India is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South Asian region on a global scale-through diplomatic means and effective military deterrence. It proceeds from the fact that in recent years the threat of terrorism has increased, including that supported by some States, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The situation, according to the Indian leadership, is complicated by other challenges: the illegal trade in drugs, weapons, as well as the activation of groups using violence under the guise of religious fundamentalism.

India traditionally adheres to the defense doctrine, the principles of non-participation in military alliances and blocs, non-use of nuclear weapons first, refusal to deploy armed forces in foreign countries (except for participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN). However, in recent years, military and strategic circles have been discussing the possibility of using offensive tactics in some cases - in order to prevent a threat to the country's security.

India's national security tactics consist of political, economic, and military measures aimed primarily at reducing or removing threats from China and Pakistan.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the changing geopolitical realities served as a powerful impetus for the development of strategic thinking in India. The USSR helped India, as some military-strategic experts believed, to resist China. In the new conditions, it was forced to develop a new strategy, while at the same time facing serious challenges and finding answers to a number of difficult questions.

Among them: what is India's current and future role in the South Asian region? Is there an opportunity to strengthen India's position in Asia as a whole, given its geostrategic position near major sea routes? Is there an opportunity to strengthen India's international standing, taking into account its huge human and increased intellectual resources? How can the process of globalization best serve India's national interests? How to solve acute problems of the country's energy security? Should India once again turn to the non-aligned policy for closer economic, political and cultural ties with developing countries, or seek new ways, given the current balance of power in the international arena? How and at what pace should the problems of poverty and unemployment be addressed? Finally, what should be the country's armed forces and what is their role in these circumstances?

Relations with China and Pakistan remain among the most pressing issues in this regard. Most of the Indian geostrategists are inclined to develop a dialogue with China. Peace and stability on the India-China border are in the interests of both countries. Post-Cold War relations between India and China-

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Even though the process itself was not smooth and even, which is natural given the history of relations between the two countries after the 1962 war, which left the painful Indian-Chinese border problem still unresolved.

Strained relations with Pakistan continue to be on India's agenda. Three wars with India and the acute armed conflict in Kargil in 1999, the Kashmir problem, which has not yet found its solution-all this affects India's relations with the United States. They have improved significantly in recent years after four decades of "non-cooperation" and even confrontation during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. One way or another, the United States is beginning to occupy an increasing place in India's geostrategic plans.

As for Russia, it has lost the positions that the Soviet Union had in India. Its political, economic and military weight has noticeably decreased, which is reflected in the overall volume and quality of relations with India, which pursues a multi-vector foreign policy and aspires to become one of the centers of power in the world.

These and many other factors determine the attitude of the Indian leadership to the role and significance of its armed forces in the present and future, especially given the technological revolution that directly affects the capabilities of the army, navy, aviation and nuclear forces.

INDIA'S MILITARY DOCTRINE

Since India's military doctrine is defensive in nature, in the first years of independence, it was characterized by a kind of "minimalist" approach to defense capabilities based on historical experience. In essence, it was all about defending the territorial unity of a country that had been attacked from outside at various times over the centuries, but had not acted as an aggressor. In the late 1980s, Indian Defense Minister K. C. Pant wrote: "The role of our armed forces is strictly defensive. They are designed to protect our right to independent decision-making and development processes, particularly in the political and social spheres. They must resist the fact that unrest in the countries adjacent to India does not spill out on our territory" [Pant, 1987, p. 212 - 213].

This philosophy determined the defensive nature of the armed forces. This meant that relatively few funds were allocated for defense. But after the Indo-Chinese war of 1962. India has changed its policy towards the armed forces. Then J. R. R. Tolkien Nehru declared: "We must build up our armed forces by all means at our disposal" (Nehru, 1963, p. 226-230). In fact, the process of building a modern Indian army, Navy and air force began from this time.

India's defense doctrine involves the creation of an effective and reliable deterrent using both conventional weapons and nuclear forces. A significant part of Indian military theorists believe that deterrence can also include the following: if necessary, the Indian armed forces should be able to effectively use both defensive and offensive tactics in order to end the war as soon as possible on conditions favorable to the national interests of the country [Singh, 1999, p. 113].

Indian military strategists believe it is necessary to take into account the fact that the end of the cold war did not lead to the establishment of a lasting and predictable peace. Moreover, the events of the late XX-early XXI centuries. they show that the world has not become safer. The confrontation between the two superpowers was replaced by bloody local conflicts caused by ethnic and religious contradictions, interference of major powers, primarily the United States, in the internal affairs of others

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states. The situation, as before, continues to be unstable. The main thing in relations between countries is not ideology, but economics. According to Suren Govil, former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy, rich countries are resorting to new, unprincipled methods to preserve their superiority and the high standard of living of their citizens [Govil, 2008, p. 124].

By the way, the same idea is confirmed by American authors. Thus, Thomas Friedman, a prominent representative and propagandist of power globalization, articulates the idea of using power in the interests of American corporations in the following way: "The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist. McDonald's cannot thrive without McDonald Douglas (the armament corporation), and the hidden fist that provides the world for Silicon Valley technology to flourish in California is called the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Marine Corps" (Friedman, 1999).

According to Nilufer Bhagwat, a professor at the University of Bombay, such statements were confirmed in practice during the preparation and during the second war of the United States and its NATO allies in Iraq, which began on March 19, 2003. Created in 2001 by U.S. President George W. Bush and Vice President David Cheney, the so-called Energy Task Force, which included America's largest energy and oil corporations, is responsible for the decision to occupy Iraq. Prior to the outbreak of this war, the American and Western press reported on contracts for the reconstruction of oil pipelines and terminals in Iraq worth $ 7 billion. Contracts were secretly provided by the US Department of Defense to the "right" corporations without a tender [Bhagwat, 2006, p. 112, 113, 116].

Even earlier, when analyzing the events related to the first war in Iraq in 1991, the Indian political commentator S. Muralidharan wrote: "A more serious concern (of the West) is to protect its claims to the financial resources of the Arab world. They are vital for guaranteeing the political stability of the United States and Great Britain, which is now irrevocably and clearly deteriorating and needs constant renewal of these resources "(Muralidharam, 1991).

The analysis of political, economic and military aspects of the wars in Iraq, Yugoslavia and other regions by Indian geopolitics is taken into account by them and the country's leadership in developing a modern military-political strategy and in building the armed forces in the present and near future. India continues to be concerned about the situation in Iraq.

Following the signing of agreements with the United States on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (July 2005 and March 2006) and the adoption of the law on cooperation in this area in the United States (December 2006), India is significantly modifying its external strategy.

India's leaders say the end of the cold War has "liberated" the country, giving it the opportunity to simultaneously deepen relations with all major power centers. India has ceased to be "bound" by the Cold War paradigm, when good relations with one power led to negative consequences in relations with its opponents. India assumes that none of the great Powers is currently pursuing exclusive cooperation with other Powers. "For the first time in the history of independent India," said Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, "the country is on the upward path of improving relations with all the great powers" [The Hindu, 18.01.2007].

At the same time, India believes that, despite all the achievements in its foreign policy, its relations with the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the European Union are not using all the available potential. India should strive to ensure that

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give real political substance to the strategic partnership that it has established with all major Powers. And one more important new point. The Indian leadership believes that some developing countries, especially China and India, are ready to abandon the ideological paradigm of the past - developed countries against developing countries, North against South, West against East. Globalization has begun to strengthen the process of redistribution of forces in the international system. The rise of China and India has led not only to the revival of Asia. The effects of their rapid growth are being felt in Africa and Latin America. Therefore, the Indian leadership sets the task for political and military strategists to change the very nature of their thinking, taking into account the growing influence and more active role of India in world affairs [The Hindu, 18.01.2007].

Such statements by the political leadership of India are part of not only diplomatic and propaganda efforts, but also military and strategic efforts aimed at establishing in Indian and world public opinion a new image of India as a growing political, economic and military power. As has been repeatedly confirmed in the late twentieth and early twenty - first centuries, India attaches great importance to strengthening its military, including nuclear, power, which would correspond to the status of a great power.

Indians believe that, despite the high level of interdependence of countries, nation-states remain the mainstay of the international system, and international security itself remains subordinate to the power and authority of the leading nation-states. National interests prevail over international ones, and powerful Powers use new rhetoric to cover up aggressive actions for their own purposes.

Hence the conclusion for Indian politicians: they should focus entirely on protecting national interests, and not give in to empty moralistic arguments. The reality is that strength and power are at the core of international relations and will continue to be so in the future. Powerful States establish international rules that ensure the subordination of weaker countries.

India attaches particular importance to its energy security issues. In this regard, it pays great attention to the Indian Ocean region with coastal States. The Indian Ocean transports 15.5 million barrels of oil per day from the Persian Gulf, 10.3 million barrels of oil passes through the Straits of Malacca and 3.3 million barrels of oil through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. India is interested in using some of these resources for its energy needs. At the same time, all this causes its concern from the point of view of both safety and ecology. The Indian Armed Forces are forced to meet these challenges with an increased level of readiness and ability to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

India takes into account the large influence of China as one of the main importers of energy resources in the volatile energy market. India believes that Russia, as a major supplier of oil and gas, also seeks to protect its interests in Central Asia and the Middle East, has a significant impact on regional and global security and the strategic situation.

According to the Indian leadership, the country's growing economic, political and military capabilities and its authority as a responsible power, including in nuclear matters, have contributed to strengthening its ties with the global community, including in the field of defense.

The Indians emphasize that although there is a positive trend in India-China relations, both sides should be more active in resolving existing problems, including the border issue, through peaceful means. India is keeping a close eye on

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China's military modernization, the rapid growth of its military budget over the past decade, and the development of infrastructure along the Sino-Indian border. It is also concerned about the close cooperation between China and Pakistan, including nuclear and missile cooperation.

INDIA ON THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN WORLD POLITICS

The revolution in information and military technologies has strengthened their role in new weapons, in changing the nature and purpose of warfare. The Indian-Pakistani armed conflict in Kargil in 1999, essentially a limited war, is considered by some Indian military experts as a kind of model of conflicts in the region in the foreseeable future, in which high military technologies and weapons can be used.

Indian defense experts believe that the use of military means can follow only after all economic, political and other non-military levers of influence are used. These principles were developed during the ancient Indian civilization. A written source known as the Laws of Manu (XI century BC - XI century AD) states that the state must use four instruments (in descending order) to achieve political goals. The first is sama (reconciliation or diplomacy), the second is dana (gift or concession), the third is bheda (sowing discord in the enemy's country), and the fourth is danda (use of force). [Chellaney, 1999, p. 112].

Politics will take the lead in relation to the economy in the future, writes Indian security expert Brahma Chellani. Because military power is central to international relations, it contributes to the achievement of economic advantages. In essence, prosperity and military power are closely interrelated, and each of these components serves the other [Chellaney, 1999, p. 529]. In this regard, B. Cellani gives an interesting example. Former US Secretary of Defense in the administration of President B. Clinton, William Cohen, during a visit to Microsoft, said:: "I would like to point out that the prosperity that companies like Microsoft have now achieved could not have happened if we did not have such a powerful armed force" [ibid., p. 529]. Expanding on this theme, Chellani writes that the US victory in the Cold War is closely related to military power, as it occurred in an era of declining American economic competitiveness. The United States began to use a policy of hard pressure to achieve advantages in trade due to its superior military power. In a politically unipolar but economically multipolar world, America seeks to remain the sole superpower, using its military advantage [ibid., p. 529].

Indian strategic planners believe that military power guarantees economic development. This is confirmed by the fact that all major economies of the world are protected by their independent "nuclear umbrellas". Military power serves political and economic purposes, including access to foreign markets. In this context, the Indians point to the US actions in Iraq, which provide them with access to cheap oil and the ability to export weapons to the Persian Gulf countries. The Indians also take into account the experience of Japan, which, being "under the protection" of the United States, creates powerful armed forces and has become the second country after America in terms of spending on weapons. Indians also remember their country's not-so-distant colonial past. Colonialism was a classic example of the use of military force to exploit India economically.

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Indian military and strategic experts attach particular importance to the experience of NATO led by the United States in Yugoslavia in 1999, essentially the intervention of foreign troops in an internal ethnic conflict. During the 78 days of the air war in Yugoslavia, 34 thousand flights were made. air strikes and dropped 22 thousand bombs. The Yugoslav armed conflict demonstrated the superior power of the United States and the strategic military dependence of Europe on them. The main lesson of this operation was that the only answer to the policy of "force is always right", based on high technologies and remote control of conventional weapons, is the possession of nuclear missile deterrent forces. NATO's victory in Yugoslavia using precision-guided weapons, including cruise missiles and guided aerial bombs, set a dangerous precedent. Therefore, India needs a reliable minimum nuclear deterrent in the context of revolutionary changes in armaments [Chellaney, 1999, p. 528-529, 533].

INDIA IN THE MODERN GEOSTRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

In geostrategic terms, India is located in a region whose security is linked to all other regions of Asia. According to former Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, Asian security can be represented by a model in the form of concentric circles consisting of West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. India is part of all circles, and each of these regions affects its security. Therefore, India should play an active role in ensuring security in Asia in cooperation with other Asian countries [Sinha, 2005, p. 5].

According to Indian international experts, India is in the sphere of interests of major powers. In the North, it has to take into account the growing power of China, with which it has the longest border. In the West and East, it should pay a lot of attention to its neighbors, which are supported by the United States and China. West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean represent a vast region for strategic play where the interests of great Powers collide. Hence the conclusion: India will continue to experience difficulties and be under constant pressure from external forces until it becomes a major player on the world stage [Chellaney, 1999, p. 534].

Indian military strategists believe that in the twentieth century, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) played a major role in military operations. During the Cold War (in Korea, Vietnam, and other regions), various types of weapons of mass destruction were used. The United States recognized the use of radiological weapons against Serbia and Iraq (in 1999) - weakly enriched uranium, which penetrates the armor of tanks and destroys people in it. Although the Pentagon considers these weapons as conventional, many scientists consider them nuclear-they burn up on impact, releasing a strong source of beta radiation [Radioactive Shells, 01.05.1999; Peterson, 29.04.1999]. Thus, Indian scientists write, since 1945, after the nuclear bombs exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States is the only country that has used all three types of WMD - biological, chemical and nuclear [Chellaney, 1999, p. 528 - 529, 556].

The Indians emphasize that thinking in terms of weapons of mass destruction continues to remain in the strategic doctrines of developed countries. Concepts such as" collateral damage " emerged during America's 1999 war against Yugoslavia. At the meeting of the Heads of State and Government of NATO member states in Washington on April 23-24, 1999, NATO changed a key element of its doctrine, which was included in it when the Soviet Union still existed. It excluded the following clause from the doctrine: "The organization (NATO) is purely defensive in its goals-

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lyakh: none of her weapons will be used except for defensive purposes." Thus, NATO has turned from a defense organization to an offensive one. The Indians also highlight the fact that NATO has announced an expansion of its role beyond the North Atlantic. After the victory in Yugoslavia, US President Clinton declared: "The North Atlantic Alliance can intervene elsewhere in Europe and Africa to fight repression. We can do this tomorrow, if necessary" [Chellaney, 1999, p. 557].

Some Indian experts believe that America as a "super-empire" is not interested in following any rules and does not recognize any restrictions on its military power. However, today the United States does not have a close counterparty in terms of power, and therefore they are so "angry" at any evidence of Russia's strengthening [Noorani, 30.12.2006 - 12.01.2007]. However, the same idea is expressed by some American researchers, in particular Harold James, professor of history and international relations at Princeton University in the United States. He also believes that the use of force should be restricted by regulations (Harold, 2005; Porter, 2006).

The Indians also point out that the United States sold new-generation supercomputers and global positioning system technologies to China, but for almost a quarter of a century tightened its control over high-tech exports to India.

Modern high technologies are playing an increasingly important role in geopolitics. Indian specialists closely follow the experience of modern military operations, especially the United States, which uses them to test new high-tech weapons (for example, Tomahawk cruise missiles during the 1991 Iraq War).

Some Indian experts in the field of geopolitics note that the structure of India's conventional weapons has remained virtually unchanged for more than a quarter of a century and is becoming increasingly inadequate in the context of the technological revolution. Since India is a de facto nuclear-armed State, it must develop a less cumbersome and more efficient military. India should create a military industry that puts nuclear missile forces at the center of national defense. The only defensive shield against the war machines of major powers is precisely the nuclear and missile forces. India can prevent a repeat of the Yugoslav experience in relation to itself if it creates intercontinental ballistic missiles. Immunity against a high-tech attack can be fully implemented only if the aggressor country is able to strike at the aggressor country. And if India wants to achieve true strategic autonomy, free from external pressure, and become a global player, it must arm itself with intercontinental ballistic missiles-symbols of force and punishment in international relations [Chellaney, 1999, p. 567].

India believes that arms control is used by the great Powers for their own purposes (the Indians themselves often avoid calling the five permanent members of the UN Security Council "great powers", but prefer to use the term" large " countries to refer to them). All great Powers provide their security with weapons of mass destruction. According to the US nuclear doctrine, their response to any attack on their vital interests should be "crushing and overwhelming."

At the same time, the United States believes that real nuclear disarmament will be possible only if, in the words of former US Secretary of Defense Cohen, "new technologies will produce a powerful new non-nuclear deterrent in the indefinite future" [Ibid., p. 570].

India is concerned about China's response to the development of US nuclear missile systems, including theater systems. By putting into practice a policy of missile proliferation, especially in Pakistan, China does not only-

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It calls into question the right of the United States to deploy nuclear weapons wherever it pleases, but also threatens India's security.

INDIAN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND CONFRONTATION IN SOUTH ASIA

Independent India has gone through several important stages in building its armed forces. The first of them lasted from 1947 to 1962, when the country was attacked by China and was defeated in the war with it. During these 15 years, India's foreign policy took into account the weakening of the British position in the world, the growing influence of the United States in the Asian region, especially its large military assistance to Pakistan, which became part of the SEATO (1954) and SENTO (1955) military blocs, as well as the constant crisis in India's relations with Pakistan over Kashmir. Starting with the visit of J. R. R. Tolkien. After Nehru's visit to the USSR in 1955 and Khrushchev's return visit to India in the same year, military-political cooperation between the two countries began to develop intensively.

India did not start its military construction from scratch. During the Second World War, the basis for the subsequent development of the armed forces was created in colonial India, including military personnel, although not so numerous. Until the early 1960s. India received several large ships from Great Britain (an aircraft carrier, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, etc.). A decisive factor in the build-up of weapons in India was the massive supply of weapons by America to Pakistan from the mid-1950s. At the same time, the first deliveries of dual-use equipment from the Soviet Union (transport planes and helicopters, as well as tanks, armored personnel carriers and small arms) to India began [Shilin, 2004, p. 16-27; Safronov, 26.01.2007, p. 32].

In 1962. India has decided to purchase a modern fighter jet abroad. The choice was between Great Britain, France, the USA and the USSR. India made it in favor of the Soviet Union. A contract was signed to supply the MiG-21 and license its production in India. This decision on the part of India was essentially forced, since the West refused to provide technology for the production of aircraft in India. In addition, the price offered by the Soviet Union was significantly lower. The Soviet Union took this step to counter the US desire to gain a foothold in South Asia, and also because of the aggravation of its relations with China at that time. Deliveries of the MiG-21 were the beginning of a large-scale Soviet-Indian military-technical cooperation [Nehru, 1963, p. 447-450].

A new stage in India's military construction was associated with the aggravation of relations with the PRC. Before the outbreak of the war with China, the Nehru government was preoccupied with solving the acute problems facing India (hunger, unemployment, illiteracy, the need to strengthen the unity of the country), and did not pay enough attention to the development of the armed forces. Before this war, defense spending was only 1.7% of GDP, which was only $ 172 billion. Rs. Two years later, they grew to 3.8% of GDP ($285 billion). rs). In 1964, a defense development plan was developed, taking into account the military assistance of the USSR. From the same year, the MiG-21 was assembled at Indian factories, including components made in India. By 1972, the country's Air Force received this aircraft, completely manufactured in India. At the same time, contracts for the supply of other military equipment (tanks and artillery pieces) from the USSR were implemented.

But India continued to develop military-technical cooperation with Western countries, primarily with the United Kingdom (for example, in the production of the licensed Vijayanta tank).

The war between India and Pakistan in 1965 pushed these countries to further intensify military construction, acquisition and production of modern military equipment.-

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weapons. Here, India found itself in a more favorable situation. During the Indian-Pakistani armed conflict, the United States refused to supply weapons to any of the parties. And the Soviet Union played a positive role in resolving this conflict at the Tashkent meeting in January 1966 between the Prime Minister of India L. B. Shastri and the President of Pakistan Ayub Khan with the assistance of A. N. Kosygin (Kaul, 1989, pp. 196-198). The USSR became the main supplier of weapons to India, while Pakistan shifted its focus from the United States to China.

Since 1964. India began to acquire modern warships from the Soviet Union. By 1970. it received 20 warships, including those with guided missile weapons. In the same years, the USSR supplied India with four submarines. At the same time, India acquired a license from Great Britain to build Linder-type frigates (in India they are called Nilgiri). By 1971, when the new Indo-Pakistani war began, the Indian Navy had 60 ships, including one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, three destroyers, 14 frigates, and four submarines [Shilin, 2004, pp. 51-52].

India's victory in the war with Pakistan in 1971 led to the formation of Bangladesh, as well as to the involvement of the United States and the USSR in this confrontation, with which India signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which provided for consultations in the event of an attack or threat of an attack on one of the parties to eliminate the threat both countries [Kaul, 1989, pp. 199-203]. The United States and the Soviet Union sent their squadrons to the Bay of Bengal in December 1971, respectively, in support of Pakistan and India.

The events in Afghanistan and the participation of Soviet troops in them gave a new "breath" to the arms race in South Asia. The United States has begun to provide tremendous support to Pakistan in strengthening its armed forces. Implementation of the 1981 agreement between the United States and Pakistan on military and economic assistance totaling $ 3.2 billion. It helped arm Pakistan with modern weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, howitzers, and helicopters. The US aid program for Pakistan (with funding from Saudi Arabia) also included the delivery of 40 F-16 aircraft worth more than $ 1.1 billion since 1983. [Moskalenko, 1984, p. 255].

Responding to this, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi said in 1982: "... in the last few years, Pakistan has more than doubled its defense capability, and we are still very far from that... Pakistan definitely made the most of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan." At the same time, she pointed out that the foreign presence in the Indian Ocean (a clear reference to the United States) is much stronger not only in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality, taking into account nuclear weapons and others [Gandhi, 1982, pp. 295-296]. In addition to the United States, France and Great Britain played a major role in arming Pakistan during this period. A prominent place in the supply of tanks, aircraft and ships to Pakistan belonged to China 1.

In turn, India has also been building up its armed forces through both its own efforts and military supplies from abroad. The bulk of these purchases came from the Soviet Union. In 1980, India purchased 20 MiG-23s and a license to build them. In 1986-1987, 48 MiG-29s, a large number of military transport aircraft, anti-aircraft missile systems, etc. were delivered to India. At the same time, India tried to diversify arms purchases and establish their production on its own. So, from 1982 to 1986, 50 fighters were delivered from France

1 A substantial analysis of China's strategy in the field of military security and modernization of the armed forces of the People's Liberation Army of China is given in the chapter " Armed Forces "in the monograph"China-Russia 2050: a Strategy for co-development" by B. N. Kuzyk and M. L. Titarenko. Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economic Strategies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2006, pp. 492-524.

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"Mirage-2000", and even earlier - Jaguar fighters from the UK. In 1986, the supply of more than 400 howitzers from Sweden began [Shilin, 2004, pp. 78-79]. Attempts were made to establish military-technical cooperation with the United States. However, America did not go for any noticeable expansion of such cooperation. Moreover, it refused to supply India with a supercomputer, suspecting the Indians of using it to build nuclear weapons (in 1974). India conducted a nuclear test, claiming that it did so for peaceful purposes). In response, the Indians a few years later created their powerful computer Param-10000.

Since 1985, India's next defense development plan has called for modernizing the armed forces and expanding its own production of weapons and armaments in order to reduce dependence on imports. Thus, the policy formulated by Gandhi in the early 1980s was continued: "We have significantly diversified the sources of our purchases of military equipment and continue to do so. We also try to produce as much as possible in our own country, and we usually make purchases from those who are willing to provide us with technology, which means those who want to help us achieve our goal of self-reliance." At the same time, Gandhi said: "Often, when you buy something from the United States, you become dependent on it because it doesn't provide technology" (Gandhi, 1982: 231, 232).

STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES

In terms of the size of the armed forces (AF) and their qualitative composition, India is one of the five world powers. The activities of the Indian Armed Forces and military construction are determined by the goals and objectives that the country's political leadership sets for them.

By the end of the 1980s, the Indian armed forces in terms of quantitative and qualitative characteristics reached the level of the world's leading countries, second only to the United States, Russia and China.

Land Forces (SV). At the beginning of the XXI century, the Indian armed forces numbered 1300 thousand soldiers and officers (third place after the PRC and the United States). There were 1,100,000 soldiers in the ground forces. The Indian Army was armed with 3,400 tanks, 2,500 light armored vehicles, 3,460 artillery pieces, 180 self-propelled howitzers, 150 multiple launch rocket systems, 2,500 different anti-aircraft systems, and 300 army aviation helicopters. The SV also had 15 launchers and 75 operational-tactical Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles.

The headquarters of the Indian Foreign Ministry is located in New Delhi. The control system is implemented through five tactical commands created on a regional basis.

1. Central Command with headquarters in Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh).

2. Eastern Command, headquartered in Calcutta, West Bengal.

3. Northern Command with its headquarters in Udhampur (Jammu and Kashmir).

4. Western Command with headquarters in Chandigarh (Punjab).

5. Southern Command with headquarters in Pune (Maharashtra).

Air Force. The Indian Air Force has about 800 combat aircraft - 40 squadrons (mostly Soviet / Russian production), as well as 46 Mirages-2000 and 100 Jaguars, more than 150 training aircraft. The Air Force has 230 military transport aircraft and about 190 helicopters, 62 reconnaissance aircraft. The number of the Air Force is 130 thousand people (including civilian personnel).

In the area of responsibility of each Air Force command, air bases and basic support units, surface-to-air missile systems, radars and other equipment are located.

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The Air Force headquarters is located in New Delhi. Seven commands are subordinate to it.

1. Western Command (headquarters in New Delhi).

2. South-Western Command with headquarters in Gandhinagar (Gujarat).

3. Central Command with headquarters in Allahabad (Uttar Pradesh).

4. Eastern Command with its headquarters in Shillong (Meghalaya).

5. Southern Command with its headquarters in Trivandrum (Kerala).

6. Air Force Logistics Command, headquartered in Nagpur, Maharashtra.

7. Training Command with headquarters in Bangalore (Karnataka).

The Navy. The Indian Navy consists of one aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers, 16 frigates, 16 submarines, 19 corvettes, and other ships. The Navy operates Coast Guard troops to protect national interests in India's exclusive maritime zone (about 2 million square kilometers). The WBO is responsible for 7,500 km of coastline and almost 1,200 Indian islands. The size of the Navy is about 53 thousand people.

The Indian Navy is organized into three regional commands. The main naval bases of the country are Mumbai and Visakhapatnam (Shilin, 2004, pp. 139-141, 166-167; Baranov, 2005, pp. 151-155).

1. Western Command with headquarters in Mumbai (Maharashtra).

2. Eastern Command with a staff in Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh).

3. Southern Command with headquarters in Cochin (Kerala).

Since India pays special attention to the development of the Chinese armed forces, the assessments of the military potential of both countries by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences are of interest. Its conclusions: China has some military superiority over India, but it is small; China is inferior to India in naval power (India has an aircraft carrier); China is stronger than India in long-range missiles; China is weaker than India in high military technology [Jane's Intelligence Review, 05.2003, p. 52 - 53].

(The ending follows)

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Belokrenitsky V. Ya., Moskalenko V. N., Shaumyan T. L. South Asia in World Politics, Moscow, 2003.
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Gandhi I. Foreign Policy of India, Moscow, 1982.
Izvestia.

Kaul T. N. Indiya i Aziya [India and Asia], Moscow, 1989.

Mazin A. Indisky MIC and ambitions of Delhi / / Asia and Africa today. 2007. N 12.

Makienko K. V. [The Indian arms market: competition is getting worse]. 2006. N 8.

Moskalenko V. N. Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Moscow, 1984.
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