The article analyzes the role of migration processes in Russian-Afghan relations in the first two decades of the 20th century. It describes the Jamshids as an ethnic group of northern Afghanistan, one of the four main Aimag tribes that fled from Afghanistan to Russian Turkestan in 1908. The arrival of the Jamshids and their settlement in the Transcaspian region of Turkestan created serious tension in Russian-Afghan relations. The article tells about the difficult fate of the Jamshids, which they had not only in Afghanistan, but also in Russia.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Russia, Great Britain, migration, Jamshids, Afghans, Turkestan, governor.

Russia's border with Afghanistan has always been affected by migration processes. The natural borders of the Amu Darya and Panj were not an obstacle to the movement of people in many areas, and the customs offices and border guard posts established by the Russian authorities on the border with Afghanistan in the 1890s, which politically divided the peoples living here, could not break their economic and economic ties. Cross-border migration often took the form of social or ethnic protest. The mass exodus of Afghan Jamshid nomads from Afghanistan to Russian territory in 1908-1909 was a factor that sharply worsened Russian-Afghan relations on the eve and during the First World War.

On June 30, 1908, more than 2.5 thousand people moved from Afghanistan to the territory of the Central Asian possessions of Russia, to the Transcaspian region (now Turkmenistan). Jamshid families (12-15 thousand people) [English aggression in Afghanistan, 1951, p. 239] 2 and applied for their admission to Russian citizenship. Here is how the Afghan historian M. G. M. Gubar describes the background of this plot:

"The flourishing lands of the Jamshids of Herat, which had long been covetously looked upon by large and influential feudal lords, as a result of a treacherous deal, passed into their hands. It so happened that the Herat feudal lords of the durbar, known as "Char Kolah" ("Four Caps"), with the help of the governor of Herat, Muhammad Sarwar Khan, who was called Baba-i Karam ("Noble Baba"), accused the courageous Jamshids of anti-government protests. Having obtained the consent of the Emir Habibullah Khan to suppress this action, they suddenly surrounded them from three sides at night. Innocent people left their homes and fled towards the Russian border, which was deliberately not covered by government troops. The lands of those who fled were distributed among the local nobility" (Gubar, 1987, p. 30).

The Russian orientalist A. A. Semenov, based on a manuscript of the early 20th century known as the "Historical Sketch of the Dzhemshids", describes this event

1. Jamshids, Jamshids (self-named-Jamshidi) - an Iranian-speaking people inhabiting the north-west of Afghanistan and the north-east of the Iranian province of Khorasan. They speak mainly Dari and are part of the Charaimak ethnic group, although they distinguish themselves from the aimags. They practice Sunni Islam. For more information, see: [Peoples and Religions of the world, 1999, pp. 160-161].

2 In the published literature, the figure of 1,605 caravans with a total population of over 9 thousand people is called [Russia and Afghanistan, 1989, p. 166], which, judging by the studied archival documents, should be considered underestimated. L. Adamek, in my opinion, will give a more accurate number-15 thousand people [Adamcc, 1967, p. 80]. In the translation of the autobiographical note of one of the Jamshid leaders who made the transition to Russian territory, it is also called 15 thousand people with 3 thousand caravans [AVPRI, F. Central Asian table "B", op. 486, d. 228, l. 5].

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as a grandiose picture of mass migration: on this day, "the entire valley of the Gor-ab River, in the vicinity of the Kushka fortress, was filled with Jamshids continuously approaching with their flocks and property" [Semenov, 1923, p.161].

The Russian border authorities, according to A. A. Semenov, were warned earlier by the Jamshid khans who had fled from Afghanistan about the impending tribal movement. As early as May 18, 1908, two sons and two nephews of the former Jamshid khan, executed under Emir Abdurrahman Khan, Yalangtusha, arrived in the Russian border settlement of Chemeni-Bit, in the Transcaspian region, who, after raising an uprising in Badkhyz3, began to seek refuge on Russian territory, informing about the possible movement of tribes to the Russian border. But such a large scale of resettlement was unexpected for the Russian authorities of Turkestan, who were not ready to accept a large number of people. In addition, the movement of the Jamshids to the Russian border was an impetus for uprisings in northwestern Afghanistan: in the Kalai-Nau district, Hazaras rose up against the Kabul authorities, in the mountainous regions - Firuzkuh and the remaining Jamshid clans in Afghanistan, waiting for news from the Russian side [Semenov, 1923, p.161].

Earlier, due to the ruinous extortion and harassment of the Afghan authorities, border tribes repeatedly sought to cross the Russian border, but this was the first time such a large movement occurred at the beginning of the XX century. According to the central and Turkestan press of that time, the last major movements of the tribes to the Russian border were in 1891-1892. due to the expected repression by the Kabul authorities, who suspected the Khazarian and Jamshid khans of supporting the enemy of Emir Abdurrahman Khan, his cousin and pretender to the Kabul throne - Ayub Khan. Then, in 1891, these tribes also moved to the Russian border in the Transcaspian region, fueled by their khans and fearing for their lives and property. Although the Transcaspian authorities headed by General A. N. Kuropatkin, in accordance with the instructions of St. Petersburg, were ready to prevent the Jamshids and Hazaras from entering Russian territory, this order did not have to be executed, since the Afghans themselves blocked the exit to the border. However, in some places, especially in 1892, it ended in great clashes between the Afghans and the tribes [Turkestansky sbornik, p. 4]. 154-156; (A. S.-Kommersant), 1908, pp. 688-697]. In 1908, the Afghan border authorities seemed to deliberately let a large number of people cross the border.

On July 2, 1908, Turkestan Governor-General Pavel Ivanovich Mishchenko (1908-1909) sent an encrypted telegram to St. Petersburg informing the military authorities about the crossing of nomads across the border and asking for urgent instructions for his administration. The Turkestan authorities understood that the placement of a large number of people in the region was undesirable, "in view of the difficulty of settling the alien Russian population and the lack of land of the local native population," and therefore considered it "expedient to expel the Jamshids back." Their position was reinforced by reports from the commandant of the Kushka fortress, I. S. Merkushev, that another twenty thousand people were expected to be resettled after this flood. The Governor-General reported to St. Petersburg that he had already ordered mounted detachments to be posted at the border, preventing the passage of Afghan nomads across the border [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692, l. 1-2ob]. At the same time, Mishchenko considered it necessary to prevent a repeat of the events of 1892, when people were subjected to "bloody reprisals by the Afghans" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d.3692, l. 2b].

Foreign Minister A. P. Izvolsky, having reported to Nicholas II about the events on the Afghan border, asked to agree to negotiations with London on the WHO issue-

3 Badkhyzskos highlands, the foothills of Paropamiz, extending into southern Turkmenistan, the main place of residence of Jamshids within Afghanistan. The southern border of Badkhiz is the Kuhi Baba range, which lies to the north of Herat. The history of this people shows that the Jamshids left the area many times for various reasons and then returned here again.

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rotation of the Jamshids back to Afghanistan [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692, l. 5-5ob]. Reports of the transfer of Afghan nomads to Russian territory caused concern in St. Petersburg, as this event could complicate relations with Afghanistan at a time when the Afghan emir was expected to recognize the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, according to which the emirate was considered a sphere of British influence. In accordance with the agreement, Russia could interact with the Afghans on all issues that do not affect interstate relations. However, the agreement concerning Afghanistan was based, at the request of the British, on the Emir's consent to this convention. But from the beginning of the autumn of 1907, when it became known about the agreement of the powers, the emir was silent, and the structure created by the British to once again emphasize their leading role in this area hung. In this light, the "Jamshid issue" for the Russian authorities arose untimely due to the desire to consolidate rapprochement with the United Kingdom. I was also alarmed by the reaction of the Afghans, who seemed to be deliberately trying to escalate the situation, when they allowed thousands of people to cross the border without hindering their passage.

However, unlike the Turkestan administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also saw the problem as a positive factor that would finally allow relations with the Afghan government to move forward, while demonstrating London's commitment to the terms of the concluded convention. In St. Petersburg, they stressed that due to the importance of the events, they are ready to discuss with the Afghans the issues of ensuring the security of Jamshids upon their return to their homeland only through the mediation of the British government. Izvolsky stated that the situation on the border due to the Jamshids ' crossing requires adhering to the signed agreement "already now" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692, l. 5-5ob.]. Thus, the need for an urgent resolution of the "Jamshid issue" became a formal reason for the Russian side to agree to the terms of the signed convention, regardless of whether the Afghan emir agrees to it or not. The British favourably supported this move.

However, the entire negotiation structure required the central and Turkestan authorities to show tolerance towards refugees and not hinder their movement. Having received the tsar's permission to conduct negotiations with the Afghan Emir through the London office, Izvolsky sent the corresponding instructions to the Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, Count A. K. Benckendorff [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692, l 7-7ob.], and an urgent telegram to Tashkent, asking Mishchenko, "in order to avoid further contact with the Afghan Emir." if there are any complications on the border that could make it difficult to negotiate, make a dependent order that the detachments posted on his orders on the border, but if possible, do not resort to weapons when preventing new parties of Jamshids from crossing into our borders" [ibid., l. 5-6]. In St. Petersburg, they did not want to take any harsh measures against the Jamshids without the support and approval of London.

Documents indicate that in the first months some of the displaced persons left Russian territory and voluntarily returned to Afghanistan [English Aggression in Afghanistan, 1951, p. 242-243]. However, attempts by the Turkestan authorities to encourage the remaining Jamshids to voluntarily return to Afghanistan were unsuccessful. The commandant of the Kushka fortress, Major-General I. S. Merkushev, received a telegram about the negotiations with the Afghan Emir beginning in London, and informed the refugees about this in order to " prepare them for the idea of returning back to Afghanistan." However, he had to regret this, because in response, people" with tears in their eyes " began to beg "for a petition to the sovereign emperor to leave them in Russia and not return them back to Afghanistan", describing all the difficulties that would inevitably fall to their lot in this case [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692, l. 28-28ob.].

History knows many examples when the Afghans (Pashtuns) carried out a very tough policy against peoples who did not belong to their ethnic group.

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A coded telegram from the Turkestan Governor-General to the Minister of War A. F. Rediger dated August 12, 1908, testified that the Turkestan authorities, when they came into close contact with the refugees, reacted with deep understanding to the desperate situation of thousands of people. "When deciding on the future fate of the Jamshids, Governor-General Mishchenko wrote in it," it is impossible to allow their return to Afghanistan without fully ensuring their personal and property security, otherwise we will sin against humanity and undermine the prestige of the Russian name " [ibid., l. 33ob.]. At the same time, contacts of representatives of the London cabinet with the emir They did not lead to a satisfactory result, since he, although he agreed to the return of the Jamshids to their homeland, did not give any guarantees that they would not be subjected to persecution by the authorities [RGIA, f. 565, op. 1, d. 3472, l. 5b.]. Moreover, the Russian Turkestan authorities were asked to return to their homeland. there is information, which, however, the British did not confirm, that a group of Jamshids who returned voluntarily to Afghanistan was harassed by the Afghan authorities [English Aggression in Afghanistan, 1951, p.242-243].

The issue of the Jamshids became not only delayed in time, but also overgrown with a number of problems, the solution of which was urgently required from the Russian government. For example, the Turkestan authorities, who could not safely expel the Jamshids from Russia, faced the question of providing food for thousands of people who, according to the military ministry, had their own food supplies only until the end of July. In Tashkent, it was considered that more than 1 thousand rubles would be required to provide for the displaced persons. per day [RGVIA, f. 1, on. 1, d. 71849, l. 1-1ob.]. On July 25, 1908, the tsar signed a list for a vacation of 15 thousand rubles. to provide Jamshids with food for two weeks [RGIA, f. 565, on. 1, d. 3472, l. 3]. At the same time, a significant role was played by Izvolsky's message that the Russian Foreign Ministry would raise the issue of compensation for the Jamshids ' food expenses incurred at the expense of the Afghan government [ibid., l. 4], which, of course, was not fulfilled due to the Emir's non-acceptance of the convention on Afghanistan.

As soon as Kushka learned about the allocation of government funds, a commission was sent to the area where the nomads were located, consisting of the chief of the Merv district, Colonel von Faler, the Pendinsky bailiff, Captain Ezerzh, the staff officer under the chief of the Transcaspian region, Captain Peresvet-Soltan, the head of the police unit in Kushka, staff Captain Levkovich, and the chief officer for assignments at the headquarters fortresses of staff-captain Nikolaev. On August 8-9, this commission worked in the area where the Jamshids were located and got acquainted with the number, property, sanitary condition and actual needs of the displaced persons. Direct inspection gave the following picture: the Jamshid nomads stretched over a huge territory from the 8th verst from the Kushkin fortress and reached the 40th verst along the course of the Kushka River. Taking into account the fact that some of the Jamshids voluntarily returned to Afghanistan in the first months, the number of remaining tents was 1,800. Calculations with an average family size of 6-7 people give the total number of remaining Jamshids on Russian territory - 12 thousand, which, as was recorded in the commission's conclusion, is "close to reality".

By mid-August 1908, the Jamshids were still living off their own funds. Members of the commission compiled lists of people in urgent need of assistance. The total number of this category of Jamshids was determined at 1300 people. At the same time, although many migrants continued to live more or less by selling their livestock and buying food from local residents, theft and raids on local peasant farms began among them, which caused numerous statements and complaints from residents of the Alekseyevsky village to the head of the Kushka police station.

On August 10, a meeting was held in Kushka under the chairmanship of I. S. Merkushev, whose decisions were based on the conclusions and conclusions of the visiting delegation.

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to the place of the commission. The meeting outlined measures to provide assistance to Jamshids from the Government-provided fund. It was decided not to help with money, but to distribute allowances with green tea, flour, grain and adobe to those in need: flour - a pound per person per month, tea-up to 1 pound per month for a family, adobe-up to 10 pounds for each animal. All work on the organization of procurement and distribution of food was entrusted to Captain Peresvet-Soltan, who was granted "the rights of the chief of the district" in relation to the Jamshids [English aggression in Afghanistan, 1951, pp. 238-241]. Consideration was given to providing the refugees with new pastures in view of the possible depletion of local pastures to feed their flocks of sheep and camels. To this end, "the chief of the Merv district and the Pendi bailiff were instructed to immediately find out what pasture areas could be provided to the Jamshids without much damage to the local population" [English Aggression in Afghanistan, 1951, p. 241-242].

The flight of the Jamshid khans and the subsequent transfer of thousands of tribesmen to the territory of Russia caused sharp discontent of the Kabul authorities. This event was another drop in the deterioration of relations between Russia and Afghanistan after the 1907 agreement that was not recognized by the Afghans. While the Turkestan authorities had their hands tied for active actions on the border by negotiations between St. Petersburg and London, the Kabul authorities acted decisively: a significant number of regular and irregular troops were sent to the border areas with Russia. Soon it became known that the Afghans were seizing land and property belonging to the Jamshids, and were taking measures to prevent other tribes from entering Russian territory [Masson and Romodin, 1965, p. 334].

This reaction of the Afghans and the aggravation of the situation on the border were justified. The Jamshids ' move to Russia was accompanied by their secret hopes that they would be accepted into Russian citizenship along with their lands. As early as May 1908, the Jamshid beks explicitly stated this hope to Staff Captain Nikolayev, an officer for assignments at the headquarters of the Kush fortress, saying that they only asked the Russians to help them with weapons and ammunition, and that they themselves would clear the entire territory of the Afghans up to Herat. In fact, the Jamshid leaders hoped to draw the Russians into this quarrel with the Afghans, who, in their opinion, "will have to intervene and defend the Jamshids as their own subjects" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692, l. 25-25 ob.].

However, neither Tashkent nor St. Petersburg had any intention of supporting the plans of the Jamshid khans. At the same time, the concentration of Afghan troops on the northern border and the determination of their actions worried the Russian government in view of the possible armed conflict. Izvolsky reported to the tsar about the state of affairs on the border, having been instructed to " take all measures to prevent such a clash." Such an order was sent to Tashkent to the Governor-General Mishchenko. Petersburg recommended that the Turkestan administration settle the Jamshid khans in Samarkand and "encourage ordinary Jamshids to immediately migrate deep into the Transcaspian region at a sufficient distance from the border" [AVPRI, F. Central Asian table "B", d. 232, l. 382]. The Russian authorities were concerned that the situation on the border could force them to take active retaliatory actions and thereby not only finally quarrel with Afghanistan, but also deserve accusations from the British of violating the Anglo-Russian agreement.

Attempts by the Turkestan authorities to settle the Jamshids on the territory of Khiva were unsuccessful.4 Therefore, on August 19, 1908, the Jamshids at the request of Turkestan-

4 In 1908, the Turkestan authorities asked the Khan of Khiva to settle the Jamshids on the territory of Khiva. Ssyid Asfsndiar refused, saying that he had a grudge against the Jamshids, since up to 12 thousand Jamshid families had already lived in the khanate since 1844, but in 1858 they moved back to Afghanistan. For more information on the settlement of the Jamshids and their history on the territory of the Khiva Khanate, see [Rashidov, 1977, pp. 14-16].

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The Russian authorities began to relocate to the depths of the Transcaspian region, to the area of Saryazy and Imam Baba, to the area of the Chemeni-Bid station, between Kushka and Merv [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3692, l. 36]. At the same time, a part of the Jamshids (called the number from 100 to 500 tents [ibid.]) decided to return to their homeland, which the Turkestan authorities did not prevent. As a result, after all the changes, a still significant mass of people, about 7,500 people, remained on the territory of the Transcaspian region, having received free land plots for occupation near Chemeni-Bid. All this time, the Russian authorities continued to spend monthly financial resources on providing for the Jamshids and their khans [ibid., l. 38-38ob.]. Nevertheless, apparently considering that the difficult issue was peacefully resolved with the eviction of the Jamshids from the border, Nicholas II in October 1908 in an interview with the British Ambassador to Russia A. Nicholson He expressed particular satisfaction that "the Jamshid incident did not cause any difficulties between the two Governments" [British Documents, 1929, p. 577].

However, the removal of the Jamshids from the border did not relieve tension between the border authorities of the Transcaspian region and the Herat province of Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities continued to be sensitive to the presence of thousands of Jamshids on Russian territory, apparently worried that they would become a role model for other non-Pashtun tribes and a tool in Russian politics. On the one hand, according to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg A. Nicholson, the Emir treated the first groups of those who returned to Afghanistan "tolerantly", and they were not repressed, on the other hand, the Emir forbade the Jamshid khans to return to Afghanistan, instructing his agents in Turkestan and Bukhara to secretly monitor their lives and activities in Samarkand where the Russian authorities placed them. The authentic firman of Habibullah Khan, found in 1910 during searches at the home of an Afghan merchant agent in Bukhara, required the agent to constantly inform "how the Jamshid Khans really behave" [TsGA RU, f. 1, op. 31, d.737, l. 28].

One of the Jamshid khans, Sayyid Ahmad beg, who in the summer of 1908 brought a significant part of the tribe to Russian territory, refused to move to Samarkand and remained in the Transcaspian region, migrating with the rest of the Jamshids to Sary-yazy. He managed to form a detachment of 200 people, poorly armed but brave Dzhigits, who in 1908-1909 made a series of raids on Afghan territory, causing fear in Afghan villages. Knowing the area perfectly, enjoying the support of the local non-Pashtun population, and always having the opportunity to hide behind the Russian border, Sayyid Ahmad-bek's detachment did not lose a single person during all this time. According to the intelligence data of the Turkestan Military District headquarters for September 1908, the situation not only in the border villages of Afghanistan, but also in Herat corresponded to wartime, the population of which was frightened not so much by the danger emanating from the raids of Sayyid Ahmad beg, but by the fanned rumors and fears that the Jamshids were trying to clear their lands of Afghans, to attach them to the Russian Empire. The intelligence data of the Turkestan military district conveyed the following picture of the life of this Afghan center at that time: "money, jewelry and other more valuable things were buried in the ground, life in the bazaars froze, shops barely traded for two taps a day, and in all the Herat bazaars it was impossible to find goods for a thousand fogs" [RGVIA, f. 1396, op. 2, d. 2075, l. 57ob. -58].

The Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire contains a translation from the autobiographical note of Seyid Ahmad-bek, in which he unequivocally states that he raided the Afghan side "not without permission", but with the permission of the Russian border authorities of Kushka and Askhabad [AVPRI, F. Central Asian table "B", op. 486, d. 228, L. 6ob. -7]. If this was the case, then neither St. Petersburg nor Tashkent wanted a deterioration of relations with Kabul and complications on the Russian-Afghan border, and after learning about Ahmad Beg's actions in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, Russian Foreign Minister A. P. Izvolsky in an appeal to the head of the Transcaspian region asked:

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if these data are confirmed, give instructions to our border guards "to refrain from such actions in the future, as they can only create very undesirable complications" at the border [ibid., l. 10ob.].

The Afghans were forced to take measures to strengthen border protection. By December 1909, their units in the Meruchak-Kush area were 1 paltan infantry 5 and 3 turpa rissale6, which were assigned five guns. In addition, militia units were drawn to the border [RGVIA, f. 1396, op. 2, d. 2103, l. 2]. The combined forces of all government detachments were commanded by Korneil (paltan commander) Abdulrauf Khan, whose punitive detachments fought against the partisan groups of Seyid Akhmadbek in the areas of Bala Murghab, Kalaya Hay and Kushka, while simultaneously trying to capture their leader [Nazarov, 1976, p. 156].

The Russian border authorities reported to their superiors that the activity of Afghans seeking revenge on the Jamshids for the raids could at any time lead to the invasion of their units into Russia and possible clashes with border guards, which would inevitably affect bilateral relations. Afghan troops have already begun to cross the border, engaging in a firefight. The first clashes occurred on August 3, 1908 in the Shor Arab Valley, in the Transcaspian region, when an Afghan cavalry patrol crossed the border. A similar case was repeated on November 30, 1909. 400, op. 3, d. 3188, l. 4], when a small group of Afghans (up to 6 people), crossing the border, fired at one of the heliographic stations near Kushka. The detachment that arrived from Kushka did not find the attackers. On the same day, a scout reported that about 20 Afghans were shelling a road in the Shor Safed valley, and that one Russian scout was wounded, two were killed, and three Afghans were wounded. However, when the head of the outpost came to the rescue with 16 soldiers, it was not possible to find the Afghans, the corpses were taken away. Attempts from Kushka to contact the Afghan border authorities in Charvilayet (Afghan Turkestan), in particular Zarinkhan, did not yield much results: they received evasive answers and promises to investigate. Teams of mounted Russian scouts sent from the fortress of Kushka were forced to move several times during November 1909 to places of possible Afghan action along the border line to Chingurek: from the Kara-Chep spring, to the Shor-Arab valley, then to the Islim-Cheshme spring, located on the direct route from Afghanistan. Commandant of Kushka, Major General Merkushev, in a report to the Commander of the Turkestan Military district dated December 13, 1909. he wrote that if the Jamshids are not removed to the depths of the region, even further from the border, then "a major clash between them and the Afghans on our territory is inevitable and hardly preventable" [CGA RU, f. 2, op. 2, d.410, l. 9-10].

In October 1909, the Transcaspian authorities learned that an uprising of non-Afghan tribes was being prepared in northern Afghanistan and that the Jamshids living on Russian territory were going to take an active part in it. The signal for this should have been the arrival of Sardar Ismail Khan or his son from Samarkand to the area of residence of the Jamshid Khan's tribe on Russian territory and the return of Sayyid Ahmad Beg's detachment from another raid in Afghanistan. At the request of St. Petersburg, the authorities established strict supervision over the Jamshid khans, not allowing them to leave Samarkand, and ordered the commandant of the Kushka fortress and the head of the Transcaspian region to prevent the Jamshids from crossing to Afghanistan [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 3, d. 3299, l. 116-116]. It was decided to arrest Seyid Ahmad-bek and forcibly, under escort, send to Samarkand [ibid., l. 120]. Only after these measures were taken did the situation on the border stabilize by the end of 1909.

5 Paltan-infantry battalion (600 men).

6 Rissale-cavalry regiment (400 people); turp-hundred, rissale division (three turp - 300 people).

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It is characteristic that in the following years, especially during the First World War, when the previously hidden and masked moral and political principles of the new military era became clear, the Jamshid khans, and in particular Sayyid Ahmad Beg, were actively in demand for Russian intelligence purposes in Persia and Afghanistan, as well as on the territory of the Anglo-Indian possessions [ibid., f. 1396, op. 2, d. 1894, l. 8]. Forced to live at the expense of a Russian boarding school in Samarkand, he himself felt a new political mood, deciding to remind himself in order to be useful to the Russian authorities. His note (the document does not have an exact date-it could have been 1913 or even 1914) was sent to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs [AVPRI, F. Central Asian table "B", op. 486, d. 228, l.10ob.]. In it, Ssyid Ahmad beg wrote:: "I know all Afghans and am well acquainted with their country from (the word is not clear. ) Zulfagar to Meimene and Andhoy. Here I commit myself to fulfill every assignment. If there is an order from the state, with God's help, I will gather and easily penetrate through any place. God willing, no one will be able to stop me, or by cunning or sword I will take what I need." "If only we were given weapons from the treasury, there will be no delay for me, I have no shortage of brave men. With God's help, I take on the responsibilities of working in Afghanistan "[ibid., p. 8]. It is known that this fruitful "cooperation" with Sayyid Ahmad-bek was actively continued in the first years of Soviet power.

The arrangement of thousands of Jamshids by the Russian authorities in the Transcaspian region and at the same time the provocative actions of some Jamshid khans on the border territory of Afghanistan, who, under the protection of the Russian authorities, carried out harsh terrorist actions in the north of their former homeland, urgently required joint actions with the Afghan authorities to restore order, which was possible only if "correct diplomatic relations"were established. The Turkestan authorities did not want to put up with their absence in the conditions when the signed Anglo-Russian agreement assumed them. In the Most comprehensive annual report to the tsar for 1909, which, in addition to the Turkestan governor-General, was allowed to the head of the Transcaspian region, it was proposed to pacify the situation in the border areas of both countries immediately "create a border commissariat similar to the one already existing in Persia" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 3902, l. 4ob.]. However, the central Russian government under the leadership of Foreign Ministry Izvolsky was stubbornly determined to implement all these measures only after the official recognition of the Anglo-Russian convention by the emir, once again showing itself to be a reliable ally of Great Britain, firmly adhering to the articles of the signed agreement. This position was justified a little later, during the World War.

The arrangement of thousands of Jamshids by the Russian authorities on their own lands affected other ethnic and ethnic minorities of Afghanistan, who were dissatisfied with the power of the Afghans and sought to emigrate to Russian territory, hoping to receive here not only protection, but also quite a tolerable level of material security at that time. Although general circulars demanded that refugees should not be allowed on Russian territory, the Russian border administration, especially in areas remote from Tashkent, had no real power to prevent these processes or often could not go to the forcible eviction of people on moral principles.

A situation similar to the Jamshid situation developed in 1909 in the area of Kulyab and Saray, when a large group of Afghan Tajiks, more than 1,570 families, moved to Bukhara territory from Afghan Badakhshan [AVPRI, F. Central Asian table "B", d. 1626, l. 84]. The head of the Pamir detachment, Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Mukhanov, who was entrusted with administrative functions for managing the region that formally belonged to Bukhara, was forced to provide material support to these people from state funds, fearing that such assistance and its size might create a "temptation" for other tribes of the north-east of Afghanistan to "follow their example." The head of the detachment could not forcibly evict people back "without first obtaining reliable guarantees from the Afghan government that the refugees would not be subjected to any persecution there upon their return to their homeland" [English Aggression in Afghanistan, 1951, p.244].

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The border authorities, when the opportunities and conditions allowed for this, tried to keep the tribes out of the border. So, in September 1910, when 1500 families of Khazars 7 [TsGA RU, f. 2, op. 2, d. 409-s, l. 51ob.] (according to other sources, 3 thousand people, which, apparently, quite corresponds to the number of families) [Russia and Afghanistan, 1989, p. 166] approached the border in the Kerk region in order to cross it without hindrance, the Turkestan authorities did not allow them to enter the Transcaspian region [AVPRI, F. Central Asian Table, op. 485, d. 684, l. 4ob.]. At the same time, the Russian government was forced to urgently ask the British to provide assistance. influence on the Afghan Emir to take measures to stop border crossings and ease the fate of returning refugees [ibid., l. 8]. The Russian authorities did the same in 1911 with regard to the attempts of the Mishmez tribe, which was related to the Jamshids, to migrate to Russian territory [ibid., p. 16].

These actions of the Turkestan authorities fell during the period of leadership of the region by Governor-General A. V. Samsonov (1909-1914). Some archival documents show that during his time the Turkestan authorities took measures to evict the Jamshids to Afghanistan, although, apparently, they did not have time to do this because of the outbreak of World War II. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the migration policy in Turkestan under Samsonov was openly anti-Semitic and was directed against all foreign Jews, including Bukharian Ones.

According to a long-standing imperial decree of June 5, 1900, severe restrictions were imposed on those Jews who could not prove that they or their ancestors had lived on the territory of Turkestan before its annexation to the Russian Empire. In this case, they were subject to eviction from its borders or, also with certain restrictions, could settle in specially permitted border reservation cities-Osh, Kattakurgan or Petro-Alexandrovsk. Later Samarkand, Kokand and Margilan were added to this list. This policy was a concession to the pressure of the emir authorities of Bukhara, where a significant part of the Jews lived, whom they actively subjected to violent Islamization. The implementation of the royal decree threatened Jews fleeing the emirate with forcible eviction from Turkestan back to Bukhara, where they would have to face various punishments, including the death penalty. That is why, until 1910, the Russian authorities of Turkestan postponed the implementation of this decree. Governor-General A.V. Vrevsky (1889-1898) at one time even offered to give Jewish immigrants from Bukhara the right to reside in the region. However, in 1910 under Governor-General Samsonov, the decree came into force [Nosonovsky; Becker, 1968, p.164-167]. Although there were mass demonstrations of Jews in Turkestan, nothing helped: Samsonov was determined to firmly comply with the long-standing royal decree.

In 1910, the Governor-General ordered the expulsion of all foreign Jews from Turkestan, including the Jedids, 8 Islamic Jews from Mashhad who, after the mass Jewish pogroms in Persia, moved to the Merv and Tejen counties of the Transcaspian region of Turkestan [Nosonovsky]. Perhaps out of ignorance, but rather intentionally, using the proximity of names, the Jamshids were somehow linked by Samsonov with the Jedids. Apparently, this was intended as an excuse to satisfy the hopes of Kabul and solve the long-standing Jamshid problem. It is known that the Turkestan authorities, from the moment the Jamshids moved to Russian territory, were determined to evict them back to Afghanistan, but before the tsar's decree came into force, they put up with their presence. Now, using, apparently, not only the factor

7 The Khazars, or Khazars, are a people of Mongolian origin who speak one of the dialects of the Tajik language [Peoples of Near Asia, 1957, p. 107].

8 Not to be confused with the Jadids-progressives, supporters of renewal and modernization, who were formed in the same years in tsarist Russia among the Muslim (mainly Turkic) peoples of the Russian Empire. For more information about the Jadids, see [Glushchsnko, 2010].

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similar-sounding names of the tribes, but also the existing misconceptions that the Jamshids are Muslim Jews, 9 they should have been subject to the royal decree.

The attempt to evict the Jamshids to Afghanistan in 1910-1911 is reported by the "Summary of Information about neighboring countries obtained by Intelligence" for the period from October 1, 1910 to January 1, 1911, which was usually submitted to the headquarters of the Turkestan military district once every 2-3 months:

"The Jemshids, natives of Afghanistan, who were being evicted from Merv and other cities of the Transcaspian region, appealed in December 1910 to the naib-ul-hukum (governor) of Herat, Shahgasi Muhammad-Server Khan, with a request for intercession and petitioning the Russian authorities to give them a six-month period to liquidate their cases, but Muhammad- Server Khan refused to do so" [Summary of information..., 1910, p. 25].

It follows from the text that some part of the Jamshids were preparing to be evicted from their already settled places in Merv and other cities of the Transcaspian region, and obviously not by their own will and not to the depths of Russian territory, namely to Afghanistan, otherwise why should they have applied to the Herat governor? However, it is not clear from the text whether the eviction was carried out and how many people were affected by it.

The consequences of this process are indirectly evidenced by the reports of the Turkestan press of those years. From them, you can learn that the Jamshids, by their actions on the border, not only created tension in Russian-Afghan relations, but also took revenge on the Russians for something. So, in October 1913, three Russian soldiers were killed on the border, not far from the Berdy Klych border post. The attackers caught the soldiers by surprise and delivered brutal blows. It is characteristic that the killers did not take any weapons (two rifles and a saber), nor money, even horses were abandoned at the scene of the murder. According to the Turkestan Vedomosti newspaper (dated October 30, 1913), the attackers were from a border Afghan village inhabited by Jamshids. "According to the circumstances of the murder and due to the alienation of the robbery,"the newspaper wrote," it is assumed that the murder was committed on the basis of revenge." Turkestanskiye Vedomosti reported that only in 1913, on the border of the Transcaspian region with Persia and Afghanistan, "seven lower ranks of the border guard were killed" [Turkestanskiye Vedomosti, No. 241, October 30, 1913]. In my opinion, the murder of the Cossacks could have been caused by the revenge of the Russian Turkestan authorities for the forced eviction of part of the Jamshids to Afghanistan, where they were subjected to long-term repression. The expulsion of the Jamshids from Turkestan, which began in 1910-1911, was apparently interrupted by the World War and the departure of General Samsonov to the front in 1914. Documentary materials confirm that most of the tribes who migrated to the Russian territory in 1908 continued to live in the Chemeni-Bid region during the First World War [AVPRI, F. Central Asian table "B", op. 486, d.228, l. 15].

Naturally, this policy of the tsarist authorities did not affect the Jamshid khans, who lived comfortably all this time in Samarkand on benefits allocated annually by the Russian government from the 10-million fund, which until 1917 was subscribed by the tsar for "emergency and unforeseen expenses" [RGIA, f. 565, op. 1, d. 3472, l. 3; for 1910: ibid., op. 14, d. 121, l. 71, 80ob.; for 1911: ibid., d. 123, l. 112, 120, 123; for 1914 and subsequent years: ibid., op. 15, d. 1080, l. 2, 142; d. 1081, l. 2ob; for 1916 and 1917: d. 1082, l. 3, 243ob]. Moreover, in the same year, 1910, the Russian government, through the British, obtained the consent of the Afghan emir. in Russia, the families of Jamshid Khans [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1,

9 The concept of Jamshids as Muslim Jews persists today. This is exactly how M. Nosonovsky (Boston), who writes a lot about Muslim Jews in general and Jedids in particular, will present them. In his opinion, the Jamshids then, in 1910-1911, shared the fate of the Jedids, i.e. they were evicted from Turkestan [Nosonovsky].

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D. 3692, L. 61], which, of course, again required an increase in allocations for their maintenance.

But in 1910-1911 there was a moment that could change the attitude of the Russian authorities towards the Jamshid khans. Then, in the first half of December 1910, while the Turkestan and Bukhara authorities were conducting investigations into the intelligence and pan-Islamic activities of the Afghan trade agent in Bukhara, M. Gauss Khan, documents were discovered that unexpectedly showed a close connection between the Herat authorities and the Jamshid Khans settled on the territory of Samarkand through M. Gauss Khan [Summary of information..., 1911, p. 8]. In my opinion, this fact could be the reason why the Turkestan authorities under Samsonov, who began at that time the mass eviction of Bukharian Jews from Turkestan, could also link the Jamshids to this anti-Semitic action. Unfortunately, intelligence reports during this period did not allow us to draw a conclusion about the significance and danger of these contacts between the Afghans and the Jamshid Khans. In any case, when the policy of evicting Jews and Jamshids who fell "under the arm" of the Jamshids began, none of the Jamshid khans who lived in Samarkand suffered or were evicted.

The Afghan authorities paid special attention to the life of the Jamshids on Russian territory and repeatedly tried to persuade them to return to Afghanistan. Apparently, in this position, it was not the fact of the return of specific people that was important, but the solution of the problem of eliminating the causes of constant border anxiety for the authorities. The Emir began to think that if he did not influence the tribal leaders and left them under Russian influence, it would be impossible to achieve a positive result in relation to the entire people. By the beginning of 1912, he tried to change the established practice and allowed the Jamshid beks and Khans living in Samarkand to return to Afghanistan. The commander of the Herat district, Jarnail (General) Abdurahim Khan, wrote a letter with the permission of the Emir, which was delivered to Samarkand. On the envelope was written: "Let the contents of this letter be known to the venerable, influential persons and elders of the fugitives of the Jamshid family." In it, with notes of moralizing, the main thing was stated: "It would be best if you returned to your homeland in peace," Jarnail wrote, promising on behalf of the emir that the former enmity would be forgotten, that they would meet "sympathy" everywhere, and their "affairs would be settled according to the law" [CGA RU, f. 1, op. 31, d. 729, l. 153ob.]. However, this did not lead to the expected result.

Later, in August 1916, Afghan mullahs came to the territory of the Transcaspian region to once again invite the remaining Jamshids and their khans to return to Afghanistan. However, the Jamshid leaders again reacted negatively to the invitation, stating, according to the official for border relations under the head of the Transcaspian region S. V. Zhukovsky, that "they live well in Russia, and no one oppresses them here" [AVPRI, F. Central Asian table "B", op. 486, d. 228, l. 17A significant part of the Jamshids led by the khans, not trusting the promises of the emir, remained in the Transcaspian region of Turkestan.

This distrust of the promises of the Afghan authorities was justified. During the First World War, when the border was under close attention of the parties and it was difficult to cross it again in large groups, the Afghans began to act more freely and aggressively against the tribes, especially trying to punish those who went abroad in 1908 and then were expelled from Turkestan in accordance with the royal decree that came into effect.. This led to a new protest action by the Jamshids in the autumn of 1916. [Nazarov, 1976, p. 180], as a punishment for which the Afghan authorities in 1919 expelled 5-7 thousand Jamshid families from Badkhiz, the area of their indigenous residence, to Kunduz. The resettlement processes, which were carried out by the Afghans harshly and forcibly, led to the fact that a significant part of those resettled died. Later, when the authorities allowed the remaining Jamshids, who had not yet adapted to life in Kunduz, to return to Badkhiz, there was often nowhere to return - many lands were lost.

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occupied by new settlers [Peoples of the Near East, 1957, p. 26]. These trials of 1916-1919 are perceived as revenge of the Afghan authorities on the Jamshids who returned or were expelled by the tsarist authorities from Turkestan for their participation in the uprising in the autumn of 1916 and for the fact that they once left for Russian territory.

list of literature

(A. С-Ъ) A page from the history of our politics in Central Asia / / Vestnik Evropy. Journal of History, Politics, and Literature. Book 6. June 1908. St. Petersburg.

English aggression in Afghanistan (1883-1917). Collection of documents. (Based on the materials of the Central State Historical Archive of the Uzbek SSR). Edited and introduced by Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Stanishevsky. Archive Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Uzbek SSR. Secret. Tashkent, 1951.

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). Foundation Sredneaziatskiy stoll B. D. 162 b; 232. On. 485. D. 684. On. 486. D. 228.

Glushenko E. A. Russia in Central Asia. Conquests and Transformations, Moscow: Tsntrpoligraf Publ., 2010.

Gubar M. G. M. Afghanistan on the path of History, Moscow, 1987.
Masson V. M., Romodin V. A. History of Afghanistan. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1965, vol. 2.

Nazarov X. Popular and educational-anti-feudal movements in Afghanistan (late XIX and early XX centuries). Dushanbe, 1976.

Parodies and religions of the world. Encyclopedia / Gl. ed. by V. A. Tishkov, Moscow, 1999.

Peoples of the Near East / Edited by N. A. Kislyakov, A. I. Psrshits; under the general editorship of S. Tolstov, Moscow, 1957 (Peoples of the world, ethnographic essays).

Nosonovsky M. (Boston). Muslim Jews in Central Asia // bcrkovich-zamctki.com/Nomcr4/MNI2. htm.

Rashidov R. T. Aimaki / Ed. by M. G. Nikulin. Tashkent: Fan Publ., 1977.

Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). F. 1. On. I. d. 71849. F. 1396. Op. 2. D. 1894; 2075;2103. F. 400. Op. 1. D. 3692; 3902. Op. 3. D. 3188; 3299.

Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA). F. 565. Op. 1. D. 565, 3472. Op. 14. D. 121, 122, 123. Op. 15. D. 1080, 1081, 1082.

Russia and Afghanistan / Ed. by Yu. V. Gankovsky, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1989.

Summary of information about the countries adjacent to the Turkestan Military District, obtained by intelligence for the month of January 1911. Tashkent: Headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, 1911. No. 1.

Summary of information about neighboring countries obtained by intelligence during the period from October 1, 1910 to January 1, 1911 Tashkent: Headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, 1910, No. 10-12.

Semenov A. A. The Jemshids and their Country (based on the Jemshid manuscript of the beginning of the XX century). // News of the Turkestan branch of the Russian Geographical Society. Tashkent, 1923. Vol. 16.

Turkestan Vedomosti. No. 241. October 30, 1913

Turkestan collection of works and articles related to Central Asia in general and the Turkestan region in particular. State Library of Uzbekistan named after A. Navoi, Tashkent 10. Vol. 502.

Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (CSA RU). F. I. On. 31. d. 729, 737. F. 2. Op. 2. D. 409-e, 410.

Adamcc L.W. Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.

Becker S. Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968.

British Documents on the Origins of the War: 1898-1914 / Ed. by G. Gooch and H. Tcmpcrlcy. Vol. 4. L., 1929.

10 This collection was compiled for many years from clippings of newspaper and magazine articles with a long break of 20 years: for 1867-1887, then 1907, 1908, from the 496th volume, the year was not indicated. It is a property of the Library named after him. Navoi.

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