Roberts, who retired from the post of commander at this time,

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He led the preparations for the "great frontier War" as an unofficial adviser at the headquarters in Simla. Comprehensive measures were taken to block the area of the uprising: trade was stopped and the perlustration of merchants ' mail correspondence was started. The British stopped paying subsidies to the Khans and Maliks of the tribes, and began confiscating the property of Pashtuns who found themselves on British territory. All suspected links to Abdurrahman Khan, who secretly supported the Pashtuns, were expelled from Bombay, Karachi and Shikarpur. From the Anglo-Indian troops that participated in the suppression of the uprising, all Pashtun soldiers were expelled [Temirkhanov, 1987, pp. 122-125].

The punitive expedition against the Yusufzais was led by General Bird, against the Momands by General Ellis, and against the Afridi by General Lockhart. General Lockhart, who had extensive experience in the colonial wars in Bhutan, Ethiopia and Burma, noted the high skill of the highlanders in conducting a guerrilla "small war": "Our opponents were very clever shooters, skilled in conducting a small war; avoiding meeting troops in the open field, the enemy did not miss the opportunity to attack our troops by surprise. on the march or in a bivouac" (cit. by: [Grulev, 1909, p. 176]).

W. S. Churchill, who as an officer of the 4th Hussars took a direct part in the battles with the Yousafzai, considered absolutely ridiculous the demands of deputies of the British House of Commons for the military to show humanity in punitive expeditions. The only possible tactic for dealing with tribal militias, which in the mountains are almost elusive for regular troops, "who can not be caught and can not be punished", was the "scorched earth" tactic combined with the use of modern artillery and machine guns. Civilian politicians demanded an end to the" barbaric and senseless " tactics of destroying all villages and limiting themselves to destroying only rebel homes that had fortified towers. But the combat officer understood that the soldiers who took the mountain village in a bayonet attack, lost many comrades and expected a mountain counterattack every minute, never understood where the house of a participant in the uprising was and where it was a peaceful inhabitant. Churchill wrote in his memoirs:: "All along the Afghan border, every house is a fortress. Villages are fortifications, and fortifications are villages. Every house has embrasures, and whether it has a tower or not depends only on the wealth of the owner."

The specifics of the" mountain war "were determined by the fact that it was impossible to distinguish between the" regular army "and the"peaceful law-abiding population" in the tribes. Punitive actions of the British troops could not cause the departure of civilians "to the enemy", because all the highlanders were originally "enemies". "Every inhabitant of these places becomes and remains a soldier from the moment when he is able to throw a stone? and as long as he's able to pull the trigger." The threat of destroying villages was the only way to stop the nighttime bombardments and attacks on the camps of British troops. "Their villages are being held hostage by their good behavior. They know this very well when they attack a convoy or a camp... Of course, this is cruelty and barbarism, like many other things in war, but it would be extremely illogical to consider the destruction of human lives legal and the destruction of property illegal" [Churchill, 2004, p. 99].

The destruction of villages, crops, food supplies and fodder created a threat of famine in the winter of 1897/1898. On September 7, 1897, the Yousafzai of the Swat Valley agreed to peace talks. Agreements between British generals and tribal jirgas were extremely difficult and did not guarantee a stable peace. W. Churchill, who witnessed such negotiations, noted that a deputation of Pashtuns "does not necessarily represent a tribe. Often it may represent a minority. Sometimes it expresses the opinion of only the members of the deputation themselves. What seems to have been solved one day is often revised the next. The jirga can accept the terms of peace in the morning, and at night the camp will be attacked." Therefore, the only guarantee of peace was the complete disarmament of the tribes. After the Yousafzai refused to return 15 captured rifles, the British troops continued fighting, and only on October 8 did the Highlanders agree to give up the weapons. Churchill observed that " complete disarmament of the border tribes... it would be all-

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ma is desirable. But its implementation would be as painful as extracting stings from wasps with your bare hands" (Churchill, 2004: 60, 112).

On October 26, 1898, a peace agreement was concluded with the Afridians, which put an end to the "great border war". British troops restored the status quo to the "tribal belt": the blockade was lifted, trade was restored,and subsidies were resumed. It should be noted that the peace agreements did not lead to an end to attacks by Highlanders on British posts and patrols.

Political agent in Chitral F. Younghusband considered the main outcome of the tribal uprising of 1897-1898 to be the need to continue the "forward policy", as a transition "from the prevailing inactivity to widespread activity". The Highlanders are " peaceful neighbors and good friends outwardly, but in reality they turn into hostile, bloodthirsty and greedy barbarians." The British frontier security policy was implemented in three main forms. First, it is the deployment of garrisons in strategic "points of advantage". Secondly, it is a "policy of raids", i.e. military expeditions. Third, there is the "rupee policy", i.e. the payment of subsidies to the tribes. Separately, all these methods were ineffective. Military posts were unable to control and, if necessary, block the movements of nomadic tribes. The raids were equally fruitless in the long run. Subsidies provided peace for a short time, but could not reduce the militant "zeal" of the highlanders as a whole. They spent the money they received not on tools of peaceful labor, but on rifles and ammunition, as a result of which "they became not only no more friendly, but in each new case more dangerous" [Younghusband, 1898, p. 251, 253].

Control over the border tribes can only be achieved through the integrated application of military, political and economic control methods. A British political agent advocated extremely harsh punitive measures against the tribes that participated in the uprising. He believes that "in the history of the world since ancient times, the first factor in pacifying troubled areas is the complete disarmament of the inhabitants." The initial cost of disarming the tribes will be quite large, but it will pay off in the future, as it will " eliminate the source of incessant anxiety and the causes of eternal expenses." In general, these costs will still be less than financing the maintenance of an army sufficient to resist the tribes.

Under the threat of ending British subsidies, it is necessary to get the Afghan emir to stop smuggling weapons. As a last resort against particularly dangerous tribes, their forced relocation may be applied. "In cases of particularly stubborn resistance by a tribe or part of it, the means of sovereign power can be applied, which consists in systematic forced emigration from the mountains to the open country within our borders." So, after the uprising, the Kheli (clans) of the Yusufzai were resettled from the southern part of the Swat Valley to the flat part of the Peshawar district. As a result, a generational shift will teach migrants to peaceful productive work and "lead to the loss of military skills and murderous instincts "[Younghusband, 1898, p. 252-255].

* * *

The British Army conducted a series of successful military-police operations to secure the northern frontier of India in the last third of the 19th century. Both in Upper Burma and in the Pashtun tribal belt, British generals had to fight not with regular troops, but with an armed population that avoided open battles and used guerrilla tactics of "small war". This required the development of a special counter-guerrilla strategy, which included a number of rules.

First, the British command sought to isolate the area of counter-guerrilla operations in order to prevent the influx of modern weapons and ammunition from outside.

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This involved foreign policy support for military-police operations: diplomatic pressure on France in 1885-1889 and on Afghanistan in 1897-1898.

Secondly, the British sought to combine the most stringent measures of armed suppression of partisans with a soft attitude towards the civilian population. The military command sought to work together with civilian officials. This included a policy of subsidizing local loyal elites, creating a free trade regime, and shipping British manufactured goods. British political agents consistently pursued a policy of indirect governance and did not interfere in the internal affairs of local communities.

Third, the British sought to establish cooperation with the local clergy. In British colonial politics, the principle of religious tolerance was constantly emphasized. This policy was successful in Buddhist Burma, but almost failed among Muslim Pashtuns.

Fourth, the mandatory conditions for concluding peace agreements were the punishment of those responsible for the murder and looting of British subjects. Criminals were executed or exiled to remote parts of the British Empire, where they were isolated among populations belonging to a different religion or culture.

Fifth, British troops were stationed in close proximity to potential hotbeds of new unrest and took control of communications. The threat of use of force provided necessary guarantees for compliance with peace agreements with tribes that lacked a stable centralized authority. The population, regardless of the degree of participation in the armed resistance, was disarmed.

In conclusion, it should be noted that both military and civilian officials of the British administration denied the effectiveness of a formalized dogmatic approach to solving issues of colonial service in the East. They argued for the need for flexibility in the use of various means based on a comprehensive study of the situation. Only in this way were the British "empire builders" able to successfully conquer, preserve, and then leave their colonial possessions with minimal damage.

list of literature

Bogomolov S. A. Strategicheskie osnovy politiki Britanskoi Indii na severo-zapadnom frontire (poslednaya tret ' XIX V.) [Strategic foundations of British Indian Policy on the North-Western Frontier (the last third of the XIX century)]. 2010. N 4.

Grulev M. V. Ocherk vosstaniy pogranichnykh plemen za poslednih 10 let [Essay on the uprisings of border tribes in the last 10 years]. SPb., 1909.

Zhuravleva L. N. The guerrilla war of the Burmese people against English enslavement. 1855-1896. Saratov: Publishing House of the Saratov State University, 1967.

Kozlova M. G. English Conquest of Burma, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1972.

Minaev I. P. Travel diaries to India and Burma. 1880 and 1885-1886. Moscow: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1955.

Novitsky V. F. Voennye ocherki Indii [Military Essays of India]. St. Petersburg, 1901.

Rieber A. Izmenyushchie kontseptsii i konstruktsii frontira: sravnitel'no-istoricheskiy podkhod [Changing concepts and constructions of the Frontier: a comparative historical approach]. Collection of articles (Library of the journal "Ab Imperio") / Edited by I. V. Gerasimov, S. V. Glebov, A. P. Kailunovsky, M. B. Mogilner, A.M. Semenov. Kazan: Center for Studies of Nationalism and Empire, 2004.

S. Svetlov "Police wars" / / A.M. Butakov, A. E. Tizenhausen. Opium wars: An overview of the wars of Europeans against China in 1840-1842, 1856-1858, 1859 and 1860. Moscow: OOO "AST Publishing House", 2002.

Temirkhanov L. Vostochnye pashtuny [Eastern Pashtuns]. (Osnovnye problemy novoi istorii), Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1987.

Churchill U. S. History of the Malakand active army. Episode of the border war / / Churchill U. S. India, Sudan, South Africa. Campaigns of the British Army. 1897-1900. Moscow: Eksmo Publishing House, 2004.

Hopkirk P. The Big Game against Russia: The Asian Syndrome. Moscow: RIPOL CLASSIC, 2004.

[Conservative]. Our Tasks in Burma // The Fortnightly Review. March 1887.

Griffin L. The Breakdown of the "Forward " Policy // The Nineteenth Century. June 1897.

Hannah W.H. Bobs. Kipling's General. The life of Field-Marshal Earl Roberts of Kandagar, VC. L.: Archon books, 1972.

Roberts. Forty-one Years in India. From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief. L.: Macmillan and Co, Ltd, 1900.

Younghusband F. The Permanent Pacification of the Indian Frontier // The Nineteenth Century. February 1898.

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