Moscow, Mysl Publishing House. 1976. 359 pp. Circulation 19,000. Price 1 rub. 40 kopecks.
The author of the peer-reviewed work, Head of the Department of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Doctor of Historical Sciences G. A. Trofimenko examines the struggle of trends within the United States on the issue of war and peace in the plane of American military political ideology, that is, the conceptual framework in which US leaders acted and made foreign policy decisions.
The author approaches the subject from the standpoint of consistent historicism. American military-political thought is analyzed in the book in its evolutionary development over 200 years of US history. Unlike many American bourgeois historians, who in such cases turn first of all to the works of their military, G. A. Trofimenko pays primary attention to the strategic precepts of the" founding fathers " of the United States (Presidents J. Washington, J. Adams, T. Jefferson, J. Madison, J. Monroe, J. K. Adams, J. Jackson, as well as such prominent statesmen as A. Hamilton, B. Franklin, J. Jay, G. Knox, B. Stoddert, J. Calhoun, etc.). This approach seems fully justified.
The study of continuity in US military-political thought has proved very fruitful. The author was able to identify and summarize certain "constants" of the strategic thinking of the ruling class: canons and stereotypes that still have an impact on the development of strategic thinking.
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influence on foreign policy practice. The main ones are, as noted in the book: a) the idea of American messianism ("pre-determined fate"); b) the idea of the need to combine rational calculation with self-serving interest in planning actions abroad ("enlightened selfishness"); c) the approach to military force as the primary basis for the strength of the international position of the state; d the concept of the "balance of power" on the world stage, which is based not so much on preserving peace as on preserving the established international system (Chapter 1). This resulted in particular, specific principles and concepts of strategic training (military construction) and strategic action (use of force in conflict).
The study of the widely interpreted concept of "deterrence", which was reflected in a number of military-political doctrines (J. Monroe, J. Hay, G. Truman, R. Nixon), deserves special mention. As noted in the book, the concept of "deterring" the main opponents from encroaching on the territory of the United States, developed already in the first years of the existence of the American republic, was not passive-defensive from the very beginning (p.33). The defensive aspect of this concept was subordinated to the tasks of American expansion on the North American continent, and soon throughout the western hemisphere. "This dialectical interrelation of two aspects of the concept of" deterrence " - defensive and offensive, - emphasizes G. A. Trofimenko, - is its most important feature. As the great-power ambitions of the United States grew, and as the United States entered the world stage, the offensive aspect of" deterrence " turned out to be an increasingly dominant element of this seemingly defensive concept. Nevertheless, the defensive element has never completely disappeared; and in times of greatest danger, when the balance of power in the world was beginning to seem unfavorable to US leaders, they sought to highlight the defensive aspect of the concept of "deterrence" (pp. 91-92).
The author explains, in particular, the "surprising coincidence" of the views of the "founding fathers" of the United States with the foreign policy philosophy of the idol of the Kissinger school in modern American diplomacy, O. Bismarck, by the pragmatism of the US ruling circles in their approach to international affairs. "Deriving from the foreign policy 'lessons of Bismarck', who operated in a 'multipolar world', the postulates for a 'new US foreign policy' for the 1970s and subsequent years, H. Kissinger," notes G. A. Trofimenko, "apparently did not realize that much more congenial- 'truly global' - was the idea of a 'new US foreign policy'. national "and at the same time similar - lessons for the United States are the foreign policy precepts of the American "founding fathers", who anticipated most of the foreign policy and strategic principles of the "iron chancellor"!" (page 33).
A significant place in the work is occupied by the analysis of the specific application of the "metasystem" of military - political concepts and views that have developed throughout the history of the United States in modern conditions.
A review of the evolution of the US military-political strategy after World War II shows that many of the traditional strategic attitudes were for some time thrown aside or distorted beyond recognition, and the American post-war leadership rushed to build the "American world", regardless of the rules of the "balance of power", with the precepts of J. R. R. Tolkien. Washington should avoid constant antipathies and sympathies for other nations, ignoring the fundamental principle of US strategy, which requires not just selfish calculation in the implementation of foreign policy interests, but "enlightened calculation", which is far from the same thing. This euphoria of American "omnipotence" gave rise to the Cold War. In the context of the entire history of the United States, the Cold War was, to a certain extent, a departure from traditional American politics: an attempt to single-handedly solve "from a position of strength" all world problems, and first of all "the problem of international communism."
By the early 1970s, as the book notes, American power politics had reached a dead end (pp. 333-339). Washington's awareness of the failure of this policy and its limited foreign policy capabilities, which the American leadership came to through a painful process of "trial and error" and sorting out "power alternatives", caused a kind of "de-Americanization" of the US strategy. This meant its reorientation to the priority of ensuring its own interests, turning from confrontation to negotiations in relations with the USSR, and official recognition of the principle of peaceful co-operation.
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existence as the basis of the relationship between them (p. 289). As a result of the Soviet-American high-level meetings held in the first half of the 1970s, much was done to ensure that peaceful cooperation, rather than confrontation, would determine the nature of these relations. About 60 agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1972-1975 created, as the book emphasizes, the infrastructure of relations between the two states, outlined their areas of interest and formulated a kind of "code of conduct", which they agreed to follow in their relations and actions on the world stage (ibid.).
Considering certain areas of interests of the USSR and the United States, the author raises an important scientific, theoretical and practical question: is it legitimate to assume that the American imperialist state may actually be interested in eliminating the danger of nuclear war, and does its very nature exclude the possibility of Washington having such a goal? Answering this question, G. A. Trofimenko is guided by Lenin's well-known position that war is nothing but a continuation of the previous policy of the state only by other, namely violent means. "As long as war," he writes, "solves problems that are rational from the point of view of the ruling class, as long as its negative consequences do not outweigh its potential "profits"- the results of victories, war remains for them one of the very real alternatives (even if politicians of this class come out with broadcast declarations of their aversion to war). an instrument of force). However, when the instrument of war is such that it ceases to yield to rational control, when the aggressor in the course of the struggle for "victory" can itself be destroyed, then war loses the character of a practically used instrument of politics. What is crucial is not the fact that the very means of waging war are excessive to achieve a particular political goal-imperialism would not hesitate to resort to any weapon in order to realize its plans - but the fact that the other side in a potential conflict has similar means at its disposal" (pp. 292-293). In other words, nuclear ("absolute") power, on which the post - war military-political strategy of the United States was based, turned out to be untranslatable into political power, primarily because a similar power appeared in the" main opponent " of the United States - the Soviet Union.
The process of adapting US foreign policy and military-political strategy to reality, which began at the turn of the 70s, and which, as the book correctly notes, is far from complete, is characterized by inconsistency. At the same time, "one thing is clear: this is a process of transition to historically more traditional canons and principles of foreign policy behavior for the United States than those that have defined US behavior since the end of World War II" (p.339). In these circumstances, the foreign policy guidelines of the founders of the American republic, who called on their descendants to "cultivate peace and harmony" with all countries, pursue a restrained, balanced foreign policy, realistically assess the capabilities of the United States on the world stage, seek settlement of disputed issues through compromises, and take into account the interests of all members of the world community, are once again becoming very important.
As for the Soviet-American relations, the historical experience, as can be seen from the book, shows that relations of peace, not confrontation, were traditional for our countries. Indeed, if we look at the history of Russian-American relations from the point of view of today, we can say with good reason that, on the whole, they have developed in a benevolent direction, that there are long - standing friendly scientific, cultural, socio-political, trade and diplomatic contacts between the Russian and American peoples that have brought mutual benefit. We are far from presenting the history of this relationship in an idyllic light. There were many controversial issues, contradictions and even conflicts, the solution of which was complicated primarily by the difference in socio-political systems. However, if we talk about the main lesson of the history of relations between our countries, it is that it is possible to overcome conflicts not through force, but through negotiations.
The work of G. A. Trofimenko leads to an important methodological issue in the study of international relations and foreign policy: the development of a generally acceptable conceptual framework. In the book - and this is a welcome phenomenon - we can trace
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a certain distinction is made between doctrines, theories, and concepts. The former refer to officially formulated universal guiding principles of foreign policy, the latter to systems of fundamental ideas, mainly of a philosophical and methodological nature, and the third to a set of views on certain specific foreign policy phenomena, their understanding and interpretation. At the same time, the author in some cases interprets the concept of "doctrine" in the broadest way and extends it to all official views, thus using it as a synonym for the concept of "concept". The arbitrary use of the term "doctrine" not only hinders the scientific classification of various foreign policy statements, understanding their place and significance in the history of foreign policy, but also makes it difficult in practical terms to identify principles that serve as a kind of long-term reference points in foreign policy.
When applied to US foreign policy, where doctrines play a special role in comparison with other countries, a strict distinction is needed not only between doctrines and concepts, but also between the doctrines themselves. In US foreign policy, first of all, "global doctrines" should be distinguished, which represent a philosophical framework for certain long-term foreign policy goals of the ruling class. Often proclaimed in relation to US policy in a particular area, they become principles of US behavior not only on a regional scale, but also on a global scale, due to the historical conditions that gave rise to them and the ideas embedded in them. These doctrines are a kind of "long-lived" in the field of foreign policy. In American history, such doctrines include the doctrine of "freedom of the seas", the doctrine of "isolationism", the Monroe, Hay, and Truman doctrines. The Nixon Doctrine has a similar character, which, taking into account the new alignment of forces in the world and the emergence of nuclear parity, formulated as the three leading principles of US foreign policy reliance on force," partnership " (sharing responsibility with allies in blocs) and negotiations with states of a different social system. The basic principles of this doctrine have not been fundamentally changed. Therefore, the book's categorical statements about the "collapse" of the Nixon Doctrine (pp. 328-329) are hardly legitimate.
Regional doctrines should be distinguished from global ones. These two types of doctrines, in addition to their names, are usually related by their origin. Both are proclaimed in relation to the regions. In order to understand the differences between them, it is necessary to carefully compare them and determine whether a particular doctrine contains qualitatively new provisions, whether these provisions can become a universal global principle. Let us take as an example the idea put forward by President J. R. R. Tolkien. The so-called "Pacific Doctrine"was adopted by Ford in December 1976. It seems to us that this doctrine was not a "replacement" (p. 329), but, on the contrary, a development of the basic principles of the "Nixon doctrine" (force, "partnership", negotiations) in relation to a very specific region-the Pacific basin. Such regional doctrines are a frequent occurrence in US foreign policy, and they appear due to both the prestige considerations of their proponents and objective circumstances. Drawing a strict distinction between global and regional doctrines is very important for understanding US foreign policy.
The book of G. A. Trofimenko is a notable phenomenon in Soviet historical literature. It not only contains an in-depth analysis of US foreign policy, but also makes us think about the need to find new ways to study international relations and foreign policy.
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