Moscow: Publishing House "International Relations". 1970. 328 pp. The print run is 6000 copies. Price 1 rub. 36 kopecks.
The history of relations between the largest capitalist country, the United States, and Soviet Russia in 1917-1920 has always attracted the attention of researchers. The problems explored in the monograph of Candidate of Historical Sciences L. A. Gvishiani are partially addressed both in general works and in many special works of Soviet historians on the participation of the United States in the anti-Soviet intervention. The appearance of a significant number of works is natural, because we are talking about studying an actual problem. The trends in American politics that emerged at that time are extremely indicative of Washington's attitude to revolutionary changes in other countries up to the present day. At the same time, during the period discussed in the monograph, the foundations of Lenin's foreign policy of our country were laid. Until now, Soviet historiography has not had a special generalizing study of US-Soviet relations in 1917-1920. The work of L. A. Gvishiani fills the gap. The author used materials from the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (WUA) and the main funds of the Archive of Foreign Policy of Russia, as well as research by Soviet and foreign historians.
Along with the problems of the Soviet state's foreign policy towards the United States immediately after the victory of the October Revolution and before the end of the anti-Soviet intervention, the book examines the formation and implementation of the aggressive, anti-Soviet course of American imperialism. L. A. Gvishiani refutes the claim of bourgeois scientists about the existence of a "threat" from the Bolsheviks from the very beginning. The myth about it was not based on facts, but was created, as shown in the monograph, "by the American government representing the interests of the big bourgeoisie" (p.314). Considerations of the struggle against the new social system pushed Washington to participate in anti-Soviet intervention, and then determined for many years its policy of" non-recognition " of the Soviet system that emerged as a result of the victory of the Great October Revolution. It was an attempt to turn back the wheel of history. This policy of Washington seriously complicated the development of Soviet-American relations. Meanwhile, there was a different path that the capitalist world, including the United States, and the Soviet government called upon to take.
The paper describes in detail the measures taken by the Soviet Government immediately after the victory of the October Revolution to establish normal relations with all countries, including the United States. Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-political systems, which is one of the main principles of the foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state, has found a vivid expression in this. The Soviet Government, while advocating an early conclusion of peace and an end to the imperialist war, saw the establishment of economic ties with the United States as one of the most effective ways for the successful development of the entire complex of Soviet-American relations. A detailed analysis of the policy of the Soviet government allowed the author to conclude that attempts "to establish contact through Robins (the head of the American Red Cross mission, which was in Soviet Russia until April 1918) with the Wilson government, as well as other steps in this direction... they didn't give me any software-
page 162
This was not the fault of Soviet Russia" (p.71).
Rejecting proposals aimed at concluding a general democratic peace, the Entente powers and the United States embarked on the path of armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Soviet country. The author rightly notes that the position of the United States in the anti-Soviet intervention differed from that of the Entente powers in form, but not in substance. The US government did not consider it possible to openly declare the hostile attitude of workers and peasants towards the state, fearing discontent within their own country (p.28). Comparing official documents of Washington with unofficial documents of the State Department gave the author the opportunity to reveal the true intentions of the American ruling circles. "The US position on the issue of intervention in Russia," points out L. A. Gvishiani, "was largely due to imperialist contradictions ... as well as the US commitment to the 'open door' policy, which they would willingly apply to Russia." Not wanting to strengthen Japan in the Far East, the United States, as the Deputy Secretary of State B. Long, considered it "impractical to agree to Japan's demand to place the Trans-Siberian Railway under its exclusive control or to agree to its occupation of part of the territory of Siberia" (pp. 50-51).
Much attention is paid in the book to the question of the relations that developed within the bloc of the Entente powers and the United States on the eve of the intervention in Russia. The author identifies two main factors that determined the decision of the countries of this bloc to launch a joint armed intervention: the desire to put an end to the first socialist state, as well as the constant fear of some powers to strengthen the positions of others by seizing certain regions of Soviet Russia (p.75). At the same time, the book emphasizes that the imperialists were united in their hatred of Soviet Russia. L. A. Gvishiani focuses on the differences between the Entente powers and the United States, which V. I. Lenin pointed out as a practical task of Soviet diplomacy.
The chapters devoted to the preparation of imperialist circles for intervention against Soviet Russia, their assistance to internal counter-revolution, and the attempt to use the Czechoslovak corps for this purpose are written with the help of previously unknown archival materials, including the letter of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin to the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Germany, Joffe, dated June 11, 1918 (pp. 101-102). L. A. Gvishiani contrasts the imperialist policy of the Entente and the United States with the peaceful activity of the Soviet state. Even when armed intervention became a fact, the Soviet Government did not stop its efforts to establish normal diplomatic relations with these countries. In response to the departure of diplomatic representatives of the Entente and the United States from Vologda to Arkhangelsk (instead of Moscow, as the Soviet government suggested), G. V. Chicherin sent a message to M. M. Litvinov, then the Soviet representative in London, the text of which is given for the first time in the book. "We officially declare," it said, " that this departure is of a personal nature... and there is no diplomatic rupture, especially since diplomatic relations continue to be conducted through diplomatic agents or consuls located in Moscow. We do not in any way want a diplomatic break with the Entente, despite the Murmansk invasion (of the Anglo-French troops - O. S. ) and the support of the counter-revolutionary rebels" (p. 123).
The monograph addresses a very important question about the position of the United States on the question of the dismemberment of Soviet Russia. In our literature, there are various points of view on this issue. Until the early 60s, it was believed that throughout the entire anti-Soviet intervention, the United States stood for the dismemberment of Russia. But N. N. Yakovlev in 1961 noted that the United States, unlike most of the Entente powers, which sought to dismember Russia, and France, which stood for the revival of tsarist Russia, which could be its ally, " stood for a united and strong Russian bourgeois republic... In defending the integrity of Russia, the United States intended to preserve it as a counterweight to its imperialist competitors and prevent them from strengthening themselves at the expense of its resources. " 1 A. V. Berezkin, considering that the United States "supported
1 N. N. Yakovlev. Modern history of the USA. 1917-1960. Moscow, 1961. p. 52.
page 163
the principle of the indivisibility and territorial inviolability of the former Russian Empire", however, did not agree with N. N. Yakovlev's opinion that the United States stood for "a united and strong Russian bourgeois republic" 2. L. A. Gvishiani, recognizing the opinion of the American historian J. R. R. Tolkien as justified. According to J. Thomson, "Wilson's position and, consequently, the American position, was to preserve the integrity of Russia", at the same time believes that " the United States took this position not because it planned it in advance (although it did not exclude this), but were led to it by the logic of the struggle of Soviet Russia, the collapse of the Soviet Union." interventionist plans" (p. 164). Thus, L. A. Gvishiani, while generally sharing the opinion that the United States did not seek to dismember Russia, very appropriately drew attention to the evolution of American policy. This book takes a step forward in understanding this highly complex issue.
The sections on the mission of State Department official and attache of the American peace commission Bullitt to Moscow, as well as the mission of the first official representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in the United States, L. K. Martens, give a clear idea of the efforts of Soviet diplomacy and personally V. I. Lenin aimed at achieving lasting peace with the countries participating in including the United States. Regarding the issue of concluding a peace treaty between the United States and Soviet Russia, the author notes that " prominent American figures... we decided to reduce the issue of making peace to the issue of organizing economic assistance to Russia and thereby neutralize the created disadvantage for American diplomacy." They saw the plan to provide food aid to Russia, according to Bullitt, "as an easier way to achieve peace with Russia... instead of going straight ahead and inviting these people (i.e., the Bolsheviks - O. S.) to a conference" (on the Princes ' Islands-O. S.) (pp. 228-229).
L. A. Gvishiani's monograph, based mainly on archival documents published for the first time, is an interesting study of Soviet - American relations.
The author reveals the multifaceted activities of the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin, who, in the difficult situation of civil war and armed intervention, steadily sought to create prerequisites for the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The main conclusions of the author are beyond doubt. I would like, however, to see in the book a more detailed analysis of some of the events covered in the final sections of the monograph, primarily the position and actions of Washington during the Polish-Soviet war of 1920. In addition, the book only sketchily traces the attitude of the United States to the situation in the Soviet Far East after the withdrawal of American interventionist troops in April 1920. Ultimately, the negotiations between the Soviet government and the head of the American syndicate, Vanderlip, about a concession in Soviet Russia hardly exhaust this topic, even within the chronological framework of the monograph defined by the author.
2 A. V. Berezkin. October Revolution and the USA, 1917-1922. Moscow, 1967, p. 258.
page 164
New publications: |
Popular with readers: |
News from other countries: |
![]() |
Editorial Contacts |
About · News · For Advertisers |
![]() 2014-2025, LIBMONSTER.COM is a part of Libmonster, international library network (open map) Keeping the heritage of the United States of America |