The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War over Nazi Germany and its decisive contribution to the joint struggle of the coalition allies in World War II protected and saved not only the peoples of the USSR and Europe, but also other countries from the Nazi threat. One of them was India, which at that time had to solve a difficult and controversial task: to fight for liberation from British colonialism and at the same time participate in the war against Hitler's fascism and Japanese militarism.
Keywords: Nehru, Gandhi, Roosevelt, Soviet Union, England, Munich Agreement, struggle against fascism, Indian independence.
On September 3, 1939, colonial India was declared a belligerent State by the British Government without the consent of its political parties. India's involvement in the World War provoked protests from the Indian public in the form of anti-war, anti-imperialist demonstrations and strikes. On September 14, 1939, the leadership of the leading Indian National Congress (Congress) party issued a statement condemning fascism and Nazism, an act of German aggression against Poland [Prasad, 1985, p. 825, 826].
In connection with the outbreak of World War II, one of the spiritual leaders of India, Nobel Prize winner Rabindranath Tagore, made an accusation against Hitler's Germany. He wrote: "The whole world is deeply shocked by the news of a new manifestation of arrogant injustice on the part of the current ruler of Germany, but this is only the logical conclusion of the campaign of intimidation of the weak, which began with the persecution of Jews in the Reich and ended with violence committed against a brave, truly liberal country-Czechoslovakia... But I do not lose hope that humanity will still prevail and in a world washed by blood streams, all the oppressed will forever find freedom, ending poverty and poverty" [Tagore, 1982, pp. 348-349].
CONGRESS ON EVENTS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
In the years leading up to the Second World War, Indians closely followed the situation in the world and reacted to events directly related to the issues of freedom and independence of India. In April 1936, they protested against the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. At the same time, one of the Congress leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru, rejected the Italians ' insistence on meeting with Mussolini and said that the war in Abyssinia was an example of "greedy and predatory imperialism behaving in a mad pursuit of colonial domination" [The Indian National Congress 1936 - 37, p. 47, 48].
In December 1936, the Congress supported the struggle of the Republican forces of Spain against the Franco regime. After the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the Congress expressed support for the Chinese people's struggle against this aggression and called for a boycott of Japanese goods. For the same purpose, on-
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On the eve of World War II, Nehru visited China. In June 1938, Nehru visited Spain and, as a guest of the Republican government, declared India's support for the struggle of the Spanish people. The Congress also strongly opposed the Anglo-French policy of appeasement of Hitler's Germany, which ended in September 1938 with the Munich Agreement. A few weeks before this collusion, Nehru, who was in Europe at the time, refused to accept an invitation from the Nazi government to visit Germany. Congress took an even tougher stance toward Germany after it sent troops into Czechoslovakia in March 1939. "Our position is clear: total opposition to fascism and total opposition to imperialism," Nehru wrote in April 1939. But we will gladly offer the same resources to defend the democracy of free India and other free countries" [The Indian National Congress, 1938-39, p. 56, 60].
In May 1939. The All India Congress Committee (WICC) opposed the involvement of India in the war without the consent of the Indian people. He called on his members in the Central Legislative Assembly of India to boycott the meeting of this body, and on congressional governments in the provinces not to support the military preparations of the colonial government.
NEHRU ON WAR, FASCISM AND NAZISM
During India's struggle for independence in the 1930s and 1940s. Nehru was a key figure in shaping Indian views on foreign policy issues. That is why his position on the Second World War, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people as an integral part of it, as well as his assessment of fascism and Nazism is of particular interest.
Nehru wrote that Congress had set its policy on the possibility of a "new big war" as early as 1927 - six years before Hitler came to power and four years before the Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Even then, the dictatorship of Mussolini, who maintained friendly relations with England, was strengthening in Italy. At the same time, there was a complete break in relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. It was about to isolate him. Under these circumstances, Nehru noted, " public opinion in India, of course, was on the side of Soviet Russia... This did not mean that communism met with approval in any broad circles, although socialist ideas gained an increasing number of adherents" After Hitler came to power in 1933, the Congress condemned Hitler and Nazism, his doctrine of racism [Nehru, 1955, pp. 452-454, 455].
Congress has adopted a two-pronged approach to war. On the one hand, opposition to fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism, on the other - an emphasis on the liberation of India. The two components of such a policy contained elements of mutual inconsistency - inconsistency in condemning fascism and Nazism while maintaining imperialist rule in India. At the time, Indians believed that their country should establish closer ties with neighboring countries in the East and West: with China, Afghanistan, Iran and the Soviet Union, and even with distant America. But there were also some people, Nehru noted, who did not like solidarity with republican Spain and China, with Abyssinia and Czechoslovakia.
The course of events before and after World War II led Nehru to conclude that Western democracies were not fighting to change, but to perpetuate the old order. Before the war, they appeased fascism not only because they were afraid of its consequences, but also because of certain ideological sympathies for it and because of an extreme dislike for some of the likely alternatives, i.e., socialism. Nazism and fascism, according to Nehru, were not a sudden phenomenon or an accident in history, but a natural consequence of past events, great-power politics and racial discrimination, national struggle, and the growing concentration of power. This did not find a way out within the framework of the society of that time, an internal conflict between the democratic ideal and the social system that contradicted it. Where the crisis has developed more rapidly, democracy has been openly and deliberately suppressed.
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Fascism and Nazism appeared on the scene. Some of these democratic countries owned colonies where there was no democracy at all, Nehru emphasized, and where the very form of authoritarian regime that "comes close to fascism"prevailed. "Naturally, these Western democracies felt some kind of ideological kinship with fascism, although they did not like many of its brutal and brutal manifestations" (Nehru, 1955, p. 4). 490, 491, 511, 527- 529].
Analyzing the program of the Nazis, Nehru wrote that their program, imbued with nationalism, was anti-Marxist, anti-communist, anti-Socialist, anti-Jewish. It opposed capitalism, but in a very vague way. Behind all of this, there was only a philosophy of violence. Industrialists supported Hitler because he cursed socialism and seemed to be the last bulwark against advancing Marxism or communism [Nehru, 1981, pp. 367-370].
Given the balance of power in Europe in the early 1930s, Hitler's Germany, Nehru believed, was then completely isolated. With this in mind, Hitler adopted the so-called peace-loving tactic. Mussolini helped him with this by proposing a pact between France, Britain, Germany and Italy, which was done in June 1933. Under the pact, the four Powers were required to consult with each other, especially on issues related to proposals for revising the Treaty of Versailles. The Pact was one of the attempts to form an anti-Soviet bloc.
As early as 1933, Nehru summed up the situation as follows. Hitler's main program is that of German capitalism, which seeks to present itself as the defender of Europe from Soviet Russia. Having declared its goal to expand living space, Hitler's Germany could only do so at the expense of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Hitler tried to get the support of England, after which it would not be difficult for him to neutralize France. In this regard, in the same year, he publicly stated that the weakening of British power in India would be a disaster. His anti-Sovietism was attractive to the British government, because "there is nothing else in the world that British imperialism would dislike more than Soviet Russia" [Nehru, 1981, p.375, 376, 411].
Looking at the entire chain of events leading up to World War II, Nehru notes the rise to power of Hitler in August 1934, when he became Chancellor-President. At the beginning of 1935, the Saarland was annexed to Germany as a result of a referendum. In May 1935, Hitler annulled the Versailles Treaty's articles of disarmament, announced the introduction of universal conscription and a gigantic rearmament program. But none of the Powers of the League of Nations did anything about it. In March 1938, Hitler's army entered Austria and annexed it to Germany. The countries of the League of Nations have also come to terms with this. The Nazis ' next target was Czechoslovakia. England, through its policy towards this country, provided significant support to the Nazis. The Munich Pact, concluded by Germany, Britain, France and Italy on September 29, 1938, decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland was occupied by Germany, and Poland and Hungary took the opportunity to seize chunks of Czechoslovak territory, Nehru wrote. Thus, the redivision of Europe began, England and France turned into secondary powers, and Nazi Germany achieved a dominant position. The determining factor in creating this situation was the role of a Power like England. "If fascism spread and became the dominant force in the world," Nehru wrote in November 1938, " it was largely due to the British government."
The Munich Agreement was a turning point in European and world history. In Europe, a regrouping of forces began, and the British and French governments openly sided with Nazism and fascism. England hastened to ratify the Anglo-Italian agreement, recognizing the conquest of Abyssinia and giving Italy a free hand in Spain. A bloc of four powers - Britain, France, Germany, and Italy-began to emerge as a united front against Russia and the democratic forces in Spain and other countries (Nehru, 1981: 379, 428).
At the same time, according to Nehru, Soviet Russia fulfilled its obligations, speaking out for peace and against aggression. She didn't completely abandon her father.
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an ally of Czechoslovakia. But Britain and France ignored Russia and established friendly relations with the aggressors. And even Czechoslovakia, betrayed by France and Britain, was drawn into the orbit of Nazism and dissolved its alliance with Russia. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union thus suffered a serious setback. Yet the Soviet Union remained the main obstacle to fascism and anti-democratic forces in Europe and Asia.
Nehru emphasized that the Soviet Union and the United States oppose fascism and Nazism for different reasons. In Europe, Soviet Russia remains the only obstacle to fascism. If it is destroyed, it will put an end to democracy throughout Europe, including in England and France. The United States is far away from Europe, and it is not easy for them to interfere in European affairs, and they do not feel such a desire. But when such an intervention does occur in Europe or the Pacific, America will very effectively make its enormous power felt [Nehru, 1981, p. 439, 466, 467].
SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE'S POSITION ON WAR
The international situation was also closely monitored by Subhas Chandra Bose, a radical politician, president of the Congress in 1938, and later leader of the Forward Bloc party. At the March 1939 session of Congress, Bos said that the most important event of the past year was the Munich Treaty, which was the" direct surrender " of Great Britain and France to Nazi Germany. As a result, France ceased to be the dominant power in Europe. The hegemony passed to Germany without firing a shot. Earlier, the defeat of the Republican government in Spain strengthened the positions of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. "The so-called democratic powers - France and Britain - joined Italy and Germany in the conspiracy to eliminate Soviet Russia out of European politics, at least for a while. But how long will this be possible? There is no doubt that as a result of recent international events in Europe, as well as in Asia, British and French imperialism will suffer considerable damage" [Bose, 1964, p. 392-394].
According to Bos, who repeatedly visited Europe in the 1930s, Nazi Germany would never have dared to annex Austria and take over Czechoslovakia if Britain and France had opposed it. He believed that British politicians were either deceived by Hitler or deliberately helped Germany establish hegemony on the European continent. "Britain surrendered to Hitler, and this meant the actual creation of an Anglo-German alliance instead of an Anglo-French alliance." Bos also believed that France could have saved Czechoslovakia and prevented a subsequent war...If the French had firmly told Britain and Germany that they supported Czechoslovakia, then Russia would have played its part" (Bose, 1962, p. 77, 78).
He proceeded from the fact that Russia stubbornly and persistently sought to conclude an agreement with Great Britain and France. "And only after it was convinced of the utter hopelessness of achieving this, it decided to sign a non-aggression Pact with Germany." Bos responded to this event with an article in his magazine "Forward Bloc" on August 26, 1939:"...if war breaks out between Germany and Poland, the sympathies of the Indian people will be on the side of the Poles." And then: "It is time to tell Britain in the clearest possible terms that India is not going to allow its human, financial and material resources to be used for an imperialist war... If the war doesn't start within a few days, and if the current storm clears, we shouldn't be so stupid as to think that the crisis is finally resolved... If Herr Hitler wants war, he will never have any trouble finding a convenient excuse. Therefore, we in India should be aware that the current international tensions will continue, and we should prepare accordingly" [Bose, 1962, p. 188, 189,222].
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Further developments - the German occupation of the Netherlands, Belgium, and then France-forced the Indians to rethink the situation in view of the changed situation. "When the German hordes captured Paris (June 14, 1940)," Bos wrote in the Forward Bloc newspaper the day after, "who would have thought that they would be able to achieve their goals so quickly?" ... It is difficult to predict how events will develop "if Great Britain is also captured. The United States of America cannot go beyond certain limits in its assistance to its allies, unless Japan creates some problems in the Far East... What should India's position be in this political situation?" Bose wondered [Bose, 1962, p. 267, 268, 306, 307]. In a difficult time for his homeland, he proceeded from the principle:"The enemy of my enemy is my friend." He believed that any enemy of England should be a friend of India. In the struggle for the liberation of India, he turned for help to Germany, and then to Japan [Bose, 1962, p. 455, 457-460].
At the same time, Gandhi said: "I have no desire to ask any Power to help India in its efforts to free itself from foreign oppression. I have no desire to replace British rule with anything else. I have never attached the slightest importance or weight to the friendly statements of the Axis countries. And so there can be no question of my approval of Subhas Chandra Bose's policy... But that doesn't mean I doubt his sacrifices and his patriotism. However, my appreciation of his patriotism and sacrifice cannot hide from me the fact that he has been misled and that the path he has chosen cannot lead to the liberation of India "(Tendulkar, 1962, p. 118).
Nehru also noted that there was almost no pro-Japanese sentiment in India, because no one wanted to change masters. However, there was a small group of people whose position was indirectly pro-Japanese - in the sense that they expected to take advantage of the Japanese invasion in the interests of liberating India. "They were impressed by the radio appearances of Subhas Chandra Bose from Germany," who had secretly fled India in 1941 [Nehru, 1955, p. 514].
However, very soon, during Bose's only meeting with Hitler on May 2, 1942, his illusions about the sincerity of the Germans in helping the Indians fight for independence finally dissipated. Hitler stated that he was opposed to Bosh's proposed declaration of the liberation of India, as it would make no sense when the enemy was not yet completely defeated. If he had half a dozen armored divisions and several motorized divisions south of the Caucasus Range to support the Arab and Egyptian rebels, then he would not hesitate to issue such a declaration. But such an opportunity may appear only within three months or even one or two years. As for India, it is infinitely far from Germany. The road to India, Hitler said, could lie over " the dead body of Russia." He also told Bosh that British rule in India could only be crushed by the simultaneous joint efforts of a revolution in India itself and a military strike by the Axis Powers. It will take Germany another year or two before it can put direct pressure on India, while Japanese influence on India will be felt in just a few months. So Hitler advised Bosh to go to Japan [Conversation..., 27 May 1942].
The chief of political intelligence of Hitler's Germany, W. Schellenberg, notes that in a conversation with the Boss, Hitler stressed: "...at the moment he is not particularly interested in India, and that he would prefer to leave Japan to monitor it both in political and strategic relations. And only if he continues to be successful, if Southern Russia and the Caucasus are conquered, and German tanks reach Iran, then and only then will he be ready to confer with Bosh about the future of India " (Schellenberg, 1991, p. 247).
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INDIANS ON THE EVENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II
The attention of the Indians at this time was attracted by Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on May 13, 1940, in which he said:: "It is necessary to understand: the British Empire will not be able to survive - everything for which it existed will perish, everything that humanity has defended for centuries, what it has been striving for for centuries, and what it will strive for will perish." In those days, Churchill wrote: "... we were all alone. Not a single English dominion, nor India, nor the colonies could give us decisive help or send us in time what they themselves had." On June 16, 1940, he sent a message to the Prime Ministers of the British Dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) to convince them of his determination to continue the struggle. He wrote: "I personally believe that ...even if we are defeated by overwhelming enemy aircraft, it will always be possible... send our fleets overseas, where they will protect the empire and enable it to continue the war and blockade, I hope, together with the United States, until the Hitler regime collapses from the strain" [Churchill, 1998, p.19, 65, 66, 102]. At the most critical hour, Churchill saw the salvation of Great Britain precisely in the empire, of which, of course, India was the main part. It was here that England was a source of huge resources, as well as a base for training and training troops there, relocated from its dominions and colonies (Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) for military operations in the Middle East and North Africa.
The German occupation of Belgium and the surrender of France caused great concern in India. Indian leaders paid particular attention to the events related to the encirclement of the British army by German troops near Dunkirk in late May - early June 1940, and then its evacuation, but in fact its flight (Churchill called it the "Dunkirk deliverance") [Churchill, 1998, p.63].
A few days before the evacuation of British troops from Dunkirk began, Hitler declared: "We are looking for points of contact with England based on the division of the world." Shortly afterwards, Hitler said to a small circle of close associates: "The army is the backbone of England and her empire. If we defeat the expeditionary force, the empire will perish. Since we do not want and cannot become her heirs, we must leave her a chance" [Lukacs, 1991, p. 119, 127]. Later, Hitler confirmed this idea in a conversation with US Undersecretary of State S. Welles, who, as Roosevelt's personal representative, visited Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London in February and March 1940. In a conversation with him, Hitler spoke about the desire to live in peace with England. He said the Germans did not want the British Empire destroyed. The same idea was expressed to Wells by G. Goering, who declared his readiness to guarantee the integrity of the British Empire [Wells, 1944, pp. 75-81, 94, 95].
Attempts to reconcile Germany and England continued later. One of the main conditions was to preserve the integrity of the British Empire. This purpose, in particular, served the flight of Hitler's deputy R. Hess to England in May 1941. R. Sherwood in his work "Roosevelt and Hopkins" writes that Hess's proposals, confidently made by him on behalf of Hitler, provided for the conclusion of a peace that would recognize and guarantee the power and prestige of the British Empire, giving Germany control over the Soviet Union. The European continent and free hands against the Bolsheviks. Hess repeated that hopes for effective American intervention were illusory, that Russia was doomed, and that Britain's position was hopeless [Sherwood, 1957, p. 483, 587]. This is confirmed by the reports of the Soviet intelligence officer Kim Philby, who in May 1941 informed Moscow that "Hess arrived in England to conclude a compromise peace, which should stop the exhaustion of both belligerents and prevent the final destruction of the British Empire as a stabilizing force" [Falin, 2000, p.186].
During this critical period, Churchill spoke frankly about the importance of colonial possessions for the preservation of Great Britain itself. On June 4, 1940, in a speech to Parliament, he said: "...we will never surrender; but even if, as I do not for a moment admit, this island or most of it will be captured and suffer from starvation.",
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then our Empire across the oceans, armed and guarded by the British Navy, will continue to fight until, in the hour of God's blessing, the New World moves forward with all its strength and might to save and liberate the Old World" (Shirer, 1960, p.885). When Churchill referred to "our Empire," he was primarily referring, of course, to India. At the time, Churchill (1930) stated: "The English people have no intention of relinquishing control over the life and progress of India... We have no intention of giving up this most brilliant and precious jewel of the royal crown, which, more than all our other dominions and possessions, is the strength and glory of the British Empire." In 1931, he said that he "did not mean that India would ever in the foreseeable future have the same constitutional rights and the same system as Canada... England, having lost India as its empire, will forever cease to exist as a great power" [Nehru, 1955, p. 477, 478].
All this did not pass by the attention of the Indians. India, Nehru wrote, was the foundation of the empire; its possession, its exploitation, was what made England's strength and glory, what made her a great Power. Churchill could not think of England as anything other than the center and mistress of a vast empire, and therefore he could not imagine India as free.
Events in Europe - the German occupation of Belgium, France, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, and the German air raids on England-strengthened the position of those Indians who supported the British war effort. However, at the annual session of Congress in April 1940, it was decided to begin preparations for a campaign of civil disobedience to protest India's participation in the war without the consent of the Indian people. In July 1940, the Congressional leadership made a new attempt to reach an agreement with the British Government on the issue of war. It has said it is ready to take an active part in the defence of India if a responsible provisional national Government is established and the British authorities declare independence for India after the war. The Congress proposed that this Government should be formed by the Viceroy within the framework of the current constitution.
But the British government refused to reconsider its position and meet the demands of the Indians. His response, dubbed the "August proposal," ignored the views of most Indian political parties and their leaders. On August 29, 1940, The National Herald, a newspaper close to Congress, wrote that the liberation of India would have a strong impact on world public opinion, including the British. "We are sure that if the war is long, Britain will not be able to win without the cooperation of America, India and Russia... India has offered the UK cooperation on terms that are honourable to both sides. A whole year of negotiations, consultations, speeches and debates ended with the complete refusal of Britain to grant freedom to India "(Prasad, 1985, p. 363).
Gandhi, Nehru, and other Congress leaders believed that India's liberation was not just her business. India was the symbol of all colonial and exploited peoples, the touchstone on which world politics was tested. If hundreds of millions of people in the colonies knew and believed that a war was being waged for their liberation, this would be a moral factor of great importance, even from a military point of view. But the policy of the colonial government prevented this.
In September 1940, Congress decided to conduct a campaign of civil disobedience against the British authorities. The participants in this campaign had to explain to the people the essence of the following appeals: "Do not contribute money to the military fund; do not send Indians to war; do not give materials for military purposes." In case of arrest and subsequent release from prison, they had to continue their performances again and again. Prominent Congress figures, including Nehru, participated in the campaign. On October 31, 1940, he was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison.-
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prison sentence. At the trial, Nehru said that he had always opposed Nazism and fascism.
The Communist Party of India (CPI), which was in an illegal position, also opposed India's participation in World War II at its initial stage. In the resolution adopted by the party leadership in November 1939, German fascism was called the main instigator of war, and British imperialism was considered as a force encouraging Hitler's aggression against the USSR. The CPI considered it necessary to use the military crisis to achieve Indian independence.
After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression Pact on August 23, 1939, Congress leaders, including Nehru, took an ambiguous position, but avoided criticizing the Soviet Union. Nehru tried to see this treaty against the general background of British policy towards the USSR. "There can be no real alliance between Hitler and Stalin," he wrote. - Both want to play the game using the methods of power politics. But in the past, Russia suffered greatly from England and could not help but remember this and express its indignation." When Soviet troops occupied eastern Poland on the basis of this treaty, Nehru said that these actions were directed against Germany and would ultimately help the Western allies, that they prevented the German occupation of eastern Poland, the seizure of Romania's oil fields, and also saved the Balkans from German aggression [Nehru, 1940, p. 162-164].
In connection with the Soviet-Finnish war in the winter of 1939-1940. Nehru wrote in December 1939 that the USSR was paying off the West with its own coin, that the Soviet-Finnish war could not be considered in isolation from the general world situation, especially since German strategists had plans to invade the USSR through Finland. A glance at the map was enough to confirm the reality of this, since Leningrad is located near the Finnish border. Hence, it is not difficult to understand the Soviet Union's desire to protect one of its vital centers. As military events unfolded on the Soviet-Finnish front, Nehru became more critical of the Soviet Union's actions. But this did not lead him to withdraw his support for the Soviet Union. It was about protecting the entire Soviet experiment, which had many undesirable features, but which remained the hope of ordinary people. The war in Finland provided a convenient opportunity for the" forces of reaction " to re-manifest their old hatred of socialism and the Soviet Union. "The Indians should not participate in anything that would contribute to the defeat of the USSR" [Nehru, 1940, p.242-257].
INDIA AND THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
A little over two months before the treacherous German attack on the Soviet Union, Rabindranath Tagore delivered his last message to India and the world. On April 14, 1941, on the day of his 80th birthday, he appealed to the general public to build a better world. He called the message "A Crisis of Civilization."
Tagore concluded his message with the following words: "As I write, a cruel monster is roaming Europe, fangs bared and claws extended, spreading terror and fear. The spirit of violence that is a product of Western civilization has awakened from its slumber: it corrupts human souls, poisoning the air around the world with its stench. Is he not to blame for our helplessness, for our hopeless, hopeless poverty?.. Today we can see firsthand the danger of the mad rampage of aggressive forces, their self-serving power. There is no doubt that the day is not far off when the words will be justified: "People who do not disdain sinful means can succeed, achieve what they want, having won the victory over their enemies, but they will inevitably die spiritually" [Tagore, 1982, pp. 348-354].
Many public and political organizations in India condemned the fascist aggression and expressed sympathy for the Soviet people. These included the Indian Progressive Writers 'Association, the All India Students' Federation, the Indian Women's Congress, as well as the All India Peasants ' Union and the All India Trade Union Congress. At their call, on July 21, 1941, a Day of Solidarity with the USSR was held in a number of cities and villages in India. In September 1941, the Week of the Soviet Union was held. In August 1941, India's first Soviet Aid Committee was established in Bombay. In his
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The appeal said: "Pay one paisa as a symbolic sign of love and support for the Soviet Union, as an expression of your burning hatred for the brutal Nazi hordes that attacked the country of socialism, as an expression of our determination to protect the first state of the workers "[Communist, 1941, N 8 (Oct. - Nov.), p.11].
The seriously ill Tagore was interested in the events on the Eastern Front in Europe. According to P. C. Mahalanobis, a well-known scholar and later Nehru's closest associate in building an independent India, Tagore, during his illness in July 1941, "waited every morning for news from the front from Russia. He repeated again and again that a Russian victory would bring him great happiness. Every morning he hoped to hear good news. When the message was bad, he dropped the paper and never read it again. Half an hour before the surgery, after which he died on August 7, Tagore asked me: "Tell me, what have you heard about Russia?" When I told him that things were getting better at the front, his face lit up and he exclaimed, " Oh, how could it be otherwise? This is how it should be. There should have been an improvement. They can achieve this. Only they will achieve this." Those were the last words Tagore said to me. I was happy to see his face illuminated by a firm belief in the victory of man" [Mahalanobis, 1961, p. 64].
The Indian press widely covered the events on the "Russian Front". Many newspapers expressed confidence that the Red Army would be able to stop the advance of German troops into the depths of Russia. However, this confidence soon gave way to concern, especially after the German armies advanced towards Leningrad in August 1941, the loss of Kiev, and the real threat to Moscow. Already in the autumn of the same year, articles began to appear in the Indian press, far from being left-wing in its ideology, which raised the question of opening a second front in order to force Germany to withdraw some divisions from Russia. Thus, the Nagpur-based Hitavada newspaper wrote in October 1941: "The serious situation in Russia, especially in the Ukraine, cannot allow the Indian people to simply follow the developments on the Russian-German front with curiosity. It is necessary to prevent the Nazis from reaching the Caucasus, as this could pose a threat to the countries of the Middle East and India "[Mitrokhin, 1977, p. 56].
The British colonial administration recognized that the Indians were in support of the USSR. A report by the Bengal Government in June 1941 stated that the Bengali public considered the entry of the Soviet Union into the war to be fundamentally important, as it changed the nature of the war and made it "a battle for the liberation of oppressed humanity in all countries." A similar report by the Madras government noted that the Indians believe that "Russia's defeat will endanger democratic countries" and that "India's duty is to provide all possible assistance to Russia's military efforts" (Mitrokhin and Yunel, 1987, p.96). Similar sentiments existed in other provinces.
In January 1942, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing solidarity with the Soviet people in their struggle against fascism. The Soviet Union, it said, protects certain human, social and cultural values that are of great importance for the progress of mankind, and it would be a tragedy if the war led to the destruction of these achievements. The Congress expressed its admiration for the self-sacrifice and heroic struggle of the Soviet people for the freedom of their country. On June 22, 1942, the Day of Solidarity with the Soviet People was celebrated in many cities of India. At rallies and demonstrations, confidence in the victory of the Red Army was expressed.
By the beginning of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front had fundamentally changed. The victories of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad in February of this year, and then at the Kursk Bulge in August 1943, changed the course of the Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. Many Indians responded enthusiastically to the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. Thus, a report of the Sindh government dated February 20, 1943 stated: "The newspapers report in great detail on the success of the Russians. Universal admiration for the Russian troops is expressed. The opinion is expressed everywhere that the threat to India has been completely eliminated "[Izvestia, 23.10.1943].
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In November 1943, the famous poet and public figure Sarojini Naidu sent a message on behalf of the Congress to the Soviet people, in which she conveyed "respect, love and admiration" for their achievements and successes. In connection with the victories of the Red Army on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, the General Secretary of the Muslim League, Liaqat Ali Khan, wrote that the heroic resistance of the peoples of the Soviet Union earned the respect and admiration of the peoples of the world. The peoples of the Soviet Union have shown how a nation can fight and make huge sacrifices to preserve freedom [Mitrokhin and Yunel, 1987, pp. 100-101]. Such parties as the Congress-Socialist, Liberal, Radical-Democratic, Forward-Blok and others also gave high marks to the struggle of the Soviet people against German fascism.
Such prominent Indian scientists as Nobel Prize-winning physicist C. V. Raman, physicist and astrophysicist Meghnad Saha, nuclear physicist H. J. Bhabha, historian D. D. Kosambi, philosopher D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Buddhologist Rahul Sankrityayana, artist Jamini Rai, and writer Tarashankar Bondopadhyay actively participated in the movement for friendship with the Soviet Union. Among those who supported this movement were the future Governor-General of independent India, Ch. Rajagopalachari, future President of India S. Radhakrishnan and others.
INDIA IN THE PLANS OF HITLER'S GERMANY
After the implementation of the Barbarossa directive, it was planned to throw Germany towards the Persian Gulf and further to India. The Secret Military Convention of Germany, Italy and Japan (January 18, 1942) assumed that India would be the "meeting place" of the victorious forces and fleets of the Axis powers. Germany and Japan signed an agreement by which the Eastern Hemisphere was divided between them in 70° East longitude, passing through Western Siberia and the western part of British India (present-day Pakistan). However, this agreement did not contain any specific agreements [Hauner, 1981, p.45]. In this scenario, India could become a battlefield. But after the defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler's Germany's attempts to advance Eastward were essentially limited to propaganda.
Before the Second World War broke out, India occupied a rather modest place in Germany's plans. Nevertheless, the Germans did not discount the possibility of a weakening of the British Empire in the event of anti-colonial protests in India itself. However, everything was complicated by the Nazi approach to the racial problem. In 1934, Hitler, in a conversation with one of the leaders of the so-called revolutionary socialists in the Nazi movement, O. Strasser, criticized him for supporting the kongressist movement: "You are in favor of the so-called Indian liberation movement. But it is quite clear that this is a revolt of the lower Indian race against the higher Anglo-Nordic race. The Nordic race has the right to rule the world, and we must use this right as a guiding star in our foreign policy. It is for this reason that cooperation with Russia is out of the question... Germany's interests require cooperation with Britain... " [Strasser, 1940, pp. 117-119].
Hitler formulated ideas about the racial superiority of the Germans, about the transformation on this basis of Germany, and in the end - and the whole world. He wrote: "Germany will either become a world power, or there will be no Germany itself." Hitler openly admired the way Great Britain ruled India and even declared that "as a man with German blood in his veins, he would rather see India under British rule than under anyone else's." He believed that England would never lose India if it did not violate the principle of racial purity in its administration (which is now completely excluded) or if it was not defeated by the sword of some powerful enemy. But the Indians themselves will never achieve this by their rebellions [Hitler, 1968, p. 533, 536].
Hitler accused the British of being too tolerant towards the Indians, who under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi repeatedly organized a civil disobedience movement against the British authorities. In November 1937, in a conversation with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, who, as Vice-President of the British Foreign Office, was the first Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.-
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In 1929-1931, when the King of India negotiated with Gandhi to end the civil disobedience movement, Hitler gave him the following advice:: "Shoot Gandhi, and if that's not enough to subdue them, shoot a dozen Congress leaders. If this is not enough, shoot 200 people and so on, until order is restored. And you will see how quickly they will give up as soon as they realize that you are not joking" [Kirkpatrick, 1959, p. 97; Earl of Avon, 1962, p. 516]. Hitler called the Indian freedom fighters " Asian swindlers." He wrote: "A coalition of bastards cannot defeat a powerful state that is ready, if necessary, to fight to the last drop of blood for its existence. As a nationalist who evaluates people based on their belonging to a certain race, I must recognize the racial inferiority of the so-called oppressed peoples, and this is enough not to link the fate of my people with the fate of these inferior races." Exactly the same approach, according to Hitler, should be applied to Russia. "Today's Russia without the German ruling class cannot be an ally in the struggle for German freedom... From a purely military point of view, a war of the Russian-German coalition against Western Europe, and possibly against the whole world, would be a catastrophe for us" [Hitler, 1968, p.536, 537].
V. Schellenberg wrote that Hitler's racist views had a huge impact on his (Hitler's) decisions. This attitude towards Great Britain was largely determined by the fact that " the English were an integral part of the German race and therefore were of the same value as the Germans themselves. Hitler's ultimate goal was to bring together all the German elements in Europe and then lead them against the Communist hordes." Schellenberg goes on to explain: "In justifying this goal, Hitler's racial theory was crucial" (Schellenberg 1991: 104, 105).
In exchange for a coveted alliance with Great Britain, Hitler was willing to guarantee the integrity of the British Empire. After the signing of the German-British naval agreement in 1938 (following the Munich agreement), he went even further and talked about helping to defend the British Empire with the entire German Fleet and 12 infantry divisions [Toynbee, 1967, p.276-295].
In search of a historical analogy to the plans for the conquest of living space in the East, Hitler turned to the example of the British Empire and even drew this parallel: "Our role in Russia will be an analogy to the role of England in India... The Russian space is our India. Like the English, we will rule this empire with a small handful of people... we will be able to control this region in the East with the help of 250 thousand people plus a cadre of good administrators. Let us learn from the British, who, with a mere 250,000 men, including 50,000 soldiers, control 400 million Indians.", 1953, 27.07.1941; 8 - 10.08.1941; 17 - 18.09.1941; 10.01.1942; 22.08.1942].
Hitler justified the idea of the conquest of the eastern living space by the German super race with the example of Great Britain, which received huge benefits from the conquest of India. On January 27, 1932, Hitler declared that Britain had conquered India not by justice or law, but by the most brutal brutality. He emphasized a kind of" Nordic solidarity "or" racial internationalism "that"united the Germans with the English super race." At the same time, in his characteristic style, he simplified Anglo-Indian relations to a level accessible to him and his audience. He stated bluntly: "No one, for example, can dispute the fact that the interests of India have never determined the conditions of life in England, but, on the contrary, (it is) British interests that have determined the activities of Britain in India." Later, on January 26, 1936, in Munich, he stated: "The Indians insisted on living according to their own customs, while the British felt it necessary to teach them to live according to English rules. After 150 years, they have succeeded... The white race is destined to rule. This is her subconscious aspiration, which originates in a heroic idea of the meaning of life and which is absolutely non-pacifist" (Baynes, 1942, p. 792). Following Hitler, his subordinates also became pro --
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they tried out the same ideas and put them into practice. For example, J. Goebbels wrote in his diary on March 20, 1942: "Our attitude to what remains of Russia should be the same as that of England to India "[Lochner, 1948, p. 92, 94-95].
The USSR was the main obstacle to the spread of Nazism. At the same time, Hitler wanted to be seen as a defender of Western civilization. On August 11, 1939, he said in his entourage:: "Everything I do is directed against Russia. If the West is stupid and blind enough to understand this, I will be forced to make an agreement with the Russians, defeat the West, and then, after its defeat, turn all the forces at my disposal against the Soviet Union. I need Ukraine to protect Germany from starvation" [Burckhardt, 1960, p. 348].
Hitler planned, after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan and the defeat of the USSR, to further advance eastward-through the Middle East to the oil of Iran, and then to Afghanistan with a direct threat to India. In the event of the defeat of the Soviet Union, nothing could stop it from achieving these goals. In Directive No. 32 of June 11, 1941, entitled "Preparations for the post-Barbarossa period," Hitler declared that " after the defeat of the Soviet armed forces, Germany and Italy will become masters of the European continent." Germany's main strike force is to be relocated to prepare for defeating Great Britain in the Mediterranean and Western Asia. These operations were to begin with attacks from Libya on Egypt and Palestine, from Bulgaria via Turkey, and "under certain circumstances also from Transcaucasia via Iran", but only after the defeat of the Soviet Union created the necessary conditions [Trevor-Roper, 1964, p. 129-139].
Germany's plans stipulated that after the end of the victorious eastern campaign in Russia, the capture of Afghanistan, and then India, should follow. The Germans set themselves the task of capturing Stalingrad, the Caucasus, and then moving to India. For this purpose, a special mechanized corps was deployed to the Caucasus. The global scale of Hitler's plans indicated the intention to claim the legacy of Great Britain as the hegemon of the world system. In turn, Japan also had its own plans for India. The Japanese military expected to approach the borders of India through Burma and the Bay of Bengal. As subsequent events showed, none of these plans worked, because the Soviet Union stood in the way of Hitler's Germany, which with huge efforts and sacrifices ground up the previously invincible power of the German military machine.
The German attack on the Soviet Union and the retreat of Soviet troops meant an increased threat to the Middle East and India. In 1941, the British command of the Anglo-Indian armed forces expressed doubts that the Red Army would be able to provide a decent resistance to the Wehrmacht army. It believed that after capturing the Caucasus, German troops could seize the oil-bearing areas of the Persian Gulf within two months. On July 18, 1941, the British leadership was asked to start cooperation with the USSR in order to block the possible advance of German troops both from the Caucasus and from Turkey. "If we do not do this," the command said in a dispatch, " it will allow German troops, supported by the air force and mobile groups, to penetrate deep into the borders of India with the active assistance of the Iranian and Afghan governments." Under these circumstances, British positions in Iran and the Persian Gulf will be under great threat. It was also pointed out that it is necessary to strengthen the defense of India, which may become particularly vulnerable in the event of a double offensive - Germany and Japan [Prasad, 1963, p.86].
Assessing the military situation in early 1942, Churchill said: "...at this point, world of struggle, no one could be sure that Germany will not be defeated by Russia, and then fails to turn and to invade England either, choosing another direction - through the Caucasus and Persia, will not merge with the Japanese avant-garde in India," [Churchill, 1998, p. 101]. In connection with the possible threat to India, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt on April 22, 1942: "I believe that the Japanese and Germans are still very far away from joining forces [in India].
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and very far away, but I understand that we should not lose sight of the distant possibility." And later, on another occasion, he emphasized:"...Our first commitment to the Empire was to protect India from the Japanese invasion that seemed to threaten it... To allow the Germans and Japanese to shake hands in India or the North East would be an immeasurable disaster for the Allied cause. In its significance, I recognized it as almost equivalent to the retreat of Soviet Russia beyond the Urals, or even to the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. At the time, I didn't think either was likely. I believed in the strength of the Russian armies and the Russian nation defending their native land. But our Indian Empire, with all its glory, could have been easy prey... Without active British assistance, India could have been conquered within a few months" [Churchill, 1998, p. 150, 151].
On August 14, 1941, the heads of government of the United States and Great Britain signed the Atlantic Charter, which defined the objectives of the war against Nazi Germany and its allies. In September 1941, the Soviet Union joined this charter. On January 1, 1942, representatives of the governments that supported the Atlantic Charter signed the Declaration of 26 States in Washington. The charter itself spoke about the rejection of territorial seizures and the right of peoples to choose their own form of government. However, Britain has said that this provision does not apply to India, prompting protests from Indian politicians and the public. On May 26, 1942, Great Britain and Russia signed a military treaty for a period of 20 years. The Indians welcomed this important event.
At the same time, Gandhi continued to develop his idea that the British should leave India immediately. He said that he could not postpone the decision of this issue. "In this case, my offer loses most of its value. I want them to leave now so that I can help China and Russia. Today, I can't fully use all my weight in their favor." Gandhi explained that the idea of India gaining independence and helping China and Russia gradually became stronger in him and became final after the failure of the S. Cripps mission in the summer of 1942. "This idea took hold of me," he argued,"and I realized that I must act in the name of Russia, China and India." Reflecting again and again on the problem of the British withdrawal from India and the country's involvement in the war, Gandhi is strengthened in the idea that "British power in India must end as soon as possible. This is necessary for the sake of peace, China, Russia and our allies." In his opinion, India's full independence will release its energy and give it the opportunity to contribute to solving the global crisis. "A non-free India is a dead weight for the allies," Gandhi said, and it is in the interests of India, as well as in the interests of the allies, to resist Japanese aggression with all their might [Tendulkar, 1962, p. 100, 101, 108, 110, 127]. Gandhi's confidence in the need to achieve freedom and independence of India already during the Second World War, and in this regard, his attitude towards Russia and China, "whose existence is under great threat," ultimately led to political conclusions. They found their expression in the resolution of the All India Congress Committee in early August 1942, called " Get out of India!". This was a key moment in the history of the Indian liberation struggle during World War II.
However, the British government was proactive. It actively attracted anti-congressional forces to its side. In particular, on July 23, 1942, the government announced that it would lift the ban on the activities of the Communist Party of India, which by then had been underground for about three years, and began to release Communists from prison. This was preceded by the fact that after the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the leadership of the CPI announced that the nature of the world war had changed, and it had become a "people's war". Therefore, the Communist Party of India called for cooperation in the fight against Germany and Japan.
The issue of the slogan of" people's war " among the Indians began a heated discussion. Leftists and quite numerous organizations and groups close to them supported this slogan. However, Gandhi expressed doubts about its correctness, since, in his opinion, it gave bri-
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The Tang government has reason to claim that " at least one popular party in India considers this war to be a people's war." Gandhi also believed that a" limited alliance " between Russia and the United Nations (i.e., mainly with Great Britain and the United States) could not be achieved... change what was previously an imperialist war against the Nazis and turn it into a people's war (Tendulkar, 1962, p. 266).
On August 5, 1942, the Congress Working Committee appealed to the United Nations to liberate India. He stressed the need to create a provisional government of representatives of the main Indian parties and groups after the British left. Its main task should be to protect India together with the Allied forces. There was no response to the Congressional appeal. As for the UK, its Government has said it considers it unwise for the Indian people to demand complete and fundamental changes while hostilities continue.
On August 7, 1942, at a session of the All India Congress Committee in Bombay, the party strongly demanded the withdrawal of Great Britain from India, the declaration of its independence, and the creation of a provisional national government of the country that would become an ally of the United Nations. Speaking on the issue, Nehru said the Congress "will fight to the end." The Voice of India represents "the voice of all oppressed humanity." The current World War is the "prelude" to a huge revolution that has engulfed the entire world. "The war may end or continue for some time, but there will be no peace, no balance will be reached until this revolution goes its own way." Unfortunately, leaders in the West "do not realize the revolutionary significance of this war... Churchill and other Englishmen did not abandon thinking in terms of the Anglo-Saxon race. ...There is too much talk now about the greatness and dignity of the Anglo-Saxon race, or the German race, or the Italian race. But there are also other races in the world... Racial superiority can no longer be tolerated... Despite all the threats and dangers, Britain does not want to give up imperialism and empire... The whole system is rotten through and through." On August 8, 1942, the WICC decided to launch a massive struggle for Indian independence and bring it to an end [Quit India, p. 74 - 77, 83, 86 - 89].
The All India Congress Committee expressed concern about the deteriorating situation on the Russian and Chinese fronts: "We convey to the Russian and Chinese peoples our admiration for their heroism in defending freedom." "This growing threat makes it necessary for all those who fight for freedom and sympathize with the victims of aggression to critically assess the foundations of the policies that the United Nations has pursued so far, policies that have led to devastating consequences." WICC also said that his demand for India's freedom was made in order to respond to the current threat and allow India to defend itself and help China and Russia in their hour of need. This should in no way interfere with the defense of these countries, whose freedom is of great value. But the danger is growing both in relation to India and in relation to these countries. At the WICC meeting, Gandhi said: "I cannot hesitate to be a mere witness when Russia and China are under threat." He linked the demand for the protection of China and Russia with the granting of freedom to India: "They (the British) will deal a fatal blow to China and Russia if they resist nonviolent India.. If India feels free, it will demand freedom for China. The road to help Russia will also be opened" [Tendulkar, 1962, p. 148, 150, 152, 167, 168].
After the arrest of Congress leaders and activists in August 1942, the struggle for Indian independence did not stop. It was only temporarily "postponed" until the release of Gandhi, Nehru and other leaders from prison in 1944 and 1945. Nevertheless, many Indian figures continued to directly link the country's independence cause with the victory in World War II.
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THE WAR APPROACHED INDIA FROM THE EAST
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the war began to rapidly approach the borders of India. On February 15, 1942, Singapore fell under the onslaught of the Japanese army. The troops defending it, including the Anglo-Indian divisions and brigades, were forced to capitulate. In early March 1942, the Japanese captured Rangoon and continued their advance through Burma to the Indian border. They were opposed by Anglo-Indian troops, who by mid-May 1942 were concentrated on the territory of India in the area of Imphal. Thus, the Japanese, supported by powerful naval and air forces, captured the entire island chain of the Netherlands Indies (present-day Indonesia), Thailand, British Malaya, Southern Burma, and the Andaman Islands, and directly threatened India itself.
Britain was trying to create a naval force in the Indian Ocean that could protect India. For this purpose, 4 aircraft carriers, 5 battleships, 7 cruisers and 16 destroyers were stationed in the area. In addition, efforts have been made to establish air bases along the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal. On April 5, 1942, 80 Japanese bombers from Admiral Nagumo's strike force (5 aircraft carriers, 4 battleships, plus their accompanying cruisers, destroyers, and tankers) struck Colombo, where the British Fleet was based. In the air battle, 21 Japanese aircraft were shot down, and the British lost 25 aircraft; a destroyer and an armed merchant cruiser were sunk in Colombo harbor. A little later that day, Japanese aircraft sank two British cruisers in the open sea. The next day, 54 Japanese bombers accompanied by fighter jets raided the Trincomalee naval base (Ceylon). A British cruiser and destroyer were sunk. At the same time, a second Japanese strike force (an aircraft carrier and six heavy cruisers) was operating in the Bay of Bengal against defenseless British merchant ships. Within a few days, the Japanese sank British ships with a total tonnage of more than 115 thousand tons [Churchill, 1998, p. 52, 74-82].
Given the threat to India from Japan, Churchill in early March 1942 asked Roosevelt to use U.S. naval forces to force Japan to return its ships to the Pacific and thus abandon the invasion of India. Churchill wrote that the Japanese had established their control over the Bay of Bengal and could at any moment do the same in the Ceylon area, and that the British naval forces had for the time being completely abandoned the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the African coast. To prevent the Japanese from landing in India or Ceylon, Churchill asked Roosevelt to consider the possibility of quickly delivering American aircraft to India to cover the US fleet in the Indian Ocean. In addition, to ensure the delivery of goods to the United Kingdom, a significant part of which came from India, he requested that merchant ships be sent to assist those that were at the disposal of Great Britain.
Roosevelt expressed his understanding of the large-scale problems that Great Britain faced in the Indian Ocean, but stated that the United States was concerned about the situation in the Pacific Ocean. In his reply, he wrote: "India needs to be held, and you need to do it; but frankly, this issue doesn't bother me as much as many others. The Japanese may land on the sea coast west of Burma. They can bomb Calcutta. But I don't see how they can concentrate enough troops to make anything more than a small breakthrough on the borders, and I think you can hold Ceylon." In turn, Churchill expressed the hope that America will continue to provide assistance and, thus, will enable Great Britain "to successfully defend Egypt, the Levant (the general name of the countries adjacent to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. FY) and India. This will be a difficult task. Now everything depends on a broad Russo-German struggle "[Churchill, 1998, pp. 82-91].
In March 1944, the Japanese launched an offensive on Imphal, but by mid-May it was stalled. Much better-armed Anglo-Indian forces, equipped with aircraft and heavy artillery (which the Japanese did not have), delivered blow after blow to the Japanese army. June 3
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In 1944, the Japanese began to retreat. Of the 220,000 Japanese soldiers who participated in this campaign, only 130,000 survived. The retired Indian General Habibullah described to the author of this article in 1964 how the Anglo-Indian army, in which he participated as an officer, "smashed the Japanese in the Burmese swamps."
INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AXIS POWERS
Events in Europe in the late 1930s were accompanied by the preparation of Great Britain for war in its empire, especially in India. It carried out organizational and mobilization activities in industry, transport, and the production of military materials. In 1939-1940, eight factories were opened for the production of weapons and ammunition, including field guns, tanks, armored cars, machine guns, submachine guns, aerial bombs, shells, the construction of patrol boats and minesweepers, and the first aircraft factory using equipment purchased from the United States. Work was carried out to create chemical industry enterprises for military purposes.
In the first days of the war, the Indian industry received significant military orders for the supply of ammunition, steel and coal, iron ore, manganese, mica, jute products, khaki cotton fabrics, wool products (blankets, overcoats, etc.) for England and other countries of the British Empire. military enterprises in India have grown six to seven times compared to the previous year.
During the war years, the greatest growth was observed in the military industries and those serving the needs of the army (cotton and food). India supplied food to the Anglo-Indian army stationed in the country itself, as well as South African, American and Chinese troops stationed in India and Burma. In addition, it provided food for Indian and British troops operating in North Africa, as well as in the Near and Middle East. And this is despite the fact that before the war, India imported grain (1.5-2 million tons per year) from Burma, Thailand, and the countries of Indochina [Newest..., 1959, p.373, 374].
In November 1939, the British Government entered into an agreement with the colonial administration of India (i.e., with its own agent) on the distribution between the mother country and the colony of the costs of maintaining the Anglo-Indian army and conducting a number of military actions. The mother country undertook to maintain Anglo-Indian troops stationed outside India, and the Indian troops themselves stationed in India. In reality, however, most of these costs were passed on to India. According to official figures, military expenditures in the budget of India during the war years amounted to 1,275 million pounds. In total, the value of the material resources withdrawn by the UK from India during the same period cost India at least 2,800 million rubles. pounds sterling [Newest..., p. 388, 391].
In 1940, Frank Noyce, the British government's adviser on trade with India, described the importance of India during the war as follows:: "Its most important economic function is to serve as a supply center for countries ranging from Egypt, where some of its troops are already stationed, to Malaya. She will be... do everything possible to supply raw materials and finished goods to the entire coast of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, thus freeing up resources and, most importantly, the British fleet for use for more important purposes " [India, 1941, p. 275]. This is exactly what happened during the war. A portion of US lend-lease shipments, which totaled more than $ 2.1 billion from March 1941 to September 1945, were also sold through India. dol.
India's contribution to the Allied war effort was also very significant. On the eve of the war, the Anglo-Indian armed forces numbered about 350 thousand people. The main group of armed formations (206 thousand) regular army-consisted of hired Indian troops recruited in India and Nepal (159 thousand), and British units (47 thousand) sent for a certain period of time from Great Britain. In the Indian divisions, one English regiment was assigned to every three Indian regiments. The Anglo-Indian army was divided into two main divisions:
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parts. The first is the regular units of the British Army located in India, recruited in the home country. The second is the so-called Indian Army, which is recruited in India. At the beginning of the war, the Anglo-Indian army was the second largest in the empire after the British army itself, and at the end of the war even surpassed it. The Indian army was recruited as a mercenary army. There was no conscription law in India. Indian soldiers and officers swore allegiance to the King-Emperor of England, and were educated to protect the security and integrity of the British Empire. During the war, about 2.5 million Indians were recruited into the army, who took part in combat operations in North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Europe, in providing security for the transportation of goods from India and other parts of the empire across the Indian Ocean, the Red and Mediterranean Seas. (There were 1.3 million Indian soldiers in World War I, who also fought on many fronts.)
India's strategic importance to the British Empire played a role in the war. In a certain sense, the words of the former British Foreign Secretary J. R. R. Tolkien were confirmed. Curzon, who spoke of India's central position, its vast resources, its growing population, and its army that could be deployed anywhere in Asia or Africa. Curzon believed that "India is the center of defense of the British Empire" [India, p. 278].
The extreme strain on India's resources during the war, especially grain, with the usual shortage and lack of government supplies, led to famine. In 1943, about a third of the country's population was starving. Most people died in Bengal and its largest city Calcutta: according to official data-from 1.5 to 2 million people, according to other estimates-from 3.5 to 4.5 million people [Ghosh, 1951, p. 46; Nehru, 1955, p. 544-545; Sen, 1981, p. 65, 75-78]. In this regard, Viceroy Wavell sent a number of telegrams to Prime Minister W. Churchill, in which he reported that several million people were dying of hunger and food aid was needed. In response, Churchill sent the Viceroy a telegram in which he sarcastically asked:: "Why hasn't Gandhi died yet?" [Tunzelmann, 2007, p.120].
The Minister for Indian Affairs, L. S. Emery, wrote to Churchill in connection with the Bengal famine: "Once it is known that food supplies from outside sources are not coming to India, the Government of India will not be able to prevent the widespread concealment of food, and the famine will spread with devastating speed throughout India... The result could be absolutely fatal for our participation in World War II, and not just from the point of view of India as a base for our further operations. I don't think you have a good idea of how deeply public opinion is already against the government because of the famine in Bengal and how much damage it has done to us in the eyes of Americans. This is the most serious blow that has already been dealt to our name as an Empire in our entire life. We simply cannot allow this to happen again, and on an even larger scale... After that, nothing can keep India in the Empire" [Tunzelmann, 2007, p. 121,342].
* * *
Less than two years after the end of the Second World War, the British Empire, which until recently had seemed indestructible, began to fall apart. August 15, 1947 India declared its independence, which radically changed the political situation both in the East and around the world.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War contributed to the creation of an international environment favorable for India's national independence, and the public relations between the two countries that strengthened during the war years paved the way for future cooperation between the USSR and free India.
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