EVGENY YU. SERGEEV. RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR WITH JAPAN, 1904 - 1905. SECRET OPERATION ON LAND AND SEA. London-New York: Routledge, 2007. 252 p.*

The interest of Russian and foreign researchers in the history of Russian and Soviet intelligence services has been booming over the past decade and a half or two. Thanks to the absence of ideological blinders and prohibitions, the possibility of working with previously inaccessible documents of archives "slightly opened" at the turn of the XX and XXI centuries, the number of monographic works devoted to intelligence in our country and abroad has already reached many dozens, and perhaps even exceeded a hundred.

Unfortunately, most of the books that have appeared, written by both historians and former special services personnel, suffer from one common and very significant drawback: only a relatively few of them are created on the basis of an analysis of the entire range of sources, all available archival and published documents, memoirs, diaries and notes of participants and contemporaries of events, press materials, works of the Russian Academy of Sciences, published in Russia and abroad, documents of oral history. As a rule, these publications are either based on personal memories and experience, or are more or less successful compilation of information gleaned mainly from the works of those relatively few researchers who took the hard work to get acquainted with the available published and archival materials, the work of their predecessors and colleagues, and other sources. In addition, a significant part of these works examines the history of individual intelligence agencies (Russian military intelligence, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army)./Soviet Army and intelligence OPTU/NKVD/NKGB/KGB of the USSR), their activities in any one country or are devoted to the history of individual operations and do not give a broad perspective of the entire Russian (Soviet) intelligence community. As for the history of the work of the Russian military and naval intelligence services on the eve, in the years and after the end of the war with Japan, then, in my opinion, this story was not studied at all by researchers until recently. These reproaches apply equally to both Russian and foreign authors.1
Sergeyev's monograph, devoted to the little-studied pages of the history of relations between Russia and Japan, their place and role in the global context of international relations at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and, above all, the activities of the Russian military and naval intelligence services, compares favorably with the vast majority of works on which were mentioned above. The source base of the study is extremely wide. For the first time, the author introduces and uses not only the documents of the General Staff, the Main Directorate of the General Staff, but also such archival funds as documents of the Field Headquarters of the Manchurian Army, the Office of the Military Commissar of Mukden Province, the Rear Headquarters of the Far East Troops, the Commander-in-Chief of the troops in the Far East A. N. Kuropatkin, Quartermaster General V. A. Kosagovsky, the Main Naval Staff, the 2nd Pacific Squadron, personal funds of the governor, Admiral General E. I. Alekseev and many other documents. The more studied papers of the Chancellery are also not ignored

* E. Y. Sergeev. Russian intelligence in the war with Japan. Secret Operations on Land and Sea, 1904-1905. London-New York: Routledge, 2007. 252 p.

1 Some aspects of this important topic are reflected in the following works: Pavlov D. B., Petrov A. S., Derevyanko I. V. Secrets of the Russo-Japanese War. Japanese Money and the Russian Revolution, Moscow, 1993; Savelyev V. I. Mysterious Tokyo / / Essays on the history of Russian Foreign Intelligence. Edited by E. M. Primakov et al. In 6 volumes, Moscow, 1996-2006. Military intelligence of Russia from Rurik to Nicholas / / Moscow, 1998. Vol. 1-2; Dobychina E. V. Foreign intelligence of Russia in the Far East. 1895-1904 Candidate of Diss., Moscow, 2003; Pavlov D. B. Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Moscow, 2004; Schimmelpenninck van der Oye D. Russian Military Intelligence on the Manchurian Front. 1904 - 1905 // Intelligence and National Security, 1996, Vol. XI, N 1.

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Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, China, Japan and the Pacific 2. Official publications of documents of the Main and Naval General Staffs, the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, the headquarters of the St. Petersburg, Moscow and Amur military districts also played a huge role in the work on the monograph (pp. 228-229). Numerous documents of the diplomatic, military, naval and consular services of the United States and Great Britain3, which were previously practically not studied by domestic and foreign researchers, are also well used. The list of memoirs, diaries and works of participants and contemporaries of the Russo-Japanese War, publications of Russian and foreign historians used by E. Yu. Sergeev also makes a very gratifying impression (pp. 229-233).

The author examines the whole complex of problems associated with the creation and daily activities of the Russian military and naval intelligence services: the specifics of the emergence and evolution of these services, the tasks assigned to them by the country's political and military leadership, the selection of heads of individual intelligence agencies and the staffing of structural divisions with officers and agents, issues related to the financing of intelligence operations. Considering the practical activities of military and naval intelligence on the eve and during the years of the conflict, E. Yu. Sergeyev, for the first time in Russian and foreign historiography, provides a detailed and highly objective analysis of pre-war assessments of Japan's military and economic capabilities, intelligence operations conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels ("long-range", "near" and "flank" intelligence, as they were defined during the war), the role of legal and agent intelligence, and the role of the Japanese military in the It shows how the political, military, and economic information obtained was selected, compared, analyzed, and used, and examines the sources of all this information, the channels of information received and evaluated by intelligence officers, and the many challenges and obstacles they faced in their daily work.

The author of this monograph is certainly successful in providing a comparative analysis of the history of the creation, evolution, and practical activities of the intelligence agencies directly and indirectly involved in the conflict between Russia and Japan (the special services of Japan, Britain, Germany, and the United States) at the turn of the 20th century, based on a large amount of factual material, as well as the specifics of their structures, place, and role in the conflict. shaping the foreign policy of these great Powers. The work of Japanese military intelligence is particularly well shown, which, unlike similar services of European powers and the United States, which largely did not overcome the "diseases" of the formation period by the beginning of the XX century, not only relied on rich historical traditions and experience in conducting reconnaissance and sabotage operations acquired during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. but also because of the mentality of its officers and agents, it turned out to be much better prepared to work in the conditions of the countries of the Far Eastern region that are alien and often incomprehensible to Europeans.

And yet, as E. Y. Sergeev very convincingly showed, Russia had great opportunities not only to prepare well enough for an attack by the Japanese armed forces, but also to seize the strategic initiative during the outbreak of war. Both St. Petersburg and Port Arthur, where Lieutenant Admiral Alekseyev's headquarters were located, regularly received extensive (though sometimes very contradictory) information during the pre-war years about the military potential of the Land of the Rising Sun, the feverish efforts of the Japanese government in the field of economic and military preparation of the country for an attack on Russia, the activation of Japanese military intelligence in Europe and in the Far East. And although, as the author emphasizes, not all officers who served before the war in Japan, China and Korea, Russian shta-

2 See: Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). 400, 2000, 13057, 14378, 165, 76; The Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA VMF). F. 417, 531, 32; Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). F. 133, 143, 150, 148.

3 См.: National Archives of the United States (NA US), Washington, D. C., Record Groups (RG) 59: Department of State. Dispatches from U. S. Consuls; RG 165: War Department General and Special Staffs; RG 80: Secretary of Navy; RG 38: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; The National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, Richmond, Surrey: Foreign Office, Cabinet (Committee of Imperial Defense, C. I. D.), War Office.

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Although they were not always able to collect, process, and analyze the information they received, the overall picture that was emerging in the central command structures of the Russian armed forces made it possible to come to an unambiguous conclusion: the long-term confrontation between the two leading powers of the Far East was inexorably heading for a denouement and the beginning of a big war.

The tragedy of Russian military intelligence was that the political and military leadership of Russia, including Emperor Nicholas II, was unwilling or unable to assess the available information, and often simply ignored the information collected by intelligence and forecasts of possible developments. Conflicting and sometimes mutually exclusive aspirations to avoid conflict with Japan and at the same time the temptation to use a "small victorious war" to resolve the internal political crisis in Russia and strengthen the empire's position in Europe could not but leave their mark on the perception of the Russian political and military leadership of the situation in the Far East.

A very significant element of E. Y. Sergeev's research is the periodization of the Russo-Japanese War, based on a detailed and well-reasoned analysis of the features of the organization of the intelligence service during the initial phase of this armed conflict (until the direct contact of the ground forces at the end of April 1904), the operational work of scouts during its maneuver period, and, finally, on the generalization of experience organization of reconnaissance operations during the positional phase in the spring and autumn of 1905.

A significant contribution of the author of the monograph is also a description and analysis of the formation of Russian naval intelligence and its use of new technical means, which were previously practically not studied by domestic and foreign researchers. Such vivid, but still little-known pages in the history of the war as the organization of radio intelligence by the commander of the Pacific Squadron, Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov, and constant patrolling of coastal waters by the light forces of the fleet (including the first use in world history for this purpose of submarines that carried out patrol service on the approaches to Vladivostok in 1905), the use of radio, telegraph and telephone signals, signal searchlights, balloons, etc. by sailors for operational communication not only significantly enrich and adorn the monograph (and with it our perception of the long-past war), but also give a completely new idea of the technical capabilities of the supposedly "backward" Russian fleet and its intelligence, previously either unknown or unknown. or deliberately suppressed by a number of Soviet and foreign historians.

History is unthinkable without the people who participated in it, and the author of the monograph gives us the opportunity to get in touch with them. Instead of a cursory mention of unnamed officers who served in Russian intelligence during the war with Japan in St. Petersburg and Port Arthur, on the battlefields of Manchuria, Korea, in the capitals of European powers and nameless Chinese villages, E. Yu. Sergeev unfolds a wide gallery of portraits of statesmen, diplomats, officers and civilians (merchants journalists, missionaries, etc.) who are more or less involved in the work of the Russian intelligence services. On this side activities admirals E. I. Alekseev and S. O. Makarova, M. V. Alekseeva generals, Dobrovolsky, V. A. Kosakowska, V. E. Fluga, V. I. Kharkevich, G. M. Schwanck, A. E. Evert, officers of the army and Navy A. A. Ignatyev, K. P., Linda N. Markevica A., Panov, V. I. romeiko-Gurko, P. F. Ryabikova, A. A. Svechin, K. M. Slesareva, M. A. Sokovnin, military and naval attache K. N. Desino (Beijing), A. D. Nechvolodova (Seoul), F. E. Ogorodnikova (Beijing), A. I. Rusin, V. K. Samoilov (Tokyo) and many of the other officers know it was still extremely little. Appendices containing lists of intelligence officers, their positions and information about their service periods in the headquarters and individual structural units of front-line intelligence are very valuable. The author's undoubted success is also the maps and diagrams of theaters of military operations collected by him, as well as photographs: portraits of military intelligence leaders, scenes from the front-line life of officers and soldiers. Many of these photographs and prints are unique and have never been published in historical literature before.

It is also important that, while paying tribute to the merits of all these people, the author of the book does not exaggerate their role, contribution to the work of intelligence and influence on the course of the war. Comparing the successes and failures of Russia's military attaches in London, Paris, Berlin, Tokyo, Vienna, Stockholm, Beijing, and Seoul, the successes of

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and miscalculations of the operational and informational work of the Office of the Quartermaster General of the General Staff, General Staff officers (who served in the army, corps and divisional levels of the army command), showing and analyzing the features of conducting reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the enemy's rear, undertaken by the forces of Cossacks and irregular detachments of Hunghuz (deserters from the Chinese Army, bandits, etc.) Sergeev creates a voluminous and holistic picture of the work of military intelligence, its unfortunate failures and miscalculations, and at the same time its considerable successes.

It is hard to disagree with the author of the book that the efforts of Russian military intelligence (and counterintelligence), along with failures, brought tangible results. It was thanks to them that a number of Japanese intelligence operations aimed at destroying bridges and tunnels on the China-Eastern Railway (CER) were prevented. Thanks to the good coordination of military and naval intelligence activities with the Ministry of the Interior, with the unfortunate exception of the so-called Gullya incident, the successful transition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean was ensured (an operation of the fleet unprecedented in its scale). It is also very doubtful that, despite the heroism of the Russian sailors, soldiers and officers, Port Arthur could have held out for so long and held down so many formations of the Japanese ground forces, if the scouts of this fortress had not been able to successfully disinform the enemy regarding the defense system of the entire fortified area.

Finally, Russian military intelligence managed to intercept and decrypt the secret correspondence of Japanese diplomats and military personnel both in a number of European countries and in China. Alas, despite all these obvious successes, the lack of practical experience and training of many officers, as well as such organic vices of the Russian military department as inertia, routine, intrigue and nepotism, significantly reduced the effectiveness of military intelligence and, along with other factors, predetermined the defeat of the Russian army and navy in the Far East.

An important and valuable part of E. Y. Sergeev's monograph is the chapter devoted to the lessons of war. The bitterness of defeat and the experience gained during a year and a half of military operations, as the author convincingly shows, bore fruit and stimulated in subsequent years both the reform of the system of organization and leadership of the armed forces as a whole, and the restructuring of military intelligence and counterintelligence. And first of all, the creation of a single service responsible for receiving, processing, analyzing and evaluating information, as well as for timely providing the collected information to those responsible for making political and military decisions.

Critical comments are more like recommendations. I would like to hope that in the process of preparing the book for publication in Russian (which seems very desirable), E. Yu. Sergeev will be able to include more information about the activities of naval intelligence and its officers. In the meantime, even taking into account the author's desire for a balanced display and analysis of intelligence operations, the work of military intelligence officers, especially during the war and after its completion, is recreated much more voluminously and vividly. Given the active and "multi-faceted" activities of Japanese military intelligence in Russia and Europe, it would also be possible to provide more material describing the cooperation of military and naval intelligence with counterintelligence, the Security Department and the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

E. Y. Sergeev's book is certainly a serious contribution to the domestic and foreign historiography of international relations, wars, and the activities of special services (the fact that this monograph was published in a series of works on the history of Russia and Eastern Europe, published over the past few years by one of the leading British scientific publishers "Routledge", is absolutely not random). Created at the intersection of several areas of scientific research, this book will undoubtedly be of interest not only to professional historians, but also to a wide readership.

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