V. V. ZELYONY, Candidate of Political Sciences, Military Academy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Keywords: principle, counterterrorism, morality, Israel
The international community has not yet formulated common principles for combating terrorism. What are the main reasons for this? First of all, there are differences in the functioning norms of different political systems - norms that directly affect the principles of the fight against terrorism. The second reason is the permanent transformation of the forms and methods of terrorist activity, as a result of which the very principles of countering terrorism change.
These reasons do not prevent the development of principles for combating terrorism at the national level. In some countries, for example, in the Russian Federation, they are declared in the documents of the regulatory framework and implemented in practice.1
In Israel, the situation is different. These principles have not been formally established, but in the course of counterterrorism activities in Israeli society, a number of provisions have been developed, the fundamental nature of which allows us to consider them as principles.
The semantic field of the concept of "principle" is quite broad. The synthesis of its various meanings, given, for example, in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language 2 or the Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Teacher 3 in relation to counter-terrorism activities, allows us to characterize the concept of "principle" as a stable position that determines the norms of behavior, compliance with which contributes to the optimal achievement of the goals of counter-terrorism activities.
The principles of combating terrorism have two main sources. The first is the need for counterterrorism practice, which is characterized by the large-scale use of law enforcement agencies, including special services. Compliance with the provisions developed on the basis of practice ensures the effectiveness of counter-terrorism activities.
The second source is the moral norms adopted in Israeli society. They are the ones who set the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu notes, in order to succeed in dismantling the entire terrorist network, the subjects of the fight against terrorism must feel morally right4. At the same time, law enforcement agencies are no exception, since "the entire social system rots if its invisible part (meaning special services. - author's note) loses its moral guidelines " 5.
Thus, the principles of combating terrorism can be divided into two levels::
- practical, because they are developed based on the needs of counter-terrorism activities;
- institutional, because they are developed within the framework of the institute of morality.
Practical level principles are the source material for institutional level principles.
PRACTICAL LEVEL PRINCIPLES
1. Consolidation of society in the face of the terrorist threat. The existence of this principle is due to the fact that terrorism is considered as one of the threats to national security. In some cases, it is comparable to an existential threat, which is determined by the position of individual regional actors who use terrorist methods against Israel and do not recognize its right to exist. At the same time, as B. Netanyahu notes, terrorism "is not determined by the personality of the people who commit terrorist acts, and not by the cause under whose banner they have joined. It is determined by the nature of the act itself."
The implementation of this principle is greatly facilitated by the existence of a single ideology in Israel-Zionism, as well as the rejection of terrorism as a means of achieving political goals. "It is the pervasive nature of terrorist violence that reduces its effectiveness in democratic societies. Fear is neutralized by equally strong, and often much stronger, disgust and anger, and makes a repulsive impression on society. " 6
2. Clear identification of the source of the terrorist threat. This principle presupposes the identification of terrorism primarily as a manifestation of external aggression against Israeli society. For example, despite the existence of separate examples of terrorism, the subjects of which were Jewish extremists, the anti-Israeli activities of a particular ethnic group-the Palestinians-are considered as one of the main terrorist threats. This thesis is supported by the use of the term "Palestinian terror"in the 2012 Annual Report of the Israeli General Security Service.7
3. Priority of ensuring high performance of the counter-
terrorist activity over individual rights and freedoms of citizens. This principle asserts the priority of ensuring security over other interests.8 Over the period from the late 1940s to the present, Israel has developed a so - called security culture-a way of optimal interaction of elements of the political system in matters of security. As part of this culture, Israelis tend to respond appropriately to the costs of carrying out measures to prevent the terrorist threat: thorough and numerous checks when visiting state institutions and public places, traffic jams caused by checking suspicious cars, etc.
The implementation of this principle directly affects individual rights and freedoms of citizens, in particular, freedom of speech. There is a view in Israel that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to combine a democratic regime, justice and legal order with the conduct of an anti-terrorist war. Forced into a rigid framework, counterterrorism activities may lose their effectiveness.9 These restrictions, combined with the granting of special powers to law enforcement agencies, can provoke abuse of power. However, B. Netanyahu, based on a study of the experience of counter-terrorism activities in various states, claims that "in none of the countries of democracy, the adoption of harsh measures has led to any serious or prolonged restriction of individual freedoms."10
The specific nature of the interaction of elements of the political system within the framework of the "security culture" allows at least part of the Israeli scientific community to draw a conclusion about the militaristic nature of Israeli society.11 With this nature, it is natural that the vast majority of those liable for military service are conscripted in the armed forces, and also participate in the training of reserve soldiers. This helps to maintain a high level of readiness of ordinary citizens to act in an emergency situation, which is what a terrorist act is.
After obtaining the appropriate permit from the Interior Ministry, Israelis can purchase light small arms. Its presence in the population makes it difficult to carry out terrorist acts 12. In addition, military personnel on leave are usually armed, and there are examples in Israeli counterterrorism practice of killing terrorists by them13.
4. Ensuring high efficiency of the activities of authorized bodies. Effective implementation of this principle is facilitated by a number of features inherent in the security forces themselves in Israel: low corruption of employees, their high professionalism, relative openness in interacting with the media and non-governmental organizations, etc. An adequate response to criticism from elements of civil society against the authorized bodies allows you to adjust the activities of the latter. As a result, even mistakes that periodically occur in the actions of law enforcement officers do not reduce the level of support and trust provided to them.14 This trust is shown by various forms of cooperation between Israeli citizens and law enforcement agencies, for example, informing the latter about suspicious objects and persons.
This principle is being implemented despite the absence of legislative consolidation of the powers of individual subjects to conduct counter-terrorism activities. An example is the fact that the law "On the General Security Service" (one of the main bodies involved in the fight against terrorism) it was adopted only in 2002. Prior to this, there was no legal support for the counter-terrorism activities of the General Security Service.
5. The priority of ensuring the security of specific citizens over the needs of counter-terrorism activities in general.: "In the military sphere, Israel has always served as an example of uncompromising fight against terrorism. None of the governments that came to power in Israel has yielded to the terrorists ' demands."15. Despite such statements, Israeli legislation does not establish the principle of inadmissibility of political concessions to terrorists. As a result, so-called deals were repeatedly carried out, during which, in exchange for the release of citizens captured by terrorists, Israel granted freedom to persons convicted of crimes against the security of the state. One recent example is the "deal" concluded between the Israeli Government and Hamas in 2011.16
The issue of expediency and acceptability of the price that the Jewish state has to pay for the release of its citizens held captive by terrorist organizations is being discussed in Israeli society. I. Schweizer, head of the project "Terrorism and Low-intensity Conflicts" at the Institute for the Study of Israeli National Security Problems, notes that in all cases where Israel had a real opportunity to This opportunity was used to release citizens captured by terrorist organizations, as well as prisoners of war. When the possibility of a successful use of military force was called into question, the Israeli Government negotiated and agreed to pay a disproportionate (in quantitative terms)price for the release of its citizens. 17
There is a view that" deals " for the exchange of prisoners and abductees encourage the continuation of the practice of capture and lead to an increase in terrorist activities.18 In this regard, there is an urgent need to legislate the principles that determine the algorithm of government behavior in situations involving the abduction of Israeli citizens. However, this approach is not always applicable, since it does not take into account specific circumstances, and in some cases - political and geopolitical factors. I. Schweizer notes that the problem of freeing Jews in enemy captivity is particularly significant for Israel. Israeli politics is inherently responsible for the lives and destinies of its citizens, who are in the hands of the enemy-
ka. It can be described as a "national character trait," and its roots are rooted in Jewish tradition.19
6. "Soft power". The essence of "soft power" is non-military pressure on terrorism, mainly through the hands of the population from which the terrorists come.20 First of all, we are talking about the Palestinian security services, whose effective counterterrorism activities Israel is interested in. The final report of the General Security Service, "Terrorism Data and Trends" for 2009, indicated that the decline in terrorist activity in the West Bank was due not only to the continuous activity of Israeli authorities,but also to the Palestinian security services. 21 In addition, among the Palestinian population, the Israeli security forces have created and effectively use an extensive network of agents and proxies to fight terrorism.
7. The permissibility of collective responsibility for terrorism. This principle provides for the application of repressive measures not only to persons directly related to terrorism, but also to their environment, primarily members of the families of terrorists. Examples of such measures are numerous and varied, including the blockade of the Gaza Strip or the destruction of terrorist homes. The Israeli leadership adheres to this approach, despite criticism of the subjects of world politics.
8. Permissibility of the practice of spot liquidations. Targeted elimination is defined as "deliberate destruction of a person or group of persons carried out with the support of the State"22. This type of action is contrary to the legal norms, according to which the death penalty can be imposed only by a court verdict. In Israeli counterterrorism practice, targeted elimination can currently only be used as a means of prevention, although previously it could also be used as a form of punishment for a committed terrorist act. The continuation of the practice of targeted liquidations is partly explained by the fact that, according to the Institute for Strategic Studies, it is applied only to individuals whose active participation in terrorist activities does not cause the slightest doubt.23
Israeli experts in the fight against terrorism note that the Jewish state is sharply criticized for using the practice of targeted liquidations. However, despite judicial and moral dilemmas, as well as legal restrictions, the use of targeted liquidations, when they are reasonable and accurate, is an effective and efficient tool at the disposal of a democratic state, which, according to Israeli analysts, is not advisable to abandon.24
Although the practice of targeted liquidations has proven to be one of the most effective counterterrorism tools, 25 there is an understanding in Israeli society that it is impossible to solve the problem of terrorism using it alone. Even the elimination of the head of a terrorist organization, no matter how significant and symbolic he may be, will not lead to a quick end to the terrorist activities of this organization.26
The principles of combating terrorism at the institutional level are an integral component of the regulatory framework of a particular society. Their elaboration is carried out in a comprehensive manner - on the basis of moral norms, on the one hand, and the results of a comprehensive study of terrorism as a social phenomenon and political tool, on the other.
The desire to bring counterterrorism activities in accordance with the norms of morality stimulated the implementation of a project on the development of relevant principles at the Israel National Security College. In the course of two years of work, a team of college employees led by Major General A. Yadlin developed the Principles of Armed Struggle against Terrorism27. They address the moral aspects of the counterterrorism activities of the Israeli armed forces.
The authors of the document highlight special and general principles of the fight against terrorism.
Special principles are divided into three groups.
The first group, focused on the attitude of the state towards its citizens, is represented by the principle of the need for self-defense. It is based on the duty of the State to ensure the safety of its citizens and provides for their protection from various threats, including terrorist ones. According to the authors of the document, this principle is relevant for all states, but its implementation should take place without violating the totality of democratic principles, including the principle of respect for a person, even one who is not a citizen of this state.28
The second group, focused on the attitude of the armed forces to terrorists, is represented by the principle of military necessity29. Its essence is to use the armed forces in the fight against terrorism only if the use of military force is appropriate. The question of expediency is decided depending on the observance of four conditions, which have received the name "Conditions of military necessity":
1. There is a corresponding goal. Based on the principle of the necessity of self-defense, the use of armed forces is morally justified only if it is aimed at preventing terrorism, but not punishing terrorist activities. The implementation of this principle stipulates that in the fight against terrorism, the actions of the armed forces can only be defensive in nature. They should be aimed at disrupting attempts to carry out terrorist activities, eliminating the real threat of a terrorist act, as well as minimizing the damage caused to them.30
Punishment is one of the means of preventing terrorism. Despite this, according to Israeli analysts, punishments aimed solely at preventing terrorism are immoral. It contradicts the principle of respect for the individual, because it uses one individual as a deterrent to another. One of the authors of the document, A. Kasher, notes that there is neither-
what is the moral justification for actions carried out not for the purpose of self-defense, but for the purpose of influencing another person? Immorality and unethical use of punishment as a deterrent are eliminated if deterrence is only an additional, but not the main product of punishment.31
This conclusion is directly relevant to one of the principles of the practical level, which provides for collective responsibility for terrorism. We are talking about the practice of destroying the homes of relatives of persons involved in terrorist activities. Such actions cannot have a moral justification, since they are not a form of punishment for neutralized terrorists or a means of preventing their terrorist activities. This approach allows the authors of the document to characterize the practice of destroying terrorist homes as inappropriate.32
In addition, it is inappropriate to involve the armed forces in punishing those involved in terrorism, since this transforms the body whose main function is to protect State citizens into a law enforcement agency.
2. Relative effectiveness of the use of military force. The content of this condition is largely explained by the semantics of the phrase "military necessity", i.e. it takes into account the lack of alternatives to the use of military force that are adequate to threats, or other alternatives are fraught with more negative consequences than the chosen one.
3. Focus on minimizing damage. This paragraph provides for the need to work out in detail the issues of protecting the lives of State citizens, as well as minimizing possible damage caused by counter-terrorism activities.
4. Integrity. This condition implies that the moral requirements that Israel must meet in the fight against terrorism are similar to those imposed on other political actors. 33
The third group focuses on the attitude of the armed forces to various social groups. Israeli experts proceed from the impossibility of clearly defining the enemy of the Israeli armed forces in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the basis of the basic distinction for classical wars: a soldier - a civilian.
The need for a higher degree of differentiation, reflecting the realities of the fight against terrorism, has contributed to the identification of two grounds for classifying various social groups whose representatives can be considered as opponents of the armed forces in the fight against terrorism, and the formulation of relevant principles:
1. Accounting for the degree of participation in terrorist activities. We are talking about specific forms of such activities. Their study made it possible to develop a scale of the degree of participation - direct or indirect-in terrorist activities (the scale begins with the highest degree of participation):'
- suicide bomber;
- a terrorist intending to commit a terrorist act;
- a person providing assistance to a terrorist;
- the person supervising the terrorist's activities;
- a person preparing ammunition for a terrorist act;
- the person who supplies the materials necessary for the manufacture of ammunition;;
- a recruiter of suicide bombers, etc.
Such a scale reflects the degree of involvement of a particular person in terrorist activities and, accordingly, allows you to determine the level of threat that he poses. As a result, we may be talking about the ethics and expediency of carrying out certain operational measures in relation to him, the conditions for their implementation, as well as the means used 34.
The degree of participation in terrorist activities is determined based on both the form and specific circumstances of this participation. It takes into account the fact that terrorist acts involving suicide bombers can be carried out both for financial remuneration and without it. If the execution of a terrorist act is not conditional on financial remuneration, it is not a question of direct participation in terrorist activities of a person who provides material support to the family of the suicide bomber. Accordingly, no sanctions are expected to be applied against him. The penalty should be applied only to those persons who are directly involved in creating a threat 35.
Regardless of the location on the scale of forms of participation in terrorist activities, in accordance with the principle of military necessity, if there is an alternative, it is advisable to apply the least severe form of influence to the terrorist.
2. Accounting for belonging to a particular social group. The use of this principle is due to differences in the nature of the State's obligations to different groups of its citizens. According to Israeli experts, the state should act within the framework of a certain priority scale, which is based on the characteristics of specific social groups. The document identifies several such groups::
- persons who are not involved in terrorist activities and are under the effective control of the state;
- persons who are not involved in terrorist activities and are not under the effective control of the State (for example, residents of the Gaza Strip);
- persons indirectly involved in terrorist activities (couriers used to transfer funds; persons involved in the production of means of visual propaganda; preachers who call for terrorist actions during speeches in mosques);
- persons directly involved in terrorist activities.
The characteristics of the selected groups allowed us to build the following scale of priorities in ensuring security, minimizing damage, and the ability to endanger their members:
- citizens of the state;
- persons who are not involved in terrorist activities and are not citizens of the state, but are under its effective control;
- employees of authorized bodies performing counter-terrorism tasks;
- persons who are not involved in terrorism, but are not under the effective control of the state;
- persons indirectly involved in terrorism;
- persons directly involved in terrorist activities 36.
The use of such a scale determines the appropriate algorithm of actions. For example, an attempt to detain a terrorist rather than eliminate him is impractical if the detention puts at risk the lives of members of a social group located in the priority scale higher than the group to which the terrorist belongs 37.
The general principles of the armed struggle against terrorism include: proportionality, low probability, consideration of the time perspective, professionalism, constant warnings, compensation, operational deterrence.
1. The principle of proportionality 38 is used in counter-terrorism activities to determine whether the use of military force is appropriate at two levels:
- use of military force in general - a decision is made on whether its use, taking into account the nature of the intended enemy, is an appropriate action; in fact, the principle of proportionality allows you to determine the moment of military necessity.;
- use of specific forms of military force - a decision is made on whether the armed forces act in proportion to the actions of the enemy; the level of effectiveness of the use of various forms of military force is calculated by employees of statistical and analytical structures.
There are two approaches to the implementation of the principle of proportionality. According to the first approach, in order to achieve a certain goal, it is necessary to take appropriate measures (excessive, sufficient or insufficient). Consequently, proportionality is determined not by quantitative indicators, for example, the ratio of the number of victims of terrorist acts to the number of terrorists killed in targeted actions, but by the volume of use of military force.
According to the second approach, the expediency of the measures taken is determined from the ratio between possible damage and benefit. An example is spot liquidation. Possible damage to persons who are not involved in terrorism is considered as negative consequences. The benefits of the proposed targeted elimination are determined based on the study of a number of factors, the main ones being:
- the degree of danger of a terrorist act, in order to prevent which it is planned to carry out targeted elimination;
- the level of participation in terrorist activities of the person against whom targeted liquidation is planned;
- estimated time frame for committing a terrorist act;
- the status of a terrorist for whom targeted elimination is planned;
- difficulty level and probability of successful spot elimination;
- the probability of reducing the enemy's ability to carry out a terrorist act, as well as the degree of possible reduction.
2. The low probability principle 39 involves optimizing the use of various means and methods of using military force, taking into account even the most insignificant probabilities of serious threats. When developing this principle, Israeli experts assume that a high probability in itself is close to reality, which encourages the adoption of an appropriate decision. Low-probability conditions significantly complicate this process. Employees of the National Security College suggest the following algorithm of actions in such conditions::
- determine whether the threat can be ignored;
- focus on the least worst-case and most dangerous scenario, which allows you to identify really serious threats.
3. The principle of taking into account the time perspective provides for the duty of the State to ensure the protection of its citizens from threats in various time perspectives. Israeli experts consider it necessary to take into account the circumstances concerning the elimination of immediate, medium-term and long-term threats, while giving priority to eliminating the immediate ones. This approach is due to the inexpediency of postponing the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in the hope that this postponement will solve the problem of terrorism in the future. The fight against terrorism must be conducted continuously. An example of a violation of the principle of taking time into account, according to Netanyahu, is the events in the Gaza Strip: hoping to put an end to terrorism, which the PLO was a subject of, by granting it territories, the Israeli government only encouraged Islamic terrorists to continue their activities.40
Principle of professionalism 4. assumes that only military personnel who have received appropriate training and have knowledge and skills in this area are involved in the fight against terrorism. The authors of the" Principles of Armed Struggle against Terrorism " note that the involvement of military personnel who have not completed the appropriate training course to be on duty at roadblocks and checkpoints does not allow us to count on their highly effective functioning. This principle largely overlaps with one of the principles of the practical level, which provides for ensuring high efficiency of the activities of authorized bodies.
The principle of constant caution 5. It is aimed at public wide-scale coverage of the results of counter-terrorism activities, informing about the degree of responsibility for terrorism, as well as about its possible consequences. In the course of reporting on counter-terrorism activities, according to Israeli experts, special attention should be paid to explanatory work.
6. The principle of compensation implies compensation for damage to a person who is not involved in terrorism, if the damage is the result of counter-terrorism activities.
7. The operational deterrence principle focuses on considering deterrence as a byproduct of preventing a terrorist attack. According to Israeli analysts, inflicting damage in order to ensure deterrence is immoral, although it does not contradict the norms of morality of actions that are aimed at ensuring prevention, even if their implementation leads to damage.
The study of the "Principles of Armed struggle against Terrorism" allows us to state that the staff of the National Security College has developed a serious document that contributes to bringing the principles of combating terrorism in line with the norms of morality adopted in Israeli society. Despite the fact that this document is focused on the ideal and is not binding, employees of State authorities and authorized bodies can take into account the provisions contained in it when solving tasks related to countering terrorism.
* * *
An analysis of the fundamental approaches to the fight against terrorism in Israel allows us to conclude that this state has developed a developed system of principles for counter-terrorism activities. It includes practical and institutional levels and has a number of specific characteristics, primarily due to the peculiarities of counter-terrorism practice.
The condition for ensuring high efficiency of counter-terrorism activities is an organic combination of practical and institutional principles, and the absence of contradictions between them. However, at present, the need to eliminate terrorist dangers and threats as soon as possible leads to the predominance of practical principles that do not fully correspond to the norms of morality.
In this regard, attempts are being made in Israeli society to develop and implement institutional-level principles designed to form and consolidate in the public consciousness certain assessments of various patterns of behavior in the implementation of counter-terrorism activities that correspond to the moral norms accepted in society.
1 Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 35-FZ of March 6, 2006 "On Countering terrorism" / / Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 2006.
Ozhegov S. I., Shvedova N. Yu . 2 Tolkovyi slovar russkogo yazyka: 80,000 words and phraseological expressions, Moscow, Azbukovnik Publ., 1999.
Bezrukova V. S. 3 Fundamentals of spiritual culture (encyclopedia of the teacher). 2010 - http://didacts.ru/dictionary/1010/ word/princip
Netanyahu B. 4 The War on Terrorism: how democracies can defeat the network of international terrorism / Translated from English by Alpina Publisher, 2002.
Lahav P. 5 "A barrel without hoops": the impact of the fight against terror on the Israeli legal culture / / National Security and Democracy in Israel. Anthology, vol. 1. Open University of Israel. 2007, pp. 307-351.
6 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
7 Sikum shnati 2009-netunim u-megamot be-teror ve-maane ha-sikul (Annual Report for 2009 - data on terrorism, trends in it and measures to prevent it) - http://www.shabak.gov.il/ publications/archive/skirot-archive/Pages/terrorsummary. aspx
Zamir I. 8 Prava cheloveka i bezopasnost ' strany [Human rights and Security of the country]. Anthology, vol. 1, pp. 261-306.
Lahav P. 9 Edict. op., pp. 349-350.
Netanyahu B. 10 Decree. soch., p. 61.
Pedatsur R. 11 Hakdama (Introduction) - see: Ha-havra be-yisrael ve-ha-bitachon ha-leumi (Society in Israel and National Security) - http://www.fes.org.il/src/IsraeliSocietyandNationalSecurity Hebrew. PDF
Netanyahu B. 12 Decree. soch., p. 61.
13 Terrorist was eliminated by a soldier who did not want to join the army for "right-wing" views - http://www.newsru.co.il/israel/ 02jul2008/plesner8003.html
Epshtein A.D. 14 Antiterrorist terror. "Point liquidations" by Israel of Palestinian Leaders: political, Legal and Moral Aspects, Moscow, Institute of the Middle East, 2009. (Epshtein A.D. Antiterroristicheskiy terror." Tochechnye likvidatsii " Izrailem palestinskikh liderov: politicheskie, pravovye i moralnye aspekty. M., 2009) (in Russian)
Netanyahu B. 15 Decree. soch., p. 104.
16 Iskat shalit: ha-diyun ha-gorali be-memshala (Deal for the liberation of G. Shalit: a fateful vote in the government) / / Ha-Arets, 13.10.2011 - http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/shalit-deal/ 1.1522188
Schweizer Y. 17 Milhama bein Arahim tsodkim ve-manigadim (The War between Just and Contradictory Values)- http://www.newsl.co.il/Archive/003-D-30619 - 00.html
18 Israeli experience in combating terrorism - http://www.pravda. ru/world/asia/middleeast/25 - 01 - 2011/1064621-israterror-0/
Schweizer J. 19 Decree. Op.
Lukov V. V. 20 International terrorism: New approaches of Russian scientists (on actual problems of public counteraction to terrorism). М., ЛКИ, 2007. (Lukov V. V. Mezhdunarodnyi terrorizm: Novye podkhody rossiyskikh uchenykh. M., 2007) (in Russian)
21 Sikum shnati 2012-netunim u-megamot be-teror ve-maane ha-sikul (Annual Report 2012 - data on terrorism, trends in it and measures to prevent it) - http://www.shabak.gov.il/ publications/study/Pages/summary2012. aspx
Epshtein A.D. 22 Decree. soch., p. 23.
Schweizer Y., Inav Y. 23 Artsot ha-brit ve-maarehet ha-sikul ha-mamukad (USA and the system of point liquidations) / / Mabat Al, 2011, N 265 - http://heb.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4348&page=24
Schweizer Y., Inav Y. 24 Decree, Op.
Schweizer Y. 25 Ha-im yesh manatseach? Hazor le-mitkefet ha-teror be-artsot ha-brit (Is there a winner? Ten years since the terrorist attack on the United States) / / Mabat Al, 2011, N 8281 -http://heb.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4348&page-23
Schweizer J. 26 Hirhurim rishonim leahar hisul ben laden (First thoughts after the elimination of bin Laden) / / Mabat Al, 2011, N 254 - http://heb.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id-4348&page=25 (10.02.2014)
Kashar A. 27 Ekronot shel lehima tsvait be-teror (Principles of armed struggle against terrorism) / / Ha-krav shel ha-mea ha-esrim va-ahat. Democracy of neelhamat ba-teror (War of the XXI century. Democracies fight terrorism). Israel Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2004 - http://www.idi.org.il/media/265793/ THEBATTLE-FORWEB. pdf
28 Ibid., p. 268.
29 Ibid., p. 269.
31 Ibid., pp. 269-270.
32 Ibid., p. 270.
33 Ibid., p. 273.
34 Ibid., p. 274.
35 Ibid., p. 276.
36 Ibid., p. 277.
37 Ibid., p. 278.
38 Ibid., pp. 280-282.
39 Ibid., p. 282.
Netanyahu B. 40 Decree. soch., p. 53.
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