A. P. KOVALCHUK

Candidate of Economic Sciences

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Key words: official development assistance, Africa, global financial and economic crisis, global economic development model

The ongoing global financial and economic crisis certainly affects the development of most African countries, including those that have long been supported and continue to be supported by developed donor countries. However, today they also need an influx of external financial resources. The debt crisis has ceased to be an iconic feature of backward economies and has come to Western Europe. Now many rich countries no longer have the same resources, their financial and economic situation has noticeably worsened, and despite the anti-crisis measures taken, they are forced to reduce spending.

In most of the developed countries that served as donors to African countries, production continues to fall, investors remain uncertain, and budget problems are growing. The incalculably high social obligations of the "welfare society", an overestimation of its material and financial capabilities, costly military adventures, etc.gradually led to an overstrain and destabilization of the economies of Western countries. ¹

In 2007, the world entered a global financial and economic crisis unprecedented since the Great Depression, which, according to the very convincingly reasoned concept of Russian researchers L. L. Fituni and I. O. Abramova, marks the beginning of the transition to a new model of world economic development (MMED). In this model, the balance of economic forces in the world is significantly changing and new paradigms of trade, financial and other economic relations between countries are maturing.²

DID AFRICA SURVIVE?

The first wave of the crisis, which occurred in 2007-2009, bypassed the States of the African continent.³ The main indicators of their financial and real sectors of the economy, as a whole, according to experts, have remained very good all this time.⁴

It seemed that the African economy, not reacting to the curtailment of markets for African raw materials in the West, would continue the progressive development of the previous seven years. Between 2002 and 2010, sub - Saharan Africa's GDP growth rate was even higher than the pan-African rate, averaging ^5.4% per year5. Almost all the countries of the continent have been quite successful in resisting the blows of the crisis, which was greatly facilitated by the fall in world food prices.

Despite the crisis, foreign capital inflows to Africa have been record-breaking. In 2008, foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled $87.6 billion, official aid from many countries reached $44 billion, and migrant remittances totaled $44.2 billion.⁶

The fact that the African economy did not collapse under the blows of the crisis, there was a completely reasonable and satisfying explanation. Analysts agreed that the impact of the global crisis on the continent was simply "delayed" due to the lack of integration of the African economy into the global financial and economic system7. After all, a significant part of the continent's population still exists at the expense of semi-natural economy, and the fate of this population depends more on natural conditions than on the state of global financial markets.

By the beginning of the second wave of the crisis, many African countries were more vulnerable than in the first phase. Then the most prosperous of them had their own resources and indirectly even benefited from the fact that the" developed world " began to pour heavily into their economies, including in the import of raw materials and other goods from developing countries. And relatively poor countries could at least partially solve their financial, economic, and social problems through external aid, which continued to flow through the pre-crisis obligations of developed countries.

Under normal conditions, the average annual economic growth of developed countries - 2.5-3% - would have made it possible to remove the severity of the problems that have arisen by the middle of the decade. However, during the crisis, most of these countries were forced, first of all, to continue to stimulate their economic growth and reduce public spending. In this situation, developed countries began to buy significantly less traditional exports from Asia and Africa, while Western countries did not.

entrepreneurs should be wary of investing in expensive investment projects. Growing budget deficits in Western countries have forced them to scale back aid to African countries. ⁸

The more distant the beginning of the current global financial and economic crisis, the less predictable its consequences become, and more questions arise about the prospects for the development of the African economy.

THE PROSPERITY WAS SHORT-LIVED...

Since the second half of 2011, the main indicators of the development of the African continent began to deteriorate. In the same year, there was a slight decline in the GDP growth rate of African countries - up to 5% (in sub-Saharan countries - up to 4.2%). The inflow of foreign capital has noticeably decreased, foreign exchange earnings have decreased, and the problem of budget deficits has worsened. The outlook has also become quite bleak, especially with regard to the prospects for financing investment projects, the cost of food imported to Africa, and energy prices.⁹ African leaders themselves, as well as international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the African Development Bank (AfDB) did not spare the gloomy tones in their forecasts. Although, in general, the economic situation on the continent was not the worst in the world.

The export sector of African economies was particularly hard hit. The total value of sub-Saharan exports decreased by 45%. Particularly unpleasant was the fact that the decline was mainly due to the fall in world prices for many resources of purely African exports. Due to the sharp drop in prices for crude oil, metals, diamonds, wood, rubber, tropical agricultural products, etc., the ability to fill the budget in countries exporting fuel and raw materials has sharply deteriorated. This meant that with the previous labor investments in real production per unit of export goods, state budgets received less foreign exchange income. In the real sector, the crisis has most affected industries focused on the markets of developed countries. However, in the period between the first and second waves of the crisis, the situation on the world markets of the so-called "fossil raw materials" was generally favorable for Africa. However, the situation on the food market, on the contrary, became more and more alarming. Although food prices were rising then not only in Africa, but also around the world.

The current food shortage in Africa and rising food prices cannot, as some experts say, be attributed entirely to the effects of the crisis or drought. Both, of course, contributed to the catastrophic deterioration of the food situation in the second half of 2011.

However, it should be recalled that during the seven years of the African boom (2000 - 2007), agriculture in many countries of the continent was consistently underfunded. Agricultural infrastructure, as well as road construction, irrigation, etc. received crumbs from budget allocations. Agricultural lending, marketing of the industry's products, and its financial, informational, and technological support have not been sufficiently developed. As a result, labor productivity in the African agricultural sector remains low, as does the income of rural workers. The only exceptions are South Africa, Egypt and Morocco. For example, the presence of a developed economic infrastructure, a broad technological base, highly qualified management and engineering personnel, as well as an extensive market for fairly cheap skilled and unskilled labor made South Africa extremely attractive and profitable for free business activities and foreign capital investments.

Major international investment firms identify South Africa as an emerging market with the most favorable conditions for foreign investment. Natural gold has taken the country's mining industry to new levels of ingenuity and innovation in order to remain competitive. These skills and abilities provide the basis for global relations (international commitments) today. Platinum mining keeps South Africa at the forefront of the world's precious metal producers.

It is the world's largest platinum producers and South African-based mining groups that play a major role among other groups engaged in the extraction of mineral resources of international importance, such as coal and ferrous metals. This is undoubtedly a good example of South Africa's ability to deal with crisis situations.

It is worth recalling that ending hunger, along with halving poverty, eliminating gender inequality, improving education and health systems, as well as water, sanitation and the environment, are included in the "Millennium Development Goals" (MDGs) - key socio-economic benchmarks for all developing countries, proclaimed by the UN and agreed upon with 147 countries back in 2000 (by 2012, the number of MDG countries had increased to 193) and with 23 international organizations.

The achievement of the MDG targets by 2015 by African countries has always been called into question. And now, as the second wave of the global crisis has risen, it has become absolutely clear that most of these countries will not be able to achieve the "Millennium Development Goals" even far beyond this deadline.

To some extent, the situation looks paradoxical. On the one hand, even 10 or 15 years ago, when the expert community, consisting of world - renowned scientists, announced the planned goals, they did not look unattainable. In the mid-1990s, when the macroeconomic situation in the-

Table 1

Geographical distribution of ODA provided to developing countries in 2011 ($ million)

Source: http://stats.oecd.org/ODA

The situation in Africa was much worse than in the 2000s, and the goals were perceived as quite realistic and achievable. A decade later, when the growth rate of African economies has reached an unprecedented high in recent history, the implementation of the MDGs on time by most countries of the continent looks like manilovism.

What is the reason for this contradiction?

In our opinion, the reasons largely lie precisely in the problem of external assistance. Initially, when planning indicators, it seems that the internal capacities of the continent's countries were relatively overestimated and the obstacles to mobilizing external support were underestimated.

Both donor countries, including the Group of Eight, and recipient countries were expected to meet all their commitments. In particular, industrialized countries have pledged to allocate 0.7% of their annual GDP to the development programs of the poorest countries, channeling resources through both bilateral-through government agreements with developing countries, and multilateral aid channels - through contributions to international government organizations and international financial institutions.

Developed countries have pledged not only to provide more aid, but also to improve its quality, as well as to implement improved trade and debt policies.¹⁰ For their part, African Governments have pledged to fight corruption, ensure transparency and monitor the targeted use of financial aid. We won't talk about how these commitments have been implemented yet. But the" shortage " of funding for African states by developed countries, according to estimates by OECD experts, ¹¹ in 2010 alone amounted to about $30 billion ¹².

WHAT IS ODA?

In the current situation, the issue of improving the effectiveness of official development assistance (ODA), aimed primarily at financing and implementing modernization programs for African economies, is particularly acute.

ODA refers to assistance to developing countries and international institutions in the form of grants, loans ,and other transfers in cash or in kind (goods or services) to partner countries identified as recipients of ODA in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list13.

An important distinguishing feature of ODA from other types of aid to poor countries is its predominant focus on promoting the socio-economic development of developing countries, as well as its concessional nature, which is expressed in the presence of a so-called grant element in the total amount of aid in the amount of at least 25% of this amount (calculated at a fixed discount rate of 10%).

(Note that economic assistance to developing countries in Africa also comes from non-OECD countries , such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, Iran, Malaysia, Turkey, Arab oil-producing states, etc. At the same time, the share of these countries in the total volume of economic assistance to the continent is steadily growing. And the PRC has generally overtaken most developed countries in terms of such assistance.)

The strategic goal of ODA is to allocate financial resources for lending to industries and activities that are most important for the development of the continent. Traditionally, a significant part of concessional loans and subsidies is used to finance infrastructure projects, including transport, communications,and energy. This is due to the fact that poor countries can develop these very expensive industries, but at least at the stage of their actual creation "from scratch", only with the help of the world community.

ODA is provided not only to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, but also to the poorest countries in Europe and Oceania (see Table 1). Most of the ODA goes to the poorest of the developing countries; 34 of them are in Africa.

For grants and loans to qualify as ODA, they must: a) be provided by specific States; b) be aimed at promoting economic development and well-being; and c) be provided on a concessional basis.

In addition to financial flows, ODA also includes technical cooperation. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are not considered as ODA. Transfer payments to individuals (pensions, compensation, and insurance payments) are also not considered ODA. The average terms of ODA loans are as follows: the loan term is 25-30 years, and the grace period is about 10 years.

WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS FOR PROVIDING ASSISTANCE?

ODA typically accounts for more than 4/5 of the funds allocated by donor States as international aid. All creditor countries have institutions that specialize in shaping ODA policies. Funds for this purpose are allocated from the budget and controlled by the parliaments of donor countries. Loans are usually linked in nature, i.e. they are linked to the delivery of pre-defined goods. This, of course, severely restricts the scope of credit use and reduces the maneuverability of the recipient country. Unfortunately, the prices of goods supplied under ODA are often inflated. And most of the resources allocated to ODA are tied to the financing of specific facilities, which implies monitoring of their use by donor countries.

Despite the" concessional nature " of ODA, it cannot be seen as a sign of altruism on the part of donor countries. The freedom to use funds received by African countries is severely restricted. As a rule, they can only be used to purchase products of the creditor country. Even in cases when the equipment comes "as a gift", there is a chain of dependencies associated with the need to purchase spare parts, components and consumables in the future, and perform maintenance, for which, of course, you have to pay and, as a rule, a lot.

After the end of the cold war, when providing ODA, it became customary to set conditions for receiving such assistance to implement certain so-called liberal democratic political and economic reforms that donor countries consider "important for economic growth and poverty reduction in the recipient country." But even if the reform concepts developed by donor countries are fundamentally correct from the point of view of economic theory, in practice they are often not at all a priority for developing country Governments. Naturally, the state elites of the recipient countries are afraid of losing some of their power as a result of such reforms. And in some cases, this leads to a gradual reduction in external funding, which is usually explained by the fears of donor countries - some of their aid will be wasted in countries with unstable political conditions or due to high levels of corruption.

As an example of ODA tied to certain political and economic requirements, the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries¹⁴officially announced as its goal is to ease the debt burden of large debtors from among the poorest countries.

To participate in this program, a country must be not just poor (in other words, meet the WB criteria for low - income countries) and have a large external debt (i.e., the amount of debt obligations of more than 150% of annual export revenue).¹⁵. It should also demonstrate in practice its ability to successfully develop and implement its own strategy to support economic growth and reduce poverty. It is believed that this serves as a guarantee that the released budget funds that were previously used to service the external debt will be used in the interests of the country's economic development, and will not be spent, for example, on military needs, personal enrichment of officials, etc.

During the current financial and economic crisis, the volume of ODA provided to African countries has shown contradictory dynamics. By the end of the first wave of the crisis, the volume of aid payments transferred at constant dollar prices in 2009 increased by 0.3%. But at the same time, the total amount of DAC countries ' commitments decreased by almost 8% (see Table 2).

The structure of ODA to African countries, in terms of its intended purpose, in 2010 was as follows. 40% of all ODA was allocated for social projects, 22% for general economic needs and support for economic reforms, 10% for production purposes, and for unemployment-

Table 2

Dynamics of ODA to Africa (from all sources) on the eve of the second wave of the crisis

Источник: Development Aid at a Glance Statistics by Region. 2. AFRICA 2013 edition. Paris. 2013. P. 2 - stats.oecd.org

Table 3

Distribution of growth in development assistance to African countries from 2001 to 2010

Source: Development Aid at Glance...

left-wing programs - 6%, " general program assistance "(this includes financial and food assistance under the relevant programs) - 6%, debt service-8%, humanitarian aid-7% and for other purposes-1% ¹⁶.

SOCIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURAL ACCENT

Infrastructure remains the main area of financing and lending under ODA, although the focus is gradually shifting towards addressing social issues. In 2010, allocations for education, health, and other social and managerial needs in Africa totaled $22.4 billion (39.1/6 of total ODA), significantly exceeding expenditures related to concessional lending to infrastructure and manufacturing - $5.4 billion. (9,8%)¹⁷.

There are three areas that both donor and recipient countries view as super-important in terms of channeling ODA resources : education, health, and water. At the same time, the problems of reserves and sources of clean fresh water are becoming increasingly important, and the growth rate of investment in this area is outpacing the growth rate of ODA in general. This trend has been observed since 2003. The main recipients of "water assistance" in 2010 were Morocco ($268 million), Egypt ($229 million), Kenya ($165 million), Tanzania ($150 million), Ghana ($144 million), Ethiopia ($132 million), Cameroon ($ 115 million), Senegal ($109 million)and Mali ($128 million).¹⁸.

Loans and subsidies to the agricultural sector have also increased, as the main pockets of poverty in African countries are concentrated in rural areas. As for industry, it has always occupied a relatively modest place in ODA. This corresponds to the strategic line of ODA, which is that in principle, lending to industry should be carried out at the expense of funds received on the world capital market, since the use of concessional financial resources can negatively affect the efficiency of established industries.

In recent years, there have been dramatic changes in the structure and quality characteristics of ODA. Thus, if we take a closer look at the increase in such aid from 2001 to 2010, it turns out that it is increasingly directed to solving problems directly related to the requirements of the Millennium Development Goals.

This is shown in table 3, which shows the distribution of the nominal increase in aid, which for the period from 2001 to 2010 amounted to $51.2 billion.¹⁹

Development programmes directly linked to the MDGs have accounted for almost 78% of the total increase in aid to African countries in recent years. Of course, this is a good indicator of the increased activity of developed countries in supporting developing countries.

One of the important features of the structure of ODA is the relatively high share of technical assistance expenditures, which currently reaches about 1/3 on average in OECD countries. Thus, a significant part of development assistance is spent in donor countries in the form of expensive consulting services. According to World Bank experts, technical assistance is the most typical example of linked assistance, although it is not shown as such in OECD statistics. Thus, more than 70% of the funds allocated by donors for primary education in Africa come in a related form in the form of technical assistance, i.e. equipping schools with visual aids, computer equipment, etc.

However, it should be borne in mind that a significant portion of new aid between 2004 and 2010 came from Africa and "post-conflict" (in DAC terminology) countries that are particularly important for major donors in geopolitical terms (Iraq and Afghanistan). Nigeria is also one of the main recipients of aid, not only in Africa, but also around the world. The reason is that the country has accumulated huge debt obligations, which have been systematically written off by the main Nigerian creditors since 2005.

In recent years, African countries have achieved the most impressive economic growth rates and the lowest inflation rates in the last 30 years. According to the IMF experts, the maximum GDP growth for this group of countries between 2000 and 2011 was 6.4% in 2010, which is 2.7% higher than in 2000, and the average inflation rate for this group of countries (excluding Zimbabwe). decreased to 6.75%²⁰. To some extent, these successes are linked to the outcomes of the Monterrey ²¹ Conference and the Group of Eight Summit in Kananaskis in 2002, when major donor countries developed key policy directions for providing ODA.

Table 4

OECD DAC leaders in providing assistance to African countries in 2009-2011 ($ million)

Source: Development Aid at Glance...

In 2010, the largest amounts of ODA from Western countries came to African States from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom22 (see Table 4).

The table shows that the United States remains the leading donor, but its share has fallen from 1/2 in the 1950s to less than 1/5 in 2010. France retains the role of one of the main donors, but its credit and financial relations in this area are concentrated in the group of African countries that were part of the franc zone. The position of Great Britain has significantly weakened, as it has lost close ties with its former colonies, and the sterling zone has collapsed. At the same time, Japan and Germany came to the forefront as leading donors.

One of the most powerful players in the African commodity markets in recent years is China, which has entered into fierce competition with the United States and EU countries for African mineral resources.

Based on bilateral agreements, the PRC provides assistance to African countries in the form of grants, interest-free loans and concession loans. Since 2002, China's financial assistance to African economies has totaled $1.8 billion. Over the past decade, Chinese aid programs have expanded to include debt relief, technical and humanitarian cooperation, and staff training. Chinese aid is not transparent, its figures are usually not advertised, and the published data are extremely contradictory. Nevertheless, it is clear that Beijing is becoming a significant donor to African countries, providing them with an average of $1-2 billion annually. help ²³.

In addition, China is actively investing in Africa. A favorite Chinese practice is to set up joint ventures with state-owned oil companies. This gives the Chinese not only control over the resource, but also direct access to the country's business and political elite. The most prominent examples are joint projects with Sudapet (Sudan), Sonatrach (Algeria), Sonangol (Angola) and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Nigeria). China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Sinopec, China National Oil and Gas Exploration, Development Corp (CNODC), PetroChina, BGP International and China Petroleum Engineering & Construction Group (CPECG) are leading the Chinese race in Africa. One of the main interests is the purchase of a stake in coastal fields. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, more than $5.7 billion was spent on more than 800 projects in Africa in 200624.

In accordance with the Monterrey Consensus, which was adopted on March ²², 2002 following the UN International Conference on Financing for Development, the contribution of donor countries to development assistance should reach 0.7% of gross national income (GNI25) as ODA to developing countries by 2015, and 0.15% by 2010. - 0.2% of GNI for least developed countries. Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg have already reached the 0.7 percent level. Australia, Canada and the Republic of Korea are approaching this level faster than the rest ²⁶.

In 2011, the main recipients of such assistance were: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - $5,522 million (8% of all Africa's ODA transferred), Ethiopia - $3,563 million (7%), Kenya - $2,474 million, Tanzania - $2,445 million. Mozambique - $2,047 million (more than 5%), Sudan - $1,138 million, Nigeria - $1,813 million (4% each), Ghana - $1,815 million, Uganda - $1,580 million, and Cote d'Ivoire-$1,437 million (4% each). 3%). Other African recipients accounted for $27,426 million , or approximately 53% of all ODA.

"BLACK HOLES" ARE GETTING SMALLER

The question is, is the support provided by developed countries to Africa effective? Won't some of the continent's states turn out to be a "black hole" in which no matter how much you invest, the results will be minimal at best, and the money will settle in the bank accounts of corrupt officials?

One of the WB studies that was conducted back in the

In the 1960s, it showed that about 85% of financial aid to Africa was then spent for other purposes. L. L. Fituni estimates that by the end of the 1990s, up to 47% of ODA left Africa in the form of "runaway capital"due to poor management of projects implemented within the framework of ODA, criminal contracts with contractors from donor countries, corruption and theft²⁷. According to his estimates, the total illegal export of capital from Africa in 2000-2008 amounted to about $437.1 billion. In total, over almost four decades, from the early 1970s to the present, $854 billion has been illegally exported from Africa.²⁸ These are mainly corruption proceeds, as well as the fruits of financial fraud and unpaid taxes to the state.

If you add to this sum the legal dividends paid to foreigners, interest on loans, as well as payments for forced purchases of goods and for the payment of specialists in the framework of "related assistance", then it turns out that Africa has been providing not only resources, but also financial support to developed economies for many decades.²⁹ The OECD estimates that linking aid to developing countries reduces its effectiveness by 20 to 30% ^.30

In 2001, DAC member countries adopted the Recommendation on Untying ODA to Least Developed Countries. In 2008, the provisions of the recommendation were extended to all HIPC countries. According to official OECD publications, the steps taken have reduced the share of "linked" aid in all aid provided by DAC countries from 58% in 2005 to 16% in 2010. ³¹ However, it should be borne in mind that this is the "average hospital temperature" and the share of linked aid varies significantly from country to country. At the same time, large economies and "more democratic" countries are not so inclined to "unleash" aid.

The United States was one of the most backward countries in this regard. Speaking at the 4th High-level Forum (HLF-4) on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, South Korea, in 2011, US Secretary of State H. E. Clinton attributed the slow progress in "unleashing" aid provided by her country to the peculiarities of the democratic political process of budget decision-making in the ^United States32.

According to the results of the Global Financial Integrity study, a picture emerges that few people know about, although it has absorbed the brightest colors of the global financial and speculative mafia.

"Illegal financial flows from Africa are twice the amount of foreign aid to the region," the author of the study writes, shocking the imagination of his few readers.

Between 1970 and 2008, illicit flows from Africa totaled at least $854 billion, according to a report by the Global Financial Integrity research center. and they could reach as much as $1.8 trillion, if we take into account missing data from some countries, as well as other illegal withdrawal routes not covered by the report.

The amount will increase, the report says, "if we take into account unaccountable money obtained through smuggling, intellectual property rights violations, drug trafficking and other contraband goods, slave trade, prostitution and other illegal activities^."

$1.8 trillion is already an incredible amount of illegally exported funds, in reality the amount may be even more.

Illicit flows are a persistent and destructive problem in African countries. The Global Financial Integrity report shows that illegal withdrawals of large amounts of money from the continent have continued to increase every decade since the 1970s, at an average rate of 12% annually. In recent years, the effectiveness of ODA has been systematically monitored. For example, in 2006-2010, UNECA and AfDB conducted a study on the effectiveness of ODA in four African countries: Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Mozambique. The results showed both some progress in all major areas of ODA activities and many outstanding challenges.

It was noted that Ghana, Kenya and Mozambique had already developed and implemented national development programmes, all of which were strictly linked to the expenditure side of their budgets. Malawi is finalizing a national economic development strategy.

At the same time, experts still have a lot of questions about poverty reduction strategies in these countries. These strategies are ineffective and serve mainly to maintain financial support from major donor countries, which usually link their aid to government commitments to fight poverty. In general, national programmes in the future should become more transparent to all "stakeholders" - the private sector, various trade unions, non-governmental organizations, etc.-and not just to direct donor countries.

Some Countries, such as Kenya, are quite efficient in managing ODA resources, both at the level of individual industries and at the national level. For example, in Malawi, ODA is often poorly used, there is no feedback from donors, and as a result, development programmes are often developed without their participation. However, in this country, the effectiveness of aid varies from project to project, and, for example, agriculture provides a number of successful examples.

Schemes for direct allocation of ODA by donors also leave much to be desired. In 2010, almost all African countries reported that the bulk of funding from the West came from Governments and was spent outside of national budgets. This is where there are great opportunities for corruption schemes ³⁴.

Most African States are ready to increase their efforts to accelerate the development of their economies, but they need more extensive and more qualified official assistance to do this,

in order to most effectively finance public spending aimed at achieving the MDG goals.

To fully integrate the African continent into the global economy, developed countries need to continue to improve an open, regulated, predictable and non-discriminatory global trading and financial system. The interests of the least developed countries should be particularly taken into account. It is advisable, in particular, to fully exempt export goods from such countries from tariffs and quotas; to develop new and improve existing programs for debt relief and cancellation of official bilateral debt; to provide more extensive ODA to States that have taken a course to reform their economies.

At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that the above-mentioned actions and steps of donor countries do not actually turn into a tool for linking aid and foreign policy dictates. Thus, in 2000, the United States passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which, among other provisions, provided for the gradual reduction and elimination of tariff and quantitative restrictions (quotas) for certain countries in Tropical Africa.

According to some sources, as a result of the adoption of this law, the United States was the only Western country that increased its imports from Sub - Saharan Africa between 2001 ^and 200835. In its form, the AGOA looks like a tool for providing development assistance to the countries of the continent. However, this is a vivid example of related aid, and it imposes not only economic burdens on the recipient State, but also dictates political conditions.

The fact is that the granting of benefits to Africans is strictly linked to the fulfillment of their "qualification requirements" for the liberalization of economies and political systems. At the same time, as the researchers note, the AGOA is also aimed at providing assistance to American companies operating on the continent. In addition to encouraging the steady growth of trade turnover, this law helps American businesses insure their property against investment risks. In addition, this law is an effective tool for ensuring the preferred access of American companies to the markets of African countries.³⁶

WHAT IS HINDERING AFRICA'S FASTER DEVELOPMENT?

There are many explanations for why ODA has not yet had the desired effect in African countries. Many experts refer to geographical, historical, cultural and institutional "brakes" of development. Most often, the main reason for the "underdevelopment" of Africa is called colonialism, as well as the pronounced backwardness of state institutions and low qualifications of civil servants. Not all African statesmen know that stable economic growth and development must rely on the presence of certain political institutions, and that the basic prerequisites for the development of any State, including, of course, an African state, are individual freedom, private property and compliance with legal norms.

Other elements that are necessary to ensure high efficiency of financial assistance (the lack of which was the main reason for the failure of many assistance programs in the past) are the presence of feedback between business and the state, as well as well - established reporting. Without such reporting, there is no incentive to find truly effective methods of providing assistance. The availability of highly professional reporting is a prerequisite for achieving the proper level of responsibility of organizations for performing specific tasks to help the poor. Reporting improves the ability to independently assess how public and private entities are performing their tasks, and also creates incentives for the most effective work at all levels of management.

It should also be noted with regret that there is currently no methodology for conducting an independent assessment of the results of developed countries ' efforts to provide international financial assistance to African and other poor countries. Not just a general assessment of national development programs, but a specific and routine, regularly conducted assessment of each individual aid initiative.

Many experts believe that it is necessary to create a truly independent scientific group to assess the effectiveness of development operations, which-very importantly-would not have a conflict of interest with development financial institutions. Of course, we need incentives for development banks to respond to the assessments of this independent group. The allocation of funds to the budgets of poor countries should be regulated according to the estimates of independent experts. And international development banks should be encouraged to suspend the implementation of ineffective programs or to make proposals for the adjustment of those programs that are still amenable to correction.

RUSSIA'S CONTRIBUTION

As for the role of Russia in providing economic assistance to Africa's development, according to the criteria and procedures that would qualify such assistance as ODA, our achievements in comparison with other countries are still quite modest.

According to data announced in October 2012 at the 67th session of the UN General Assembly by Director of the Department of International Organizations of the Russian Foreign Ministry V. N. Sergeev, Russia has already written off the main debt of African states-more than $20 billion.³⁷

Russia recently contributed $50 million to the World Bank's Poor Countries Development Fund. Most of this money will be invested in supporting the States of the Sub-Saharan region. In addition, in the period from the beginning of 2008 to October 2012. Russia has allocated $42.9 million. to the WB educational program

for developing countries, including those in Africa. By 2012 The Russian Federation has contributed a total of $100 million to the fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. In 2011 Russia has invested $20 million in the World Bank's malaria control program in Africa, and our country has signed relevant agreements with Zambia and Tanzania. According to them, the debts of these two states to the Russian Federation will be used to finance development projects. Similar agreements are planned to be concluded with Benin, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Russia also participates in the financing of the IMF program to help the poorest countries affected by external "shocks" (natural disasters, deterioration of trade conditions, high oil prices, etc.). Our voluntary contribution to these purposes in 2006-2010. it amounted to about $45 million ³⁸.

Russia is participating in the financing of the IMF's program for the establishment of African Regional Technical Assistance Centers (AFRITAC), aimed at strengthening the human and organizational capacities of African countries. In 2003-2005, $250,000 was transferred to the IMF for this purpose. In January 2006, our Government decided to make an additional voluntary contribution to AFRITAK - also in the amount of up to $250,000 - on behalf of the Russian Federation in 2006-2009. ³⁹

* * *

The ongoing second wave of the crisis is likely to bring changes to the policy and practice of providing ODA to African countries. The main constraints will remain the tense situation in the economies of donor countries and, especially, the debt crisis in the EU. The African States themselves, with the exception of the post-revolutionary Arab countries in the north of the continent, will, we believe, show relatively high economic growth rates with increased demand for material and financial resources from external sources.

^{Varoufakis Yanis.} 1 The Global Minotaur America, the True Origins of the Financial Crisis and the Future of the World Economy. L.& N.Y., 2010; Macroeconomic Theory and its Failings. Alternative Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis. Northhampton, Mass., 2010.

^{Fituni L. L., Abramova I. O.} 2 Regularities of formation and change of models of world economic development // MEiMO, 2012, No. 7, pp. 3-4.

³ United Nations. The Global Economic and Financial Crisis: Regional Impacts, Responses and Solutions. N.Y., 2009, p. 15 - 25.

^{Fituni L. L.} 4 Mesto Afrika v postkrizisnoy mirovoy ekonomike [Africa's 4th Place in the post-crisis World Economy]. 2011, No. 1, pp. 15-20.

⁵ UNECA. Economic Report on Africa. Addis Ababa. 2009. P. 5 - new.uneca.org/era/era2009.aspx

⁶ UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2012. N.Y., 2012.

^{Fituni L. L.} 7 Ekonomika Afrika: vyzovy poskrizisnogo razvitiya [African Economy: Challenges of Post-crisis Development]. 2010, No. 8, p. 47.

⁸ IMF Survey: Lagarde lays out roadmap to shape Post-crisis World - www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/NEW101212A.htm

⁹ UNECA. Economic Report on Africa. Addis Ababa. 2011. P. 7 - new.uneca.org/era/era2011aspx

^{Nurshaikhova A. Zh} 10 Analytical materials // Bulletin of International Organizations. 2009, N 3 (25), pp. 98-99.

¹¹ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) - an organization of developed countries that recognize the principles of representative democracy and free markets. Established in 1948 to coordinate European economic reconstruction projects under the Marshall Plan. The original name is the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

^{Kartamyshev V. A.} 12 Development and Africa // Bulletin of International Organizations. 2010, N 4 (19), p. 5.

¹³ DAC - OECD Development Assistance Committee. A structure that coordinates aid policies in developed countries. It includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the EU as an independent entity. The World Bank, IMF and UNDP have observer status.

¹⁴ Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - poor countries with high debt levels. According to the classification of the IMF and WB, it includes 39 developing countries that are united by the criterion of combining extreme poverty and high external debt and therefore fall under particularly preferential conditions for receiving international assistance.

^{Fituni L. L.} 15 Differentiation of developing countries and the new architecture of the world economy // Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 10, p. 12.

¹⁶ Development Aid at a Glance Statistics by Region. 2. Africa 2012 edition. Paris. 2012. P. 2 - stats.oecd.org

¹⁷ http://oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/42139250.pdf

^{Abramova I., Fituni L.} 18 The price of "blue gold" / / Asia and Africa today. 2008, N 12, с. 10; Development Aid at a Glance... P. 17.

¹⁹ Development Aid at Glance... P. 15.

²⁰ http://databank.worldbank.Org/ddp/h,me.d,?Step=2&id-4&DisplayAggregation=N&SdmxSu pported-N&CNO=1147&SET_ BRANDING-YES

^{On March 21-18 - 22}, 2002, the United Nations Conference on Financing for Development was held in Monterrey (Mexico), which was attended by more than 50 heads of State and Government. The "Mont-Terre consensus" was adopted, which implies the need to find resources for development, primarily within developing countries, which will be facilitated by Western countries, including with the help of the private sector.

²² Development Aid at Glance...

^{Deich T. L.} 23 "The Big Game": China and the United States in the African commodity markets / / Asia and Africa Today. 2010, N 8, p. 15.

^{Davies M.} 24 How China delivers development assistance to Africa // Centre for Chinese studies. Stellenbosch, 2008, p. 6.

²⁵ Gross national income (GNI) is expressed as the sum of primary income earned by residents of a given country over a given period of time, both within the country and abroad, less income transferred abroad.

²⁶ Составлено по: http://oecd.org/dataoecd/16/38/45539274.pdf; http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/655062

^{Fituni L. L.} 27 The role of shadow international capital movement in the context of globalization. 2000, N 3, p. 18.

^{Fituni L. L.} 28 Economy of Africa...

^{Abramova I. O., fituni L. L.} 29 the Economy of Africa in the face of a looming second wave of the global economic crisis // problems of modern economy. 2012. N 4. P. 110.

³⁰ OECD. Tying of Aid. Paris, 1991. P. 9.

³¹ DAC OECD. Development Cooperation Report 2012. Paris, 2012. P. 189.

³² Busan Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness: Proceedings. P. 68 - http://www.oecd.Org/dac/aideffectiveness/Final/o20file.pdf

³³ The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development - africafocus.org

³⁴ Economic Report on Africa 2008 - stats.oecd.org

^{Abramova I., Fituni L.} 35 To Africa... Business as always / / Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. 2009. N 2, 3. P. 149.

^{Zimenkov R. I.} 36 Trade and economic relations between the USA and Africa - http://rusus.ru/?act-read&id=240

³⁷ Speech by V. N. Sergeev, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly - http://www.russiaun.ru/ru/news/ga_nepad

^{38 Saltanov A.V.} Relations between Russia and Sub-Saharan Africa - http://www.vneshmarket.ru/content/document_r_51 DF08CE-71DB-40E3-9FB7-BD323395F48F.html

³⁹ Ibid.

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