(Dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the YALTA AND POTSDAM CONFERENCE)

In the history of international relations, there are events whose significance is fully revealed over time. Among such outstanding events, a prominent place belongs to the Crimean (Yalta) and Berlin (Potsdam) conferences of the leaders of the three allied powers of the anti-Hitler coalition-the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. Held four decades ago at the final stage of the Second World War, these inter-Allied conferences consolidated the world-historic results of the peoples ' victory over fascism and laid a solid foundation for post-war peace. The closely linked Yalta and Potsdam Agreements reflected the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of fascism, to the creation and strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition, and were an expression of the unyielding will of the peoples for peace, democracy and social progress.

Among the meetings of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition that took place at various levels during the Second World War, the Yalta and Potsdam conferences occupy a special place. Whereas the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain (October 1943) and the Conference of the leaders of the three Powers in Tehran (November - December 1943) were devoted mainly to military issues and, above all, to the opening of a second front, and the conference in Dumbarton Oaks (August-September 1944) and the conference of the leaders of the three While the United Nations Conference in San Francisco (April-June 1945) focused entirely on the creation of the United Nations, the drafting and adoption of its Charter, the conferences in Crimea and Berlin focused on the fundamental issues of post - war settlement.

Modern historical science has a solid documentary base for in-depth and comprehensive study of the preparation, course and results of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, and analysis of their impact on the entire system of post-war international relations. Special mention should be made of the collections of diplomatic documents published by the USSR Foreign Ministry as part of the 6-volume series "The Soviet Union at International Conferences during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", dedicated specifically to the Crimean and Berlin Conferences, as well as other Soviet and foreign documentary publications .1 Based on the diplomatic primary sources, the leaders of the-

1 Crimean Conference of the Leaders of the three Allied Powers-the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (February 4-11, 1945). Collected papers, Moscow, 1984; Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the Leaders of the three Allied Powers-the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (July 17-August 2, 1945). Collected papers, Moscow, 1984 Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during

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Guided by the Marxist-Leninist methodology, Soviet researchers in their works determined the place and significance of these conferences in the history of World War II, showed the connection of the results achieved at them with the military-strategic situation, the impressive victories of the Soviet Army, the anti-fascist aspirations of the masses, and their hopes for a lasting post-war peace. 2
In the light of the current political and ideological struggle on international relations, it is of fundamental importance to conclude that in the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam, as in the history of the anti-Hitler coalition as a whole, Lenin's idea of the possibility and necessity of cooperation between states with different social systems was put into practice, and the exceptional importance of this cooperation for The agreements reached reflected the increased influence of the new social system - socialism and its diplomacy - on international development, and provided the post-war settlement with the necessary long-term margin of safety.

As for the bourgeois authors, the majority of them approach the assessment of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences biased, from the standpoint of the "cold war" and the" inevitability "of confrontation between the two world systems. They see in these conferences almost the root cause of the" split " of Europe into opposing groups, and their positive results are often explained by non-objective reasons, and the" compliance " of the USSR's Western negotiating partners, their "mistakes" and other subjective factors .3 In fact, if we approach the assessment of the results of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences strictly historically, then everything immediately falls into place.

Those in the West who try to portray the agreements of the war years as a "major mistake" of the leaders of the United States and Great Britain, deliberately falsify historical events, discount the specific military-political situation in the victorious year of 1945. And this situation developed under the powerful influence of the offensive of the Soviet troops, when the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of fascism was fully manifested. Where bourgeois authors see a blind "game of chance", in fact, historical necessity has made its way. Having dispelled the myth of the "invincibility" of Hitler's army in the battle of Moscow, having made a radical change in the course of the entire Second World War in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, the Soviet Army expelled the invaders from their native land and began to fulfill its great international mission-liberation

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (hereinafter-Correspondence). Vols. 1-2. Moscow, 1976; Soviet-British relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Doc. Moscow, 1983; Soviet-American relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Doc. Moscow, 1984; Soviet-French relations during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Doc. Moscow, 1983; Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sb. dokl. Moscow, 1967; Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. 1945. Washington. 1955; FRUS. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference). 1945. Vol. I - II. Washington. 1960.

2 See for example: Sosinsky S. B. Action "Argonaut" (Crimean Conference and its critics in the USA), Moscow 1960; Sipols V. Ya., Chelyshev I. A. Crimean Conference, 1945, Moscow, 1984; Vysotsky V. N. Event "Terminal". Potsdam. 1945. M. 1975; Beletsky V. N. Meeting in Potsdam. M. 1980; Borisov A. Yu. USSR and the USA: Allies during the war of 1941-1945. M. 1983; Roshchin A. A. Post-war settlement in Europe. M. 1984; Sipols V. Ya. On the way to the great victory. Soviet Diplomacy in 1941-1945, Moscow, 1985; et al.

3 See, for example: Fish H. Tragic Deception. FDR and America's Involvement in World War II. Old Greenwich. 1983, p. 105; Eggleston G. Roosevelt, Churchill and the World War II Opposition. A Revisionist Autobiography. Old Greenwich. 1979, pp. 187-189. The English newspaper "The Times" even calls the Yalta agreements "a symbol of betrayal" (The Times, 4. II. 1984).

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the liberation of the peoples of Europe from Fascist enslavement. The gigantic figure of the Soviet soldier-liberator was an invisible participant in diplomatic negotiations.

As for the United States and Great Britain, their tactics of delaying the opening of a second front throughout the war in order to exhaust the Soviet Union turned out to be a losing political card in the end. They underestimated the strength and power of the Soviet state, the enormous possibilities of the new social order - socialism, and the determination of the Soviet people to defeat fascism and end the war in a democratic world. In the end, the fear of "being late to Berlin" and "giving up Europe to the Russians" forced US President F. D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill to commit themselves at the Tehran Conference to open a second front in Europe (the so-called Operation Over-Lord) "during May 1944." 4 The leaders of the United States and Great Britain had no doubts that the Soviet Union was capable of bringing the war to a victorious end on its own and liberating all of Europe from fascism.

Professional falsifiers of history portray the events of that distant time in a different way. Celebrated with great fanfare in the West, the 40th anniversary of the Normandy landings was devoted to one task: to prove that it was Operation Overlord that paved the way for the liberation of Europe from fascism. In American assessments of the events of 40 years ago, downright messianic motives began to sound: America came to the aid of a tortured Europe and brought it the long-awaited liberation from the "brown plague" 5 . It was as if the Soviet Army's offensive, which created favorable conditions for the Allied landings in Normandy and forced the Nazis to transfer the best divisions from Western Europe to the eastern front, had never taken place before. It is as if there was no subsequent crushing offensive of the Soviet troops according to the Tehran agreement, which ensured the advance of Anglo-American troops in France. As if the "Atlantic Wall" widely advertised by the Nazis, which was defended by the 7th German Army, which had 213 thousand elderly soldiers under arms against the almost three-million invasion group 6, did not turn out to be a bluff .

Such "forgetfulness" is necessary for modern Western propagandists in order to cast a shadow on the Soviet Union, and portray the United States as the" guardian angel " of world civilization and draw false historical parallels on the need of the day between the invasion of Anglo-American troops on the European continent at the end of the war with fascism and the deployment of American missiles in the 80s in order to turn Europe into an atomic hostage of the Pentagon. In order not to be unfounded, we will refer to the authoritative opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American forces in Europe, General D. Eisenhower. When planning Operation Overlord, he took into account that "Soviet troops have already entered Poland and the bulk of German forces will be tied down by defense against the Russian offensive on the eastern front."7
4 See Teheran Conference of the Leaders of the three Allied Powers-the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain (November 28 - December 1, 1943). Collected papers, Moscow, 1984, p. 155. Speaking at a dinner in honor of the visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher to the United States at the end of February 1985, President Reagan said: "We (i.e., the Americans and the British - A. B. ) together returned freedom to the continent "(Pravda, 10. III. 1985).

5 See Time, 1984, May 28, p. 9.

6 For more information, see: Irving D. The War between the Generals. Lnd 1981 pp. 335 - 359.

7 Eisenhower D. Crusade in Europe. N. Y. 1948, p. 228.

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The military strategy of Washington and London had nothing in common with the role attributed to the Anglo-American troops as a selfless "savior" of European civilization, but, on the contrary, pursued the goal of creating dominant positions in Europe for the United States and Great Britain. One of the most prominent US military figures during the war, General A. Wedemeyer, recalled during the anniversary celebrations in Normandy: "Our plan was to land as quickly as possible and move as quickly as possible so that by the end of the war, the Anglo-American troops would secure control" (in Europe. - L. B. )8 . Finally, the testimony of the US Secretary of War, G. P. Blavatsky, is also of interest. Stimson, who, in a conversation with J. V. Stalin at the Potsdam Conference on July 25, 1945, stated:: "During the war, I closely followed the progress of the conferences in Teheran and Yalta, and in this regard I highly appreciated the assistance and position taken by the Generalissimo in relation to the operation that so interested me, namely, the crossing of the Canal, as well as the landing in Southern France... The position he took ensured our success - not only in France, but also later in Germany. " 9
Taking advantage of the favorable opportunities created by the Soviet offensive, and not meeting strong resistance from the Nazis, the Anglo-American troops quickly advanced through the plains of France to the east and in September reached the border with Germany. It seemed that the end of the war was very close and nothing could stop the victorious advance of the Allied forces into the depths of Germany. However, soon dramatic events took place on the western front, which, as it were, from within illuminated the balance of forces in the anti-Hitler coalition at the end of the war.

Much has already been written about the Ardennes operation10 . As you know, the task of Hitler's planned operation "Watch on the Rhine" was political. As the American historian J. R. R. Tolkien points out, Tolland, the goal was " to win the conditions for concluding an honorable peace with the West so that it (Hitler - LB ) could throw all German power against the East. But to achieve such peace, he had to be in a winning position. So he struck across the Ardennes, rallying all the divisions he could muster in order to reach Antwerp and thereby drive a powerful wedge between America and England. Churchill always feared Bolshevism as much as he (Hitler - AB), and this military defeat would have given the Prime Minister an argument to insist on any agreement with Germany. " 11
Hitler's calculations for a separate peace with the Western Allies were not so groundless. In the United States and Great Britain, there were powerful forces that were ready to collude with the Nazis in order to prevent social changes in the European countries liberated by the Red Army. American and British intelligence maintained constant contact with the right-wing forces in Germany, as well as, through various intermediaries, with the leaders of the Nazis, including Himmler. As early as October 1942, in a telegram to the USSR Ambassador to Great Britain, I. M. Maisky, I. V. Stalin admitted the possibility of Churchill colluding "with Hitler or Breuning's Germany at the expense of our country" 12 .

8 Time, 1984, May 28, p. 21.

9 FRUS. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945. Vol. II. Washington. 1960, p. 396.

10 For the Ardennes operation, see: History of the Second World War 1939-1945, vol. 9, Moscow, 1978, pp. 271-279; Second World War. Brief history, Moscow, 1984, pp. 417-420. See also: Sokolov A.M. Soviet-German Front and military actions in the West. Voprosy istorii, 1985, No. 1.

11 Tolland I. The Last 100 Days. N. Y. 1966, pp. 40 - 41.

12 Soviet-British Relations, vol. I. 1941-1943, p. 294.

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On December 16, the German counteroffensive on the western front began, which caught our Allies by surprise. The situation of the Anglo-American troops was becoming critical day by day. In fact, the first and only major battle in Europe with Hitler's Germany, whose troops by this time were already pretty battered and could not compare with the strength of the Wehrmacht two or three years earlier, was lost by the Western Allies. Only a new offensive by the Soviet Army could prevent the catastrophe, as Washington and London well understood. On January 6, 1945, Churchill sent his well-known message to the head of the Soviet government, 13 which sounded like a cry for help. In Moscow, they responded to it in the way that was expected between comrades-in-arms 14 .

Launched eight days earlier than the promised date-on January 12, 1945, the Soviet offensive, which went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as the Vistula-Oder offensive, quickly paralyzed the actions of the Nazis on the western front and forced them to begin transferring units-primarily the 6th SS Panzer Army, the Ardennes breakthrough shock force, to the western front. east. The role of the Soviet Army was crucial. The Anglo-American forces now faced no serious obstacles. The road to an offensive in Germany was open. So the truth of history leaves no stone unturned from the myth of the" salvation " of Europe by a generous America. A decisive contribution to the liberation of Europe from fascism was made by the Soviet Union, which fulfilled its great international mission.

What happened in the Crimea in the Livadia Palace - the former royal residence from February 4 to 11, 1945, still causes bewilderment of many bourgeois authors. How could it happen that the leaders of powers so different in social structure and ideology as the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain could agree among themselves on the most complex issues of conducting the war and the post-war world? Not wanting to recognize the objective regularity and necessity of cooperation between states with different social systems, due to history itself, they try to explain the results of the meeting of the "big three" in Crimea with all sorts of far-fetched reasons. In fact, there was no" mystery " in the decisions of the Yalta Conference, if, of course, we consider it with an open mind and really strive for historical accuracy. There were no unilateral "concessions" on the part of Western leaders to the head of the Soviet government, but there was a difficult and at the same time fruitful process of coordinating the positions of the parties on the basis of mutual concessions and acceptable compromises, taking into account the objective situation and the peculiarities of that great time when the victory over fascism was approaching. American author R. Messer, for example, notes: "This military situation in January and early February 1945 was at the heart of all the military and political negotiations in Yalta."15
As follows from the correspondence between J. V. Stalin and Roosevelt, the initiative in raising the issue of a new summit meeting belonged to the American side. The President was concerned about the success of the Soviet Army at the front, and he wanted to discuss in advance the issues of the end of the war and the post-war structure. "Since events are developing so rapidly and so successfully, I think that a meeting should be arranged as soon as possible between you, the Prime Minister and

13 Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 348.

14 Ibid., p. 349.

15 Messer R. The End of an Alliance. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman and the Origines of the Cold War. N. Y. 1982, pp. 40 - 41.

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by me, " he wrote to Moscow on July 19, 1944 .16 Three days later, the head of the Soviet government agreed to the president's proposal, but said that for reasons related to the need to manage affairs at the front, he could not leave the country. At this time, Soviet troops launched a broad offensive to liberate Western Belarus (Operation Bagration). There followed a lengthy correspondence between Moscow and Washington regarding the choice of venue and time of the meeting.

From the archival documents published by the USSR Foreign Ministry, it is clear that the venue of the conference was proposed by the American side, and not at all "imposed by Moscow" on the sick Roosevelt, as some bourgeois authors still claim. 17 On October 13, 1944, presidential aide and close friend H. Hopkins, in an interview with the Soviet Ambassador A. A. Gromyko, stated that " in his opinion, Roosevelt could arrive on a warship in the Black Sea for a meeting." As the ambassador reported to Moscow, "Hopkins admits that the meeting could have taken place anywhere on the Soviet Black Sea coast." 18
The Soviet Government attached great importance to the upcoming conference, especially in terms of further strengthening cooperation between the three Powers, both in ending the war and in consolidating peace. It saw its main task in reliably guaranteeing post-war security, preventing new aggression, and finding a just solution to the German problem. At the same time, it was important to consolidate the security interests of the Soviet state, both territorial and political, and to achieve a solution to the reparations problem. Finally, it was also about helping the European peoples liberated from the Nazi occupation to get back on their feet .19
As for the Soviet Union's negotiating partners, their goals were determined by a complex interweaving of imperialist interests on the one hand, and by a fairly sober assessment of their own capabilities in the current situation on the other. The publication of the American Congress notes that Roosevelt had two major goals: to finally achieve Soviet commitments to enter the war in the Far East and to agree on all issues related to the creation of the United Nations. Among Churchill's main tasks, as it emphasizes, was the preservation of the British Empire "along with ensuring a stable balance of power on the European continent by reviving France and Germany as a powerful counterweight to the Soviet Union"20 .

During a meeting in Malta on the way to Crimea, the British tried to coordinate joint tactics with the Americans at the upcoming conference, but to no avail. Roosevelt did not want to deprive himself of freedom of maneuver in advance and create the impression of an Anglo-American "conspiracy" behind the Soviet Union's back. The two powers were prevented from reaching an agreement by inter-imperialist contradictions. The case was limited to a discussion of military issues between the chiefs of staff of the United States and Great Britain. In his diary, the English Minister Eno-

16 Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 158.

17 Mastny V. Russia's Road to the Cold War. Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism. 1941 - 1945. N. Y. 1979, pp. 239 - 259.

18 Soviet-American Relations, vol. 2, p. 234.

19 See. Istoriya vneshnoi politiki SSSR [History of Foreign policy of the USSR]. Vol. I. 1917-1945. Izd. 4-E. M. 1980, pp. 474-486.

20 US Congress. House of Representatives. Committee of Foreign Affairs. Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior. Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy. Vol. I. Washington. 1979, p. 143.

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strange cases A. Ideas testily wrote down that he could not even "get close to business" during the planned working dinner. "I approached Harry (Hopkins)later, - he recalled, - and pointed out that we have to participate in an important conference, and we still haven't agreed on what we will discuss, nor on how to behave with the Bear (as the Soviet Union calls Ideas - A. B.), which, of course, knows what it wants. wants"21 .

Military matters, for all their importance, occupied relatively little space in the conference's work and were quickly agreed upon at the first meeting on February 4, following reports from the chiefs of General staffs of the three Powers. It was a question of closer coordination of Allied military operations in Europe in the run-up to the German capitulation. The Soviet government was expressed "deep gratitude" for the effective assistance rendered in connection with the breakthrough of the Nazis on the Western Front. In response, it was stressed that "the Soviet government considered it its duty, the duty of an ally, although it had no formal obligations in this regard." 22 It was a lesson in loyalty to the duty of an ally, taught to those who often neglected it.

The main place at the conference was occupied by the political problems of the post-war settlement, which the Soviet side considered appropriate to begin with a discussion of the question of Germany. The Soviet government was a principled opponent of any unviable and reactionary schemes for the future structure of Germany, such as the ideas of its "dismemberment" or "agrarianization" (the "Morgenthau plan"), which were put forward by British and American leaders during the war in pursuit of imperialist goals. At a meeting in Yalta on February 5, the US President, for example, indicated that he "sees no other way out than dismemberment." 23 In contrast to these plans, the USSR advocated the creation of a peaceful, democratic Germany that broke with the Nazi past. It was precisely this goal that the head of the Soviet delegation had in mind when he firmly stated that "Germany will have a future." 24 As a result, the Allies agreed among themselves that their "unwavering goal is the destruction of German militarism and Nazism and the creation of guarantees that Germany will never again be able to violate the peace of the whole world."25 On the basis of the recommendations of the European Consultative Commission (ECC), created at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain from representatives of the three allied Powers with the aim of considering the future European peace settlement , 26 the question of the zones of occupation of Germany was finally resolved. France was allocated a zone of British and American parts, and also granted the right to be a member of the Control Council for Germany.

The territorial issues that interested the USSR were relatively easily agreed upon. Roosevelt and Churchill understood that further resistance on these issues threatened to complicate relations with the Soviet Union. They had to unconditionally recognize the Soviet-Polish border as it had developed before the war began. In the decisions of the Yalta Conference, it was written:: "The eastern border of Poland should run along the Curzon Line with deviations from it in some areas-

21 Eden A. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden Earl of Avon. The Reckoning. Boston. 1965, p. 592.

22 Crimean Conference, pp. 61-62.

23 Ibid., p. 68.

24 Ibid., p. 64.

25 Ibid., p. 266.

26 See the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (October 19-30, 1943). Collected papers, Moscow, 1978, pp. 348-349.

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nah from five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland " 27 . This was a concession made by the Soviet side in order to mitigate the severity of the issue.

In connection with the official decision of the Soviet Union to enter the war with Japan "two or three months" after the German surrender and the end of the war in Europe, the conference participants signed an agreement with a list of conditions. It provided for the restoration of the rights belonging to the USSR, violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904, namely: the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of the island. Sakhalin and all its adjacent islands; the transfer of the Kuril Islands to it and the resolution of a number of other important issues 28 .

American leaders were extremely appreciative of this agreement. A member of the American delegation, Admiral W. Lehi, told Harriman: "This makes the trip worth it."29 . All subsequent attempts by some not very conscientious American authors to cast a shadow on the agreement as a whole or question its individual provisions do not take into account the main thing: Roosevelt's entourage was firmly convinced that without the participation of the Soviet Union, victory in the war with Japan was extremely difficult, if not impossible. Interesting is the testimony of the US Secretary of State in this regard. Stettinius. "I knew in Yalta," he wrote, " for example, about the enormous pressure exerted on the president by our military leaders in order to get Russia to join the war in the Far East. At that time, the atomic bomb was still an unknown quantity, and our defeat in the Battle of the bulge (as the Battle of the Bulge is usually called in Western historiography - A. B. ) was fresh in everyone's memory. We still haven't crossed the Rhine. No one knew how long the European war would last, nor how great the losses would be. " 30
The Yalta Conference resolved a key issue in the creation of the United Nations-the voting procedure in the Security Council, an agreement was reached to convene a constituent conference in San Francisco at the end of April, the circle of its participants was determined, and some other controversial issues that remained open after negotiations between representatives of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain at the Dumbarton Oaks 31 . On the issue of voting, American diplomacy was forced to move away from its position that undermines the principle of unanimity of the great Powers. After a lengthy discussion, an acceptable compromise was found. The Soviet delegation went along with the American proposals, which were based on absolute unanimity.

27 Ibid., p. 270. The Curzon Line is the name of the conventional line recommended on December 8, 1919 by the Supreme Soviet of the Allied Powers as the eastern border of Poland. When developing the Curzon line, it was based on the decision of the delegations of the main allied powers, who considered it necessary to include only ethnographically Polish regions in the territory of Poland. On July 12, 1920, British Foreign Secretary Curzon addressed a note to the Soviet Government outlining the line approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Allied Powers in 1919 as the eastern border of Poland. Curzon's note stated: "This line runs approximately as follows: Grodno-Yalovka-Nemirov-Brest-Litovsk-Dorogusk-Ustilug, east of Grubeshov, through Krylov, and then west of Rava-Ruska, east of Przemysl to the Carpathians "(see Crimean Conference, p. 306, note 25).

28 Ibid., pp. 273-274.

29 Harriman A., Abel E. Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin. 1941 - 1946. N. Y. 1975, p. 399.

30 Stellinius E. Jr. Roosevelt and the Russians. The Yalta Conference. N. Y. 1949, p. 90. One of the intelligence documents of the Anglo-American command of that period stated: "The entry of the Soviet Union into the war will finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat" (The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945. Washington. 1955, p. 87).

31 See Conference of Representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in Dumbarton Oaks (August 21-September 28, 1944). Collected papers, Moscow, 1984.

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members of the Security Council on all major decisions related to the maintenance of peace, including the adoption of economic, political and military sanctions, and allowed for deviations from the principle of unanimity in the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Soviet delegation also withdrew its proposal for the participation of all the Union republics in the UN and limited itself to two of them-Ukraine and Belarus, which was met with satisfaction by the Anglo-American side and received its immediate support.

As might be expected, the greatest controversy in the Livadia Palace flared up over the political structure of the liberated European states. During their discussion, the class contradictions between the participants in the negotiations, their different understanding of the principles of democracy, freedom, and democracy, became particularly acute. At a time when the peoples were still engaged in a deadly struggle against fascism, the leaders of the United States and Great Britain wanted to keep their "free hands" for the future and preferred to get rid of general declarations devoid of concrete content. Nevertheless, the "Declaration on a Liberated Europe" - this most important political document-contained a fundamental provision that read:: "The establishment of order in Europe and the reconstruction of national economic life must be achieved in a way that will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last traces of Nazism and fascism and establish democratic institutions of their own choice." 32 The Declaration cemented the inalienable right of the European peoples to self-determination, to choose the path of independent social and economic development, provided that there is no external interference in their internal affairs.

The Polish question occupied a large place in the conference. The initiative in its production belonged to the Western allies, alarmed by the democratic changes in Poland and the weakening of the positions of their proteges. They were primarily concerned with the question of power in this country. "The most essential part of the Polish question," Roosevelt emphasized at the February 6 meeting, "is the establishment of a permanent government in Poland." 33 Contrary to the later legend of the president's "compliance", he was determined and spared no effort to defend the Polish reactionaries. Together with Churchill, he tried to persuade the Soviet delegation to accept such a "reorganization" of the Provisional Government, which would return to power pro-Western, anti-Soviet figures who had lost all contact with their people. But all attempts to impose a reactionary government on the Polish people and thereby deprive them of their right to self-determination met with a strong protest from the Soviet side, which defended the point of view that the Poles should not be prevented from deciding their own affairs and imposing on them the will of others. The head of the Soviet delegation also insisted that Poland was linked to the most important strategic interests of the Soviet state and its security issues. "That is why,"he said," the Soviet Union is interested in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland. " 34 The firm position taken by the Soviet delegation apparently made a proper impression on Roosevelt. He understood the need for compromise. On February 6, the President sent a special message to Stalin on the Polish question, the words of which are now perceived as his political testament. "I am determined," he wrote, " not to allow a split between us and the Council-

32 Crimean Conference, p. 276.

33 Ibid., p. 97.

34 Ibid., p. 100.

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by the Russian Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences. " 35 The agreement reached with regard to Poland stated that the current Provisional Government should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis, with the inclusion of democratic figures from Poland itself and Poles from abroad. This decision made it possible for the Polish people to determine their own future. The Soviet Union has also shown every effort to reach a constructive agreement with its allies on this vital issue. Later, in the United States, there were many complaints about Roosevelt in connection with the agreement on the Polish question. It was considered a big concession to the Soviet Union. The American researcher P. Ward points out in this connection that "in fact, Roosevelt himself was not satisfied with the agreement on Poland reached in Yalta, but he believed that this was the best compromise that could be reached at that time." 36
The reparations issue was also difficult to discuss. The Soviet Union, which suffered terrible disasters from the Nazi occupation, wanted to compensate at least part of what was destroyed and destroyed by the enemy through reparations. At the same time, the USSR, putting forward its proposals, sought to emphasize that aggression cannot go unpunished. However, thanks to the efforts of Western partners, this issue was turned into an object of unworthy political bargaining. Thinking only of how not to weaken post-war Germany as a new "bulwark against Bolshevism", Churchill, under various pretexts, refused to record in the protocol the exact amount of German reparations proposed by the Soviet delegation. Roosevelt initially supported him in this. The fact is that the president clearly exaggerated the importance of German reparations for the Soviet Union and hoped to use the reparations issue, as well as the problem of American lending to Soviet orders discussed during the Yalta Conference in Soviet-American relations, to exert political pressure on the USSR. It is noteworthy that at the conference itself, the American delegation did not raise the issue of a long-term US loan to the USSR in the amount of $ 6 billion, which was put by the Soviet government on January 3, 1945, in order to strengthen the material foundation of Soviet-American relations for the post-war period, and apparently expected some "counter steps" from the Soviet side, in other words, political concessions. In any case, when V. M. Molotov reminded Stettinius of the Soviet proposals at a meeting of foreign ministers on February 5, he evasively replied that he was ready to discuss the problem of crediting Soviet orders at any time .37 However, it didn't go any further than that.

However, during one of the exchanges of views between Roosevelt and J. V. Stalin, a seemingly humorous and at the same time very remarkable conversation took place. The President, paying tribute to the high quality of Soviet champagne, expressed a desire to "write out" several hundred bottles from Moscow. To this, the head of the Soviet government ironically remarked that he could "release" this product to the president on the basis of a long - term loan with installments of 30 years-just for the period referred to in the Soviet proposal of January 3, 194538 . The hint was quite transparent and must not have gone unnoticed.

There is some reason to conclude that Roosevelt linked the

35 Correspondence, vol. 2, p. 199.

36 Ward P. The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers. 1945 - 1946. Kent State Univ. 1979, p. 150.

37 FRUS. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945, p. 610.

38 Stellinius E. Jr. Op. cit., p. 114.

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German reparations with the post-war restoration of the USSR. At a meeting on February 5, when the reparations issue was being discussed, he said that "he very much hopes that it will be possible to restore what was destroyed in the Soviet Union, but doubts that it will be possible to cover all the damage at the expense of reparations." 39 Unsaid, apparently, was the idea that the less the USSR receives on account of reparations, the greater its interest in American loans will be, with all the resulting political advantages for the United States. Thus, Roosevelt's initial intransigence on the reparations issue is understandable, until Hopkins intervened, seeing that it went too far and threatened to over-complicate relations with the Soviet Union. Apparently thinking about how to shift responsibility for the impasse in the reparations issue to the British, on February 10 he sent a note to the president saying: "The Russians have already conceded too much at this conference, and I think we should not let them down. Let the British disagree, and if they want to, continue to disagree in Moscow. Just tell them that all this is being passed to the reparations commission along with a protocol stating that the British do not agree to any mention of the figure of $ 10 billion. " 40
In the end, this was done. The signed protocol indicated that the Soviet and American delegations had agreed to refer the issue to the Moscow Reparations Commission, which should base its discussion on the Soviet proposal for a total amount of $ 20 billion in reparations from Germany, with the Soviet Union entitled to 50% of that amount. The British, as the Americans expected, refused to fix the exact figure of reparations.

The Yalta Conference was the pinnacle of cooperation between the USSR, the United States and Great Britain during the war years. It opened up real prospects for continuing this cooperation in peacetime. The last section of the communique signed in Crimea was called: "Unity in the organization of peace, as well as in the conduct of war." It should be emphasized that all the steps taken by the Soviet representatives at the conference, including their readiness to meet the Allies halfway on certain issues, were checked against the main task set by the party for Soviet foreign policy: to achieve the development of stable relations in the post-war period with the main capitalist powers - allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition in the spirit of a policy of peaceful coexistence.

The actions of Soviet diplomacy at the conference, its flexibility, purposefulness, and constructive approach were highly appreciated by the Western participants in the negotiations. The Permanent Deputy Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, A. Cadogan, noted in his diary: "I think that Uncle Joe (as Western figures called J. V. Stalin among themselves - A. B. ) made the strongest impression. The president got all worked up and the Prime Minister got all worked up, but Joe just listened with a sense of surprise. When he entered into a conversation, he never wasted words, but spoke only to the point." Elsewhere, Cadogan wrote:: "I've never seen Russians so approachable and accommodating. Joe in particular was exceptionally good. He is a great man, and he looks good against the backdrop of two aging statesmen. " 41
39 Crimean Conference, p. 80.

40 FRUS. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 920.

41 The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan. N. Y. 1972, pp. 706, 708 - 709.

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The Yalta Conference was a classic example of the triumph of the principle of reciprocity in international relations, the willingness of the parties to make mutually acceptable concessions and compromises in the name of lasting cooperation and mutual understanding. Her decisions went far beyond that time. The historical results of the Second World War and its colossal consequences for the fate of mankind were consolidated in them. Bourgeois authors are also forced to admit this. Roosevelt's biographer J. Hacker, for example, writes that " the agreements reached in Crimea had an impact on international relations for decades to come."42 . Another Roosevelt biographer, W. Butler, notes: "Probably there has never been a more important meeting in our entire century than this one." 43
The results of the Crimean conference were met with great enthusiasm in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The Soviet public hailed them as a historic demonstration of close military cooperation between the Allied Powers as the war entered its final phase. Soviet leaders highly appreciated the results of the work done in the Crimea. Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov recalled: "J. V. Stalin told me about the Yalta Conference. I realized that he was satisfied with the results, and he spoke very well of F. Roosevelt"44 .

The decisions of the conference were met with enthusiasm by the American public. The press noted their businesslike and constructive nature, high efficiency. The British Embassy in Washington noted: "The Yalta communique provoked an exceptionally favorable first reaction... There is no doubt that Yalta has had a truly positive impact on American public opinion... Although the initial enthusiasm gave way to a more in-depth and sober assessment of what was achieved at the conference, the main thing in this assessment remains"45 .

The results of the Yalta Conference were also welcomed by the English public. The press noted the promising nature of the Yalta decisions for the consolidation of post-war peace based on the cooperation of the three allied Powers. In a telegram addressed to J. V. Stalin on February 17, 1945, W. Churchill wrote:: "None of the previous meetings has shown with such clarity the results that can be achieved when the heads of three Governments meet with each other with the firm intention of bravely facing difficulties and overcoming them." 46
The decisions of the "big three" meeting in Crimea expressed the anti-fascist sentiments of the masses and their hopes for a peaceful post-war future. It was about achieving not a short - term peaceful respite-the threshold of a new world war-but a truly lasting and stable peace.

There is a period of less than six months between the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, but this period was filled to the limit with major historical events. Berlin fell under the powerful blows of the Soviet Army, the "millennial" third Reich collapsed, and German fascism was swept off the face of the earth. After the surrender of Hitler's Germany, militaristic Japan was doomed to defeat. On July 20, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, informed the Japanese Foreign Minister that " after joining Antico-

42 Hacker Y. Franklin D. Roosevelt. N. Y. 1983, p. 97.

43 Butler W. Franklin D. Roosevelt. Nothing to Fear But Fear. Lnd. 1982, p. 115.

44 Zhukov G. K. Memoirs and Reflections, vol. 3, Moscow, 1983, p. 206.

45 Washington Despatches, 1941 - 1945. Weekly Political Reports from the British Embassy. Chicago. 1981, pp. 515, 519.

46 Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 360.

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under the Mintern pact, our foreign policy is completely bankrupt. " 47 The Soviet Union, true to its commitments, was preparing to enter the war in the Far East.

The closer the end of the war was, the more pronounced were the class contradictions in the camp of the victors, the different goals pursued in the war by the allies-states with different social structures. While the Soviet Union sought a democratic post-war settlement that excluded the possibility of new world wars, the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain hatched far-reaching plans to redistribute the world in their favor at the expense of the states defeated and weakened by the war. The government of the British Conservatives and personally Prime Minister Churchill himself were the promoters of the anti-Soviet course. Class motives in his policies were closely intertwined with concern for the interests of the weakening British imperialism. The first half of 1945 was marked by an increase in the British government's hostility to the USSR .48
The post-war program of American imperialism, imbued with the idea of the so-called American century, was particularly aggressive and expansionist. Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, and the rise to power of his successor, H. Truman, a reactionary politician, accelerated the turn in US foreign policy towards confrontation with the Soviet Union and non - cooperation with it. Truman expressed the political philosophy of those circles that presumptuously believed that "America should become the elder brother in the community of nations." 49 This meant that by the end of the war, ideas of American omnipotence and superiority were gaining more and more influence in the ruling circles of the United States, there was a dangerous overestimation of one's own strength and underestimation of the capabilities of others, and an open claim to world domination was being made.

The new president, inspired by right-wing politicians, immediately tried to take a "decisive tone" in relations with the Soviet Union, but the real balance of power did not favor the plans of the White House. The Soviet Union had successfully completed its military operations in Europe, and the United States was still at war with Japan, counting on the Soviet Union's help. It was necessary to resolve complex European problems, where without mutual understanding with the USSR it was difficult to count on success. They had to back down, sending Hopkins, who, as Washington well knew, enjoyed the confidence of the Soviet leadership, to Moscow on a "reconciliation mission" at the end of May. During this visit, a final agreement was reached on holding a new conference of the leaders of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. Here is what is said about the meeting in the Kremlin that took place on May 26, 1945 between the head of the Soviet government and President Truman's representative in the Soviet recording of the conversation: "Hopkins says that on the way home Roosevelt talked a lot about the Crimean Conference and the meeting with Marshal Stalin. Roosevelt was as confident of the possibility of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in peacetime as it was during the war. Roosevelt spoke with great respect of Marshal Stalin and was glad in advance of the next meeting after the victory over Germany. He spoke of Berlin as a place to follow-

47 FRUS. The Conference of Berlin. Vol. II, p. 1256.

48 See Trukhanovsky V. G. Antoni Eden, Moscow, 1983, p. 251.

49 Dallek R. The American Style of Foreign Policy. Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs. N. Y. 1983, p. 142. For recent biographical works in the United States devoted to the activities of H. Truman, see: Ferrel R. Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency. Boston. 1983; McCoy D. The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. Lawrence. 1984.

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next meeting. Stalin says that in the Crimea they drank to the meeting in Berlin. " 50
It was natural to draw a line to the war in the capital of the defeated third Reich and agree on cooperation for the future. True, Truman in a close circle expressed the idea of the desirability of Stalin's arrival in the United States, but then abandoned this idea. "The president said," it was said at one White House meeting, "that he did not like the choice of meeting place in Germany, because he believed that this time Stalin was coming to us and he had Alaska in mind as a possible meeting place." 51
In the summer of 1945, on the eve of the Potsdam meeting, relations between the USSR and the United States improved somewhat. The results of Hopkins ' negotiations in Moscow, his sense of realism, and the concrete balance of forces at the final stage of the war had an impact. The Soviet government was ready to continue to follow the path of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. A sense of relief after the failed "test of strength" with the Soviet Union was also felt in the White House. In his diary, President Truman wrote about the outcome of the negotiations in the Kremlin: "Hopkins did a good job in Moscow... In any case, we are now in a better position from the point of view of the peace conference than before."52
After negotiations in Moscow, the formation of the Polish Government of National Unity was successfully completed, with which the United States and Great Britain established diplomatic relations in early July 1945. With the support of the Soviet Union, the Polish people defended their right to control their own destiny without outside interference. After some tension, Moscow and Washington agreed on the withdrawal of American troops from Saxony and Thuringia, which were part of the Soviet occupation zone, which initially the State Department and the British Foreign Office intended to use as a "lever of pressure" on the Soviet Union in resolving other issues. After considerable hesitation, Truman still showed prudence and did not go in this double-edged question about Churchill. As noted by the famous American diplomat Charles Bohlen, "he sought to appease the Soviets and rejected Churchill's approach in the spirit of power diplomacy." 53
Meanwhile, new clouds were already clouding the diplomatic horizon. London and Washington did not want to accept the democratic changes in Eastern Europe and the transfer of power to the working people. American and British representatives in Eastern European countries misrepresented the actions of the people's government in their reports. They maintained close ties with counter-revolutionary forces, including those who collaborated with the fascist occupiers, and persistently sought ways for bourgeois restoration. They claimed that the Soviet Union had "broken" with the Yalta Agreements and taken the path of unilateral action. The American representative in Bulgaria, M. Barnes, for example, reported to the State Department on July 9 that, in his opinion, "the war in Europe is not over, but has entered a new phase", during which "the old confrontation between England, the United States and Russia against Germany has turned into a confrontation between Russia and England and the United States." 54 . Especially strong pressure from the West was applied to government agencies.-

50 Soviet-American Relations, vol. 2, p. 318.

51 FRUS. The Conference of Berlin. Vol. I, p. 13.

52 Off the Record. The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. N. Y. 1980, pp. 44 - 45.

53 Bohle n Ch. Witness to History 1929 - 1969. N. Y. 1973, p. 212.

54 FRUS. The Conference of Berlin. Vol. I, p. 403.

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va of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. The American side, for example, refused to establish diplomatic relations with them, as the Soviet government suggested. A State Department document from that time stated:"We should seek equal opportunities for American businesses in these countries and an agreement that protects the rights of American owners." 55
At the same time, new ways of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs were being sought in Washington. The issue of reparations came to the fore. Due to the obstructionist position taken by the British and American representatives in the commission created by the Yalta decisions, the problem of reparations has reached an impasse. 37 meetings of the reparations commission ended in vain. The Americans and the British essentially came up with a revision of the Yalta agreement 56 .

The problems of European settlement, which centered on the German question, were primarily to be resolved at the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, which was held from July 17 to August 2, 1945. This conference, the last of a series of high-level inter-Allied meetings of the war years, on the one hand, drew a line under the Second World War, and on the other, pointed out the real possibilities of continuing cooperation between the USSR, the United States and Great Britain in the post - war period. Other Western authors oppose this historically justified interpretation of the Potsdam Conference, portraying it as a kind of" fruitless international meeting "that heralded the beginning of the Cold War and" legitimized "the split of the" grand coalition". In their opinion, the Potsdam Conference drew a line to inter-Allied cooperation during the war years, and did not open the door to the future. 57 This is a fundamentally false idea, which aims to justify the false thesis of the "inevitability of the cold war".

Of course, the Potsdam meeting was different from the previous meetings of the "big three" that took place during the war years. It differed in its spirit, the mood of its participants, the atmosphere of negotiations, etc. There was no mutual understanding and trust that marked the negotiations in Tehran and Yalta. The reasons lie primarily in the changed nature of the international situation after the end of the European war, the strengthening of anti-Soviet tendencies in the politics of the United States and Great Britain, as well as in a number of subjective factors. Soviet diplomacy had to deal with new Western figures. Roosevelt, with his broad political outlook and ability to make his own decisions, was not alive. Churchill behaved exceptionally belligerently and defiantly, as Marshal Zhukov noted .58
Secretary of War Stimson's memorandum prepared for Truman on July 19, "Reflections on the Main Problems that We Face", rejected the possibility of US cooperation with the Soviet Union because of the "fundamental differences" in the social systems of the two states and expressed the absurd idea that fundamental "changes" in the Soviet system were necessary as a prerequisite for such cooperation .59 In fact, this meant a revival of the political philosophy of the ruling circles

55 Ibid., p. 480.

56 См. Yergin D. Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Securuty State. Boston. 1977, p. 430.

57 См.: Mee Ch. Meeting at Potsdam. N. Y. 1975; De ZayasM. Nemesis at Potsdam. Lnd. 1977.

58 Zhukov G. K. Uk. soch. T. 3, p. 314.

59 The Truman Presidency. The Origins oi the Imperial Presidency and the National Securuty State. N. Y. 1979, p. 123.

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The United States during the period of non-recognition of the Soviet state, which suffered complete bankruptcy, but which nevertheless soon received its conceptual consolidation in the doctrine of "containment of communism" 60.

However, this does not mean that the conference was held in the spirit of confrontation and the Cold War. It is true that every decision was not easy, but it was achieved, and this was important in itself. The members of the Soviet delegation had to expend considerable effort, show maximum endurance and patience in order to bring the negotiations to a successful outcome. The head of the Soviet delegation showed constant composure, which was noted on the American side. "In Teheran, in Yalta, and in Potsdam, and during the 10 days I saw him during Hopkins' visit in the spring of 1945, "Bohlen wrote," Stalin's behavior was impeccable. He was patient, could listen carefully, and was always calm... He was always polite and inclined to express his thoughts with restraint. " 61
The Potsdam Conference, which took place during the crucial transition period from war to peace, on the eve of the nuclear age, was not accidentally subjected to such purposeful falsification in the West. Along with the misinterpretation of its general meaning, the Soviet Union's negotiating goals were also distorted. Bourgeois authors, as a rule, reduce them to specific issues, for example, to German reparations .62 In reality, the Soviet delegation in Potsdam was defending broad political goals related both to summing up the results of the war and, above all, to the final solution of the German problem, and to continuing the process of creating a solid foundation for post-war peace, the foundation of which was laid in Yalta. As Marshal G. K. Zhukov, a member of the Soviet delegation, noted, "the Soviet delegation arrived in Potsdam with the firm intention of achieving a mutually agreed policy of resolving post-war problems in the interests of peace and security of peoples and creating conditions that would exclude the revival of German militarism and the repetition of aggression."63
An example of the loyal attitude of the Soviet government towards its allies is the attention shown by the Soviet side to the problems that concern them, and above all to the question of the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan. In the summer of 1945, even after the atomic bomb test, American leaders continued to pin their main hopes on the entry of the USSR into the war in the Far East. "There were many reasons for my trip to Potsdam," Truman wrote, "but the most important one, in my opinion, was to get Stalin to personally confirm Russia's entry into the war against Japan, which our military leaders attached exceptional importance to." 64 At the first meeting with the head of the Soviet delegation in Potsdam, Truman said that "the United States expects help from the Soviet Union" in this matter .65 On July 21, after the atomic bomb test, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that the president "speed up the entry of the Russians into the war against Japan." 66
In Potsdam, the United States and Great Britain tried, though unsuccessfully, to negotiate "from a position of strength", thus opening the era of "atomic diplomacy", the policy of "atomic blackmail", which painted a dark color-

60 См. Gaddis G. Strategies of Containment. N. Y. 1982.

61 Bohlen Ch. Op. oil., p. 215.

62 См.: De Santis H. The Diplomacy of Silence. The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union and the Cold War. 1933 - 1947. Chicago. 1980, p. 155.

63 Zhukov G. K. Uk. soch. T. 3, p. 309.

64 The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman. Year of Decisions. Vol. I. 1955, p. 411.

65 Berlin Conference, p. 43.

66 FRUS. The Conference of Berlin. Vol. II, p. 1325.

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post-war international relations. The main bet on their part was made on the test of a new "superweapon" - atomic-timed to coincide with the opening day of the Potsdam Conference. It was no accident that, five years after the conference, Truman dubbed it the "meeting under the shadow of the atomic bomb." 67 Despite the advice of his closest advisers, as well as Churchill's insistence that the Big Three meet as quickly as possible while American troops were still in a strong position in Europe, the president deliberately delayed the Potsdam Conference, waiting impatiently for news from the Alamogordo Air Force Base in New Mexico, where the first test was being prepared. an atomic device. "My dad delayed the start of the conference because he wanted to hold it after the atomic bomb was tested," 68 the president's daughter, Margaret, testified.

However, the Potsdam Conference, despite all the efforts of representatives of the United States and Great Britain, did not become a cold war arena. This conclusion could have been made after the first meeting of the head of the Soviet government with the US president on the opening day of the conference on July 17. During the conversation, Truman stressed that "he is very happy to meet with Generalissimo Stalin, with whom he would like to establish the same friendly relations that Generalissimo Stalin had with President Roosevelt." In response, it was said that " the Soviet government is fully prepared to go along with the United States." At the same time, it was realistically emphasized that "difficulties are necessary and that the most important thing is the desire to find a common language" 69 . By taking a constructive approach to the problems under consideration, the Soviet delegation tried to "find a common language" in practice with its Western negotiating partners.

The main diplomatic struggle, as in Yalta, flared up around the future of the European peoples, in particular, around the problems of concluding peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and on this basis normalizing their international situation, the problem of reparations, determining the western border of Poland and other issues. Without going into all the twists and turns of the diplomatic battles at the Caecilienhof Palace, it is fair to say that the head of the American delegation showed a somewhat more realistic approach than Prime Minister Churchill, who was seized with fear of communism and a desire to restore the war-torn "balance of power" in Europe, beneficial for England. By this time, Churchill-an active skirmisher of the Cold War-had put into practice the lie he had picked up from the Nazi propaganda arsenal about the "Iron Curtain" that supposedly divided Western and Eastern Europe as a result of the advance of the Red Army. In a conversation that took place shortly before the opening of the conference with the Soviet ambassador in London, F. T. Gusev, the Prime Minister behaved openly provocatively and spoke in the spirit of the "cold war". "One of two things," Churchill said, "is either we can agree on further cooperation between the three countries, or the Anglo-American united world will stand up to the Soviet world, and it is difficult to foresee possible results if events develop along the second path," 70 the ambassador told Moscow.

However, the American and British delegations were eventually forced to move away from the "hard" positions they had originally taken and make compromise decisions on the most pressing issues.-

67 Off the Record, p. 63.

68 Truman M. Harry S. Truman. N. Y. 1973, p. 283.

69 Berlin Conference, p. 42.

70 Soviet-English Relations, vol. 2, p. 386.

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news of the day. The Soviet delegation protected the national interests of the Eastern European countries. Marshal Zhukov noted that "J. V. Stalin was extremely scrupulous about the slightest attempts of the US and British delegations to resolve issues to the detriment of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the German people"71 . Behind this was concern for the post-war security of the Soviet state, international solidarity with the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, which brought the peoples of these countries liberation from fascist enslavement, helped them to get out of diplomatic isolation and take their rightful place in the international community. Thus the foundations of the fraternal union of socialist states were laid.

The Western negotiators, who based their tactics on the" special interest " of the USSR in solving the reparations problem, failed to understand the true goals of Soviet diplomacy at the conference. The American delegation also waited in vain for appeals to the United States from the Soviet side for "economic assistance." In the reconstruction of the country, as in the recent repulse of the aggressor, the Soviet people relied primarily on their own strength.

The Potsdam Conference ended with historic decisions that clearly confirmed the vital force of the policy of peaceful coexistence and the ability of States with different social systems to find ways to resolve the most complex international problems not only in times of war, but also in conditions of peace. The victory of the Soviet Union over nazi Germany was so convincing that the ruling circles of the United States and England decided to make the decisions that the peoples were waiting for.

Of great importance for the fate of Europe and the whole world was the agreement reached by the conference participants that "German militarism and Nazism will be eradicated" and that other measures will be taken in the future so that Germany will never again threaten its neighbors or preserve world peace. The goal of "the final reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis"72 was agreed . Thus, for the first time in the history of international relations, militarism, a sinister product of imperialism, was strongly condemned and outlawed.

As for the question of German reparations, in view of the uncompromising position taken by the American and British delegations, the Soviet side was forced to agree to receive them mainly from its own zone of occupation, although this was contrary to the agreed policy of treating Germany as a whole. Thus, the United States, as noted by the American author D. Yergin, took a "significant step towards splitting" Germany .73 The Soviet delegation managed to resolve the issue of transferring a third of the German military and merchant fleet to the Soviet Union, which representatives of the United States and Great Britain tried to use to put pressure on the Soviet position. An agreement was reached on the annexation of part of East Prussia with the city of Konigsberg to the USSR.

As a result of the persistent efforts of Soviet diplomacy, plans for imperialist intervention in the affairs of Eastern European countries were rejected, in particular Truman's demands for an "immediate reorganization" of the governments of Bulgaria and Romania, for control by Western powers over elections in these countries, etc.,

71 Zhukov G. K. Uk. soch. T. 3, p. 317.

72 Berlin Conference, p. 484.

73 Yergin D. Op. cit., p. 118.

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its tasks included the preparation of peace treaties with the former allies of Hitler's Germany, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with them in the future. This contributed to strengthening the position of the people's government in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, strengthening their sovereignty and independence.

Of great importance was the final solution of the question of Poland's western border, which the imperialist Powers were trying to use to put pressure on the young Polish government. The leaders of the United States and Great Britain were forced to declare that they had stopped recognizing the "former Polish government in London" and agreed that it "no longer exists."75
The conference did not support the expansionist plans of the United States in relation to European states, which were manifested in Truman's insistent idea of "internationalization" of navigation on the Danube and the Rhine. The Soviet delegation refused to consider this question, much less include it in the conference communique.

Fulfilling its allied obligations, the Soviet Military Command introduced American representatives to the plans for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan and agreed to deploy meteorological stations staffed by American personnel in the Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk regions.

Of course, the Soviet delegation did not succeed in achieving all the goals set at the conference, but the overall outcome of the negotiations was undoubtedly favorable. "The conference can probably be called a success," 76 the head of the Soviet delegation said before it closed. It was successful, first of all, from the point of view of the positive experience of cooperation between the great Powers in the new peacetime conditions.

Unfortunately, the decisions of the Potsdam Conference were not properly developed in the future, and many of them were not implemented due to the fault of the Western powers. The American and British leaders did not draw proper conclusions from the negotiations that took place. As for US diplomacy, it pinned certain hopes on the implementation of "atomic diplomacy". That's why Truman was so thrilled when he returned to the United States on board the cruiser Augusta to hear about the atomic bombings of Japanese cities. In his diary, the following eloquent entry appeared: "This is probably the most terrible thing ever invented, but it may also be the most useful"77 . American researcher R. Messer writes about the mood in Washington in this regard that "the possession of a bomb immediately strengthened American strategic power against the Soviet Union armed with conventional weapons." 78 The desire for world domination blinded American leaders, who could not then understand that the US nuclear monopoly could not last.

The decisions of the Potsdam Conference opened up real opportunities for continuing cooperation between the member States of the anti - Hitler coalition in peacetime. After the end of the bloody war, this cooperation was strongly demanded by the interests of the peoples and concern for the preservation of universal peace. The ambitions of imperialist circles came into deep conflict with the sentiments of the broad masses of the people on both sides of the Atlantic. A typical example of the peaceful mood of the Western public was the crushing defeat of the Conservative Party and its leader, W. Churchill, in the UK elections in the summer of 1945. The defeat came

75 Berlin Conference, p. 472.

76 Ibid., p. 300.

77 Off the Record, p. 56.

78 Messer R. Op. cit., pp. 88, 89.

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It is all the more remarkable that the Prime Minister was surrounded by the aura of a "war hero" and "savior of the nation". In a telegram from London to the NKID dated July 27, 1945, the Soviet embassy reported: "The election results show that the majority of English voters clearly understood that a Conservative victory could lead to war with the USSR... The conservatives did not take into account that the people were tired of the six-year war and did not want to be involved in a new one, especially with the Soviet Union."79 It is worth quoting the authoritative testimony of I. Berlin, president of one of the American colleges, who was appointed to work at the US Embassy in Moscow in August 1945. "The war was over," he recalled, " and the Potsdam Conference did not lead to an open rupture between the victorious Allies. Despite the gloomy forecasts in some quarters in the West, the general mood in official Washington and London was cautiously optimistic; among the general public and in the press, it was even more hopeful and enthusiastic: the exceptional courage and heavy sacrifices of the Soviet people in the war against Hitler generated a powerful wave of sympathy for their country... there was a broad and fervent desire for cooperation and mutual understanding everywhere. " 80
The agreements reached in Yalta and Potsdam could well become the basis for the development of post-war cooperation between states with different social systems that developed during the war with fascism. There were all objective conditions for this. But such a prospect contradicted the self-serving interests of imperialist circles, primarily the United States and Britain, who sought to impose their will on other peoples. The struggle of the Soviet Union and all progressive forces for the implementation of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements became an important part of the struggle against the Cold War policy and for the establishment of Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations.

The attempt made by the Western powers to revise the inter-Allied agreements, the "cold war" they unleashed against the socialist countries, which was accompanied by an arms race, whipping up international tension, and the revival of militarism and revanchism in West Germany, turned out to be completely untenable. Gradually, objective prerequisites for a turn towards defusing tensions began to mature .81 - The fact that the Soviet Union achieved military-strategic parity with the United States and its NATO allies and did not allow them to achieve superiority over socialism in this area was of key, truly historical significance for the preservation of universal peace. The Warsaw Pact countries and all peace-loving forces thwarted attempts by revanchist circles of Germany, fueled from overseas, to revise the historical results of World War II. By the end of the 60s, it became clear that the CDU's foreign policy line aimed at changing European borders, non-recognition and absorption of the GDR, and the implementation of the idea of revenge was absolutely hopeless. "Moscow's achievement of nuclear parity with the United States in the '60s and' 70s eliminated the lingering hope that some American government would intervene militarily in Europe to change the Yalta system," American magazine 82 acknowledged .

A decisive factor in the turn towards de-escalation of tension at the turn of the 1970s was the peaceful foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union.-

79 Soviet-English Relations, vol. 2, pp. 415-416.

80 Berlin I. Personal Impressions. N. Y. 1981, pp. 155 - 156.

81 See for more details: Socialism and the world (history, theory, modernity), Moscow, 1983

82 Newsweek, 11.II.1985, р. 15.

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the program of strengthening European security based on the recognition of the territorial and political results of World War II and post-war development, which was set out in the well - known Bucharest Declaration of the Warsaw Pact member States (1966), was collectively developed by them. The central place in it was occupied by the proposal to hold a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, designed to draw the final line under the Second World War and outline the prospects for cooperation between European states in the future. The signing of the so-called "Eastern treaties" of the Federal Republic of Germany with the USSR (1970), the People's Republic of Poland (1970), the GDR (1972), the Czechoslovak SSR (1973) and the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin (1971), which are based on the principles of the inviolability of European borders and the inadmissibility of the application of politics, was important in this regard forces in international relations or its threats, recognition of the indisputable fact of the existence of two German states and the need to develop relations between them in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, establish the special status of West Berlin as a territory not belonging to Germany, finally cross out the Munich diktat, etc.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which concluded its work in Helsinki, the capital of Finland, in August 1975, developed a set of principles for inter-State relations that meet, both in spirit and in letter, the requirements of peaceful coexistence. The Conference, on the one hand, drew a line under the past, confirming the inviolability of European borders, on the other hand, its results are directed to the future. Prospects for peaceful cooperation in a number of areas - economy, science and technology, culture and information, development of contacts between people-were identified. A powerful acceleration of the pan-European process of rapprochement of states and confidence-building between them, including in the military field, was reported in Helsinki.

In the post-war decades, the attitude of the ruling circles of the Western powers to the historical agreements of Yalta and Potsdam was far from simple and unambiguous. When the international situation worsened, Western capitals usually called for revision of the signed agreements. Back in October 1947, a prominent figure of the Republican Party of the United States, J. F. Dulles, in the near future the US Secretary of State, proclaimed: "There will be no retreat to Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam." 83 This also happened in the late 70s and early 80s, when the policy of the United States and its NATO allies undermined the process of defusing tensions and caused a serious breakdown in the entire system of relations between states with different social systems.

The influential part of the imperialist camp has never given up its hopes, however illusory they may be, of "replaying" the results of World War II, "rejecting" socialism and achieving a general change in the balance of power in the world in its favor. These goals were served by the Cold War unleashed by the imperialism of the United States and Great Britain. In this direction, the actions of their NATO allies, who have declared another anti-communist "crusade" and launched a new, dangerous round of the arms race, are also taking place.

It is not surprising that Washington has begun to systematically destroy the foundations of detente, escalate international tensions, and openly interfere in the affairs of other nations in order to change the existing order of things.-

83 Pravda, 8. II. 1984.

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not only the agreements of the 70s, but also the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam-the unshakable foundation of European and universal peace. The current attempt to revise the agreements in Yalta and Potsdam is being made, however, "not head-on", as in the 50s, but rather insidiously and subtly. In essence, this attempt to revise the historical decisions that laid the foundation for the entire post-war world order is based on calculations for the restoration of the bourgeois order in individual socialist countries. This goal is supposed to be achieved by contrasting the inter-Allied agreements of the war years with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975), signed three decades after the victory over fascism, although it is well known that these documents are linked by a common sense to strengthen pan-European cooperation on the basis of the territorial and political realities development. Bourgeois ideologues claim that the Helsinki Act created "a completely new framework for international relations", gave rise to a new political situation, which allegedly replaced the agreements of the war years and almost made them obsolete .84
Such a biased interpretation of the Helsinki Act, a carefully balanced and balanced document that marks the tenth anniversary of its signing this year, is absolutely illegal and serves the purpose of legalizing counterrevolutionary subversive activities against socialist countries in order to restore bourgeois order in them. While paying lip service to the territorial realities in Europe, imperialist circles at the same time advocate the possibility of implementing "peaceful changes" in the socialist countries towards bourgeois restoration in the spirit of the notorious tactic of "quiet" or "creeping" counter-revolution .85 It is also on this basis that the idea of overcoming the "split of Europe" is conceived, as opposed to Lenin's idea of peaceful coexistence of two socio-economic systems - the only possible and reasonable basis for establishing pan-European cooperation, taking into account the prevailing post-war social and political realities.

Efforts aimed at undermining the European legal system are being made by the United States and at the official level. It is difficult not to see this in connection with the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe, which began at the end of 1983. Speaking at the opening of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building, Security and Disarmament Measures in Europe in January 1984, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said: Schultz stated: "The United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the artificially imposed division of Europe." 86 Newsweek magazine in an article under the characteristic heading "The Long shadow of Yalta" in this regard explained:: "In Helsinki, an agreement was reached on the 'inviolability of borders', not on the inviolability of communist regimes within them. " 87 Scientific arguments about the" split of Europe "and the Yalta agreement on dividing it into "spheres of influence", translated into the language of practical politics, turned into a terry counter-revolution.

84 См. напр.: Hyland W. US - Soviet Relations; The Long Road Back. - Foreign Affairs, 1982, N 3, p. 542; Konrad Y. Antipolitics. San Diego. 1984.

85 This counter-revolutionary idea was especially cynically described in the article by Z. Brzezinski, under the pretentious title "The Future of Yalta", in which this towering anti-communist, who held a high position in the Carter administration, advocated "evolutionary change in Eastern Europe" by, as he did not think it necessary to hide, the "historical abduction" of individual socialist countries (see Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. Brzezinski Z. The Future of Yalta. - Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85, pp. 295 - 297).

86 See Pravda, 8. II. 1984.

87 Ibid.

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If anyone had any doubts about this, they were dispelled by President Reagan's speech on August 17, 1984, in which the head of the White House officially questioned the decisions of the Yalta Conference and called for their revision. He stressed that "passive consent" to the current situation in Europe "is not an acceptable alternative" for Washington .88 The White House and the State Department expressed similar sentiments on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Crimean Conference in February 1985.

Is it any wonder that in these conditions, taking advantage of the high patronage from overseas and the support of the official authorities in Bonn, the "forever yesterday" - revanchist and militaristic forces-once again raised their heads in Germany? Once again, as was the case in the days of Karl Adenauer, L. Erhard and K. Kissinger, irresponsible calls are being made in West Germany to "restore Germany within the borders of 1937", the mythical "German question" is being declared "unresolved", and plans for the absorption of the GDR are being discussed. The intensification of revanchist forces on the Rhine shows that ultra-reactionary circles, indulging in groundless hopes of seeing communism "on the ashes of history", do not lay down their weapons and only wait in the wings. E. Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, pointed out in this connection that there was once again a danger of unleashing a world war from German soil, from the territory of West Germany .89
The historical significance of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences lies primarily in the fact that they consolidated the colossal shift in the global balance of power that occurred as a result of the Second World War and determined the development of international relations for many years to come, reflecting an important stage in the formation of a new social system on earth - socialism.

The historical agreements of Yalta and Potsdam are a major achievement of Soviet foreign policy, the result of the increased authority and power of the Soviet state.: "As a result of the historic victory won by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, the USSR has been unconditionally recognized in world affairs as a great power, without which no major problem can be solved. This, in particular, is indicated by the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. This is reflected in the Charter of the United Nations, according to which the Soviet Union, as a permanent member of the Security Council, bears special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."90
The inter-Allied agreements have convincingly demonstrated that cooperation between States with different social systems is quite possible and feasible in conditions of fundamental revolutionary changes accelerated by the course of the anti-fascist struggle, and that class contradictions in themselves are not an insurmountable obstacle to establishing such fruitful cooperation. This experience is of great importance in the light of the development of modern international relations and the ideological struggle.

There is a direct historical link between the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam and the Final Act of the Pan-European Conference. In spite of all the obstacles created by the Cold War, the unshakable foundation of inter-Union agreements has been formed.-

88 The Department of State Bulletin, October 1984, p. 17.

89 Pravda, 20. VIII. 1984.

90 Gromyko A. A. Lenin's course of peace. Selected speeches and articles, Moscow, 1984, pp. 513-514.

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a branched system of European treaties, which is a material expression of the process of defusing tension. The main driving force behind this process is the peace-loving initiatives of the Warsaw Pact countries that focus on key European security issues, primarily the prevention of nuclear war, limiting the arms race, and strengthening confidence-building measures between European States. Guided by these objectives, the Soviet Union submitted proposals to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building, Security and Disarmament Measures in Europe for the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace .91 Combining large - scale political and international legal steps with confidence-building measures in the military field, which follow up on the Helsinki Final Act, could make a significant contribution to strengthening European and international security.

Soviet leaders have repeatedly stressed that in politics and diplomacy there is always room for reasonable compromises and mutually acceptable agreements, as well as a vast field for developing and strengthening mutual understanding and trust based on close or overlapping interests. There would be, as they say, a desire to cultivate this field. An example of this is the history of the anti-Hitler coalition, the instructive experience of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.

91 See Gromyko A. A. Uk. soch., pp. 636-645.

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