In 1911, the Xinhai Revolution took place in China, which ended the monarchical system and the rule of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, eliminating the threat of complete enslavement of the state by imperialist powers, and led to the establishment of a republican system and the proclamation of the Republic of China.

The Xinhai Revolution was the result of a series of uprisings in the early twentieth century. Although it was far from solving the tasks set by the revolutionaries and failed to solve all the pressing problems, it nevertheless became a turning point in the history of China, an example of the national democratic struggle of the Chinese people for independence and sovereign rights, and created the basis for the country's renewal and modernization of society.

Keywords: China, Xinhai Revolution, consulate in Hankou, Ostroverkhov.

Changes in the domestic political situation and the maturing of the revolutionary situation in China at the beginning of the 20th century could not remain out of sight of the Russian diplomatic institutions. The information received from them was extremely important for developing the Chinese direction of Russia's foreign policy, especially given its considerable interests in the Middle Empire. During this period, the Russian Imperial Mission in Beijing and more than 20 consulates in different parts of the country worked in China.

During the Xinhai Revolution, the Russian Consulate in Hankou was at the center of events that radically changed the course of Chinese history. On the ground, the change of power entailed the creation of new political institutions, the appointment of new officials with whom diplomats had to communicate on a daily basis and solve numerous and diverse problems.

Consular offices mainly work with citizens of their country abroad, protect their interests and rights, contact local authorities, and draw up various documents. Political activity, including gathering information about the country, preparing analytical materials and notes, is not the main focus of consular work. However, when creating Russian consular institutions in Eastern countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries, political considerations were brought to the fore [Diplomatic Dictionary, 1986, p.82]. This fully applies to consulates in China, for which the political component has become the main content of their work.

The leadership of the Russian Imperial Consulate in Hankou carefully monitored the development of the situation in their region and regularly sent reports (i.e. information and reference materials) about specific events, accompanying them with their own assessments, especially since changes in the internal political situation and the establishment of a republic in China could have a direct impact on the situation of Russian citizens and the Russian concession in Hankou.

It seems that without constant attention to what was happening in the country and its district, the consul could not defend and protect the interests of citizens and their commercial interests, in particular, merchants who were engaged in the tea trade and settled in China in the XIX century. The first modern enterprise of Russian capital - a tea factory-was opened in Hankou in 1863, and at the beginning of the XX century, tea trade accounted for 50% of the trade turnover between Russia and China and was estimated at substantial amounts. In addition, full and accurate information about recent events gave the consul the opportunity to actively participate in joint actions of the consular corps in defense of the rights of foreigners enshrined in international treaties and conventions.

The content of the reports received from the consulate allows us to conclude that the mission's staff is well trained in regional studies and language skills. Reports were regularly sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg containing an in-depth analysis of the domestic political situation in China, as well as reviews of the most important events, which were compiled from materials of the local press of various political orientations in Chinese ("Dahan bao", "Qun Bao", "Gunghe Min Bao", "Zhongguo Bao") and Western ("The Peking Daily News", "The Mail", "Journal de Pekin", "China Tribune", "China Gazette") languages.

Until May 1912, the consul in Hankou was A. N. Ostroverkhoe ¹, who had previously worked in Chifu (Yantai) and Niuzhuang (Yingkou), and who proved himself to be a person who understands Chinese issues and defends the interests of Russia. He began working in Hankou as a collegiate councilor, ending his stay in China with the rank of full state Councilor. While working as a vice-consul in Chifu, Ostroverkhov, not being, strictly speaking, a specialist in either the military or maritime fields, expressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. N. Muravyov his opinion on the importance of acquiring (which was done later) an ice-free port in the Far East for creating a naval base. about Port Arthur. Arriving in 1899 to work in Nyuzhuang as consul, Ostroverkhov convincingly justified the need to gain a foothold in it in order to create a support base in Manchuria. He wrote that Niuzhuang "is important as a significant commercial port, which can provide us with significant revenues in the future... if we do nothing in the very near future, then either the Chinese will expel us from here, or the Japanese will occupy the city" (Datsyshen, 1998).

The Wuhan Tri-city Area, which Hankou was part of along with Wuchang and Hanyang, was a major commercial and industrial center in China. Since the second half of the XIX century, enterprises of foreign and national industry began to appear here. However, the formation of the latter was hindered by the dominance of the Qing monarchy and the dominance of foreign capital. The Government was unable to protect the interests of the nascent national bourgeoisie. The situation and working conditions of the still small working class, artisans, coolies and others, were extremely difficult. The peasantry, which made up the absolute majority of the population, was in servile conditions. The peasants were ruined, lost their land and could not find use for their forces, replenishing gangs of robbers and bandits. The situation was compounded by natural disasters, catastrophic tax increases, and an increase in the number of refugees and the impoverished. All this pushed the people to fight with the owners and the authorities. Spontaneous protest actions occurred first in one place, then in another. "The overthrow of the more than 267-year-old yoke of the Manchu conquerors was prepared by the entire course of the country's social development" [Xinhai Revolution, 1968, p. 110].

¹ Full name of Consul A. N. Timchsnko-Ostrovsrkhov. He signed his documents from Hankou as Ostroverkhov. Since the article was written on the basis of reports, I considered it possible to refer to it as Ostrovsrkhov.

Even before the Wuchang uprising, in April 1910, A. N. Ostroverkhov, informing the envoy I. Ya. Korostovets in Beijing about the "restless mood" in society and the "weakness of the Chinese authorities", requested the dispatch of a military vessel to Hankou to "protect compatriots" [AVPRI, D. 385, L. 45]. In December of the same year, a detachment (an infantry company) arrived in Hankou to protect the Russian concession.

Ostroverkhov assessed the unrest that began on the eve of the Xinhai Revolution in the provinces of Jiangxi, Hubei and Hunan, drawing attention to their anti-Qin orientation.: "There are many secret societies in China, most of which have as their goal the overthrow of the reigning Manchu dynasty and the restoration of the Chinese Han Dynasty." The Consul noted that the most active secret societies in Hubei Province were Galaohui (Big Brother Society) and Dadaohui (Big Knife Society), led by landlords and Shenshi2. The consul did not address the problems of the structure of organizations, the relationship between the leadership and ordinary members of societies, whether they have permanent or temporary common interests, the contradictory position of secret societies during the Xinhai Revolution, but only reported the composition of participants in the uprisings: "... there are dissatisfied and sympathetic to the revolutionary movement in all strata of society - in the troops, among the workers of the Hanyang arsenal, officials, merchants, robbers, mainly among young students " [AVPRI, d. 385, p. 31]. The consul wrote in particular about the revolutionary mood among students who returned from studying in Japan. At the same time, Ostroverkhov rightly noted that the younger generation makes up only a small part of the Chinese population, and their advanced ideas, borrowed "from foreigners", cannot be accepted by the majority of traditional Chinese society, and China cannot be "immediately put on the same level as the oldest countries of European civilization." Reports from the Consulate indicated that revolutionary ideas had also spread widely to the New Army, affecting both soldiers and officers. In 1906-1911, a number of uprisings took place in southern China: in 1906 in the provinces of Jiangxi and Hunan, in 1907 in Guangdong and Guangxi, in 1908 in Yunnan, in 1911 in Guangzhou and Sichuan. However, due to lack of preparation, lack of a clear political program and consistency of leadership, all these speeches ended in defeat.

Preparations for the new performance were taken over by the Hubei patriots. Established by Sun Yat-sen in 1905, the Tongmenghui ("United Union"), although a national revolutionary organization, did not have enough power in China at that time to prepare and lead a revolution. The Consulate paid due attention to this organization, singling it out from other associations. A. N. Ostroverkhov highly appreciated the activities of Sun Yat-sen, noted the growing influence of him and Tongmenghui in China: in Henan Province, for example, in the 1910s, "at least 60% of the population belongs to the followers of the revolutionary ideas of Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen), and in the Yangtze Valley there are his agents and assistants." On the eve of the Revolution Ostroverkhov rightly noted: "It is difficult, of course, to predict the future of this movement, but, apparently, one should think that it has a particularly serious significance in view of the awakening of public national consciousness in China that has begun in recent years", "... the Chinese population begins to express dissatisfaction with the existing state and social system " [AVPRI, d. 385, l. 43].

Prominent Russian / Soviet diplomat Yu. Ya. Solovyov in his book " Memoirs of a Diplomat. 1893-1922 "after a business trip to China, he spoke positively about Ostroverkhov's work during various periods of his activity and, in particular, wrote about the role of the consul general in the events of 1911:" ... a group of leaders of the revolution operating underground gathered at Ostroverkhov. He did this at his own risk, without receiving instructions from St. Petersburg. When at Easter in 1912

² Shenshi - "learned men", one of the four official estates in old China, officialdom.

(in pre-revolutionary times, awards were distributed on this day and appointments were made) he received a coded telegram, he thought it was a resignation; in fact, it turned out that he was promoted to full state councilor. St. Petersburg, after the revolution in China had passed "safely" for us, thus approved the initiative shown by Ostroverkhov" (Solovyov, 1959, pp. 53-54). It is well known that a joint headquarters operated on the territory of the Russian concession, the production of grenades was established, and it was there that an explosion occurred on October 9, literally and figuratively causing the fire of the revolution.

On October 11, 1911, the leaders of the uprising gathered in Wuchang to discuss the formation of a military government. A. N. Ostroverkhov reported that the rebels were not able to manage such a large center as Wuhan, because they did not have qualified personnel with official experience and the necessary training. Members of the former Advisory Committee were invited for consultations. The meeting participants unanimously voted to nominate the commander of one of the brigades of the Chinese New Army, Li Yuanhong, who happened to be in a revolutionary camp, for the post of military governor (dudu) of Hubei Province. He was literally forced to accept the position. An accidental fellow traveler of the revolution, he at first still spoke out on its side, against the retention of power by the Manchu dynasty in the country and entered into a confrontation with Beijing. A. N. Ostroverkhov in a secret telegram dated November 21, 1911, informed the envoy I. Ya. Korostovets in Beijing that in order to resolve the contradictions between the North and the South, Authorized representatives of Yuan Shikai and Li Yuanhong met at his home. Without going into the essence of the negotiations, we note that Ostrovyorkhov tried to take on the role of a mediator in resolving the conflict between the two sides and informed the envoy in Beijing in detail about the progress of the negotiations. Ostroverkhov communicated with Feng Guozhang, who represented Yuan Shikai, and with the South's delegates, Li Yuanhong and the Wuchang Government's Foreign Minister, Hu Ying, passing on the views of one side to the other, trying in vain to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The consul reported on Li Yuanhong's desire to "settle this dispute peacefully" and "agree to suspend military operations if the same is done by the enemy" (Belov, 2001: 84-85).

After the fall of Hanyang, the Russian Consul's mediation mission was continued by the British Envoy to Beijing, John N. Jordan, and the English Consul in Hankou, Claude M. MacDonald.

The Russian Consulate in the summer of 1912, noting the growing authority of Li Yuanhong, described the general as follows: "He is distinguished by patriotism and a fervent desire to recreate China. Although he does not possess an extensive statesman's mind, he cannot be denied directness and honesty of views, energy bordering on selflessness with a large practical mind " [AVPRI, D. 386, l. 29].

It seems that the consul overestimated the revolutionary loyalty of Li Yuanhong, who eventually turned from opponents of Yuan Shikai to his supporters, taking up the post of Vice-president of the republic (under President Yuan Shikai) in January 1912. Be that as it may, any information, biographical information about the new leading figures of China, local opinions about their first steps in the political field in the new conditions were very useful for the Russian government, which was in the process of determining its attitude to the Republic of China after the revolution and was considering the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the new government. Thanks to the information gathered by Russian diplomats, many Republican leaders were known to the Russian leadership when it recognized the Republic of China in October 1913.

The Russian Consulate in Hankou has consistently protected the property interests of its citizens. In particular, when the question of restoring the city arose, almost

completely burned down by the troops of General Feng Guozhang, a plan for its construction modeled on Washington, with wide streets, squares and squares appeared. This required additional plots of land previously occupied by privately owned households. The land was to be seized from the owners, including foreigners. In this regard, the consul informed the envoy to Beijing V. N. Krupensky about the disrespectful attitude of the new republican government to property:"...how little importance do local authorities attach to the right of private property" [AVPRI, D. 385, L. 184]. The consuls, including the Russian one, made a statement to the Governor General of the province about the need to preserve the rights of foreign owners in connection with the reconstruction of the city.

From the reports of the consular staff, many minor details become known, acquaintance with which makes it possible to fully imagine the atmosphere of that difficult time.

After the proclamation of the republic, the work of consular offices was complicated by the lack of diplomatic relations. As reported from the consulate in Hankou, new officials were ready to pay visits, get acquainted with foreign representatives, and establish working contacts. In this case, it was necessary to make reciprocal visits, and no employee of a foreign consulate could do this without official recognition from their state. Relations were maintained at a semi-official level, which made it difficult to resolve specific issues related to the affairs of foreign citizens. Due to the lack of diplomatic relations, none of the foreign consuls attended the reception hosted by Li Yuanhong on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Republic of China. Although the real power was in the hands of new officials, and the Russian consulate stated its serious intentions, without official recognition from the point of view of international law, normal contacts were impossible [AVPRI, D. 385, L. 142].

Local republican authorities, according to reports from Hankou, showed their favor to foreigners, but often expressed "tense attitude" towards them due to the "tendency of the Chinese to attribute the plight in which China found itself to an unloved foreigner" and suspect foreigners of trying to "gain a dominant position" during a period of internal turmoil [AWPRI, d. 385, l. 178]. The Consul General did not ignore reports of various opinions spread at the domestic level about the possibility of war against foreign powers for the return of lost sovereign rights. Russia was seen as the weakest and often most likely enemy, not feeling strong enough to declare war on other imperialist Powers. The head of the Finnish missionary community in Hunan Province, G. Meedor, told Ostroverkhov that he had heard talk among the local population about declaring war on Russia after the establishment of the republican form of government. The consul, in a report to the envoy in Beijing, M. S. Shchekin, in March 1912, also reported on similar sentiments in Hubei Province and regarded them as proof of "the militant policy that the Chinese Renewal Party intends to make the basis of this country's future relations with foreign countries" [AVPRI, D. 385, L. 177].

However, Li Yuanhong, in a conversation with the new Russian consul A. Zinkevich in November 1912, assured the latter that "it is impossible to judge the course of the Chinese government from the newspapers", which is disposed to maintain "the most friendly relations with Russia" [AVPRI, d. 386, l. 29].

The patriotic rise of the Chinese people immediately after the Xinhai Revolution is evidenced by the collection of funds by the Consulate General's staff in favor of the state, accompanied by a huge gathering of people and fiery speeches in defense of national sovereignty. The shares were supposed to prove that China is able to do without foreign loans. Although by-

The amounts received were significant, and on a national scale they were a drop in the bucket and could not prevent borrowing from foreign banks [AVPRI, D. 386, L. 41]. The consulate provided detailed coverage of the Beijing government's negotiations to obtain loans from foreign banks and foreign powers.

A brief review of the reports of the Consulate in Hankou shows the importance of the day-to-day work of its staff in collecting information and analyzing the internal situation in "Hubei Province and its environs," as the consulate's reports indicated, for bilateral Russian-Chinese relations. The Consulate's documents serve as a serious and reliable source for further studying the history of the Xinhai Revolution and assessing its significance for the subsequent development of China.

list of literature

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). Chinese table. F. 143. Op. 491.

Belov E. A. Brief history of the Xinhai Revolution. 1911-1913. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura Publ., 2001.

Datsyshsn, V. G., The Russian City of Yingkou (from the History of Russian-Chinese relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries), Russ. http://cvraziasib.info (accessed May 30, 2012)

Diplomatic Dictionary, vol. II, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1986.

The Xinhai Revolution. 1911-1913. Collection of documents and materials, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1968.

Solov'ev Y. Y. Memoirs of a diplomat. 1893-1922. Moscow: Publishing House of Socio-economic literature, 1959.

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