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words: Keywords: security, power, guerrilla experience, loyalty to the leader, Juche ideas, songun policy, soyoungwa model, nationalism.

The historical radicalism of the North Korean regime is confirmed by its impressive ideological purism, smooth continuity of generations. But is it possible to interpret the steady reproduction of the regime and model of social structure - this kind of conservative "reverse" of innovation - in any other way than as an inseparable addition to the revolutionary "obverse"? Isn't it enough to explain the regime's resilience by measuring the depth of its break with Korean traditions? Or, on the contrary, the gap was not at all as radical as it seems at first glance? To answer these questions, it is necessary to determine whether traditions were really uprooted, or whether they have grown into the fabric of the new society, its institutions, values and norms. There is another method that can suggest answers - research that focuses on just one, but revealing, aspect of the problem. As such, we chose the views of the ruling elite of the DPRK on security.

This raises two new questions. Why can security concepts serve as the golden key to the door leading to the backstage of a North Korean theater? And why can we limit ourselves to the ideas of the elite?

SECURITY AND POWER IN THE DPRK: INSEPARABILITY IN VIEWS

The value of security has long influenced the norms and patterns of human behavior, even when and where there is no specific concept for it. Generally speaking, the absence of a concept does not necessarily imply the absence of a state. This variation is also possible-

1 Article 2 of the DPRK Constitution explicitly states that the Republic is a revolutionary state (emphasis added). - Author). (See: [Sotsialisticheskaya...]).

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ant, when there is no concept because the state to which this concept could adequately correspond is not yet isolated in its perception from adjacent states. So, in the ancient Egyptian language there was no direct correspondence to the Russian word security, the English word security, or the Arabic word aman. But there was an abstract synthetic concept of maat, which included a whole complex of ideas about truth, truth, justice, law and order, ethical norm, law, divine institution, etc. In fact, it reflects the ideal model of safe social relations [Kolganova and Petrova, 2013, p. 15-17], and it can be assumed that their unity or inconclusive semantic dismemberment contributed rather than hindered the implementation of iaat.

A research project implemented in 2010-2013 at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences provided a lot of evidence in favor of the thesis about the universal significance of security. The semantic content and evolution of security-related terms were traced on the examples of ancient and modern languages, Italian and Burmese cultures, on the experience of ancient Egypt and China, Japan of the XVII-first half of the XX century. and modern Uzbekistan [Security as value..., 2012; Security the West..., 2014]. However, even the most basic forms of security that are in demand in any human community, since basic survival is impossible without them, are not generally recognized, since not all societies are "ready to extend them to outsiders, foreigners and enemies" [Bok, 2002, p.X].

As for the question "why the views of the elite?", then the answer to it lies on the surface. In a country with the most severe censorship and almost complete isolation from the outside world, only her performances can be somehow tracked. Voices of "subalterns"2 from the DPRK are not heard. And if they did, they would largely reproduce the ideal of security, which is implicit in the worldview imposed by the regime's propaganda. After all, the North Korean official body has long had a monopoly on information, and judging by the impressive arguments given by A. N. Lankov [Lankov, 2013], in the field of information control, the North Korean authorities managed to get as close as possible to the picture drawn by Orwell [Orwell, 2009, pp. 97-337].

Another thing is that this control does not necessarily oppress the people of the DPRK as much as the heroes of Orwell. Orwell's heroes Julia and Winston are endowed with the spontaneous ability to reject the picture of the world imposed on them. The DPRK probably has its own Julia and Winston families outside the well-informed stratum, but this is hardly a widespread phenomenon. Most people are more or less satisfied with life simply because they know little about its alternative structure and are able to find joy and pleasure in what is available to them [Kurbanov, 2008].

Of course, the study of the ideas of only the elite entails a narrowing of the research field both in the subject and in cognitive terms. Security issues that are paramount for a commoner - preserving the life cycle, creating savings, etc. - if high authorities are concerned, it is only because of exceptional circumstances. The position of the political elite in the social hierarchy is determined by its access to the key decision-making process, control over their implementation, the ability to manage resources and the use of institutions of suppression. The specific position of the elite determines which aspects of security are in the center of its attention. First of all, it is its own security, which in authoritarian states is understood as the inseparability of access to power (even to the" body " of the upper classes-

2 Literally - junior in rank (English subalterns), broadly-subordinates, managed. In the discourse of the school of Subaltern Studies, which borrowed the term itself from Antonio Gramsci, this concept covers all those who are placed in the position of voiceless objects of the historical process. For more information about Subaltern Studies, see [Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 9-32].

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personal security in all its forms - from prestigious forms of consumption to physical survival. Personal security, in turn, is directly related to the security of the state.

In fact, personal security and state security are not opposed to each other: in the views of the elite, they are inseparable, as in maat - truth and law and order. (And here it does not matter that at the conceptual level such a division, in contrast to the ancient Egyptian situation, is formally implemented.) As a result, we will focus mainly on one type of security - national security. Theoretically, it applies to the entire natural resource, social and cultural content of the space outlined by the borders of a particular state. In the North Korean case, national security is reduced precisely to the security of the state, primarily military 3, while the security of an individual or group, dignity or life, flora or fauna can always be sacrificed and sacrificed.

NORTH KOREA: A PLACE IN THE TYPOLOGY OF STATES

The closure of security to the state forces us to turn to the concept of securitization of the so-called Copenhagen school. In its most general form, securitization is the interpretation of any process and / or phenomenon in extrapolitical terms - in the categories of security as survival [Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p. 23-24]:

"Theoretically, any socially significant issue can be ranked as non-politicized, politicized and securitized. The first rank is when neither the state deals with this issue, nor in any other way it becomes the subject of public discussion with a subsequent decision. The second is when the issue becomes an integral part of public policy, partially requiring government decisions, allocation of resources, or, in rare cases, other forms of public regulation. The third rank means that this issue is presented as containing an existential threat, requiring such measures to prevent it and justifying such actions that do not fit into the framework of regulatory political procedures."

"The connection between securitization and politicization does not mean that the former always comes from the state: both can be launched on other platforms" [Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p. 24]. Nevertheless, States, with all attempts on their prerogatives by the global and glocal, remain the main agents of existing security systems. They determine the dynamics of security in any region of the world, and changes in the scope and content of security primarily depend on their policies [Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 20-26]. Accordingly, the gradation of states according to their strength and type, determined by the stage of development, is fundamentally important. In terms of strength, they are divided into consolidated and loose, and as security subjects, the former are much more effective than the latter.

In terms of stadiums, with the formal uniformity of all states of the modern world,three types of states co-exist: premodern, modern and postmodern. The reference point is the modern states , which have the most pronounced features of the ideal state of the Westphalian type4. This is an increased concern for the inviolability of sovereignty, relative isolation from the outside world, control over the territory and society, or the desire for such and no less strong - for the survival of the state.-

3 It is significant that in one of the main ideological documents of the North Korean regime, the security of the people is mentioned only once and inextricably linked with military security ("self-defense") [Kim Jong Il, 1986, pp. 57-58].

4 This refers to the idea of the state as an equal and self-sufficient subject of international relations in the form in which they were formed in Western Europe at the turn of the Middle Ages and Modern Times, which then received formal legal sanction in the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648.

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the state's exclusive right to securitisation. These qualities are absent in premodern States. Therefore, unlike modern states, which represent a wide range of differences in terms of strength - from very strong to relatively weak-they form a set of states that are weak or not at all successful, unable or only partially capable of securitization. In postmodern states, some significant components of the modern model, such as the tendency to closeness or the deification of sovereignty, are largely overcome. This has as its consequence, firstly, the division of the right to securitisation between the state and civil society; secondly, a significant revision of the securitisation agenda itself-bringing to the fore levels, aspects or types of security that were not a priority for the classical modern state.

According to the Copenhagen school typology, the DPRK is an extreme version of a modern state, in which a repressive authoritarian regime forcibly imposes "modernity" on society [Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 23, 120-133]. This assessment seems simplistic to us; the question of whether modernization in North Korea is an exclusively imposed process remains open. And there is no doubt that the monopoly entity that has set and is setting the direction of social transformation in the DPRK is the narrow elite that manages it, which - let us emphasize once again - attaches such importance to those components of its worldview that guide its securitization policy. But before we proceed to their identification, let us turn to the experience of revolutionary regimes in their genesis, whose sincere desire to completely overcome the past no one seems to doubt.

TRADITION IN THE REVOLUTION: APPROPRIATION AND INVENTION

This aspect is well understood, and we can count on it to help us choose the right "path to Pyongyang". The most famous examples are the Jacobin dictatorship in France and the Bolshevik regime in the USSR.5 The Jacobins sought to overthrow the "old order" in all its forms. They did not limit themselves to introducing into the public consciousness the idea of a monolithic non - ancestral civil nation as the desired ideal, and in political practice-terror as a means to achieve this ideal. Their transformative zeal extended far beyond the political proper. It is enough to recall that under the Jacobins, France received a metrical system, a new chronology and calendar, new festivals and rituals; they tried to replace the historical religion with the cult of the Supreme Being.

The Bolsheviks, acting on the political field, widely introduced the ideas of internationalism and revolutionary expediency and actively used terror. But they were not satisfied with the political sphere either - they outlawed traditional religions, reformed the calendar, unified the system of weights and measures, cleaned up the alphabet, and filled the Russian language with abbreviations and ideologically consistent neologisms. In addition, they made class origin the only lens , with a few exceptions, through which to look at any person and any cultural phenomenon of any time.

In France, within the framework of nationalism and rationalism, institutions, customs and documents inherited from the past were not simply denied the right to exist [Goloborodko, 2012, pp. 31-37; Sokh, 2007]. History itself was abolished, filled with these institutions and customs, so that "the dark past does not stain the greatness of the nation"

5 More precisely, before the adoption in 1934 by the Council of People's Commissars of a resolution on the teaching of civil history in schools and the appearance in 1937 of the "Short Course on the History of the USSR", which emphasized the continuity of the historical development of Russia, figuratively speaking, from Rurik to Stalin. (For more information, see: [Fuchs, 2009, pp. 104-113; History Russia..., 2010, pp. 944-948]).

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[Gautherot, 1914, p. 21; cit. by: Sokh, 2014, p. 46]. In Russia, internationalism and the class approach have served as equally effective means of rethinking the past and breaking with it. However, in both cases, a tradition can be found at the core of the rejection of the past. As applied to revolutionary France, this was done by Karl Marx [Marx, 1970, p. 422]:

"People make their own history, but they do it not in the way they want, under circumstances that they did not choose themselves, but which are directly present, given to them and passed on from the past. The traditions of all the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the minds of the living. And just when people seem to be doing nothing but remaking themselves and their surroundings and creating something even more unprecedented, just in such epochs of revolutionary crises, they fearfully resort to spells, summoning the spirits of the past to their aid, borrowing their names, battle slogans, costumes, so that in this hallowed place they will be able to use them. ancient attire, in this borrowed language, play out a new scene of world history. Thus, Luther disguised himself as the Apostle Paul, the revolution of 1789-1814 was draped alternately in the costume of the Roman Republic, then in the costume of the Roman Empire, and the revolution of 1848 found nothing better than to parody the year 1789, then the revolutionary traditions of 1793-1795... Thus, one century earlier, at a different stage of development, Cromwell and the English people used for their bourgeois revolution language, passions and illusions borrowed from the Old Testament..."

Even before the revolution, the Bolsheviks were engaged in what Eric Hobsbawm called "inventing tradition,"6 and they did not stop doing so after the revolution. As an argumentum ad tapit, let us recall Lenin's periodization of the new history of Russia based on the main revolutionary milestones [Lenin, 1968, pp. 255-262]and his post-revolutionary references to the images and examples of the Jacobins. 7 After the victory of Nazism in Germany, which demonstrated the mobilization capabilities of nationalism, revolutionary nihilism in relation to the past was replaced in Russia by its appropriation and rewriting to meet the needs of the regime [Istoriya Rossii..., 2010, p.946]. The complete disqualification of historical players of non-Proletarian origin has been replaced by their selective aggrandizement.

It was the policy of inventing tradition. However, together with it and, importantly, before it, the embalming of Lenin's body proved that the tradition that is approved is strong when it resonates with the tradition that is rejected. The relics of the leader of the proletariat turned out to be possible because they found form and sanction in the relics of Christian saints; communism became a religion because, having overthrown the old religions, it cleared a place for itself [Ryklin, 2009, pp. 17-20].

As we can see, there are good reasons to believe that in states that declare a break with the past, the tradition does not disappear at the command of their superiors and is used by the superiors themselves. At the same time, both sides of the coin are important - the front side revealed to the public = the invented tradition, and the hidden, sometimes not realized reverse side = the cultural environment of innovation. Moreover, taking into account pre-revolutionary patterns of political behavior and beliefs nurtured by the old culture often makes the most significant contribution to explaining policies that claim to be completely new.

Therefore, in this article we will focus on the reverse side of the coin minted by three generations of Kims. Her drawing was created under the influence of three pillars-

6 Hobsbawm defined the invented tradition as follows:" A set of social practices of a ritual or symbolic nature, usually regulated by explicitly or implicitly recognized rules; its goal is to introduce certain values and norms of behavior, and the means to achieve the goal is repetition " [Hobsbawm, 2000, p.48].

7 As early as 1904 he actually presented the Bolsheviks as successors of the Jacobins: "A Jacobin who is inextricably linked with the organization of the proletariat, who is conscious of its class interests, is a revolutionary social-democrat" [Lenin, 1967, p.370].

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the main components of the worldview of the North Korean elite: the military-partisan experience of the first leaders of the DPRK, the Confucian tradition in Korean culture and Korean nationalism [Asmolov, 2005; Zhebin, 2006; Kurbanov, 2001, pp. 58-65; Lankov, 2003].

NORTH Korea: REDUCTION OF SECURITY BY MILITARY-PARTISAN EXPERIENCE

By the time the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established, its leadership had inherited a ruined country with a population literally exhausted by the last decade of Japanese colonial rule. One of its results was the absence of any influential national and political elite within the country (Kurbanov, 2009). As a result, in each of the two Korean states, leaders came to power whose political formation was carried out outside the country, half in an emigrant, half in a foreign cultural environment. In South Korea, Lee Seung-man came to power as a politician who developed in cosmopolitan Shanghai and in the United States. North Korea was headed by Soviet Army captain Kim Il Sung, who for several years was called Jin Zhicheng, based on the Chinese reading of his name characters (Lankov, 2003). Both characteristics convey the essence of the early biography of the North Korean leader, formed by two complementary experiences.

On the one hand, it is an experience of partisan struggle. Kim Il Sung and a large number of his associates spent quite a long time - from 1932 to 1940 - in the spartan conditions of an active partisan unit, which could not but affect the formation of their characters, as well as their vision of the administrative system. Korean partisans in Manchuria were incorporated into the Chinese Communist partisans, and for those, the Special Region of China served as a model for organizing life. But by the end of the 1930s, Mao Zedong's ideas about the primacy of the leader over the party were partially implemented in political practice there.8 It can be assumed that the increasingly consistent management style, which was reproduced in the liberated areas at other levels of the party and administrative hierarchy, was already stored in Kim Il Sung's subconscious as a role model that emerged when he became the main person in Pyongyang.

On the other hand, it is the experience of military service with a predominance of vertical connections and power relations, repetitive and simplified social situations, and a command style of communication. For Kim and his comrades, military training was supplemented by training in management skills - "according to the patterns of the Stalinist system" [Balkansky, 2011, p. 69]. A. N. Lankov is right: "Kim Il Sung's partisan and military background could not but lead him to overestimate the role of military methods of solving political problems" (Lankov, 2003). This component of the worldview also resulted in the initial reduction of security: understanding it mainly in a military-tactical way - as a state provided by weapons and maneuver, and at the same time fragile and unstable.

Both experiences were dominant in shaping the worldview of Kim Il Sung and his entourage, and were further legitimized by the successes he witnessed in other countries: the Chinese Communists extended their power from partisan bases throughout the country; the Soviet Army, by sweeping away Kwantung and making a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany, demonstrated the military might of the USSR. These successes were evidence of security achieved through strength, patience, unity of command, and great sacrifice.

8 They were fully manifested in the course of the "zhengfeng" or "style correction movement" campaign, described in detail in [Vladimirov, 1973].

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During the formation of the DPRK, along with the "revolutionary" traditions borrowed from the USSR and the PRC, the country's leadership actively introduced the "traditions of anti-Japanese partisans" into the consciousness of its citizens [Zhebin, 2006, p.19]. The specific function of the latter was to firmly impress on the minds of Koreans the necessity of a paramilitary situation, which required the mobilization of all available resources, which automatically predetermined the preservation of a low standard of living. Through propaganda, the population maintained a sense of a constantly unstable situation-being in the "enemy's rear" or on the front line of defense that runs along the entire perimeter of the North Korean borders. In the economy, primary attention was paid to the military-industrial complex. When during the Korean War (1950-1953) and in the first years after it, the DPRK found itself in a partial economic blockade, these elements of consciousness became even more popular. The former partisan commanders still felt that they were the leaders of a liberated area in a hostile environment, but the area had grown to the size of a country that needed to be turned into a fortress.

The result of this thinking was a cult of internal unity, embodied in one political line drawn on the map of the future by one commander.9 So understood unity was perceived as the most important guarantee of state security, and constant deprivation instilled in the population the habit of being content with little. A habit that is still sustained by accumulated poverty and the efforts of those who for decades have been proclaiming the victorious power of "ways to survive" ("We are used to hostile sanctions, we have our own ways to survive in such conditions" [Disgusting behavior..., 2006].) It is not surprising that the issues of survival both stood and still stand at the first place in the everyday concerns of the average person. Finally, the desire for complete autarky was quickly manifested, and calls were made for charek kansen - self -reliance. At the same time, Kim Il Sung initiated the Cheonglim movement (the legendary horse that runs 1000 li, i.e. 250 km in one day), the Korean equivalent of the Chinese Great Leap Forward (Altov and Panin, 2004).

The DPRK received assistance from the USSR, and in 1960 the enterprises built thanks to it produced 40% of electricity, over 50% of pig iron and coke, and 70% of cotton fabrics [Torkunov, Denisov, and Li, 2008, p. 191]. In the future, the amount of aid could be reduced, but before the collapse of the USSR, it did not stop completely. Helped the DPRK and the PRC. So the reason for the course towards autarky was not due to unreliability, insufficient volume or limited foreign economic relations, but to the attitude taken from the partisan past: the partisans cannot count on regular external assistance and therefore must make maximum use of internal resources. Such an accentuation of the inner, "own" and "self-strong" impoverishes both the ideal vision of security and its actually achieved state. After all, it blocks the very idea of security through cooperation with the outside, with the "alien" and"foreign".

CONFUCIAN HERITAGE IN NORTH KOREAN IDEOLOGY

For all its significance, the complex of security concepts based on partisan experience was not comprehensive and therefore could not serve as the only source of ideology for the new state.

Outwardly, this ideology and the political system sanctified by it reproduced the Soviet model. The same can be said about the concept of security. Figuratively, its essence can be conveyed by a metaphor known to every Soviet person.-

9 Cf.: "The Party and the people will demonstrate their inexhaustible strength and achieve victory in revolution and construction when they unite together..." [Kim Jong Il, 1986, p.48].

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swarm "border on the lock", in the categories of securitization theory, it qualifies as typical for a modern state. In fact, the components of the worldview that have defined the mentality of Koreans for centuries have not disappeared - just as the religious beliefs of the inhabitants of the USSR have not completely disappeared under the pressure of Soviet atheism. The forms of political structures, their functioning and ideological reinforcement introduced to the DPRK from outside were established precisely because they had a fertile ground prepared for them over a long historical period by the traditions of world perception and normative behavior characteristic of the Confucian cultural area. Without such a synthesis of traditional and modern 10, new trends would probably be rejected.

The Confucian complex played a primary role in the management processes in the Far East. According to S. O. Kurbanov, its system-forming element was a category that sounded like xiao in Chinese, hyo in Korean, and translated into Russian as "filial piety". Xiao / he "begins in the service of parents, passes into the service of the ruler, and ends in establishing one's place in life "[Kurbanov, 2005, p. 316]11, permeating the life of a person and society with relations of circular causality. One can disagree with S. O. Kurbanov, since he himself convincingly shows that during the Joseon period (1392-1897), the content of the category was gradually reduced to showing signs of respect for parents. But even if the historian exaggerated the role of Xiao / he in the system of Confucian values and norms, three conclusions seem quite correct, in our opinion, following from the facts and arguments presented by him.

First, the norm of behavioral deference to parents is isomorphic to deference to power, so it is not difficult for the propaganda apparatus to transfer it to the universal "father and mother" - the personifier of power. And it doesn't matter what ideology the transfer is framed by: for its success, it is enough that the relationship of domination (father/patron)is reproduced in families on a daily basis - subordinates (children/clients).

Second, the xiao/hye category resonates precisely with the Confucian moral norms that prevailed in pre-colonial Korea. In particular, with the "Three Commandments" or "Three Foundations", which again confirmed the identity of political and family hierarchies [Kurbanov, 2005, p. 184-185]:

"1) The subject serves the sovereign (and the sovereign takes care of the subject);

2) The son serves the father (and the father takes care of the son);

3) The wife serves the husband (and the husband takes care of the wife)."

Third, even in Han China, " filial piety "was placed in an indissoluble connection with" loyalty":"Who knows what filial piety is, [is] able to embody the loyalty of [a subject]." Ma Joong, who so conveyed the idea of Confucius, wrote a special" Book on Loyalty", where this virtue was presented as a sine non for the stability of the state, social harmony and personal prosperity [Ma Joong, 2004]. Thus, the intra-family relationship was again intertwined with a priori loyalty to the authorities, the idea of what is due - " with a vertically organized system built on the framework of hierarchical relationships of a quasi-family type..."[Asmolov, 2005, p. 8].

Between the time of Confucianism in Korea and the beginning of socialism in the north, there was a period of colonial modernization that could erase much of the Joseon legacy. This, however, did not happen, since the colonial authorities placed special emphasis on loyalty to the state and the emperor, on unconditional

10 The term is borrowed from a well-known work of Soviet Orientalists. See: [Evolution..., 1984].

11 Confucius ' teaching from the Xiao Jing ("Canon of Filial Piety") is known in Korean as"Hyegen onhe". The above quotation is taken from the commented Russian translation of "Hegen onhe" made by S. O. Kurbanov and placed in Appendix 1 (Kurbanov, 2005).

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priority of vertical social communication over all other connections. With the help of Confucian ideological "props", their control over Korean society reached such strength that by the end of Japanese rule, as some South Korean scholars believe, it became completely totalitarian, and this legacy "also had a strong influence on the official ideology and political practice of the DPRK" [Zhebin, 2006, p.13]. It promoted the perception of security as a conditional right12-in this case, conditioned by the patron-client relationship (recall: the subject serves the authorities - the authorities take care of him), and spread the basic strategy for achieving security, which consisted in demonstrative loyalty to the leader who replaced the emperor.

In the DPRK, the Confucian heritage is also implicitly present in the idea of a "correct" state - its social structure and power in it, although the Constitution of the DPRK uses the usual Marxist terms to describe them: "Power in the DPRK belongs to the workers, peasants, working intelligentsia, and the entire working people", they are led by the Workers ' Party of Korea, are guided by They use the ideas of "the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung", who is revered "as the eternal President of the Republic" 13. They hold together this socio-political pyramid of the value of loyalty-service, reverence and obedience. As it was said in "Hegen onhe" (Kurbanov, 2005, p. 322):

"If you serve the ruler through he, that is loyalty. If you serve your elders through respect, then that is obedience. And only without losing loyalty and obedience, they serve these [their] superiors."

The ruler is located at the very top because here he is not separated by any mediating sociality from the Sky. This allows him to act as a conductor of heavenly harmony and order on Earth, and therefore a guarantor of stability. In the Confucian system of values, the value of stability is raised very high [Asmolov, 2005, p. 9]. We can talk about a cult of stability and a non-auditable way to maintain and achieve it, reducing it to immutability.

The cult of stability cannot but affect the idea of security. First of all, in a situation where its various aspects compete or even come into conflict, people are more likely to choose stability that guarantees survival than an aspect that involves the risk of change, for example, security of dignity. 14 The value priority of stability perfectly legitimizes the idea that the interests of the three "floors" of the state (people-party-leader) always and in everything coincide. After all, their discrepancy would mean a threat to stability. It also reinforces the idea that the country's security is unattainable without someone who personally embodies stability - without a supreme ruler or leader.

JUCHE: SELECTIVE SYNTHESIS OF TRADITIONS AND INNOVATIONS

As in revolutionary France and revolutionary Russia, in the DPRK the synthesis of the traditional and the modern took place in two ways. At the first stage-gradually, without special verbal registration of the process, sometimes not recognized at all by its participants. So it proceeded mainly on an individual and family-group basis.-

12 The thesis on the conditionality of the right to security was formulated based on the results of an analysis of security terms in the Chinese language (see: [Dmitriev, 2012, p. 78]). In our opinion, it is quite applicable to Korea.

13 So it is written in Article 4 of the Introduction to the Constitution of the DPRK [Socialist...].

14 The idea of security of dignity as the core of security distinguishes the work of the Japanese writer Kenzaburo Oe (see: [Zeidenstein, 1995, p. 147, 149]), a native of a country that is part of the cultural circle of Confucianism. It seems, however, that the decisive role was played by his personal, not collective experience.

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at a new level, in everyday practices, including routine contacts between managers and managed people. The second was the path of selection-the rejection of some components of the heritage, acceptance, use and partial transformation of others.

In our opinion, the Juche philosophy is an example of a selective approach to tradition, not so much inventing it a la Hobsbawm as giving it the appearance of a revolutionary innovation. At first glance, its core idea that "man is the master of everything" and "master of the world" echoes the general communist principle of aggressive anthropocentrism. But it also goes back to the Korean tradition-though not to Confucianism, but to the Tonhak doctrine that spread at the end of the XIX century, one of the central postulates of which was the "equation" of man with the Sky [Zhebin, 2006, p. 26]. In addition, one of the reasons for the emergence of Juche was the regime's intention to oppose the North Korean path of development to the Soviet and Chinese ones. This can be seen from Kim Il Sung's first speech in December 1955, where the word "juche" was used [Balkansky, 2011, p.144]. Juche ideas were actively introduced in 1963. For a decade and a half, their propaganda went on a crescendo and in 1980 they were crowned with the adoption of a new Charter of the Workers ' Party of Korea. In it, Juche was declared the sole ideology of the party (Zhebin, 2006, p. 28), and hence of the entire society.

Juche has four guiding principles. These are independence in ideology, independence in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy, and self-defense in the defense of the country [Kim Jong Il, 1986, pp. 40-61]. In general, for North Korean citizens, the Juche teachings define a wide range of ideas about the basic laws of public life, and some of them are close to, or even identical to, Confucian ideas.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the selective "appropriation" of the Confucian tradition by the DPRK authorities is the normative attitude towards the head of state. In Confucianism, loyalty of subjects to the ruler is one of the pillars of the universe. But also, "the core of the Juche-based view of the revolution is loyalty to the party and the leader." For the leader begins "the work of socialism and communism," and this work is carried out "under the leadership of the party and the leader." "The revolutionary movement wins only under the leadership of the party and the leader. Consequently, in order to develop a correct view of the revolution, it is necessary to put a sense of selfless loyalty to the party and the leader as the basis of education " [ibid., p. 73]. And "only those who remain loyal to the party and the leader to the end, even if they have to give their lives for this ...are a true revolutionary with a firm Juche view of the revolution" [ibid., p. 74].

Both "paths" are equally utopian in the sense that they ascribe a world-building function to the ethical norm. But it is also impossible not to notice the difference, which indicates not only the selective, but also partly transformative approach of the "Jucheists" to Confucianism. If in Confucianism the casual relationship of "faithfulness → world harmony" provides an ideal return to the perfect past, then in Juche ideology it promises a happy future.

NATIONALISM IN THE DPRK: BLOOD, SOIL, AND NEGATIVE IDENTITY

The Juche philosophy is not only evidence of the DPRK's gaining ideological independence, but also an important way for North Korean nationalism to assert itself. There are two points of view about how long nationalism has dominated North Korean ideology. One, polemically extreme, was formulated by Brian Myers: "paranoid nationalism" with a pronounced racial connotation directs politics in the DPRK from the first years of its existence ("from the start") [Myers, 2010, p. 15]. Proponents of the latter talk about the evolution from internationalism, Marxism-Leninism and patriotism through the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and Charek kang-

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path to the domination of nationalism 15. This position seems to be more historical; but what is important for us is what both point out: nationalism has actually become - if not initially - another pillar of the DPRK leadership's vision of security.

Nationalism cannot live without enemies. In the North Korean mind, these are external enemies - the Japanese and Americans. North Korean nationalists do not have an internal enemy in the face of an ethnic "other", since there are no ethnic minorities in Korea. This does not mean that there are no internal threats at all. The decree" On further strengthening work with various strata and groups of the population", adopted by the eighth Plenum of the WPK Central Committee in 1964, divided the inhabitants of the DPRK into three layers: "main", "wavering" and "hostile" [Zhebin, 2006, p.22]. Reference to the subversive activities of internal hostile elements is still found in the DPRK Constitution.16 But their identification is based on social, political, and ideological characteristics that are not considered to be unchangeable, at least in theory, as evidenced by the widely practiced policy of re-education in labor camps. 17 Blood identity is a different matter: it can only be changed by the influx of other people's blood (if it is allowed). The blood "naturally" feeds the heart and brain of Korean nationalism, unites all Koreans, with the exception of the "servants of American imperialism" ruling in the South. The innate involvement of this lineage makes a person a part of a single whole, unique in its homogeneity; and in the quality of homogeneity, which has become "the spiritual source of unity that is necessary in... the struggle for the eternal development and prosperity of the nation", the Korean nation surpasses all others [Multinational...].

The Korean population is truly mono-ethnic. Let us also recall the closeness of the DPRK and the scanty proportion of its residents with experience of interethnic contacts, which precludes testing the myth of the superiority of life experience. It is hardly possible to accurately assess the depth of its internalization by the country's population, but the North Korean general's painful reaction to the idea of interethnic marriages speaks volumes [Lankov, 2009]. He is one of those responsible for national security, and his perception suggests that identity by blood can easily be securitized by the authorities.

Any nationalism is selflessly engaged in reinterpretation, mythologization and falsification of history. North Korean-too, but its concept of history does not shine with originality. Korean nationalists believe in the myth of the deep antiquity of their ethnic group, the history of which, according to scientists on both sides of the 38th parallel, has at least five thousand years. As the Japanese political scientist, ethnic Korean and admirer of the DPRK and its wise leaders Kim Myung Chol categorically put it (Kim Myung Chol, 2001, p. 10-11):

"The Korean nation is famous in East Asia for its ancient, five-thousand-year history. It has the opportunity to be proud of the fact that it has a history of more than a thousand years of prosperity of a single state behind it."

The "aging" of the ethnic past is a typical structural element of the nationalist historical myth and, perhaps, the most favorite. For by believing in the maxim "the older, the more glorious", it is easy to claim greatness in the present and/or its attainment in the future 18.

15 A typical example is the text of a young researcher M. Nasr from the University of Sydney [Nasr, 2013]. This approach is also presented in the cited works of Russian korsists.

16 In Article 12 [Socialist...].

17 Of course, the policy is extremely harsh, even cruel (see [Balkansky, 2011, p. 187]).

18 This element is clearly visible in the discourse of post-Soviet nationalisms (see Panarin 1991: 30-37; Savva 2001: 86-107; Shnirelman 2002: 128-147; Shnirelman 2001).

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The DPRK still believes that Koreans have always lived where they live now. Thus, the archaic and unverifiable blood connection is legitimized by the nationalism of the soil, whose own legitimacy is no longer based on myth, but on reality - the territory of the successor Korean statehood, now inscribed within the borders of the modern state. The North Korean nationalist version of history is autochthonous. In this way, it is close to the interpretation of history in the late Stalinist USSR and contrasts with the migration version, which is somewhat popular in the South. "Migrationists" proclaim their ancestors to be wandering "civilizers" who in ancient times spread high culture throughout the Old and even New World19. However, recently in the DPRK there is a tendency to include all of Manchuria and the Russian Primorye region in the area of Korean ethnogenesis (Lankov, 2002). But attempts to expand the space of cultural creation do not cancel the recognition of the primordial presence of ancestors in it, the principle of autochthonous nature remains, and everything that can "dilute" it should not even be mentioned [ibid.].

Myers called North Korean nationalism racist. We consider this qualification to be an anachronistic proposition by analogy. Yes, in Nazi Germany, purity of blood was considered a genetic advantage. But the "bloodline" can also be understood as a spatiotemporal and cultural continuity that has nothing to do with biology. Here it is appropriate to recall the phenomenon of cultural ethnocentrism in the medieval states of the Far East. The model was set by the Chinese model of the world, which was adopted in Korea and Japan and remained unchanged for a long time. But in the Joseon era in the first state, Tokugawa - in the second, other models were developed. The logic of their construction largely followed the Chinese model, but they were centered differently: Korean - on Korea, Japanese - on Japan [Meshcheryakov, 2012, p. 161-176]. In Japan, the "national" model sanctified the shogunate's isolationism. The memory of the Japanese aggression of 1592-1598 served as an impetus for the construction of the Korean model of soyoungwa. and the coming to power in Beijing of the dynasty of the next barbarian Manchus. The former encouraged maintaining good - neighborly relations with Japan, while simultaneously positioning themselves on an equal footing with it; the latter encouraged not irritating the powerful Qing suzerain and at the same time distancing themselves from him [Jeong-Me Lee, 2010, p. 305-318]. Soyoungwa , the concept of a Small World Center in Korea, solved both problems. Even though Korea is forced to be a vassal of barbarians and seek the friendship of recent enemies, it retains internal superiority, because it inherited the purity of "cultural blood"from the collapsed Minsk ideal. It is no coincidence that it was during the Joseon period that the renaissance of Confucianism took place in Korea, it replaced Buddhism and became the dominant ideology [Tolstokulakov, 2010].

Soyoungwa set a precedent for resolving the contradiction between the awareness of external security threats that Koreans are not able to completely eliminate, and the need to preserve self-esteem in order to maintain cultural integrity. At the same time, it was a precedent for choosing a negative identity, i.e. one that is characterized by fear of change, uncritical acceptance of authoritative opinions and stereotypical assessments, and in extreme terms - "replacing ethics with etiquette, actions with ritual, confidence with self - confidence and pride with pride" [Panarin, 2011, pp. 208-201].

19 There are no numbers of such opuses. You can recall the fantastic research of fans of the Hyperborean theory, and the" creativity " of Murad Aji, who attributed all Russian and European culture to the Turks. But as a concrete example, let us refer to a work written, alas, by a professional philologist, an academician of the Tatar Academy of Sciences (Karimullin, 1995).

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The historical situation in which North Korea found itself after the collapse of the socialist system is isomorphic to that to which the Joseon dynasty had to adapt. Active subjects of political consciousness in the DPRK have re-created the picture of the world in such a way as to reassert the national identity in its negativist version (as happened with disastrous consequences in Japan in the interwar decades of the 20th century). [Meshcheryakov, 2012, pp. 170-173]).

This is not to say that Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and their ideological services have been rummaging through historical archives and rereading Confucian classics. They were primarily driven to choose a negative identity by the logic of an uncontrolled government; but the idea of national exclusivity was "voted for" by the traditions of upbringing and behavior dating back to the past, the real mono-ethnicity of the country, and the belief in the continuity of its history and territory for thousands of years.

The attitude to the past as the foundation of identity and its nationalistic interpretation are integrated into the system of ideas about what is due, and deviation from them threatens the doubters with a complete loss of security. Moreover, this loss does not necessarily occur as a result of a punitive sanction - through doubt in the usual, a person can independently come to an extremely painful feeling of complete loss of security. When information flows are intense and diverse, they teach comparison and doubt; when they are weak and monotonous, doubt is unusual and painful. To have no doubts is to live in peace, i.e. safely, and the North Korean picture of the world is solid because it creates a sense of such a life in its own way. This also applies to one of the mandatory conditions for individual security - the uncritical perception of the government-sanctioned version of national identity, which is formed by three main supporting structures. This is a modern "pillar" of citizenship, an archaic "pillar" of blood and their connecting "bridge" of soil. With a high degree of confidence, we can say-and here we agree with Myers [Myers, 2010, p. 15] - that this constructed version of identity is shared by the majority of North Korean residents. Therefore, threats to it as a whole and to each structure separately - whether real or imagined - open the way for securitization, followed by the mobilization of resources and emotions.

* * *

Nationalism began to play a crucial role in the formation of ideas about security and threats to it, and only phraseology remained of Marxism. But Marxism did its job, serving both as a storehouse of experience in state-building and as a discursive form that made it possible to adapt Korea's long-standing and recent historical heritage to the realities of the twentieth century. In addition, the regime's declared commitment to Marxism-Leninism was used to legitimize its power according to the rules adopted in the socialist camp, and to obtain economic and military assistance from there.

The collapse of the socialist system and the economic difficulties caused by the withdrawal of aid from socialist countries and the natural disasters of the 1990s prompted North Korean politicians and ideologues to develop a new course that would ensure the cohesion of the population, despite all the difficulties. Such a course was songun, or the "Army first" policy.20 It involves the transformation of the army into the main "subject of the revolution", from the guarantor of security - into its creator. Thus, security, which was already a boon granted by the authorities to their subjects in exchange for loyalty, is further alienated from them and even more problematic, since the feeling of insecurity becomes a condition for survival - nuclear blackmail, with the use of nuclear weapons, etc.-

20 For more information, see Soyoung, 2003, pp. 293-294; Pankina, 2011.

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With the help of which Pyongyang hopes to improve its poor economic situation [Stepanova, 2010, p. 67].

In general, a retrospective look at the structure of the DPRK leadership's views on security confirms, as it seems to us, the hypothesis of its ideological continuity with tradition and allows us to conclude that significant progress has been made in the relative importance of the main elements of this structure - the weakening and fading into the shadow of some of them (Marxism-Leninism), the louder (nationalism). In conclusion, let us assume that the main reason for these changes was the deepening gap between what is and what is - not so much between the strategic vision of security and its available state, but between what we would like, i.e., the ideal (which also could not help but change) and the perception of what is.

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