The article deals with Vatican's "Eastern Policy" of the Polish Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski (1901-1981). The main source is the 20-volume publication of the Polish historian P. Raina "Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski. Time of Service" containing extensive fragments from Wyszynski's diaries ("Pro memoria"). We find there the Cardinal's notes on his meetings and discussions with Popes John XXIII, Paul VI, the leaders of the Roman Curia, Vatican diplomats, and leaders of the Polish Episcopate. All these give us a chance to see Vatican's "Eastern Policy" from inside, to understand its motives and its intrinsic logic, as well as the reasons for its criticism by Cardinal Wyszynski. For Pope Paul VI communism was an expanding global political system, and the Holy See's diplomacy was to find compromises with it, while for Cardinal Wyszynski and the Polish bishops, communism was an archaic and obsolete doctrine, and they saw their main duty to resist it.

Keywords: Communism, "Eastern Policy" of the Vatican, John XXIII, Paul VI, A. Casaroli, L. Poggi, S. Wyszynski, P. Raina, the Holy See.

Filippov B. Cardinal Stefan Vyshinsky-initiator and critic of the" Eastern policy " of the Vatican (1958-1978) / / State, Religion, Church in Russia and abroad. 2017. N 1. pp. 98-122.

Filippov, Boris (2017) "Cardinal Wyszynski - Initiator and Critic of Vatican's 'Eastern Policy', 1945-1978", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 35(1): 98-122.

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In THE HISTORY of the Vatican's" Eastern policy", Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski (1901-1981) appears simultaneously as one of its initiators, as its critic, and as one of the creators of its new model. Traditionally, it is studied as the history of relations between the Holy See and the governments of individual socialist countries during the Cold War. Cardinal Wyszynski was the first to formulate an understanding of the Vatican's "Eastern policy" as a system of relations between three parties: the Holy See, the national government, and the Catholic episcopate of each particular country. Thanks to the Cardinal's insistence, this model was implemented in Poland. John Paul II will try to extend it to the Holy See's relations with all socialist countries. This article is devoted to the problem of forming this model in difficult conditions of the East - West confrontation. In Russian historiography, this topic was not touched upon. In Polish historiography, it is developed by Andrzej Grajewski 1 and Jan Jaryn 2.

The main source for writing this article is the 20-volume publication of the Polish historian Peter Raina "Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski. Time of service"4. It contains the cardinal's notes on his meetings and discussions with John XXIII, Paul VI, and the leaders of the Roman Curia (M.-J. Villot, J. Benelli), Vatican diplomats (A. Casaroli, L. Poggi). The multi-volume book contains Wyszynski's notes on regular discussions on the Vatican's Eastern policy, the Helsinki process, the situation of the Catholic Church in the Socialist countries, communism, and the role of the USSR in the world at meetings of the General Council of the Episcopate of Poland. The point of view of the Polish leadership on the Polish-Vatican negotiations is presented in this publication in the texts of official memos, instructions-

1. Grajewski, A. (2009) "Kardynalowie Stefan Wyszyński i Agostino Casaroli. Dwie osobowosc i dwie koncepcje polityki wschodniej Watykanu", Studia Prymasowskie. uksw 3: 51-79.

2. Zaryn, J. (1997) "Stolica Apostolska wobec "zimnej wojny" (w pierwszych latach po II wojnie swiatowej)", Dzieje najnowsze 2: 46-51.

3. In 2016, it was decided to publish Pro memoria (1952-1981) in 35 volumes.

4. Raina, P. (1993-2010) Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky.

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publications, analyses and reports (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Committee of the Russian Orthodox Church, Department of Religious Affairs).

The Holy See and the post-war world

With the end of World War II, the Catholic Church in Central and South-Eastern Europe faced a relentless enemy: the communist system, whose goal was: 1) to break the ties of local churches with the Holy See, and 2) to achieve complete marginalization of religious and ecclesiastical life. In the long run, this meant the elimination of the Catholic Church in most of these countries.

Pope Pius XII (1939-1958) proceeded from the temporary nature of the socio-political system established in these countries. In the beginning of the Cold War, the Holy See took its place among the allies of the United States5. This choice had far-reaching consequences. It has led to the marginalization of the international role of the Holy See.

After much hesitation, the pope and part of the Eastern European Episcopate opted for uncompromising martyrdom, symbolized by Cardinals Jozsef Mindszenty (Hungary), Josef Beran and Stepan Trochta (Czechoslovakia), and Josef Slipyj (USSR). The Pope publicly denounced the repression of clergy in people's democracies and supported the creation of underground church structures in these countries. 6 On July 1, 1949, the Pope approved a decree prohibiting any cooperation with communists.

There is an important record of the prevailing mood among the hierarchs of the Catholic Church during these years. As President Truman's special representative to the Holy See, Myron Taylor, writes (May 1949), Angelo Roncalli, the Papal Nuncio to France, told him, "that all the Catholic prelates on the other side of the Iron Curtain whom he met last year are unanimous in the belief that their countries can only be saved." as a result of the military defeat of the Soviet Union." "I'm a man of peace and it's scary that

5. О формировании этого союза см.: Żaryn, J. "Stolica Apostolska wobec "zimnej wojny" (w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej)".

6. For an analysis of these epistles of Pius XII, see Cywinski, B. (1994) Ogniem próbowane. Z dziejów najnowszych Kościoła katolickiego w Europie Środkowowschodniej, t. 2: "... I was prześladować będą", ss. 403-453. Warszawa.

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I have to say such things, " said the future Pope John XXIII 7.

The Vatican itself was thinking the same thing at that time.8
Tests of Soviet atomic (1949) and then thermonuclear (1953) weapons destroyed the American nuclear monopoly and illusions about the possibility of military victory over the USSR. At the same time, these tests allowed the leaders of the USSR and the United States to realize the scale of uncontrolled negative consequences of using new weapons. Pius XII was one of the first to advocate the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The death of Stalin and the election of a new president in the United States created the prerequisites for finding a way out of the impasse between the two world systems, which not only the Holy See, but the whole world were held hostage to. After Stalin's death, the Vatican began to receive signals from Moscow that the Kremlin leaders were ready to resume contacts that had been interrupted in the late 1920s. The Kremlin has been looking everywhere for allies in the fight for disarmament.9
Pius XII's hesitation to respond to these proposals was interrupted by the events in Hungary (October 1956). In his Christmas Message for 1956, the pope clearly spoke in favor of a Western Union and warned against the tactics of "dialogue". "What is there to talk about when there is no common language?" said Pius XII.10
The Hungarian crisis of the autumn of 1956 and its bloody suppression by Soviet troops with the non-intervention of Western countries finally destroyed the illusion in the Vatican about the temporary nature of the system established in this part of Europe. Following the realization of the fundamental nature of the changes that have taken place, the Holy See was faced with the question of finding a place for the Catholic Church in this new reality. Unofficial contacts of a number of influential cardinals and bishops with representatives of the Italian Communist Party begin. In 1956 the statements of the personal secretaries of Pius XII the Jesuits fr. Robert

7. Cit. ex: Stehle, H.J. (1993) Tajna dyplomacja Watykanu. Papiestwo wobec komunizmu (1917-1991), s. 337. Warszawa: Real Press.

8. Żaryn, J. "Stolica Apostolska wobec "zimnej wojny" (w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej)", s. 46-47.

9. For more information, see: Stehle, H. J. Tajna dyplomacja Watykanu. Papiestwo wobec komunizmu (1917-1991), s. 238.

10. Ibid., s. 242.

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Gustav Gundlach on communism and its prospects 11 and the need for the Catholic Church to find a place in the new social order 12.

In addition, there was a need to restore in most Eastern European countries the church hierarchical structure that had been destroyed during the post-war period. With the exception of Poland and, to a lesser extent, Yugoslavia, the Catholic churches of these countries were dioceses without bishops, parishes without abbots, and partly without priests. Church property was confiscated. Publishing houses are closed. Monastic orders were expelled not only from schools, hospitals and prisons, but also from most countries. Communication with Rome was disrupted, the nuncios were expelled from the country, and the concordats were declared invalid.

Pope Pius XII died on October 9, 1958. On the initiative of Cardinal S. Wyszynski (1901-1981), the question of the Holy See's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe was raised at a meeting of cardinals on the eve of the conclave in October 1958. According to a Soviet intelligence report13, Vyshinsky handed the cardinals a memorandum on the situation of the Catholic Church in these countries, criticizing the Vatican's policies of the previous period14. His performance before the Cardinals is very

11. " Communism for her (i.e., the church - B. F.'s note) is a severe test that humanity should go through on earth. But no more serious than Protestantism or the Illuminati-Masonic-bourgeois secular societies. .. communism will spread more widely... In any case, it is enough for the Church to face the need to find its place and merge with this new socio-ideological and economic reality." Breza, T. (1964) Spiżowa brama, s. 75. Warszawa: Czytelnik.

12. "The Church will, under all circumstances, seek every opportunity to provide a minimum of pastoral care in areas that do not currently have it" Cit. ex: Stehle, H. J. Tajna dyplomacja Watykanu. Papiestwo wobec komunizmu (1917-1991), s. 240.

13. In the archive of the Institute of National Remembrance (Warsaw), A. Grajewski found a" report " of the KGB "On new trends in Vatican politics". Grajewski, A. (2008) "Jak wybierano Jana XXIII", Gość Niedzielny. 26.10.2008 [http://gosc.pl/doc/787848.Jak-wybierano-Jana-XXIII, accessed on 17.10.2016].

14. Justifying the need for a compromise with the authorities of the NDP long before the conclave, Vyshinsky wrote in his diary that each of the bishops has the right to "devote himself to everything", but no one has the right to "sacrifice the diocese, the Church and the faithful". "Although martyrdom and the arrest of a bishop may be beneficial for the Church and for the diocese, yet Christ told his disciples to stay with the Church (" ) Where bishops and priests disappear, the Church disappears." Wyszyński, S. (2007) Pro memoria. Zapiski z lat 1948-1949 i 1951-1953, s. 378.

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emotionally supported by Cardinal J. R. R. Tolkien. According to Roncalli, if the situation does not change, " the Church may face a split. The Communists can start creating national Churches that are completely subordinate to them. " 15 The discussion that ensued, according to the Soviet agent, contributed to Roncalli's election as Pope (John XXIII). It also paved the way for the Vatican's "turn to the East."

Moscow has been closely monitoring changes in Vatican policy 16. In the speech of John XXIII in defense of peace and in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Berlin crisis (September 1961), Moscow saw a departure from unconditional support for US policy. It was decided to start negotiations with the Vatican 17. As Y. E. Karlov wrote, "a deeply secret agreement was soon reached to start secret negotiations between representatives of the USSR and the Vatican on the normalization of bilateral relations up to giving them a diplomatic character." 18
All these contacts took place against the backdrop of large-scale religious persecution in the USSR, so John XXIII's consent to them was met with open resistance in the Vatican. 19 At the same time, their results showed the limit of a possible compromise that the Soviet leadership was ready to make in its relations with the Holy See. During the negotiations, Soviet representatives refused to discuss the situation of the Catholic Church in the USSR. According to Yu. E. Karlov:

The decisive refusal of the Soviet representatives to discuss religious issues with the Vatican was not (...) a purely negotiation technique. This approach was based on a kind of political approach.-

Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Apostolicum i Wydawnictwo im. Stefana KardynałaWyszyńskiego Soli Deo.

15. Grajewski, A. "Jak wybierano Jana XXIII".

16. Summary of all the speeches of the Pope and the Soviet reaction to them is given in the book: Karlov Yu. E. Mission to the Vatican, Moscow: International Relations, 2004, pp. 19-21.

17. Ibid., p. 20.

18. Ibid., p. 18. In his book, Karlov elaborates on the subject matter, participants, stakeholders, and the nature and results of these contacts.

19. Melloni A. 1963. Spring of the world. Pope John XXIII's Diplomacy // John XXIII and the Modern World: Christian Witness, Coexistence and Cooperation / ed. by A. A. Krasikov, A. Melloni. Moscow: Interdialect Publ., 2002, p. 325.

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ideological justification. The prevailing view among the Soviet party leadership at the time was that in what was considered a "general and profound crisis of Catholicism,"it was necessary to avoid the possibility of such a crisis. (...) The Vatican will be forced to compensate for the decline in its religious prestige by stepping up its advocacy on international issues.20
These ideas will guide the leaders of the Socialist countries in their relations with the Holy See until the election of John Paul II (1978) and the religious upsurge in the world.

Khrushchev's resignation (1964) buried the idea of permanent diplomatic relations for a long time. Nevertheless, unofficial contacts between the Vatican and Moscow persisted.21
Through its initiatives, first of all by sending two observers to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), Moscow created an opportunity for similar contacts to its allies.22 25 bishops from Poland and several bishops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia attended its opening (1962) .23 In response to signals from Budapest, 24 John XIII sent Agostino Casaroli there in May 1963. Negotiations began with the governments of Hungary, 25 and then Czechoslovakia, where the situation of the Church was particularly depressing. Thus began the Vatican's "Eastern policy". The policy of negotiations with the governments of the Socialist countries was continued by Paul VI (1963-1978).

As Cardinal Achille Silvestrini wrote in the preface to the Memoirs of Cardinal A. Casaroli:

Throughout the years of Ostpolitik's implementation, there has been an incessant heated debate in the Church over a dramatic, recurring issue. Is " total resistance better (...),

20. Karlov Yu. E. Mission to the Vatican. p. 19.

21. In the book by B. Lai (Lai, B. (1983) Les Secrets du Vatican. Paris: Hachette) tells about the visits to Leningrad and Moscow, which were made on behalf of John XXIII and Paul VI by Cardinal J. R. R. Tolkien. Siri.

22. Since 1962, regular consultative meetings of the leaders of the Councils for Religious Affairs of the Socialist Commonwealth countries have been held, which have dealt, among other things, with the issues of a unified policy of the Socialist countries in relation to the Vatican. There are no publications on this topic.

23. The last session of the Council was attended by 89 out of 150 bishops from Eastern Europe (including two bishops from the USSR). Stehle, H.J. Tajna dyplomacja Watykanu. Papiestwo wobec komunizmu (1917-1991), s. 255.

24. Archbishop Jozsef Gres of Kaloch was released from prison there.

25. In 1963, A. Casaroli seeks the release of four Hungarian bishops.

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what is the attempt to use negotiations to collect for their children the permitted crumbs that fall from the table of tyrannical power?". Over the years, it has been debated to what extent negotiations can expand the space and give freedom to religious life, or whether they will turn out to be an illusion that increases the prestige of the authorities without lasting results for the Church.26
The choice was made in favor of the opinion that the church "should take care, like a mother, of the spiritual needs of its children"27.

There were no illusions in the Vatican. The hope was placed not on softening the anti-religious policy, but on its failure.

The primary task for Vatican diplomacy was to release bishops from prison or exile and agree on the terms of appointment of new bishops. And for this, diplomats made compromises. As Cardinal Karol Wojtyla explained to his friend and future Cardinal Andrzej Descour, " the future of the Church will be ensured mainly by the Church hierarchs. Better two good bishops and two bad ones than none at all. " 28
The USSR was the guarantor of the inviolability of the socio-political system in Eastern Europe. Therefore, a fundamental feature of Vatican diplomacy during this period was its emphatic expression of respect for the Soviet superpower status, and its understanding that Moscow was behind all negotiations with the governments of the Socialist countries.29 This explains the unfortunate fact that neither John XXIII nor Paul VI protested against the persecution of believers and clergy in socialist countries, even when they were defended by the world community. During a visit to the Domitilla Catacombs in Rome (on September 11, 1965), Paul VI explained his silence

26. Silvestrini, A. (2001) "Wprowadzenie", in: Casaroli A. (2001) Pamiętniki. Męczeństwo cierpliwości. Stolica Apostolska i kraje komunistyczne (1963-1989), sS. 9-10. Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax.

27. Ibid., s. 10.

28. Morozzo della Rocca, R. (2015) "Agostino Casaroli and the Popes of the Ostpolitik", in A. Fejérdy (ed.) The Vatican 'Ostpolitik' 1958-1978. Responsibility and Witness during John XXIII and Paul VI, p. 48. Roma: Istituto Balassi. Bibliotheca Academiae Hungariae.

29. For more information, see Grajewski, A. (2009) " Kardynalowie Stefan Wyszyński i Agostino Casaroli. Dwie osobowości i dwie koncepcje polityki wschodniej Watykanu", s. 68.

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because he doesn't want to "provoke more evil"by protesting 30. Earlier, John XXIII expressed himself even more explicitly on this topic in a conversation with the ambassador of the Polish emigrant government, Casimir Pape:"We cannot tease the beast." 31
As a result of the lengthy Vatican-Hungarian negotiations that began in 1964, by 1976 (!) all dioceses received bishops loyal to the authorities. At the cost of concessions from the Holy See, it was possible to partially restore normal church life and regular contact with Rome.

The Vatican hoped for the same result from the negotiations in Czechoslovakia, for which they abandoned the practice of ordaining secret priests and bishops. As a gesture of goodwill, the Czechoslovak side released several bishops from prison without the right to return to their ministry. For its part, the Holy See refused to take advantage of the liberalization that began in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968. But even after many years of negotiations, by 1989 in the Czechoslovak SSR, out of 13 dioceses, 8 did not have a ruling bishop.

In most countries, over a decade of negotiations, a partial restoration of the church hierarchy has been achieved. But it was not possible to restore the activities of monastic orders, religious education of schoolchildren, and the opening of the necessary number of seminaries in these countries.

These multi-year negotiations had two important features. First, the local episcopate did not participate in the negotiations between representatives of the Holy See and the governments of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and SFRY. Secondly, the negotiations conducted by Vatican diplomats in Budapest, Prague or Warsaw implied that they were forming a common position for the countries of the bloc in relation to the Vatican. This circumstance imposed additional obligations on the negotiators. P. Raina cites the text of the "Explanatory note on conversations with the Vatican delegation in Warsaw" from February 4 to 6, 1974. This document was signed by Secretary of the Central Committee of the PORP Stanislav Kanya and Foreign Minister Stefan Olshovsky. In it, the goals of the conversations were called "acquiring a positive attitude".

30. Gianelli, A., Tornielli, A. (2006) Papieże a wojna. Od pierwszego światowego konfliktu do ataku na Irak, s. 174. Kraków.

31. Grajewski, A. (2012) "Skryci komentatorzy", Tygodnik Gość Niedzielny. 18.10.2012.

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international resonance" for the peace-loving policy of the People's Republic of Poland, as well as "representing the unified cohesive policy of Poland, the USSR and the entire socialist community"32. This involved additional consultations with Moscow.

What they looked like can be judged from a letter (February 1973) from the head of the Department for Religious Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland, A. A. Abramovich. Skarzynski to his Soviet colleague V. A. Kuroyedov, in which he writes that the Vatican "would like to bring to an agreement with Poland, which would become a precedent beneficial for the Church in relation to other social countries. We are interested in negotiations, not an agreement." In this regard, Skarzynski suggests:.. "think together about the next steps in the game with the Vatican" 33.

The most fruitful negotiations were held in Yugoslavia. They ended not only with the restoration of the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church in the country, but also with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Holy See (1970). For various reasons, 34 the Holy See was unable to establish diplomatic relations with other countries of the socialist system.

Eastern policy would have remained a matter for a few prelates if it had not been closely linked to the defusing of international tensions and to the key problem of post-war Europe, which was the legitimacy of post-war borders that were not confirmed by international legal acts. Their absence did not allow the Holy See to bring the boundaries of dioceses in line with the new state borders and appoint a permanent church administration.

The main ally of Paul VI in solving these problems is Germany, 35 of which Lee became Chancellor (since October 21, 1969).-

32. Raina, P. (2006) Kardynał Wyszyński. Tom 13 Czasy Prymasowskie 1974, s. 42. Warszawa.

33. Cit. ex: Grajewski, A. "Kardynalowie Stefan Wyszyński i Agostino Casaroli. Dwie osobowości i dwie koncepcMe polityki wschodnieM Watykanu", s. 68.

34. In Poland and the GDR this was opposed by the episcopate, in the GDR and Czechoslovakia by the Governments of these countries. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Apostolic Capital was opposed by Moscow. Yu. E. Karlov writes that "Poles and Germans from the GDR sought consent from the Soviet leadership to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican, starting in 1977" (Karlov Yu. E. Mission to the Vatican, p. 31.)

35. According to M. Mrouz, Casaroli consistently, "retreating half a step", followed the policy of detente in relations with the socialist countries of the Vedu-

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der SPD Willy Brandt. He initiates a new Eastern policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 36 based on the legal recognition of the results of the Second World War. Another important "ally" of the Holy See during these years was the Helsinki Process (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe), which in March 1969 the socialist countries invited all European countries, including the Vatican, to participate in. 37 The Holy See accepted the invitation. It was a historic decision. According to Pope Francis ' Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the move was as innovative as it was important, as it has been since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Holy See did not participate as a full member in the Congress of States. (...) The first reaction of the West, Cardinal Parolin continued, was to expand the range of issues discussed. (...) At this preliminary stage, the Holy See played a decisive role in establishing the principle of religious freedom and, consequently, fundamental freedoms and human rights in their various aspects.38
The Helsinki process has brought the Holy See back into the realm of world politics. Signed in Helsinki (August 1, 1975) -

most Western countries, primarily Germany. Mróz, M. Watykańska polityka wschodnia wczoraj i dziś. Stolica Apostolska i dyplomacja watykańska wobec komunizmu i transformacji ustrojowej w Europie Środkoweji Wschodniej w latach 1958-2010, s. 80.

36. Hence "Ostpolitik Vatikana". In order to overcome the resistance of the CDP/CDU deputies in the Bundestag and expand the social base for future policies, at the end of November 1969, members of the SPD leadership and Catholics by religion Herbert Wehner and Georg Leber arrive in Rome for negotiations at the Vatican. Then there was a meeting with them arch. Boleslav Kaminka. Contacts were established between the SPD leadership and the leadership of the Polish Episcopate.

37.According to the author of the Helsinki Process, A. Zagorski, it consisted of the following:" It was an exchange of recognition of the principle of inviolability of borders, which the Soviet Union sought, for recognition by the Soviet Union of the principles of human rights and the 'third basket' - contacts between people, free exchange of information". Vedrashko V. The new book of Professor Andrey Zagorsky "The Helsinki Process" / / Radio Liberty. 08.11.2005 [http://archive.svoboda.org/11/soc/1105/11.110805-9.asp, accessed from 09.09.2016].

38. Vatican Secretary of State on the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Katolik.ru. 07.07.2015 [http://www.katolik.ru/mir/122689-gossekretar-vatikana-vystupil-s-dokladom-po-sluchayu-40 -letnyaya-godovshchina-podpisaniya-khelsinkskogo-zaklyuchitelnogo-akta.html, accessed from 19.08.2016].

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The final Act contained the agreed obligations of European countries on a set of fundamental human rights. He provided Vatican representatives with important arguments in negotiations with representatives of social countries on expanding religious freedoms.

Participation in the Helsinki process allowed the Holy See to implement the most revolutionary change in its policy. The Catholic Church has abandoned the protection of its confessional interests in favor of protecting "the rights of the human person." Formulated by John XXIII ("we must take care of all people as such, not just Catholics")39. This principle was laid down in the documents of the Second Vatican Council ("On the Church in the Modern World") and in the encyclical Populorum Progressio of Paul VI. In 1974, the Pontifical Commission Iustitia et Pax prepared an official document of the Holy See entitled "The Church and human rights" .40
Cardinal S. Vyshinsky and the Vatican's "Eastern policy"

Most Polish bishops and priests had no reason to trust the new government. They were well aware of "the tragic fate of religion and the church in the USSR and the merciless policy of the Soviet authorities towards the Catholic Church in the part of the territory of the Polish Republic occupied in the years 1939-1941"41. The new government also considered the church its enemy. But in 1944-1947, it could not afford a simultaneous confrontation with the Church, the armed underground, and the legal political opposition represented by the Polish Peasant Party. Only in mid-1947 was the church officially (in party and official documents) named the main enemy of the people's power.42
39. For more information, see Roncalli, M. (2007). Giovanni XXIII. Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli - una vita nella stori, p. 627. Milano: Mondadori. Цит.Based on: Krasikov A. A. Vatikan - gosudarstvo i tserkva [Vatican-State and Church] / / At the crossroads of the Mediterranean: "Italian boot" before the challenges of the XXI century. Edited by T. V. Zonova, Moscow: Vse mir Publ., 2011, p. 421.

40. For more information, see: Filippov B. A. Popes and problems of human rights // Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Social Aspects, Moscow: INION RAS, 1998, pp. 202-222.

41. Dudek, A., Gryz, R. (2006) Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce (1945-1989), ss. 11, 61. Kraków: Znak.

42. Ibid., s. 61.

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At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the new government could not do without cooperation with the clergy. For example, without the support of the clergy, the Communists could not fully implement the adaptation of the former German territories43 that Poland received by decision of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences.44
Organizationally, the Catholic Church in Poland consisted of 25 dioceses and about 5 thousand parishes. The number of clergy in 1946 totaled 1,344. There were 2,063 believers per priest 45.

It was during these harsh post-war years that the position of the Primate of Poland, Archbishop Stefan Wyszynski of Warsaw and Gniezno (1948-1981) and the leaders of the Episcopate was formed in relation to the new social system. It is based on the deep patriotism of the cardinal and bishops. In their activities, they will separate their Homeland (Poland) The country's leaders will be judged on their "degree of independence from Moscow." 46 Cardinal Wyszynski avoided recognizing the legitimacy of the Marxist government and at the same time tried to prevent conflicts that could lead to Soviet intervention. It is significant that when he criticized the authorities in his sermons, he never allowed himself to criticize the authorities outside the borders of the People's Republic of Poland. "Anything critical I want to say, I say at home." This is how Vyshinsky responded to foreign journalists. This position of the cardinal and bishops allowed them to act as intermediaries between rebellious workers and the authorities during the period of social conflicts that are so frequent in the history of Poland.47
It should be noted that Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski had broad special powers (facilitates speciales),

43. " Immigrants coming from beyond the Bug agreed to live in a foreign land only where a priest appeared and a parish was established." Cywiński, B. Ogniem próbowane. Z dziejów najnowszych Kościoła katolickiego w Europie Środko wowschodniej, t. 2: "... I was prześladować będą", s. 22.

44. We are talking about territories that were torn away from Poland by the German rulers at various times: parts of Pomerania (with Stettin / Szczecin), West Prussia (with Danzig/Gdansk) and two-thirds of East Prussia, Lower Silesia (with Reslau/Wrocław) and Greater Poland (with Poznań).

45. Ibid., s. 40.

46. For more information, see: Filippov B. A. Caesarean section. Church and State in Communist Poland / / Filippov B. A. Ioann Pavlo II. Poland. Politika, Moscow: PSTGU Publishing House, 2013, pp. 254-272.

47. For more information, see: Ibid.

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which the dads gave him. According to the current Primate of Poland arch. Wojciech Polack, "two popes, Pius XII and Paul VI, have made it clear many times that Primate Wyszynski is their representative in Poland, as well as in a sense in the East"48. These powers included the right to negotiate independently with the authorities and select candidates for bishops. And Vyshinsky actively used them.

In Poland, the Decree of the Holy Congregation of 1949 prohibiting cooperation with communists was not announced. In April 1950, representatives of the Episcopate signed the first Agreement with the Polish government, in which the episcopate undertook to prevent clergy from participating in political activities. Following the Polish episcopate, Hungarian bishops signed an agreement with the authorities in August 1950. But while Wyszynski managed to convince the pope during a visit to the Vatican in April 1951 of the need for an agreement with the authorities, 49 Pius XII condemned the agreement signed by the Hungarian bishops for making too far-reaching concessions.

Since 1951, a new offensive against the Catholic Church begins. It is accompanied by arrests and trials of clergy. On February 9, 1953, a decree was issued on the procedure for appointing clergy to ecclesiastical positions, which placed all appointments under the control of the Government. The authorities responded to the protest of the episcopate by arresting Vyshinsky and imprisoning him in a monastery. The release of the cardinal was preceded by the events of the Polish "October 1956" and the return to power of Wladyslaw Gomulka. Then the cardinal and the episcopate supported Gomulka. In December 1956, a new Agreement was signed. After much hesitation, Pius XII did not condemn this agreement of the Polish episcopate either. 50 Thus began the formation of the" Polish model " of the relationship between the church and the socialist state.

48. Polak, W. (2011) "Kardynał Wyszyński a Stolicą Apostolską - wystąpienie na KUL-u", Prymas Polski. 25.05.2011 [http://www.prymaspolski.pl/pl/prymas_polski/oficialne_wypowiedzi/kardynal_wyszynski_a _stolica_apostolska_-_wystapienie_na_kul-u.html, accessed on 11.03.2017].

49. Cywiński, B. Ogniem próbowane. Z dziejów najnowszych Kościoła katolickiego w Europie Środkowowschodniej, t. 2: "... I was prześladować będą", ss. 89-90.

50. This is evidenced by the visit of Cardinal Wyszynski to the Vatican in June 1957. See: Breza, T. Spiżowa brama, s. 189.

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Contacts between representatives of the Polish government and the Vatican began in April 1965 in Rome. As an initial subject of negotiations, the possibility of Pope Paul VI coming to Poland for the celebrations dedicated to the millennium of the baptism of Poland (1966) was considered. The visit didn't take place. However, negotiations continued. Casaroli, who was able (June 1966) to sign the first bilateral agreement with the socialist Government of Yugoslavia with international legal status, wanted to conclude a similar agreement with the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland. His Warsaw interlocutor is the head of the Department of Science and Education of the Central Committee of the PORP A. Verblyan preferred to talk not about the agreement, but about the hostile position of Cardinal Wyszynski. In the absence of a result, at the end of July 1967, the Commission on Clergy Affairs of the Central Committee of the PORP decided to terminate the negotiations. Cardinal Wyszynski might have been pleased. Most of all, he did not want to conclude an agreement either on the Hungarian or on the Yugoslav model.51
A few years later, he would write in his diary: "The line of the Episcopate of Poland cannot completely coincide with either the line of the Government of the People's Republic of Poland or the line of the Eastern policy of the Holy See. And this is "not because of the Primate's stubbornness," but "as a result of 30 years of experience in negotiating with the Communists."52 The Cardinal was convinced that the Vatican did not fully understand the totalitarian nature of communist power and had too much confidence in the agreements signed with it.

In December 1970, as a result of labor unrest on the Coast of Poland, there was a change in the country's leadership. And already in January 1971, almost simultaneously in Warsaw and in the Vatican, a decision is made to resume negotiations.

The Foreign Ministry and the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party prepared notes and instructions for the negotiations, which indicated the desire of the Polish leaders to get concessions from the Vatican similar to those that the Hungarian government managed to achieve. The Instructions developed by the specialists of the Central Committee of the PORP (08.03.1971) in the section" Strategic principles "stated that" negotiations should lead to maximum political neutralization-

51. Dudek, A., Gryz, R. Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce (1945-1989), ss. 251-252.

52. "Kardynał Wyszyński a Stolicą Apostolską - wystąpienie na KUL-u".

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of the Church in Poland, and above all to restrict the political activities of its hierarchy."53

The aim of the negotiations was (1) to ensure the hierarchy's full loyalty to the authorities and the system, and (2) to ensure the necessary "influence over ecclesiastical appointments that fall within the competence of the Vatican."54
According to the plans of the Foreign Ministry leadership, "through direct bilateral negotiations with the Vatican, we exclude Vyshinsky from them, take away the episcopate's monopoly on contacts with the State Secretariat and the Roman Curia in general, and create prerequisites that contribute to the evolution of the position of the Polish episcopate and accelerate the process of revaluation of its political position imposed by Vyshinsky."55
For his part, Vyshinsky sends a secretary of the Episcopate to Rome. Bronislaw Dombrowski, who conveyed to Casaroli the Cardinal's advice regarding negotiations with Polish representatives. According to the cardinal, negotiations should begin only after the relations between the church and the authorities in Poland are settled, that is, the Catholic Church is recognized as a public legal status56 Diplomatic relations are secondary. If negotiations do start, the EP will need to be present in Rome. Dombrowski as a consultant. These recommendations were transmitted (on 25 March) by Cardinal K. Wojtyla to Paul VI, who agreed with them.57
Negotiations began in Rome (April 1971) and continued in Warsaw (November 1971). And although the proposals of the authorities contained unacceptable conditions for the Vatican (removal of" law-breaking "bishops," recognition by the Church and the episcopate of the inevitability of political and social transformation in Poland after 1945", " the decisive influence of the state on the church-

53. Raina, P. (2003) Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1971, s. 60. Warszawa.

54. Ibid., s. 62.

55. Ibid., s. 57.

56. During Luigi Poggi's talks with Kazimiz Konkol, head of the Department of Religious Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland, he heard that " granting the Church the status of a legal entity... It contradicts the trend of development of the law of the socialist state and cannot be reconciled with the separation of Church and state."

57. Raina, P. Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1971, s. 68-69.

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secret appointments"), Paul VI and Casaroli preferred to "preserve the dialogue..." 58.

Negotiations continued in Warsaw (November 1971). Following the ratification by the Bundestag of the treaty between Poland and Germany, the Pope appointed (26.06.1972) a permanent ecclesiastical administration to the former German territories that were ceded to Poland after World War II.

Only the borders of dioceses in the former Polish territories of Lithuania, Western Belarus and Ukraine remained unresolved. At the meeting of the General Council of the Episcopate (14.11.1972), the Vatican decided not to raise this problem until the USSR raises it.59 They did not want to raise this problem in the Central Committee of PORP 60 either.

The Vatican's involvement in the Helsinki process and willingness to make far-reaching compromises with the governments of the Socialist countries, and especially the removal of Cardinal John by Paul VI at the insistence of the Government of the GDR. Mindszenty's resignation as Archbishop of Esztergom (December 18, 1973) caused concern to Cardinal S. Wyszynski. "If only they don't betray us," he writes in his Diary.61
The Cardinal reacted negatively to the results of Casaroli's agreements in Budapest. Vyshinsky outlined his ideas about the desired Eastern policy during a meeting with Casaroli in Rome (29.11.1973).

As an effective means to protect the church, he suggested putting the issue of human rights at the forefront; he called for pointing out violations of these rights:

Question: should I remain silent or speak? Atheist governments are afraid of exposing their programs 62. But we don't want to die in silence. Diplomats often advise silence. Pastors should speak, warn their children, and remind them. This should not be forgotten by the Holy See's diplomats. It is necessary to organize public opinion against the violation of people's rights. (...) Porabo-

58. Casaroli, A. (2001) Pamiętniki. Męczeństwo cierpliwości. Stolica Apostolska i kraje komunistyczne (1963-1989), s. 224. Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax.

59. Raina, P. (2004) Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1972, s. 179. Warszawa.

60. Dudek, A. (1999) "Problem normalizacji stosunkyw między PRL a Stolicą Apostolską w latach 1971-1977", Mazowieckie Studia Humanistyczne 2: 64.

61. Raina, P. Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1974, s. 18.

62. These are government programs, both those aimed at weakening the position of the Church and those that violate the rights of Polish peasants and workers.

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The peoples of the world should know that the Holy See protects them. ... Silence destroys the hope of those who see in the Roman Church the only and final salvation. This is what we are told by Orthodox People who live in Poland, as well as those who live in the USSR 63.

The cardinal will repeat all this at a meeting with Paul VI 64. As A. Casaroli writes in his memoirs, the Polish "bishops were deeply convinced of the greater necessity of resistance and struggle than of the necessity or simply the possibility of negotiations with the government." 65
In February 1974, the first official negotiations of Architect A. Casaroli with representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Poland took place. Wyszynski expressed his doubts about this model of negotiations, in which Casaroli represents the world church, the atheist government, and no one represents the Polish Church, in a letter to Paul VI. B. Dombrovsky (1917-1997) went with him to Rome in March 1974. On 21 March, it was received by Paul VI, who presented to the bishop his deeply pessimistic view of the future of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe and the objectives of his "Eastern policy" .66
According to the pope, the Church in Poland today does not need His intervention, but what will happen in 10, 20 years? The political system in which you live is permanent. Nothing indicates any changes. As long as this Church-bound generation lives, you are strong, but what happens when it's gone? ... Can the Church resist as much as it does today? ... The Apostolic Capital is taking action with a long-term perspective in mind. "We believe that the basis should be only mutual trust and genuine cooperation provided by the Apostolic Capital and the Episcopate of Poland also from the outside.67
63. Raina, P. (2004) Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1973, s. 138. Warszawa.

64. Ibid., s. 141-143.

65. Casaroli, A. (2001) Pamiętniki. Męczeństwo cierpliwości. Stolica Apostolska i kraje komunistyczne (1963-1989), s. 230-231.

66. Paul VI had never spoken so openly to the Poles before. According to Vyshinsky, he listened in silence and said nothing. Raina, P. Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1973, s. 142.

67. Raina, P. Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1974, s. 30-31.

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As follows from the fragments of Cardinal Wyszynski's "Diary" published by Peter Raina,

The Vatican's Eastern Policy " was the subject of regular discussions and criticism at meetings of the General Council of the Episcopal Conference. What Bishop Dombrowski heard from Paul VI in March 1974, Vyshinsky interpreted as a carte blanche for his policy. The Apostolic Capital is making its "turn to the East", the Primate said at a meeting of the Main Council (August 16, 1974). It has the right to do so, but Poland should not allow itself to be drawn into this" turn". We must have a sense of responsibility for the Church and the People in Poland. This requires us to be independent in dealing with the problems of the Church in Poland 68.

According to the agreement reached during the July-November 1974 negotiations, working groups were created for permanent contacts between the Government of the People's Republic of Poland and the Holy See. A Polish group led by K. Szablewski was to be permanently stationed in Rome, and a group of the Holy See could come to Poland as needed. It was headed by the Archbishop. Luigi Poggi. It was a compromise. The Polish government failed to establish a permanent representation of the Pope in Warsaw, through which it planned to put pressure on Wyszynski and the episcopate. With the consent of Paul VI, all negotiations were preceded by consultations with Vyshinsky or Dombrovsky. They were also informed about the results of the negotiations. This is how the negotiation "triangle"69, or the Polish model of the Vatican's Eastern policy, was formed.

In his memoirs, Casaroli writes about the paradoxical situation in which the government sought support in the Vatican against the Polish Episcopate.70 The authorities could not go into conflict with the church, fearing the reaction of the faithful people, and could not show their weakness in the eyes of the fraternal communist parties. At the same time, it could not be " too much-

68. Ibid., s. 39-40.

69. Expression of the head of the Department of Religious Affairs K. Konkol.

70. The authorities of the NDP and GDR considered that it would be easier for them to negotiate with the Vatican than with their own episcopate, so they advocated the establishment of official diplomatic relations. This was opposed by Moscow. See Karlov, Yu. E. Mission to the Vatican, p. 31.

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kom Stalinist" in the eyes of the West, with which Poland of the Terek tried to get closer 71.

Another EP visit. Dombrowski's letter to the Pope (February 6, 1975) brought an important clarification to the understanding of the nature of the papal "Eastern policy". It was the "Russian complex", otherwise - "fear of Russia". As during the first audience, the pope stressed that " Russia is powerful, it imposes its own concepts on everyone, the Communists feel powerful and strong, and in a human way-there is no such force that could defeat them. It is our responsibility to see the future and protect ourselves," said Pope Francis.

Such a position and "the prevailing fear in the Vatican of the victory of communism all over the world "("God forbid you to touch the USSR") " 73 were unacceptable for the cardinal. The leaders of the Polish Episcopate had no respect for the USSR 74. They considered the struggle against communism as their historical mission 75. At a meeting of the General Council of the Episcopate of Poland in March 1974, Wyszynski stated::

Where does the Vatican's belief in the sustainability of the system come from? I ask you, what is the basis of this stability? On the power of the doctrine? Or a position in society? Or on military force? There is no development of the doctrine, the position of power in society is rather decreasing, and the stability guaranteed by military power is fragile. The formation that relies on cannons is the weakest. And why does the Apostolic Capital want to strengthen what is dust, which sooner or later will fall apart due to its internal weakness?76

71. Casaroli, A. (2001) Pamiętniki. Męczeństwo cierpliwości. Stolica Apostolska i kraje komunistyczne (1963-1989), s. 223.

72. Raina, P. (2001) Arcybiskup Dą browski: rozmowy watykańskie, s. 144-145. Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax.

73. Raina, P. (2006) Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1975, s. 20.Warszawa.

74. In conversation with his confessor, the cop. Bonevich (08.11.73) Vyshinsky spoke about the USSR standing "on clay feet". Raina, P. Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1973, s. 105.

75. In the words of Cardinal Wyszynski, " the fate of communism will be decided... not in Russia, but in Poland, thanks to its Catholic Church. Poland will show the whole world how to take up communism, and the whole world will be grateful for it" (Cit. ex: PZPR. Uchwaly КС PZPR od III do IV zjazdu (1968), s. 404.Warszawa).

76. Żaryn, S. (2011) "Trzeźwe spojrzenie Kościoła". Tygodnik Solidarność. Warszawa.

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For the members of the Council, the socialist system was a product of an" anachronistic "and" backward " doctrine (meeting of the General Council of the Episcopate of Poland, June 1977).77. During a dinner at Paul VI's (9 Dec. 1973) Vyshinsky described the USSR as "Marxist-draped imperialism." 78
The differing views of Vatican dignitaries and Polish bishops about the prospects of communism also led to differences in the model of relations between the episcopate and the authorities. According to A. Dudek: the Vatican was dominated by the belief that the liberalization of religious policy in Poland is the result of a broad process of weakening the repressiveness of communist regimes and their evolution in the national direction. Hence their appeal to the Polish hierarchy to moderate their criticism of the regime.79
Cardinal S. Wyszynski, for his part, believed that insufficient criticism of the authorities by bishops is the cause of social crises in Poland.80 Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski made the episcopate's position in times of crisis very clear in a message sent to the authorities in March 1971, which stated::

The Episcopate of Poland does not want to turn the Church into a political opposition, nor does it want to play the role of a political leader, nor does it want to mobilize the forces of society to overthrow the existing system, which it is constantly accused of. In matters concerning the fate of the people and the State, he is always guided by the Polish national interests 81.

77. Raina, P. (2010) Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1977, s. 50. Warszawa.

78. Raina, P. Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1973, s. 152.

79. Dudek, A. "Problem normalizacMi stosunkyw między PRL a Stolicą Apostolską w latach 1971-1977", s. 65-66.

80. In his" Appeal to All Poles " (December 25, 1970) after the tragic events on the Coast, the Cardinal wrote:" ... For perhaps I did not appeal enough, did not demand enough, did not warn enough, and did not ask enough." Wyszyński, St. (1981) "Apel do wszystkich Polakyw, po Sumie w uroczystość Bożego Narodzenia 25 grud. 1970 r.", Tygodnik powszechny 23: 4.

81. Filippov B. A. Caesarean section. Church and State in Communist Poland / / Filippov B. A. Ioann Pavlo II. Poland. Politika, Moscow: PSTGU Publishing House, 2013, p. 262.

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The views of the pope and his entourage determine the topics for the cardinal's conversations with Vatican dignitaries in Rome: Russia, the essence of communism and socialism, the nature of the relationship between the church and the authorities in Poland. The Cardinal will make a special report on Evangelization in the Second World at the Synod of Bishops in Rome (01.10.1974)82. In it, he will describe the socialist system as state-capitalist. He will speak about the situation of the church in the Socialist countries at a meeting of cardinals on the eve of the conclave (August 1978) and during the first audience with Pope John Paul I.

In the Vatican, Wyszynski (May 13, 1975) urges his interlocutors not to believe in the sincerity of Communists. They are interested, the cardinal said, only in what "serves to improve their reputation in the world." 83 For them, rapprochement with the Vatican is only "political and propaganda" in nature. In a conversation with L. Poggi, Vyshinsky convinced him that " Russia is not Europe proper. This is a cast of Tatars, Mongols, Great Russians, etc. Poland has its own experience, and the Vatican should not ignore it. The Vatican's negotiations with Russia did not benefit the Church, because Eurasia always tried to get out of it and not fulfill its obligations." The cardinal drew the attention of his interlocutor to the fact that the Soviet representatives were negotiating not with the Church, but with the Vatican state.84
The nature of the relationship between the Episcopate of Poland and the Roman Curia is well illustrated by such an example. In 1976, Archpriest L. Poggi arrived in Warsaw without the consent of the Primate. The General Council of the Episcopate of Poland appealed to the State Secretariat of the Holy See to protest against the visit without prior consultation. This message angered the Curia leadership. For the first time, the pope did not receive Bishop Dombrowski, and the Secretary of State, Cardinal Jean-Marie Villot, appealed to the pope to accept the resignation of Wyszynski, who turned 75 years old. 85 The Pope did not accept his resignation, and L. Poggi did not come again without consulting the episcopate.

82. Morawski, D. (1975) "Korespondencia z Rzymu: Prymas Polski o 'drugim świecie'",

Kultura 3: 60.

83. Raina, P. (2006) Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1975, s. 23. Warszawa.

84. Ibid., s. 25.

85. Grajewski, A. (1975) Nowe tezy wsprawie zmagań Prymasa Wyszyńskiego z komunistami [https: //system.ekai.pl/kair/?screen=depeszatekstowo&_scr_depesza_id_depeszy=342220, accessed on 01.10.2016].

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However, despite Wyszynski's opposition, the Vatican leadership decided to establish a permanent representation in Warsaw in the form of an "apostolic delegatura". This topic was discussed during Vyshinsky's last audience with Paul VI (11.11.1977). Over the years, the Pope's position has not changed. The same fear of Russia and communism, the same faith in the saving power of diplomacy. For him, permanent representation is "an opportunity to put your foot in the territory of the Bloc - this opportunity may not happen again. ( ... ). Today is good, but Brezhnev's whim can destroy everything. ( ... ). Since the doors are open, you need to enter"86, the pope said. Paul VI believed that by doing so, he was helping the Episcopate of Poland in case the situation worsened ("the spread of communism all over the world"87). The same words were repeated by the pope on the same day in a conversation with Cardinal Wojtyla 88.

Paul VI died on August 6, 1978, before he could appoint an apostolic delegate.

The problems that the Holy See tried to solve through years of negotiations with the governments of socialist countries, the Polish Episcopate solved without the help of the Vatican. Since the October 1956 crisis, the Polish Episcopate has increasingly become a partner of the Government in maintaining social stability in the country.

For Pope Paul VI and his diplomats, communism was a new social system that sought to embrace the entire world, and the task of the Holy See was to find a place for the Catholic Church in it. Hence the long negotiations, compromises, the desire to gain a foothold.

For Cardinal Wyszynski and the Polish bishops, communism was an archaic and obsolete doctrine that they felt it was their duty to resist.

The concept of the Vatican's" Eastern policy " changed fundamentally after the election (October 16, 1978) of Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II) to the papacy. Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski's efforts were not in vain. The goal of the "new Eastern policy" was to strengthen the authority and position of the state.-

86. Raina, P. Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1977, s. 187.

87. Ibid., s. 188.

88. " Put your foot up before the door slams shut."

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integration of local episcopates in society, making them partners in negotiations between the Holy See and the Governments of socialist countries. But to do this, John Paul II needed to significantly increase the authority of the Holy See in world politics. And this will be the main focus of its efforts.

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