In the 1990s, Russia's relations with Iran focused on common geopolitical interests at the global and regional levels and economic benefits. However, relations between the two countries have developed unevenly. The strengthening of pragmatic tendencies in Moscow's foreign policy since the beginning of the twenty-first century and its following in a "pro-Western" direction caused dissatisfaction on the Iranian side. The international crisis over Iran's nuclear program and Russia's accession to sanctions against it have worsened the situation. Nevertheless, the political establishment of both countries continues to emphasize the closeness of positions on the main problems of the Middle East and Central Asia and demonstrate interest in developing political and economic contacts.

Keywords: Russian-Iranian relations, the Caspian problem, Bushehr nuclear power plant, sanctions against Iran.

In recent years, many publications have appeared in Russia, Iran, and the West on various aspects of Russian-Iranian relations. The interest shown by the expert community in this area is explained by attempts to predict the development of relations between the two countries in the context of the ongoing international crisis over Iran's nuclear program and increasing destabilization in the Middle East. However, these studies consider only certain aspects of bilateral relations, and not the entire complex of international and regional problems that affect the level of contacts between Russia and Iran, including Russia's accession to the sanctions regime against Iran. The latter causes dissatisfaction on the Iranian side and reinforces the historically persistent distrust of the northern neighbor. This article will attempt to find out to what extent and in what aspects the geopolitical and national interests of Russia and Iran coincide, and on what basis relations between the two countries can develop in the future.

Russia and Iran approached the beginning of the new century with a fairly high level of mutual relations. In the 1990s, the two countries managed to lay the foundations for cooperation and significantly expand the areas of cooperation. This process was uneven: periods of active dialogue, rapprochement and reaching agreements were followed by periods of restraint and mutual discontent. The amplitude of fluctuations was determined by both international and regional factors, as well as national priorities of each of the parties. Then the fears of some circles in Russia regarding the spread of Islamic ideas by Iran in the southern regions of the Russian Federation, in the Caucasus, Central Asia and attempts to compete with it in the region were not justified. Tehran has been Moscow's partner in curbing Islamic extremism in the Caucasus. The religious factor has not become a dividing factor for the two countries. A common approach was to the problem of NATO's eastward advance and the emergence of" third " forces in the Caspian region. Iran has played an important role in chairing the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) since 2011. Organization of Islamic Cooperation) during the WTO period-

In 1999-2000, the Russian government was responsible for the swarm of the Chechen campaign, pursuing a cautious policy and providing assistance to Moscow, which is explained by the internal threats common to the two countries. The multiethnic composition of the population, the presence of territories densely populated by ethnic minorities, areas inhabited by divided peoples, and separatist tendencies are characteristic of both Russia and Iran. Both countries saw an opportunity to contain these threats through cooperation. It is also important to note that contracts signed in the early 1990s for the construction of a nuclear power plant and the supply of weapons during a difficult period for the Russian economy contributed to the preservation of a number of its production facilities and the survival of the military-industrial complex.

Attempts were made in Russia's political circles to emphasize anti-Americanism in Tehran's policy. This made it possible to consider the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) as a strategic partner in the military-political alliance in the region, which was welcomed by the Iranian side. However, the weight of socio-economic problems and the lack of coordination of interests in the ranks of the Russian ruling elite led to inconsistent actions towards Iran. Relations between Russia and Iran, which was considered a pariah of the world community, developed in waves, which was largely facilitated by international factors. The United States, concerned about cooperation between the two countries in the field of nuclear energy and military-technical cooperation, put constant pressure on Moscow. A strong pro-Western lobby in the Russian establishment advocated curtailing contacts with Iran. The most striking evidence of this approach was the Gore-Chernomyrdin memorandum of 1995, according to which Russia stopped fulfilling contracts in the field of military-technical cooperation.

As for Iran, its policy towards Russia in the 1990s was more consistent. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the separation of the two countries ' borders from each other, Iran stopped perceiving Russia as a potential threat hanging over its 2,000-kilometer northern border. Russia's refusal to promote a communist worldview also removed the main ideological obstacle that had complicated relations between the two countries for many years. Continuing to consider Russia a significant international factor, Iran considered it as its diplomatic ally in the field of international and regional security, and regarded the Russian presence in the region as an obstacle to the influence of the United States. Tehran has repeatedly expressed interest in moving bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership. In expanding contacts with Russia, the Iranian leadership saw an opportunity to reduce tensions in its relations with the West and get out of international isolation.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia focused on implementing a pragmatic policy that meets national needs and focuses on economic efficiency. The most important tasks were the development of relations with the CIS countries, as well as with Western countries and the United States. Iran and a number of countries in the Middle East were not included in the priority group [Kontseptsiya..., 2000]. Nevertheless, the desire to return to the Middle East and strengthen its position in Central and South Asia has pushed the Russian leadership to reassess the role of Iran due to its special geostrategic position, which allows it to directly influence the situation in the Caspian, Central Asian, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern regions and provides access to the Persian and Oman Gulfs. The importance of the Islamic Republic of Iran increased due to its participation in all the problems of the Middle East and its independence in determining its foreign policy. The new century in relations between Russia and Iran has started on a high note. President Khatami's visit to Russia in March 2001 opened a new page in the history of relations between the two countries with the signing of the Treaty on the Foundations of Relations and Principles of Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the first decade of the XXI century. Iran has become an object of closer attention from the international community, which was due to its involvement in political processes in the Middle East and its ability to influence the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the beginning of the Iranian nuclear crisis. Since then, the development of Russian-Iranian relations has been influenced by increasing criticism of Russia's continued cooperation with Tehran, as Moscow considered Iran as a possible partner in a strategic dialogue (Vinnikov and Orlov, 2005).

M. Ahmadinejad's coming to power in Iran in 2005 did not affect the two countries ' approaches to assessing the significance of relations between them. In the face of limited contacts with Western European states, the new leadership of Iran continued to see Russia as its ally. The ruling circles of the Russian Federation, giving a sharp assessment of the most confrontational statements of the Iranian president, were aware of the need for interaction with Tehran.

NATO's military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which led to a change in the balance of power in the region, helped to intensify the dialogue between Russia and Iran on the situation in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Caspian region. Russia and Iran oppose any attempts to exclude them from the processes of cooperation in the Caucasus. Russia has its own vision of security and cooperation in the Caucasus. Good relations with Armenia, cooperation with Nagorno-Karabakh, and maintaining constant contacts with Azerbaijan allow Tehran to influence the settlement of the crisis situation in Nagorno-Karabakh to a certain extent. The Iranian Foreign Ministry is actively promoting a formula for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the framework of the three Caucasian states-Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and the three closest neighbors-Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Russia is not yet ready to work within the framework of this proposal. It continues to rely on the OSCE, although it does not deny the need for contacts with these countries.

Iran showed readiness to act as a mediator during the aggravation of relations between Georgia and Russia in 2007. In August 2008, after the events in South Ossetia, despite good relations with Tbilisi, Tehran, seriously concerned about Georgia's possible accession to NATO, took a cautious position and did not openly support or blame one side or the other. Expressing concern about the possibility of turning this conflict into a regional one, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the 2008 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) called Western states and Israel its initiators. Iran, taking a wait-and-see approach to recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, expressed its readiness to provide any assistance in establishing peace and stability in the region [Sokhanrani-ye raisjomhur..., 2008].

In order to strengthen cooperation with Russia and other countries in the region, strengthen ties with China, and strengthen its influence in Central Asia, Iran has shown interest in cooperation with the SCO since its inception. In 2004, the country's leadership, hoping to get minimal security guarantees and secure political support in the face of the deepening nuclear crisis, openly expressed interest in joining the organization. Russia supported this aspiration. SCO members invited Tehran to participate in their structures as an observer in July 2005. However, the anti-Americanism of the Iranian leadership hinders the process of its admission to membership. In 2008-2009, when Russia was chairing the SCO, Iran was very much hoping not only for its active involvement in its activities in all areas, but also for the possibility of its admission to membership in the organization. However, "the issue of admission, which was planned to be discussed at the Yekaterinburg summit in June 2009, was not resolved, mainly due to the surge in internal instability in Iran after the presidential elections"

[Mamedova, 2011, p. 44]. It is worth noting that the official invitation of Iran to the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, presented in the official Iranian media as unconditional support for M. Ahmadinejad in his confrontation with the unfolding "green movement", spurred a wave of anti-Russian sentiment in Iran. The oppositionists spoke with the slogan "Death to Russia", spread deliberately false rumors about Moscow's assistance to the Iranian special services in suppressing protest actions, which played a significant role in shaping the negative image of Russia in public opinion in Iran.

After the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against Iran in June 2010, the chances of its accession to the SCO sharply decreased. At the next summit in Tashkent, a draft Regulation on the procedure for admission of new members to the SCO was approved, according to which a member state should not be under UN sanctions [Regulations..., 2011, pp. 185-187].

For its part, Iran, being an active member of a large regional association - the Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO) - supports Russia's involvement in the structures of this organization.

Another problem in the region that both countries are coordinating efforts to solve is the Afghan one. A mechanism for regular Russian-Iranian consultations on this issue has been established. Iran and Russia express concern about drug trafficking originating from Afghanistan. In 2005, a Memorandum of cooperation on combating the drug threat was signed. Representatives of the two countries, participating in UN programs, contribute to the economic recovery of Afghanistan. Iran supports solving the Afghan problem on a regional basis, while Russia is ready to cooperate at the international level based on the UN mechanisms. Despite the fact that there is no complete agreement of positions, the Russian side is aware of the need for cooperation on this issue, since "Iran can really play a very positive role here" [Transcript.., 2010].

Regarding the Caspian issue, the positions of Moscow and Tehran are quite far from each other, and the issue of determining the legal status of the Caspian Sea is one of the most sensitive in the political dialogue. The establishment of state borders at sea does not meet the interests of either Russia or Iran. However, attempts to find a compromise made over the past 10 years have not yet yielded results. At present, Russia is in a more advantageous position, as it has managed to settle all the issues of demarcation with neighboring states, which meets its national interests at the current stage. Iran's persistent unwillingness to abandon the principle of equal-salt division of the Caspian Sea significantly hinders the settlement of legal problems.

The Caspian problem is related to countering military and political threats in the region, developing energy resources and creating transport flows, including for the transfer of hydrocarbons, and preserving the unique natural environment and bioresources. In solving this set of tasks, Iran and Russia act as competitors and rivals in some areas. However, the coincidence of positions prevails over contradictions. Thus, Russia and Iran agree on the need to limit the influence of external forces in the region. In the summer of 2005, Russia, in view of the possible appearance of military forces of non - Caspian states in the Caspian Sea, initiated the creation of a Caspian security system and proposed to coordinate the efforts and capabilities of coastal states through a single structure-CASFOR1.

¹ Naval Operational Cooperation Group in the Caspian Sea region. Moscow has stressed that it does not call for the creation of a military bloc and that the tasks of this structure are to coordinate cooperation between the Caspian littoral states against threats and challenges in the region. Iran, although it supports the demilitarization of the sea, supported this initiative. It is very likely that he saw in the new structure the basis for the formation of a defensive bloc in the region.

Both sides solve the problem of ensuring maximum control over the transport flows of hydrocarbons. Despite the fact that today the energy factor in the region is more destructive, Iran and Russia are aware of the need to diversify energy transportation routes and can cooperate with each other, taking part in regional and international projects. They share a common position on the issue of Trans-Caspian pipelines and try to consolidate the idea of the need to coordinate the projects of future transit pipelines in the five-party format at the legal level.²

Both countries are participants in the project to create an international transport corridor "North-South". The creation of sea corridors in the Caspian Sea is another field for cooperation between the two countries. In order to jointly address environmental protection issues, Moscow and Tehran joined the Caspian Environmental Program and signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in 2003.

At the Second Summit of the Caspian littoral States in Tehran in 2007, Ahmadinejad actively called for the establishment of the organization of cooperation of the Caspian littoral states. This idea was put forward by Iran in 1992, but in those years it did not receive proper support. According to Dmitry Medvedev, Russia is generally very interested in this idea, and the creation of the Caspian Economic Cooperation Organization could make a significant contribution to the expansion of economic ties [Medvedev, 2009].

Vladimir Putin's visit to Tehran in October 2007 for the Second Caspian Summit occupied a special place in the history of relations between the two countries. Although the Russian side did not consider this visit as a state visit, the Iranian press attached extreme importance to it and called it historic. Diplomatic dialogue between Iran and Russia has been ongoing, and the two presidents have met repeatedly in international and regional forums. However, from the point of view of the Eastern mentality, it is the visit of the first person that is evidence of respect and recognition of the significance of the host state. Therefore, the arrival of Vladimir Putin in conditions when the country was under UN Security Council sanctions and the possibility of a military strike on Iran was actively discussed, was used to the maximum extent by the Iranian side for propaganda purposes both inside the country and outside.

The Russian side, in the face of deteriorating relations with the United States due to plans to deploy missile defense facilities in Eastern Europe, was pursuing its own goals by initiating the summit in Tehran. Vladimir Putin made an attempt to find a solution to the problem of Iran's nuclear program in order to remove the concerns of the international community and eliminate complications at the bilateral level due to Russia's support for the sanctions resolution in December 2006 G. and delays in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. During the visit, the prospects for cooperation between the two countries in the trade and economic sphere, coordination of their efforts in the energy sector, as well as military-technical cooperation were considered [Joint Statement..., 2007].

Following the talks, both sides emphasized the closeness of approaches to solving key issues of world politics. The meeting of the leaders contributed to the settlement of bilateral problems. However, the Iranian side ignored Russian proposals that could help reach a compromise on the "nuclear dossier".

On the eve of Vladimir Putin's visit to Tehran, the issue of strategic partnership was periodically discussed in Russia's political and expert circles. However, the meaning of this concept was interpreted differently. Some saw it only as a long-term development of relationships. Others, in particular some representatives of the military and political circles, continued to convince the country's leadership and public of the need for rapprochement with Iran at any cost, calling Tehran a potential partner.

² Five Caspian littoral States - Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

as a strategic partner, they even saw the possibility of creating a union of two states as a basis for regional security in the future. This did not take into account that for Iran, the United States and Israel were the first-line enemies, and at the beginning of the XXI century, the Iranian side was aware of the increasing danger of their military attack. Russia, on the other hand, saw the main threats in the international sphere "in the attempts of other states to counteract its strengthening as one of the centers of influence in a multipolar world, hinder the realization of national interests and weaken its positions in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region" [Kontseptsiya..., 2008].

Russian Iranists have always paid attention to the differences in understanding the "main threat" and wondered: "Who can such an alliance be directed against?". Thus, back in 2002, A. Z. Arabajyan, when asked whether Iran could be considered as a strategic ally of the CIS as a whole or of the Russian Federation, answered emphatically: "No... because in connection with the Russian Federation, this is determined by the versatility of Russia's inclusion in world geopolitics. This is also hindered by the ambiguity of Iran's domestic political doctrines. At the same time, not the least role is played by the fact that in the official internal political doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the confessional factor is given the status of statehood. There is another reason. This is the current alignment of political forces in Iran. It is such that it does not exclude a sharp change in the current foreign policy course of the state" [Arabajyan, 2003, p.9-10].

V. Sazhin, analyzing the possibilities of partnership, wrote that "the question is posed as follows: to what extent, without affecting the interests of Russia, can and should there be a rapprochement between democratic Russia and Islamic Iran, so that our country, while maintaining normal, partnership relations with Iran, which are certainly beneficial to the Russian Federation, does not simultaneously "drop out" of the list of civilized countries. European states, since an alliance with Iran would be a kind of anti-Western counterweight to the expanded NATO bloc. ..relations between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran should be characterized by the following idea:: "cautious partnership in the region", without their development into strategic-allied ones " [Sazhin, 2003, p. 23].

Mammadova also expressed great doubts about the need for strategic partnership. She argued that " the political risks of an alliance with a country in confrontation with the world's leading countries outweigh the possible dividends. Cooperation in the format of regional organizations remains more effective for Russia "[Mamedova, 2009].

The expert community in Iran also expressed skepticism about the possibilities of such an alliance. For example, a specialist in Russian-Iranian relations, J. R. R. Tolkien, writes: Karami believed that in " Iran's eastern policy, the importance of Iran-Russia relations was unduly overstated. If the goal of this policy was to create a front and alliance oriented against the West and NATO, then it was impossible to actually implement such ideas" [Karami, 2010]. M. Sanai, a member of the Iranian Parliament, a professor at the University of Tehran, head of the Center for the Study of Iran and Eurasia, noted that Iran sees relations with Russia through the prism of While Moscow focuses on bilateral relations, it does not need Tehran as a serious international partner. Even at the regional level, Russia has set a certain "ceiling" for cooperation with Iran (Sanai, 2007).

After Vladimir Putin's visit to Tehran, the topic of strategic partnership was no longer raised by official Moscow. Iran, on the other hand, preferred to view Russia as a "natural ally" (Karami, 2009, p.174).

Bilateral relations have become increasingly dependent on the crisis over Iran's nuclear program. Moscow, although it continued to cooperate with Iran in the field of nuclear energy, openly expressed concern about Iran's progress in the development of nuclear and military technologies. Supporting Iran's law

As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and a member of the IAEA for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Russia continued to seek ways to resolve the conflict and sought to strengthen its role in the negotiation process. In 2003, it facilitated the signing by Tehran of an Additional Protocol to the safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.³ Moscow has tried to allay the concerns of the international community regarding the direction of its cooperation with Iran in this sensitive area, and has managed to get it to sign a number of documents on the return of spent nuclear fuel in 2005.

While the United States and Israel were preparing plans for a military attack on Iran, the Russian leadership continued to look for ways to resolve the conflict, as it realized the categorical need to prevent a military scenario. Moscow has been trying to convince European states that missed the chance to establish contacts with Iran in the field of nuclear technology in 2003, that the constant presentation of ultimatums to Iran can only increase tensions. The Iranian side should receive economic incentives or concrete proposals. Based on this, the Russian Federation has taken the initiative to enrich uranium on its territory. Iran was also invited to participate in the work of the Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center. At the same time, Moscow guaranteed that it would exclude the possibility of transferring uranium enrichment technology to Tehran. However, the Iranian leadership in every possible way delayed consideration of the proposals, since it was interested in creating all the links of the nuclear cycle on its own territory. Later, it refused and continued its course of confrontation with the international community. The lack of any progress on the Iranian side forced Russia to support UN Security Council resolutions condemning Iran's actions and imposing economic sanctions on it in 2006, 2007 and 2008.

This development of the situation could not but affect relations between the states, which were already complicated by the slow pace of construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The Iranian side expressed doubts that the delays were due to technical reasons, accused Moscow of political intent and even declared its readiness to complete the construction without Russia's help. Moscow has been wary of new sanctions against its enterprises, ⁴ and has consistently demonstrated the peaceful nature of cooperation.⁵ In 2006, Russia managed to remove Bushehr from international sanctions.

After the meeting of the heads of state in Tehran, Russia and Iran agreed on changes to the contract, settled financial issues, and already at the end of 2007, deliveries of fuel for the reactor began. Although the date of putting the plant into operation was postponed several times, Russia did not change its intentions to launch the nuclear power plant even after joining the UN Security Council resolution No. 1929 on tightening sanctions in June 2011 and a sharp complication of relations with Iran. In August 2010, fuel was loaded into the reactor, and in September 2011, the plant was put into operation.

The analysis carried out by specialists showed that this nuclear power plant could not have been built in 5 years, as stipulated in the original contract [Khlopkov and Lutkova, 2010, p. 2-12]. The main problems encountered by the Russian side during the production, delivery and installation of equipment were revealed, which delayed the launch of the station for seven years. In the published conclusion, it is noted that the Iranian side did not fulfill its obligations in a number of parameters, and as a result, they were additionally assigned to the Russian side [Khlopkov and Lutkova, 2010, p.2-12]. Repeatedly there were financial difficulties. Although sanctions are not directly applied.

³ The Parliament did not approve Iran's accession to this document.

⁴ Similar to those imposed in 1998-1999.

⁵ Which was recognized by the American side.

When they touched upon this project, they created additional problems in its implementation, since some of the equipment was ordered outside of Russia.

During the construction period, Iranian specialists were trained to work at the plant, but both sides considered it reasonable to create a joint Russian-Iranian enterprise for the further operation of the nuclear power plant. Russia assumes responsibility for the safety of the plant's operation, which is extremely important after the disaster in Japan. At the same time, it retains, to a certain extent, the ability to exercise control over the activities of the Iranian side. This right - to preserve the possibility of permanent contacts with the Iranian side through cooperation in the development of peaceful nuclear technologies - has been constantly defended by Russia in its contacts with representatives of the EU and the United States. Moscow is convinced that severing all ties with Iran and Russia's withdrawal from this sphere may lead to more serious consequences for the international community. At the same time, the Russian leadership is aware that its leverage over the decision-making centers in Tehran is very limited.

Until recently, cooperation between the two countries in the military-technical field continued. Although this aspect relates to the sphere of economic relations, such cooperation contributes to a certain extent to solving geopolitical problems. For the period from 2000 to 2007 Iran has signed contracts worth $ 1.96 billion with Russia. As a result, it became the third largest recipient of Russian weapons [Orlov, 2010, p.5]. Russia's withdrawal from the Iranian arms market, which is constantly demanded by the West, would lead other countries to it.

The development of the nuclear program, elevated to the rank of a national idea, and excessive demands in contacts with the Russian side caused Moscow's concern. In addition, the confrontation with the Western world strengthened the position of "Westerners" in the Russian leadership, who are in favor of reducing contacts between the two countries.

Iran's desire to increase its reserves of enriched uranium, its threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and terminate relations with the IAEA have led to a convergence of positions between Moscow and the EU countries and caused a tightening of its policy towards Tehran. In response, Iran has stepped up its criticism of Russia's political line. Moscow's new policy in Iran was associated with the name of President Dmitry Medvedev, considering him a supporter of reducing contacts with Iran. Iran's concern was caused by the emerging improvement in relations between Russia and the United States, which, according to Iran, could negatively affect Iran and lead to a complete reorientation of Russia to the West. ⁶ Since 2009, Russian-Iranian relations have been "cooling".

Both opponents and supporters of developing relations with Iran remained in the Russian establishment, which sometimes led to inconsistent actions. The situation was aggravated by the news about the construction of a new uranium enrichment plant near Qom and the reluctance of the Iranian side to participate in the proposed " six " (group of negotiators "5+1")⁷ a project to exchange low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor in the Russian Federation. Russia, which has been taking steps to ease sanctions for several years, expected more openness from Iran. Tehran's unwillingness to accept the latest proposal being developed by Moscow was explained by its distrust of the"six".

⁶ At the end of May 2009, the Center for Strategic Studies of the Council for the Expediency of Decisions was hosting a round table "The Factor of the West and Relations between Iran and Russia" with the participation of politicians, diplomats and political scientists. The report was published in the newspaper Etsmad-s melli on May 24-27, 2009.

⁷ This group includes representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council-Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China, plus Germany, representing the EU.

Taking into account the new circumstances, Moscow announced the possibility of joining tougher sanctions and delaying the delivery of S-300 missile systems. ⁸ On September 22, 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree "On measures to implement UN Security Council Resolution No. 1929 of June 9, 2010", effectively freezing military-technical cooperation. Thus, the issue of S-300 deliveries was closed. At the same time, Moscow opposed the unilateral tightening of UN Security Council sanctions by the United States and the EU.

By joining in the discussion of new sanctions measures, Moscow met Washington halfway on the key issue of Iran's nuclear program. At the same time, it has aggressively negotiated with the US and the EU, seeking to eliminate "crippling sanctions" from the package in order to complete the construction of Bushehr. In the UN Security Council, Russia "supported the resolution, considering it as a forced measure designed to push Tehran to listen to the concerns of the international community" [Foreign Policy..., 2010].

It is obvious that Tehran was not ready to accept such a position. Harsh statements, and sometimes even threats against Russia, issued from various political flanks of the Islamic Republic of Iran, are associated with a narrowly pragmatic approach to Russian-Iranian relations, an overestimation of its place in the system of Russia's international priorities, as well as excessive emphasis on negative moments in the history of relations between the two countries. Claiming that Moscow is using Iran as a "bargaining chip" in relations with the United States, reformist forces in Iran called for a revision of the official position on Russia [Asibshenasi-ye ravabet..., 2010]. Surveys conducted on Internet sites showed that 95% of respondents hold anti-Russian views ⁹.

There are also supporters of a realistic approach in the Iranian political elite. They take into account the role and influence of Russia in the region and on the world stage, and believe that the development of cooperation meets the national interests of Iran [Sanaei, 2010]. Fearing further cooling of relations, they suggested that the Iranian leadership abandon biased assessments of Russia's position, take a more constructive position in order to diversify its course in international relations and build relations with Moscow taking into account the new situation [Asibshenasi-ye ravabet... 2010; Karami, 2010].

The surge of anti-Russian sentiment in Iranian society after Moscow joined the Security Council sanctions did not prevent official Iran from still seeing it as a political partner. At the meetings of the presidents of the two countries in the framework of the Third Caspian Summit (November 2010) and the anniversary summit of the SCO (June 2011), the Russian side also confirmed that it remains "determined to continue and deepen multifaceted cooperation in areas that are not subject to international sanctions" [Foreign Policy..., 2010].

Developments in the Middle East have highlighted the convergence of regional interests between Russia and Iran. The instability of the situation in the region as a result of the rise of protest movements and the intervention of external forces, the withdrawal of NATO troops from Iraq, plans to withdraw coalition forces from Afghanistan-all this is fraught with security threats for both Russia and Iran. Against the background of these processes, the pressure of the United States and Israel on Iran is increasing, and the possibility of a military scenario is being discussed. This causes alarm among the leaders of both countries and contributes to the activation of contacts between them. The political dialogue has been developing since the spring of 2011. The Russian side, holding regular consultations with the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the situation in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and noting the proximity of the border between the two countries.-

⁸ Russia responded to Iran's requests for the sale of S-300s in late 2007, as the delivery of these systems was linked to a reduction in the likelihood of missile strikes on Iranian territory. She considered it her task to prevent the transition of the nuclear crisis to the military phase.

⁹ The survey was conducted by the site www.asriran.com. and RIA-Novosti in the fall of 2009

The two countries ' joint efforts, in particular regarding the stabilization of the situation in Syria, continue to make efforts to involve Iran in the political and diplomatic settlement of the situation around its nuclear program. By launching the "step-by-step action plan" initiative, Moscow demonstrated its interest in "Iran's closest and full cooperation with the IAEA experts to restore the confidence of the international community," and confirmed that attempts to move the situation from the negotiating channel to direct confrontation with new sanctions and threats of use are unacceptable for it." military force" [Lavrov, 2011]. Moscow's new initiatives, the launch of Bushehr, and its categorical rejection of additional sanctions have helped build confidence in Russia in Iran.

The discussion of plans for the creation of new nuclear power units, the continuation of the negotiation process on the Caspian Sea, the development and approval of the "Roadmap for promising projects in the field of oil, gas and petrochemicals", the growth of trade turnover, the approval of cooperation plans in the cultural, humanitarian and educational spheres can be considered as evidence of the two countries ' interest in

The main aspect of Russia's Iranian policy in the near future is to prevent the situation from developing according to a military scenario and maintain its active role in resolving the crisis over Tehran's nuclear program. This is consistent with Russia's intention to maintain sales of its goods and technologies in Iran. Now it retains the potential for cooperation, but there is always the risk of being pushed out by more successful competitors and losing profitable orders if Iran opens up to third countries.

So far, both countries have not fully realized the existing potential for deepening cooperation in the economy. It was supported by limited transactions in a few, though large, product groups. Joint work in this direction is beneficial for both Russia and Iran. Coordination of efforts will help overcome distrust, move the parties from the category of "casual" partners to permanent and predictable partners, which will strengthen their positions in the Middle East and Greater Central Asia region.

list of literature

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