The question of how religion and modernity relate is one of the key questions for any "discourse on modernity". After all, it is not only a question of how modernity and related modernization processes affect traditional forms of religion. It is also a question about the nature of modernity itself, about its religious and theological roots, which in one way or another constantly pops up both in purely theoretical discussions 1 and in the current political agenda 2.

Social sciences in the XX-XXI century proposed several concepts designed to explain this relationship. The most famous and influential of them was the theory of secularization, which was a subsection of the more general theory of modernization, which postulated the fundamental incompatibility of modernity and religion: the more of one, the less of the other.3 Today in ip-

1. See, for example, the dispute between Karl Levit and Hans Blumenberg: Lowith K. Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschichte. Die Theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie. Stuttgart, 1953; Blumenberg H. Die Legitimitat der Neuzeit. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1996; Wallace R.M. Progress, Secularization and Modernity: The Lowith-Blumenberg Debate // New German Critique. 1981. No. 22 (Special Issue on Modernism). P. 63 - 79.

2. What is worth at least a dispute about Christian roots in Europe or about Orthodox culture in Russia?

3. Secularization Theory: the Course of a Concept // The Secularization Debate (Eds. W. H. Swatos, D.V.A. Olson). Lanham, Boulder, N. Y., Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, inc., 2000.

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As one of the possible alternatives, the concept of "multiple modernities" by Shmuel Eisenstadt is increasingly brought to the fore in religious studies, which makes it possible to complicate and nuance the conclusions of secularization theory by placing this theory in a global context. The main theme of this issue is devoted to the concept of multiple modernities and, in particular, to its aspect that allows us to better understand the conditions of religion's existence in the modern global world. In this article, I will first analyze the ideas about the relationship between religion and modernity that prevailed in the social sciences in the second half of the twentieth century (I); then I will identify the factors that shook these ideas (II); then I will consider the contribution to the discussion that the concept of multiple modernities makes (III); finally, in the last part of I will give a brief description of the thematic materials included in this issue.

I

If religious studies as a whole became interested in modernity only in the second half of the XX century, 4 then for sociologists of religion, the question of modernity and modern society has always been one of the main subjects of research interest. If we talk about the 20th century, then almost the entire theoretical base of the post-war sociology of religion, starting in the 1950s, when the so-called "religious" or "parish" sociology began to decline, 5 can be considered as a subdivision of the theory of modernization, as a reflection on the impact of the process on traditional religious forms. modernization in the sense of the transition from a traditional society to a modern one, associated with scientific and technological progress, industrialization, urbanization, social differentiation, rationalization, etc.

The initial flaw in sociologists ' theoretical reflections on the relationship between religion and modernity was a very narrow empirical base, on the basis of which large-scale and complex studies were made.-

4. Krasnikov A. Metodologicheskie problemy religiovedeniya [Methodological problems of religious Studies]. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2007, pp. 151-152.

5. Tschannen O. Le debat sur la secularisation a travers les Actes de la CISR // Social Compass. 1990. Vol.37. No. 1.

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leko's far-reaching conclusions. Key researchers, such as Peter Berger and Brian Wilson, focused only on a number of European countries (primarily England and France) and, to some extent, the United States. It was based on the analysis of these societies, which were considered pioneers in the field of modernization, that conclusions were drawn about the impact of modernization on religion. The reason for this Eurocentrism (and Westernocentrism in general) was the belief that only one version of modernity is possible: modernization, understood primarily through a series of economic processes, always has a roughly similar impact on society as a whole and on religion in particular. 6 Religious transformations taking place in Europe and the United States are not necessarily the same. to a certain extent in the United States, they were positioned-quite in the spirit of the Hegelian philosophy of history-as having world-historical significance.

Studying the examples of European societies allowed researchers to make an unambiguous conclusion that modernization inevitably leads to the decline of religion, that is, to secularization, understood as "a process by which religious thinking, practice and religious institutions lose their social significance"7. Secularization was conceived as the main religious process of our time 8. Moreover, modernity and secularization are finally intertwined in an indissoluble unity, so that secularization becomes one of the features that, in fact, define modernity, as well as modern society.9
The West-centric logic is perfectly illustrated by the reflections of Brian Wilson, one of the most influential sociologists of religion in the second half of the 20th century. In the work of " Reli-

6. This was a common belief not only among sociologists of religion, but also among most researchers of the time. See Eisenstadt S., Schluchter V. Puti k razlichnykh variantam ranney sovremennosti: sravnitel'nyi obzor [Ways to different variants of early modernity: a comparative review]. N2 (10). pp. 213-214.

7. Wilson B. Religion in Secular Society: a Sociological Comment. L.: Watts, 1966. P. XIV.

8. Wilson B. Contemporary Transformations of Religion. Oxford: Clarendon press, 1976. P. 116.

9. Naturally, the link between modernity and secularization appears long before the twentieth century - for example, this link is clearly present in one of the first modern philosophies of history in Condorcet in the eighteenth century. (Condorcet J. A. N. Sketch of the historical picture of the progress of the human mind/V. N. Speransky, St. Petersburg: N. K. Martynov, 1909) - however, in the works of sociologists of religion, it receives a clear empirical confirmation.

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religion in a secular society: a sociological Commentary "10 he writes:" Exactly so ... changes in the position of religion [i.e. secularization-D. W.] in Western-British and American-society are largely the subject of this book"11. However, a key clarification is made further: "The work contains no more than superficial comparative allusions to other religious traditions. It is probably no coincidence that the first secular societies were admittedly those of the Christian-Protestant tradition, but it is becoming increasingly clear that in societies of other traditions, among which Japan is the most prominent non-Christian example, similar secularization processes are gaining momentum. " 12 Wilson reproduces this idea even more clearly in another work: "It is assumed that the model has a general character. ... As the technical, economic, and political changes that have taken place in the West begin to take place elsewhere and characterize other cultures, we can expect to see a decline in the social significance of religion, even though local religious traditions may be much less likely to encourage and adapt to it than Christianity. these social changes " 13.

The experience of studying European examples allowed researchers to create a fairly detailed model of how modernization and religion are related to each other 14. Modernization, triggered by a number of economic processes, the most important of which are industrialization, urbanization, and scientific and technological progress, leads to a whole series of irreversible changes in society. First of all, to differentiation. In the most general sense, differentiation is the process of complicating society through its specialization: each function of society has no

10. Wilson B. Religion in Secular society: a Sociological Comment.

11. Ibid. P. X.

12. Ibid. P. XIV.

13. Wilson B. Secularization: the Inherited Model // The Sacred in a Secular age (Ed. Ph. E. Hammond). Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California press, 1985. P. 16.

14. For more information, see: Uzlaner D. Formation of the neoclassical model of secularization in the Western sociology of religion in the second half of the XX century. 2008. N 2. pp. 135-148; Tschannen O. The Secularization Paradigm: a Systematization // Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1991. Vol.30. P. 395 - 415.

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is its own institution responsible for it 15. As Karel Dobbelere explains, as a result of modernization, society is differentiated along functional lines, and corresponding functional subsystems are developed (economy, politics, science, family, etc.). Each subsystem operates on the basis of its own mediating element (money, power, truth, love), as well as on the basis of its own values (success, separation of powers,etc.). reliability and trustworthiness, the primacy of love, etc.) and norms 16. No less important is the process of rationalization, which implies a tendency to subordinate all spheres of society to the ideals of ratio and reorganize them in accordance with the criterion of efficiency 17. This is followed by the process of pluralization, which is a natural consequence of the complexity of society (differentiation). Pluralization implies the destruction of a single system of values or the symbolic universe of a given society, and many competing systems of values (life worlds) arise, which from now on have to get along with each other.18
According to this model, the primary processes of modernization of society lead to a number of secondary processes that directly affect religion. Differentiation (and pluralization) lead, first of all, to the autonomization of the spheres of society, that is, each of them acquires its own independence, first of all, from religious symbols and begins to act according to its own laws and logics19; the time of the social order prescribed by religious requirements passes irrevocably. Religion becomes another subsystem in a series of other subsystems. In addition, differentiation (and pluralization) leads to the privatisation of religion: -

15. Wilson В. Religion in Secular Society: a Sociological Comment. P.56; Berger P.L. The Social Reality of Religion. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969. P. 113.

16. Dobbelaere K. Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of Secularization // The Secularization Debate (Eds. W.H. Swatos, D.V.A.Olson). Lanham, Boulder, N.Y., Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. P. 22 - 23.

17. См. Wilson B. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. P. 156; Berger P. L., Berger В., Kellner H. The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. N. Y.: Vintage Books, 1974.

18. Berger P.L., Berger В., Kellner H. The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. P. 64; Luckmann Th. The Invisible Religion: the Problem of Religion in Modern Society. L.: Collier-Macmillan, 1970. P. 124 - 125.

19. Berger P.L. The Social Reality of Religion. P. 136 - 137.

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human existence is divided into public and private life, religion is replaced in the latter; from now on, its influence is limited to private life, it becomes a private matter of man.20
Rationalization has an impact, first of all, on religious faith. The spread of the principles of rational organization of the world leads to the decline of religious faith, as it becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile supernatural faith with the principles that underlie all other activities and operations. 21 Rationalization is also associated with the marginalization of religion, i.e. the influence of religious practices, religious faith and religious institutions on society is reduced, its principles are incompatible with the requirements of the rational organization of society 22. Finally, rationalization leads to the development of a "down-to-earth" orientation in a person, and traditional religious problems recede to the second, if not to the third plan.

According to the researchers, the main consequence of pluralization for religion is that it destroys the "sacred cosmos": a single integral religious system of values that regulated all spheres of society breaks up into many incompatible fragments, among which religion is one of these fragments 23. Pluralization leads to relativization of religious beliefs, they lose their absolute character There is a critical attitude towards any monopoly claim to truth. 24 In addition, pluralization is associated with the emergence of the so-called "market of religions", from now on religions have to compete with each other to attract the attention of potential customers.25 Hence the consumer setup

20. See for example: Berger P. L., Berger V., Kellner H. The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. P. 138 - 142; Parsons T. Religion in a Modern Pluralistic Society // Review of Religious Research. 1966. Vol. 7. No. 3. P. 134.

21. Wilson B. Contemporary Transformations of Religion. P. 13.

22. Wilson B. Religion in Sociological Perspective. P. 159 - 160.

23. Luckmann Th. The Invisible Religion: the Problem of Religion in Modern Society. P. 124 - 125.

24. Berger P.L., Luckmann Th. Secularization and Pluralism // International Yearbook for the Sociology of Religion. 1966. P. 73 - 84.

25. Berger P.L. The Social Reality of Religion. P. 142.

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26in relation to religion, a person begins to consider religious ideas or rituals as a product (service), which he begins to evaluate on the principle of "what can this give me". It is not religion that dictates what a person should be, but a person of religion.

Religions themselves, according to the model under consideration, do not remain indifferent to what happens to them. Secularization leads to a number of changes in religious organizations themselves: ecumenical sentiments (the desire of religions to unite in order to survive together), bureaucratization (improving their administrative apparatus for successful survival in new conditions), professionalization (emphasizing their special status as specialists in religious activities), adaptation of religious ideas to secular values, etc. 27.

In this model, religion is just a dependent variable, it does not determine the character of modern society, which develops according to its own immanent logic, but only adapts to the new structure that is being developed. The influence of the cultural characteristics of specific societies, not least due to the relevant religious traditions, is almost completely ignored in this approach.

II

However, already within the framework of such a West-centered model, a contradiction arose, which, ultimately, led to the need for a more global approach, embodied in the concept of multiple modernities. The essence of this contradiction was that researchers, being supporters of a single model of the development of societies and, accordingly, modernity in the singular, could not help but pay attention to the clearly visible difference between the level and nature of religiosity in the main European societies and the United States. Despite the fact that the United States is one of the most modernized societies, the level of religiosity there was much higher than in an equally modernized Europe. This circumstance cast a shadow on the rigid link between modernity and secularization.

26. Luckmann Th. The Invisible Religion: the Problem of Religion in Modern Society. P. 98.

27. Ibid. P. 136 - 137; Wilson В. Contemporary Transformations of Religion. P. 12.

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This contradiction was attempted to be resolved through the introduction of the thesis of "American exclusivity", that is, the United States was positioned as a remarkable exception to the general rule of modernization. If in Europe secularization took open forms, then in the United States, as stated, there is a process of "internal secularization", that is, the internal "decomposition" of religion with its external well-being. As Brian Wilson has written: "It has become clear that while the process of secularization in England was characterized by a decline in church attendance, in their emptying at the end of the nineteenth and, especially, during the twentieth centuries, in the United States secularization took place in a very different way. The growth of statistical indicators concerning American churches covered up the growing emptiness of religious faith and practice in the United States."28 This was echoed by Thomas Lukman:" ... the traditional ecclesiastical form of religion was relegated to the periphery of 'modern' life in Europe, while it became much more 'modern' in America, undergoing a process of internal transformation. secularization"29.

Such an original consideration of the case of the United States could not but outrage American researchers, who in the 90s put forward their own version of the events described. In contrast to the "old paradigm" (described above), they began to talk about a "new paradigm"30, which involved rethinking the nature of the relationship between modernity and religion. The greatest contribution to the development of this new paradigm was made by American researchers [31]: R. Stark, R. Finke, W. Bainbridge, L. Iannacone, R. S. Warner, and a number of other authors. Now the US is the norm, and Europe is the exception (the non-Western context is still largely ignored). As R. S. Warner points out, "the new paradigm does not follow from the old one, which appeared to comprehend the European experience, but from a completely different one

28. Wilson В. Religion in Secular Society. P. 113.

29. Luckmann Th. The Invisible Religion. P. 137.

30. Warner R. S. Work in Progress Toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States // American Journal of Sociology. 1994. Vol. 98. P. 1044 - 1093.

31. Stark R., Bainbridge W.S. The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult For-

mation. Berkeley: University of California press, 1985; Stark R., Bainbridge W.S. A Theory of Religion. Bern: Lang, 1987; Stark R., Finke R. Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley, Los Angeles, L.: University of California Press, 2000; Stark R., Iannaccone L. A Supply-side Reinterpretation of the "Secularization" of Europe // Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1994. Vol.33. No. 3. P.230 - 252; Warner R.S. Work in Progress Toward a New Paradigm. P. 1044 - 1093.

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an independent view of the problem, drawn from American history " 32. This theory allows us to draw conclusions about the relationship between religion and modernity, which are directly opposite to those that follow from the theory of secularization

According to American researchers, the old European model of secularization is based on the thesis of a certain correct, from a religious point of view, society, the classic example of which is the Middle Ages of the time of Pope Innocent III (1161-1216), and the subsequent departure from this norm in the direction of "religious pathology". This deviation from the norm, if it does not lead to the disappearance of religions, will certainly make them a marginal social phenomenon. Such pathologies are perceived as religious pluralism, the market of religions, and other consequences of modernization. The new American model, on the contrary, sees medieval European religious society as a "pathology", and religious pluralism as a norm in which all religions feel fine. The key concept for the new paradigm is the separation of churches from the state and the flourishing market for religions. 33 The consequence of this process is not the decline of religiosity, but, on the contrary, its flourishing.34 This thesis is supported by empirical studies from the history of the United States35.
Theoretically, this approach to religious pluralism is justified by the theory of rational choice in its application to the analysis of religious life and religious preferences. According to this theory, a person strives for benefits (rewards) and tries to avoid costs (costs)36. However, there are a limited number of goods in the world, and not all goods are available to a person at all: for example, knowledge of answers to questions about the meaning of being and human life. Accordingly, there is a need for compensation, which is the replacement of the desired benefits with promises or explanations that cannot be fully verified 37. The concept of compensation is based on

32. Ibid. P. 1045.

33. Ibid. P. 1050.

34. Ibid. P. 1051.

35. See, for example, Finke R., Stark R. The Churching of America, 1776 - 2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005.

36. Stark R., Bainbridge W.S. A Theory of Religion. Bern: Lang, 1987. P. 27.

37. Ibid. P. 35 - 36.

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key to understanding the nature of religion: religion is a system of the most general compensators based on references to the supernatural. 38 Accordingly, religious organizations are a kind of public enterprise, the essence of which is to create, maintain and distribute common compensators related to the supernatural.39 It is important to keep in mind that religious organizations not only meet some initial demand for compensators (the "demand" aspect), but also actively form it in the process of fighting for parishioners (the "supply"aspect). From this approach to the nature of religion and the nature of human behavior, it follows that, firstly, a person has an ineradicable need for religion; secondly, the more religious organizations there are, the greater the demand for religion. Obviously, this explanation is dominated by economic market analogies.

This theory of religion leads to the following model for analyzing the religiosity of a particular society. The emphasis is placed not only on people who are characterized by a constant steady demand for religion, but also on those who supply this religion. When there is only one such "supplier" and there is a religious monopoly, often supported by state coercion, the level of religiosity is low, since one, even the largest, religious organization is not able to generate and satisfy a diverse demand. The illusion of high religiosity is sustained by the compulsive nature of faith, but when the separation of church and state takes place (Rodney Stark calls this process "desacralization"40), then in terms of personal religiosity, there is not an unexpected decline in piety, but only the opening of a latent rejection of official faith 41. When religious pluralism is strengthened after desacralization, it leads to an increase in the level of religiosity, since the more "firms" there are, the more demand they will be able to generate and satisfy: "to the extent that the religious economy is not fully developed, the higher the number of firms is."-

38. Ibid. Р.39.

39. Ibid. P. 42.

40. Stark R., Finke R. Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley, Los Angeles, L.: University of California press, 2000. P. 200.

41. Ibid. P. 201.

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ka is competitive and pluralistic, and the overall level of religious participation will be higher. " 42

Accordingly, what was postulated by secularization theorists as the beginning of the decline of religion was in fact, on the contrary, a movement towards the rise of religions. Modernization associated with social differentiation and pluralization does not lead to the decline of religion, but, on the contrary, to its flourishing. This means that modernity does not deny religion, but rather creates the most favorable conditions for its existence. Instead of talking about "American exclusivity", the researchers started talking, on the contrary, about" European exclusivity", about"eurosecularity".

The next factor that cast doubt on the inextricable link between modernization and secularization was a whole series of global events, the most striking of which should be considered the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which led to the overthrow of the Shah's regime - one of the most modernized regimes in the Middle East - and the establishment of a rigid Islamic theocracy. First, this revolution proved that fundamentalism is a real force capable of exerting a serious and, most importantly, lasting influence on the course of historical processes. Secondly, it turned out that full-fledged desecularization is possible and that modernization does not necessarily lead to the transformation of a modernizing society into a Western prototype. Third, the revolution had a sobering effect on many Western intellectuals, who realized that religion, and Islam in particular,is not an archaic force, not a dependent variable shrinking under the impact of imminent social transformation, but a powerful revolutionary ideology. In a sense, we can say that the world has entered a new phase after the Iranian Revolution. This moment was felt by Michel Foucault, who reacted with great interest and sympathy to these events. During the revolution, he wrote: "The ongoing agony of the Iranian regime is the latest episode in a process that began almost sixty years ago: the modernization of Islamic countries on the European model." 43 Modernization and its associated secularization are not the only possible path to development.-

42. Stark R., Iannaccone L. A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the "Secularization" of Europe // Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1994. Vol.33. No. 3. P.233.

43. Foucault M. Le shah a cent ans de retard // Corriere della serra, 1 octobre 1978.

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Islam, which is not only a religion, but also a way of life, part of history and civilization, risks becoming a giant powder keg for hundreds of thousands of people. Starting from yesterday, a revolution based on centuries-old traditions can be expected in any Muslim state."44
Another factor that hit the theory of secularization was the criticism that the theory of modernization was subjected to in the 1970s (and we remember that the model of secularization described has always been a subsection of the latter). Peter Wagner points out three key points of this critique: first, the updated social theory contrasted the active and creative principle with any ideas about self-developing evolution and mechanical transformations; second, the linguistic and microhistorical turn called into question the possibility of understanding large-scale social phenomena and their long-term consistent development; third, postcolonial research and development. world-system theory drew attention to Western dominance instead of flaws in "development" as a reason for diverging societal trajectories. As Wagner concludes: "The result of such critical discussions was the rejection of any comprehensive approaches to the analysis of aggregate social configurations and their historical trajectories. Comparative historical sociology finds itself in a chaotic situation. " 45
Thus, the position of the theory of secularization as a comprehensive concept capable of describing large-scale social transformations was greatly shaken. It was necessary (1) to finally resolve the dispute over European/American exclusivity; (2) to "shift attention away from Europe and North America and see a broader global perspective"46; and (3) to do so in a way that took into account all the fair criticism that had been leveled at previous theories. Apparently, the concept of "multiple modernities" becomes the theoretical optics that allows us to solve the problems facing religious researchers.

44. Foucault M. Une poudriere nominee Islam // Corriere della serra, 13 fevrier 1979.

45. See Peter Wagner's article in this issue.

46. Casanova J. Rethinking Secularization: a Global Comparative Perspective // The Hedgehog review. Spring-Summer 2006. Vol.8. No. 1 - 2. P.9.

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III

The concept of multiple modernities, formulated by the Israeli scholar Shmuel Eisenstadt (1923-2010) in a number of papers [47], some of which date back to the 1980s, received its most detailed and concentrated consideration in the article "Multiple Modernities"[48], written by Eisenstadt for a special issue of the journal Daedalus.

This concept is quite well known, so we will limit ourselves only to those aspects of it that are directly relevant to our topic. Eisenstadt begins with the fundamental thesis that there is no modernity in the singular: modernity can take multiple forms, and each specific case of modern (modern) society is only a special variation on the theme of modernity. The fact is that in the process of modernization, elements of the "modernity program" that is by no means homogeneous and not devoid of contradictions - be it the new anthropology of the subject, the capitalist economy, the national state, democracy and human rights, scientific rationality, secularism, and others - are superimposed on specific civilizational contexts formed by specific cultural, religious, historical, and other factors. the foundations of these civilizational contexts, according to Eisenstadt, are laid in the previously described K. The so-called "axial time", dated to the middle of the first millennium BC. 49). As a result of this overlap, specific social formations arise that "have features of modernity, but with a strong influence of special cultural prerequisites, traditions and historical experience"50.

47. Eisenstadt Sh. N. Tradition, Change, and Modernity. John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1983; Eisenstadt Sh.N. European Civilization in a Comparative Perspective: A Study in the Relations Between Culture and Social Structure. Oxford University Press, 1987; Eisenstadt Sh.N. Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities, 2 Vol. Leiden: Brill, 2003; Axial Civilizations and World History (Eds. J. P. Arnason, Sh. N. Eisenstadt and B.Wittrock). Leiden, Boston: Brill. 2005.

48. Eisenstadt Sh. Multiple Modernities // Daedalus. 2000. Vol.129. No. 1.

49. For more information about "axial time", see: K. Jaspers. The meaning and purpose of History, Moscow: Respublika Publ., 1991, pp. 32-50.

50. Eisenstadt Sh. Multiple Modernities. P. 2.

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For a clear illustration - and in direct connection with our main topic - we will take such an important element of the modern program as secularism in the sense of a legal principle, which implies the fundamental equidistance of the state and all its institutions from any religious associations and worldviews. The superimposition of this element on specific historical contexts leads to completely different forms of existence of this secularism, to multiple secularism. To explain this thesis, it is not even necessary to go beyond Western societies-it is enough to point out the difference between the French and American experience of secularism. In France, due to specific historical circumstances, secularism has taken the form of laicism( laicite), that is, an ideology that implies strict control of religion by the state, its fundamental expulsion from public space and the perception of religion and any religious organizations in general as a constant threat to civil well-being. In the United States, due to specific historical circumstances, secularism, on the contrary, is primarily aimed at guaranteeing religious freedom and protecting religions from state interference (which, of course, does not cancel the inadmissibility of introducing a state religion stipulated in the First Amendment), while religion is recognized as a very important place in the public space, it is considered not the last a factor of both individual and public well-being. French and American societies provide us with two concrete examples of how the same idea can have completely different embodiments depending on the context. If you look at the experience of secularism around the world, then the number of such options can be multiplied by 51.

The refusal to think of modernity in the singular allows us to separate modernity as an idea, as Weber's "ideal type", from its first incarnations in Western societies. As Eisenstadt explains, "Western patterns of modernity are not the only 'authentic' modernity, although they do enjoy a historical advantage and continue to be the main reference point for all others. " 52 This perspective makes it possible, if not impossible, to abandon the old ones.-

51. For example, see Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (Eds. L. E. Cady, E. Sh. Hurd). Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

52. Eisenstadt Sh. Multiple Modernities. P. 3.

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If there is a self-evident link between modernity and secularization, then at least ask yourself: is a non-secular modernity possible? Perhaps secular modernity should be considered as just one concrete historical example of modernity, determined more by the characteristic features of European culture than by some immanent logic of modernization or some world-historical laws?53

In particular, it is possible to take a fresh look at the dispute between European and American researchers about whose experience of religious transformations under the influence of modernization should be considered the rule, and whose should be considered the exception, in the light of the thesis of multiple modernities. This thesis allows us not only to resolve this dispute, but also to go beyond the discussion of rules and exceptions, seeing the differences between European and American experience as differences between two specific historical cases of multiple modernities. In fact, this point is emphasized by Eisenstadt himself: "practically from the very beginning of the process of expansion of modernity, multiple modernities began to appear already in the orbit of what can be called the Western civilizational structure." 54
The differences between Europe and the United States as two different types of multiple modernities should be sought in the differences in historical, cultural and religious contexts, so needlessly ignored in the theories of secularization. Peter Berger, Grace Davey, and Efi Fokas in " Religious America, Secular Europe?"55 point to the special circumstances that led to the fact that the European experience of secularism is so different from the American one 56. What circumstances played a role in the emergence of "Eurosecularity"? First, the separation of Church and State: In Europe, the Church was closely connected-

53. Alexander Aghajanyan in the article ""Multiple Modernities", Russian "cursed questions" and the inviolability of secular Modernity", published in this issue, gives a confident negative answer to these questions. However, this does not prevent us from at least thinking about these fundamental issues.

54. Eisenstadt Sh. Multiple Modernities. P. 13.

55. Berger P., Davie G., Fokas E. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations. Ashgate, 2008.

56. Some of these points have already been pointed out in the part about the objection of American researchers to the thesis of "American exceptionalism".

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the struggle with the state, with the political regime, and the struggle with the second (and in general with the "Old Order") inevitably led to the fact that the Church also fell under this blow; however, in the United States, the separation of Church and state existed initially, so there was no strong anti-clerical sentiment there. Second, in Europe there was a religious monopoly that was ill-suited to the situation of freedom of conscience; in the United States, on the contrary, the original situation of pluralism made denominations highly effective "enterprises" competing with each other. Third, in Europe and the United States, two different versions of the Enlightenment were implemented: in Europe, the Enlightenment - in its most vivid French form-took on sharp anti-clerical and anti-Christian overtones, and its victory was marked by the triumph of laicism as a regime of secularism that implied the total expulsion of religion from public space; in the United States, the Enlightenment did not have such a bright Rather, it was freedom-oriented and imbued with the spirit of Christianity in its deistic version. Fourthly, in Europe, intellectuals as the main carriers of the Russian language. enlightenment ideals had an extremely high influence; in the United States, with its extremely pragmatic spirit, intellectuals were never as important, and accordingly, American intellectuals who were Europeanized in their views on religion simply did not have enough influence in society. Fifth, intellectuals in Europe managed to create a" high culture " imbued with the spirit of secularism, they managed to identify the secular with the modern; in the United States, intellectuals whose Europeanization began only in the second half of the twentieth century, managed to create only closed university communities in which the spirit of secularism reigns, but which are hardly able to dictate fashion to everything. to the society. Sixth, in Europe, there were powerful mechanisms for spreading enlightenment ideals: a centralized education system, as well as left-wing political parties imbued with the spirit of secularism; in the United States, education is subordinated to municipal systems, in which the leading role is given to parents who are able to protect children from unwanted knowledge; in addition, in the United States, powerful left-wing parties have not emerged. Seventh, in Europe, belonging to a denomination has ceased to be a part of a person's social status; in the United States, on the contrary, belonging to a particular denomination is clearly defined.

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it marked the social status of a person, this belonging determined his trustworthiness, as Max Weber wrote in his article "Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism"57. Eighth,in the United States, unlike in Europe, different denominations played an important role in adapting migrants to the society they moved to, and this link to a particular denomination remains in the historical memory of migrants for many generations to come. 58 As a result, the differences in all these factors led to different modes of correlation between religion and modernity: the European context was permeated with the spirit of secularization and secularism, while the American context, on the contrary, contributed or at least did not prevent the flowering of all the colors of religion.

This relativization of the Western experience of modernity does not mean that the conclusions of secularization theorists who described the impact of modernization processes on religion are no longer relevant due to their purely local Western context. Ultimately, there are not so many options for responding to these processes, and it is not at all a fact that in each individual case of modernization we will be talking about some completely specific creative response. It is possible that there is some limited set of patterns that will be reproduced from one case to another (for example, the European and American patterns)59. In fact, one of the most interesting questions today is how exactly the model of secularization based on European material, the model of the relationship between modernization and religion, will be refracted when the processes of differentiation, rationalization, pluralization, etc.are transferred to other cultures and contexts. In particular, this is the question asked by Massimo Rosatti 60 in his analysis of the Turkish material, or by David Martin, who reflects on global Pentecostalism and its ability to resist the dynamics of capitalist rationalization and " ru-

57. M. Weber. Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism // Weber, M. Izbrannoe: Protestant ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006, pp. 187-190.

58. Berger P., Davie G., Fokas E. Religious America, Secular Europe? P. 15 - 21.

59. David Martin, in one of his works, has already tried to systematize these patterns in relation to the European context, which also turns out to be very diverse. A General Theory of Secularization. L.: Blackwell, 1978.

60. See Massimo Rosati's article "The Turkish Laboratory: Local Modernity and the Post-Secular in Turkey", presented in this issue.

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61. David Martin is concerned with the question of whether social differentiation in the case of global Pentecostalism will lead to the same consequences as in the West: the erosion of social capital and the strengthening of personal narcissism, which will destroy the "spirit" of Pentecostalism and silence its "tongues".

Until now, the question of the relationship between modernity and religion has been considered mainly only in terms of how the former affects the latter. However, the concept of diverse modernity allows us to raise the question of the opposite effect, among other things: how religion not only influences, but often determines, the specific forms that modernity takes 62. After all, it is religious traditions that ultimately determine the civilizational context on which this or that version of the modern program is superimposed.

Actually, the factor of such influence has always been recognized. Max Weber also showed the fundamental importance of certain ascetic trends of Protestantism for the establishment of the spirit of capitalism.63 Peter Berger largely continued and developed Weber's thought, recognizing the special role that the Judeo-Christian religious tradition of the West played in preparing the ground for the beginning of modernization processes. What features of the Judeo-Christian tradition, according to Berger, made modernization possible? First, the principle of the radical transcendence of God: God is outside the world, therefore, a profane world is possible, developing according to its own immanent laws; second, the principle of the linearity of history, which allows changes instead of the eternal repetition of the same thing; third, the appearance of man as an actor in history, who makes changes in the world. fourthly, the radical rationalization of the world, the elimination of magic and the deification of nature, which makes it possible to search for and find effective tools for transforming and conquering the environment; fifth, the emergence of the Church as a spiritual leader.

61. See David Martin's article "Pentecostalism: Transnational Voluntarism in the Global Religious Economy" in this issue.

62. However, Peter Wagner does not agree with this thesis in the article "Modernity of new Societies: South Africa, Brazil and prospects of world Sociology" presented in this issue.

63. M. Weber. Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism // Weber, M. Izbrannoe: Protestant ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006.

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a social institution that is opposed to other institutions of society, which, in turn, get a chance to gain autonomy: "The concentration of religious activities and symbols in one institutional sphere in itself already defines the remaining spheres of society as "the world", as a profane reality, at least partially excluded from the jurisdiction of the sacred"64. In Judaism, these features are most pronounced, then Catholicism (especially medieval) freezes them, giving the Christian worldview the features of an "ordinary" traditional religion, but Protestantism picks up and develops the above aspects with renewed vigor.

The triumph of these principles in culture, according to Berger, creates an extremely favorable environment for the emergence of entire spheres of society that can now exist according to their own rules, without looking back at religion. The most important area of society that manages to get out of the control of religious norms is the economy, which gradually begins to live by its own rules. Moreover, over time, it becomes a force that determines all other spheres of society, including religious ones. The capitalist economy becomes the mainstay and engine of not only modernization, but also secularization. In this sense, Peter Berger reproduces the logic of Max Weber, who also believed that only in the Judeo-Christian tradition and, in particular, in ascetic Puritanism could the soil for the development of modern capitalist society have been born, which then gained autonomy, turning into a "monstrous cosmos", an "iron cage" or a "steel shell". it has its own autonomous logic, independent of what ultimately allowed it to arise. As Max Weber wrote: "victorious capitalism no longer needs such a support as long as it rests on a mechanical basis."65 Christianity, as Peter Berger so aptly put it, was "its own gravedigger."

The thesis of a self-developing capitalist economy as the" mechanical basis " of modernity allowed researchers to ignore the religious factor and consider it exclusively as a dependent variable. However, the concept of multiple modernities, which emphasizes the importance of

64. Berger P.L. The Social Reality of Religion P. 128 - 129.

65. M. Weber. Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. p. 127.

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The historical context of a modernizing society allows us to question the power of this "mechanical basis", its ability to grind any cultural differences into a single standardized form of modernity. This makes it possible to revisit Weber's problem of the economic ethics of world religions, to examine their attitudes towards peace and the search for salvation in the light of how they influence the form that modernity will take in this context. Moreover, in his recent articles, Shmuel Eisenstadt shows that today's religious transformations are one of the key factors in the formation of a new global modernity.67
IV

The articles collected in this issue are devoted both to a theoretical consideration of the concept of multiple modernities and to a comprehensive analysis of specific examples - Russia, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, as well as Pentecostalism as a new transnational movement transforming local contexts. Naturally, special emphasis is placed on the religious aspect of such multiplicity.

The discussion opens with an article by Shmuel Eisenstadt himself, devoted not so much to individual multiple moderns, but to the new global civilizational context against which these moderns are being formed. According to Eisenstadt, this new global civilizational constellation arises, in particular, as a result of a number of unprecedented religious transformations - the emergence of new identities, transnational religious and ethnic movements operating across national borders, etc. - which leads to a transformation at the national level.-

66. See Weber M. Economic ethics of world religions. Comparative essays on the Sociology of religion. Introduction / / Weber M. Izbrannoe: Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006.

67. See Eisenstadt's article "New Religious Constellations in the Frameworks of Contemporary Globalization and Civilizational Transformation", presented in this issue (for the English original, see: Eisenstadt Sh.N. The New Religious Constellations in the Frameworks of Contemporary Globalization and Civilizational Transformation // World Religions and Multiculturalism (Eds. Ben-Rafael & Sternberg). Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010. P. 21 - 40).

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of the former centers of power, and, in general, to the breakdown of the former global order.

Kristina Steckl's article is devoted to the issue of European integration, in particular, the problems that this integration faced in Eastern Europe. The problems are caused by the difference in the civilizational contexts of Western and Eastern Europe, which, in fact, is indicated by the concept of multiple modernities. Steckl shows that it is possible to analyze these problems based on two different interpretations of multiple modernities - comparative-civilizational and post-secular. The first one focuses on the monolithic nature of civilizations and their religious-secular trajectories. In this case, European integration is under threat: the monolithic Western Christian civilization meets with the equally monolithic Orthodox Christian civilization, as well as with the Muslim civilization. However, the second - post-secular-interpretation allows us to look at this process somewhat differently: it focuses on the internal contradictions that exist within these supposedly monolithic civilizations. These contradictions manifest themselves in clashes between religious and secular actors. Using the example of the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in recent years, in particular, the Church's attempts to propose its own concept of human rights, Steckl shows that the comparative-civilizational interpretation should not be abused and that the conflict between secular and religious groups is present in any society, so talk about a radical difference between civilizations and an unbridgeable gap between them is largely far-fetched.

Alexander Aghajanyan's article on the experience of Russia tries to refute the often-repeated thesis that modernity can be completely different, that it can have many "cultural programs". According to Aghajanyan, there are no absolutely original contemporaries. Despite all the variations, the basic set of elements of modernity is mostly the same, and it certainly includes secularism in particular. No modernity - and this is an attempt to give a negative answer to the questions raised in the previous section of our article-is possible without secularism. The idea of multiple moderns can only mean that there are many reactions, many adaptations of modernity, and many ways to" play " this program.

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Massimo Rosati's article focuses on the analysis of Turkey as one of the most striking examples of "special" modernity. Rosati examines Turkish modernity in its dynamics, focusing on modern transformations that lead to " the pluralization of the image of modernity, the transformation of the concept and practice of secularism and the formation of a post-secular society." Rosati illustrates his theses by pointing out the transformation of the image of Ataturk, the sacralization of the figure of Hrant Dink, who was killed in 2007 by a Turkish nationalist, as well as the metamorphosis that occurs with the status of Hagia Sophia. Of particular interest is Rosati's description of the transformation of Turkish secularism from a rigid Kemalist version to a regime of more harmonious relations between politics and religion, which would not repeat the Western - for example, the Anglo-American experience - but would develop in line with Turkey's special modernity, relying on its own resources and the Ottoman past.

Among the proposed materials, an article by Peter Wagner stands out, just trying to refute the thesis about the key role of religion and the religious factor in the creation of multiple modernities. To do this, he draws attention to the contemporary experience of the so-called "new societies", first of all, South Africa and Brazil, which do not grow out of the soil plowed by thousands of years of civilizations and religious traditions, but are actually re-established in the context of the meeting of settlers who arrived in new territories with local residents and their traditions. Thus, Wagner tries to introduce into the concept of multiple modernities the intuitions of modern social theory, which pays special attention to the active and creative beginning, to the ability of people not only to follow pre-set traditional patterns, but also to actively respond to new challenges, creating unprecedented socio-political formations. According to Wagner, these new forms of modernity emerging in the Global South can help the modernity of the North, which is in a situation of obvious political, economic, social and cultural crisis. However, despite the pathos of the opening statements, Wagner cannot but recognize the importance of religious traditions in determining the specific forms that modernity takes in the South. To give just one example: Wagner points to the Catholic and Protestant versions of alignment

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relations with others-Indians, Africans-in a situation of "meeting of races": while the former suggested the possibility of a hierarchy of statuses in the relationships of people, which made it possible to integrate others - that is, indigenous people-into society, even with a lower status, the latter insisted on radical egalitarianism, which required either the full inclusion of others, or their full integration. dehumanization, complete reification, as exemplified, for example, in many southern states of the United States.

David Martin's article is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenon of global Pentecostalism as one of those transnational movements that, according to Eisenstadt, are involved in the creation of a new civilizational constellation. According to Martin, "Pentecostalism, along with other charismatic movements, is the most expansive form of Protestantism in many parts of the global South, particularly in Latin America and Africa." This leads not only to a new format of interreligious relations, but also to the aggravation of contradictions between the logic of national states and the logic of transnational movements that freely move and operate across state borders. In his analysis of Pentecostalism, David Martin asks a crucial question for our consideration: "do world civilizations (with their offshoots) lay out different paths to modernity, which means the transfer of a special Western European path to the status of an exception that tried to present ethnocentrism as a universal norm, or do these civilizations have to go through the process of secularization in accordance with the rigid version of this sociological theory?"With regard to Pentecostalism, it is a question of whether it can avoid the logic that has already shown itself once in the European context: "Just as Methodism represented a phase in the development of the North Atlantic and helped to avoid revolution in the Protestant countries in which it was established, Pentecostalism also represents a phase in the development of the South Atlantic with similar consequences. It was as if capitalism had once again briefly entered into a kind of alliance with religion, as it was in the seventeenth century in Amsterdam or in Victorian England, before the new agenda for divorce was formed." Does Pentecostalism lead to a new form of modernity that is different from both the European and American forms, or is it just a revolving door or an exodus?-

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a powerful intermediary that allows many societies in Africa or Latin America to enter secular capitalism, and then, "as soon as the iron cage of rationality and bureaucracy is closed," the "flaming tongues" will turn to ashes in their mouths"? All of these are open questions that require further study and observation.

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