The article examines the main aspects of Australia's new policy of rapprochement with its Asian neighbors. The publication in October 2012-May 2013 of three reports prepared and united by a single topic on the nature of contacts between the Union of Australia and Asian States indicates another attempt to integrate this country more closely into the Asian region. But the intention of the ruling circles of Australia to "become their own" for the states of this region is faced with a number of obstacles, not only economic, but also political.

Keywords: Australian Union, Australian Labor Party, Asia, USA, China, India, Indonesia, trade relations, illegal refugees, military integration.

The integration processes observed in most regions of the world in the second half of the XX - beginning of the XXI century could not but affect the Asia-Pacific region, including its southern part, where one of the leading positions is occupied by the Union of Australia (AU). It is not surprising that the regional vector has become dominant in the foreign policy of this country, and after the creation of the Organization for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)at the beginning of this century "the new regionalism has changed the geopolitical status of Australia, including it as a component in the emerging system of integration of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region" [Slanevskaya, 2001, p.4].

In the era of globalization, it is customary to speak with approval about all possible forms and types of integration, and the deepening and expansion of interstate cooperation, especially in the financial and economic sphere, even if it damages national sovereignty and is not accepted by society, is considered as a necessary condition for prosperity. For example, the final declaration of the last APEC summit in Bali (October 2013) was prepared in this vein: one of its most important sections was a long-term (until 2016) plan to improve the investment climate in the Asia-Pacific region and create in it "a favorable institutional environment that is necessary to maximize the involvement of the private sector in development infrastructure" [ITAR-TASS].

Meanwhile, the processes of coordinating interests and strengthening economic and political ties even with traditional foreign policy partners - New Zealand, the United States, and Canada — have never been easy and cloudless for the AU. But the search for closer contacts between the country and its closest Asian neighbors was even more contradictory.

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ASIA AN OBJECTIVE REALITY

The indicated direction of Australia's foreign policy course seems natural from the point of view of its geostrategic position, the peculiarities of the economy, and other factors.-

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economic development, and in recent decades, the demographic situation. The first decisive steps towards greater rapprochement with Asian states were taken in the second half of the twentieth century , during the period of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) under the leadership of G. Whitlam, then R. Hawke and P. Keating. However, during the rule of their opponents, who represented a coalition of the Liberal and National Parties during the long premiership of D. Howard, the Asian vector of politics was partially revised. Nevertheless, the AU elite's "horror" of Asia and the resulting isolationist practice were replaced by comprehensive cooperation with its neighbors in the region [Tymoshenko, 2009, p.77-90].

I must say that even then, politicians, public figures and diplomats who worked in the countries of the East were asked: "Is Australia part of Asia?" - seemed "very slippery" and ambiguous 1. Similarly, in the eyes of Asian partners, the AU often looked like "superfluous" in the regional game [The Bulletin, March 14, 2000, p. 25-29]. But regardless of which party was in power, Australia gradually became a member of many regional organizations. In 1974, it was granted the status of an ASEAN Dialogue Partner (Association of Southeast Asian Nations); in 1989, APEC was established at the initiative of Prime Minister Hawke. Since 1995. The AU participates in the Indian Ocean Association for Regional Cooperation, and in 2005 co-founded the East Asia Summit, an organization of countries that currently accounts for 74% of Australia's exports.

Since 2007, when the ALP came to power, the interest of local politicians in Asian states has increased again. Since 2010, Australian leaders have participated in meetings of members of the Asia—Europe Forum (ASEM), which includes 51 countries. Close economic ties have been established: agreements on the creation of free trade zones have been signed with six countries, including Singapore, Thailand, and ASEAN; similar agreements are planned to be signed with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, and other important trade partners of the AU2. In November 2011, the leaders of 9 Asia - Pacific countries-Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United States - announced the adoption of the general provisions of the ambitious Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which covers trade and investment ties between member countries, promotes innovation, and promotes economic growth development, as well as the creation and preservation of jobs [Outlines..., 2011].

A significant proportion of Australian diplomats (42%) are now accredited to Asian countries; their goal is to "secure Australian interests and maintain Australia's influence". Such public organizations as the Australia-China Council, the Australia-India Council, the Australia-Indonesia Institute, the Australia-Japan Foundation, the Australia-Korea Foundation, the Australia-Malaysia Institute, and the Australia-Thailand Institute successfully operate in the country. In 2006, about 1/4 (approximately 250,000) of AU citizens living abroad were from Asian countries [AAS, 2012].

ALP AND THE "CENTURY OF ASIA"

Prime Minister Gillard's recent moves to "re-emphasize the need for Australia to be actively involved in the region's affairs in order to ensure sustainable security and prosperity" (DWP, 2013) are evidence of increased efforts to bring the AU closer to the Asian region. The concept of this course is set out in three documents: the Government report "Australia in the Future".

1 See, for example, the speech of the AU Ambassador to Japan R. Dalrymple [Is Australia..., 1990, p. 9-11].

2 The texts of these agreements can be found on the website of the AU Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

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Centennial of Asia "(October 28, 2012); Declaration " Strong and Secure. Australia's National Security Strategy " (January 23, 2013) and the next "White Paper on Defense" (May 3, 2013). Their task is to convince the Australian public that the intensification of the broadest sense of the Asian vector of foreign policy is beneficial to the Australian nation as a whole.

A lengthy government Report was addressed to the general public. The leitmotif of the document was the statement that " the rise of Asia is changing the world. This is the defining feature of the 21st century-the century of Asia." The impact of the region on "the Australian economy, society and strategic environment" was strongly emphasized, due to the fact that Asia is the world's largest producer and consumer of goods and services, the most populous part of the globe and "home to most of the global middle class". To build on the success already achieved in integration, it was suggested that special attention should be paid to the development of "five key areas" in Australia: labor skills and education, innovation, infrastructure, tax and regulatory reform. The main emphasis was placed on the need to expand comprehensive political, economic, social and cultural ties with the countries of the region "in order to better understand each other" (AAS, 2012).

The document included China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea among the" key regional nations " with which relations have become particularly important for the AU. It is no coincidence that the Government has singled out teaching foreign languages: Chinese, Hindi, Indonesian and Japanese among the top priorities of the education sector. However, according to the Report, the designation of priorities should not reduce the level of interaction with the nearest neighbors, in particular with the ASEAN countries.

With Asian immigrants playing an important role in strengthening ties with Asian partners, the AU authorities called on Asian community leaders to actively engage in this process: "Australia is well positioned to continue attracting highly qualified and talented people from the region to live, study and work in Australia. And Australians have a lot to offer the region" [AAS, 2012].

By the way, to attract Asian businessmen, the Gillard government in November 2012 "laid out a red carpet for 7 thousand rich immigrants, introducing the so-called golden ticket visa for entrepreneurs from Asia," especially millionaires from China (of which there are about 1.4 million in this country). A visa of this type is issued in case of investment in the economy of the AU of at least 5 million Australian rubles. At the same time, the requirements for knowledge of the English language, as well as age and other restrictions that are mandatory for other categories of immigrants, are removed. The Government expected that about 700 people would use this opportunity every year. In principle, this is a drop in the bucket: in 2011, the country received 185 thousand immigrants (including 30 thousand Chinese, 22 thousand Indians, 11 thousand Filipinos). However, 55 thousand people arrived under the "family reunion" quota, and the "drop" truly becomes "golden" - able to compensate for the reception of" expensive " categories of visitors [The Straits Times, November 30, 2012, p. A3].

As for the Declaration on National Security of Australia and the "White Paper on Defense", these documents had a target audience: diplomats, civil servants, the military. They mainly defined the country's foreign policy and general strategic interests and assessed the corresponding geostrategic risks. A special feature of the new approach to maintaining a foreign policy balance in relations with the United States, China and India is its complexity. Unlike the previous White Paper (2009), the entire Indo-Pacific region has now been classified as a "single strategic arc". And although the previously outlined parameters of military policy and reforms in the field of management and rearmament of Austria-

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While the British Armed Forces were almost completely preserved, the Gillard government approached the issue in its own way. On the one hand, attention to the Indo-Pacific arc looks like a search for a zone of their own influence, the creation of which became especially important after the United States and China took the first roles in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, in the context of the excessively prolonged financial crisis since 2008, Western countries have begun to reduce their military spending, while Asian countries are increasing it in every possible way (in China alone, defense spending increased by more than 140% in 2000-2013) [DWP, 2013, p. 2-3, 8]. This race is on the presence of weapons at the side of the Australians can not but alarm them. The possible development of the "natural rivalry" between the United States and China into a more serious conflict is also frightening.

As the closest neighbors and trading partners, the states of Southeast Asia (SE) attract close attention of Australian leaders. At the same time, it is also taken into account that among them are countries with a large proportion of the Muslim population, in which there is a threat of the rise of radical Islamism and terrorism. Therefore, special emphasis in the AU was placed on supporting the principle of effective self-defense, which provides opportunities to "take active positions in the region" [DWP, 2013, p. 11, 15]. Naturally, the balance in the Indo-Pacific zone will be achieved in alliance with the United States. The Prime Minister emphasized that the efforts of Australian diplomats and the military are aimed at creating a peaceful environment [The Straits Times, January 24, 2013, p. A17].

As the choice of a major ally remains a sensitive issue for the AU, the language in the White Paper is quite diplomatic: "The Government does not believe that Australia should choose between a long-term alliance with the United States and its expanding ties with China; equally, the United States and China do not believe that we should choose between a long-term alliance with the we must make a similar choice." Despite being aware of the growing appetites of the Chinese leadership and its territorial disputes with its neighbors, the Gillard cabinet, unlike its predecessors, "does not consider China an enemy", supporting the "peaceful rise" of the PRC and hoping that "strategic rivalry in the region will not lead to conflict" [DWP, 2013, p.11].

AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY AND GILLARD CABINET INITIATIVES

The assessment of the Labor government's new proposals has provoked a mixed reaction in the Australian public. In the initial media responses, approval of the government concept prevailed. The focus was on the nationwide nature of these initiatives, which require " an Australian-wide effort in which businesses, unions, communities and governments become partners in a transformation as profound as those that have shaped Australia throughout its history." Intellectuals and artists liked the policy of expanding cultural ties with neighbors developed under the leadership of Minister of Culture S. Krin, aimed at "better understanding of Asia" [The Age, 2012, October 29, p. 1-2; April 16, p. 17].

Similarly, the initiatives of the Gillard cabinet were evaluated by the business community. Representatives of the Australian film industry were looking forward to multi-million dollar fees from the rental of their products in the Chinese market. J. Parker, who made a fortune in gambling, in addition to gambling houses in Melbourne and Perth, decided to open a new casino-hotel in Sydney to attract rich tourists from Asia. Corporate managers have touted the benefits of moving production to offshore zones, seeing this as a "path to business success and survival" and reassuring Australians that their jobs will not be affected [The Straits Times, March 4, 2012, p. 24; The Age, 2012, November 20, p. 7; October 17, p. 13].

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The first official responses to the AU's new initiatives from Asia were also predictably positive. Thus, they were " warmly welcomed in Jakarta, despite the existing view that this policy simply imitates the course of the US government to create a "pivot in Asia"." The Chinese authorities were more reserved in their assessments, not accepting any hints of limiting their country's military power, but their reaction was generally positive [The Age, October 30, 2012, p. 2].

Meanwhile, some Asian intellectuals immediately pointed out the difficulties of Australian-Asian interaction, primarily in the field of culture. This position was most clearly expressed in an article by K. Mahbubani, a public policy expert at the National University of Singapore, entitled "Listen, Australia, the Asian Century is knocking". It stated that the AU is not ready for the coming changes. "The first and perhaps most painful psychological step Australia must take is to accept the fact that Western dominance in world history is ending and that the Asian age is coming unstoppably and unstoppably." That is, that Australians should learn to "look at the world with Asian, not Western eyes" and they should "win the hearts and minds" of 250 million Indonesians and 1.3 billion Chinese by all means. To do this, they should "develop a deeper and more sensitive cultural understanding of Asian communities." Otherwise, "there will be a catastrophe" [The Straits Times, November 1, 2012, p. D3].

Leaving aside the excessive "alarmism" and didacticism of such statements, we have to admit that they are not without certain grounds. In particular, the defense initiatives of the Gillard cabinet were seriously criticized by Australian experts. So, Professor X. White, of the Australian National University's Center for Strategic and Defense Studies, concluded that "in the age of Asia, Australia must either do more to support America, or do more to protect itself, than it has anticipated for at least the last 40 years." The hope for an improvement in US-China relations is illusory, given the " clear tendencies to escalate the strategic rivalry between the two powers in recent years." This means that appropriate response steps are needed, which are not mentioned in the government declaration [White, 2013].

Public opinion research also suggests that not all ordinary Australians accept the latest turn in politics in the Asian direction without reservation. Although more than 30% of respondents generally supported the AU's participation in policy forums with Asian States, only about 16% approved of the idea of attracting Asian investment in the AU. An even smaller number of respondents favourably supported an increase in immigration from Asia [AAC, 2012]. And the refusal of friendly communication with people from neighboring countries is a common phenomenon among Australians. Many representatives of the Chinese diaspora in the AU complain that it is difficult for them to enter the dominant society: Anglo-Australians, when communicating with them, as a rule, limit themselves to polite greetings, and the circle of their (Chinese) close acquaintance inevitably closes on their compatriots [The Age, October 30, 2012, p. 2].

However, it can get worse. A series of attacks on Indian students in AU cities in 2009-2010 significantly damaged Australia's image as a country with favorable opportunities for higher education; the number of Indian students in the country almost tripled, and the Australian budget fell almost 2 billion Australian dollars. United States dollars. The Indian authorities reacted sharply to these incidents, which led to some tension in relations between the two countries [The Age, October 16, 2012, p. 13]. Australia's reputation was somewhat patched up thanks to the joint efforts of the government, the media and public organizations: exhibitions, mutual visits, lectures, concerts and other events softened the unfavorable atmosphere.

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Members of the left-wing Australian intelligentsia, which has long assumed the role of expressing public aspirations in the AU, complained about the deep-rooted fear of Asia that undermines "our determination to participate in the affairs of the region." This is partly due to historical traditions. To blame, according to the left, and the opposition-the Liberal Party of Australia (LPA) with its idea of "stopping boats" with illegal refugees from Asian countries and the National Party with its protests against Chinese investment. The Australian Green Party (A3), which is ideologically close to the ALP, also suffered, as they "attack Malaysia for human rights violations" [The Age, October 31, 2012, p. 11]. However, it is not important who is to blame, but that the desired unity in Australian society is not yet observed.

FOREIGN TRADE RELATIONS

This lack of consensus creates many obstacles to the AU's harmonious cooperation with Asian countries. Since the problem of reflecting ethno-cultural differences in politics requires a separate study, I will focus only on the factor of cultural diversity in the life of Australian society. For example, the difficulties in building relations between the AU and Islamic countries are often caused precisely by cultural differences and the specific mentality of Australians. Although cattle exports have long been one of Australia's most lucrative exports, since 2011 there have been problems in relations with Muslim partners - the main importers of this commodity. First, Australian animal rights activists protested about the inhumane methods of slaughtering livestock exported to Indonesia. In 2012, the AU authorities were forced to develop special instructions that guaranteed improved conditions for transporting animals. However, there was a surge in Australian discontent with the "inhumane" slaughter of sheep sent to Singapore and other Muslim countries. Labor backbenchers and the Greens have demanded that suppliers ' export licenses be revoked. As a result, many large sheep farms in the Northern Territory found themselves in an extremely difficult situation [Livestock..., 2012].

In principle, such requirements are absurd, since Australian cattle are purchased for slaughter for ritual purposes in compliance with certain religious rules, and not with Australian animal treatment standards. The inflamed passions did not help to improve the image of AU businessmen in the eyes of their main partners, and since 60% of livestock exports go to Indonesia, any disruptions can lead to large losses. It should be noted that the response was quick: first, the Indonesian authorities imposed a number of restrictions on trade with the AU, and then decided to minimize the purchase of animals abroad, providing up to 90% of their beef needs at the expense of their own resources [Trouble..., 2012]. Their example was followed by Singapore, whose government stated the need to find alternative sources of supply of live cattle for the Eid al-Adha holiday. The losses of the AU were very large [Ludwig..., 2012].

Even in an area as far removed from cultural differences as mining, where seemingly consensus is provided by huge revenues from mineral exports, many of the Gillard government's steps to establish contacts with Asian neighbors were not always well understood. Take, for example, the trade in uranium, whose reserves in the AU are estimated to be second only to Canada's in the world. The Australian Uranium Association, which represents the interests of exporters of this raw material, claimed in 2010 that in the next ten years the AU could become the world's largest producer of uranium [Australia tipped..., 2010]. But in March 2011, public opinion was split over the government's approval to sell uranium to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which planned to sell it by 2017.

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launch your own nuclear energy program. Senior officials argued that it would pursue exclusively peaceful purposes, and the agreement with the UAE would open up a new large market for Australian uranium. But Senator S. Ludlam of the Green Party said that such a turnaround does not correspond to global efforts for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In August 2012, impressed by what he saw in Fukushima, he once again expressed his concern about the expansion of uranium exports [Australiapaving..., 2011; Australia signs..., 2012].

Sales of this type of fuel to India are no less acute. In January 2011, the country's Foreign Minister, S. M. Krishna, asked the Australian Government to reconsider the ban on the sale of uranium to India, imposed due to its failure to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. India's market is large: by 2030, it is ready to purchase 2.5 thousand tons of uranium concentrate from the AU at a cost of US $ 300 million [Waters, 2011]. In addition, this ban not only hinders mutually beneficial partnership, but also seriously complicates Australian-Indian relations. Moreover, the AU sells uranium to the PRC without international guarantees [Edwards, 2011]. At the same time, some Australian politicians see India, one of the world's fastest-growing economies, as a serious counterweight to China's powerful influence in the region. In addition, of the 5.5 million Australians born in other countries, 5.6% are from India, and their flow is not decreasing, reaching 10% of annual immigration to the AU. These include tens of thousands of Indian students studying in Australian universities [The Age, October 17, 2012, p. 12].

These circumstances have become a strong argument for the government in favor of lifting the ban on the supply of uranium to India. And although this decision caused dissatisfaction of the Labor left, who believed that Australia would thereby fuel the nuclear arms race in the region [Labor left fears..., 2011]3, in December 2011, the United States of America and the United States of America did not agree with this decision. Under pressure from the government, the AU Parliament lifted the ban. During Gillard's visit to India in October 2012, the supply of Australian uranium there became an important topic. Although it is considered that a long (at least two years) process of reconciliation of interests is necessary before a concrete agreement on this issue is concluded [Trembalh, 2012], the Prime Minister was determined. She was not fazed by the fact that, according to Indian auditors, the nuclear industry in their country is "dangerously unreliable, disorganized and in many cases completely unregulated." Regulatory authorities are virtually devoid of authority, and the fines - 500 rupees (about $ 10) - for safety violations are simply ridiculous. For Gillard, India is not only a potentially important importer, but also "one of the most important countries for Australia" in the coming "century of Asia", and a potential counterweight to China. Therefore, during the visit, the Prime Minister made significant efforts to resolve all bilateral contradictions and maximize contacts, including joint naval exercises [The Age, October 17, 2012, p. 4; October 15, 2012, p. 1, 2; October 18, 2012, p. 4].

The issue of uranium supplies to India has, in a sense, united the ALP and the opposition parties. But the protests of environmentalists and their well-founded concerns about the trade in "explosive" fuel cannot be discounted, primarily because of the increased sensitivity of Australian society to such things. All this suggests that the Australian-Indian cooperation needs constant attention from the AU Government.

3 Pakistan reacted immediately: it was not opposed to selling uranium to India, but it would consider it discriminatory for the NSIRC to provide it with the same conditions for developing peaceful nuclear energy programs. Islamabad's reputation as an "unreliable partner", which did not comply with the restrictions imposed by the international community, made it difficult to make such a decision. Moreover, India refuses to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referring precisely to the possible threat from Pakistan and China [Labor's left plans..., 2011].

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IMMIGRATION FROM ASIAN COUNTRIES IS A" PAIN POINT " OF THE AU

Another problem that has been roiling Australian society since the end of the 20th century, and is at risk of escalating from domestic politics to international conflicts, is related to immigration from Asia, especially illegal immigration. In the first half of 2012 alone, in violation of all border regulations, more than 7,000 people arrived via Indonesia to the AU (by boat), which is more than half of the annual quota for accepting refugees. Most of them turned out to be ordinary economic migrants seeking access to benefits provided by the Australian Government only to refugees [The Straits Times, August 14, 2012, p. A8].

Theoretically, regional integration implies an expansion of migration flows, but Australia is not ready for such a turn. On August 13, 2012, the Gillard Cabinet decided to resume the practice of placing illegal immigrants in offshore immigration centers (on the islands of Nauru and Manus) until their cases are considered in court. However, observers noted the weakness of this decision: within two months after its adoption, more than 5 thousand people arrived in the AU by boat. illegal immigrants [The Age, October 26, 2012, p. 8; October 31, p. 5].

The formation of a policy regarding this mass of people arriving on the northern coast of the country has become a stumbling block for the AU authorities. There is little chance of reaching an agreed line: the coalition parties insist on strict restrictions on illegal immigration, the ALP creates extraterritorial camps for their reception, and A3 opposes any restrictions on the rights of illegal refugees [Stalemate..., 2012; Offshore..., 2013].

The problem is compounded by the fact that the AU, as a sovereign state, decides to accept migrants based on its far from limitless capabilities, but a complete refusal to accept them can cast a shadow on its foreign policy reputation, causing a corresponding international response. The Indonesian government expresses its impatience at the fact that more than 10 thousand asylum seekers are being "used as a waiting room" in its territory, and demands that Australia accept them. It sees the presence of migrants as a "major political problem" and a " threat to the country's sovereignty." In addition to economic and social difficulties (increased crime, drug distribution, etc.), Indonesia has faced religious problems: most of the arrivals are Shiites from Afghanistan and Iran, and this causes discontent among local Sunnis. If we take into account the increasing influx of "refugees" from Malaysia, and they are estimated to have accumulated about 100 thousand in Indonesia, we can understand how much this situation can worsen relations between Canberra and Jakarta. The latter requires the former to "open the doors" to illegal immigrants, but, as already mentioned, only the Green Party agrees with this in Australia [Indonesians Impatient..., 2012].

The AU authorities are also under pressure from the UN, whose representatives criticize measures to limit the flow of illegal immigrants, interpreting this as a violation of the relevant convention on the rights of refugees and, consequently, Australia's international obligations. The world community is demanding better conditions for their detention, in particular, providing them with medical services, including psychological assistance. Asian communities within the country, which actively support their compatriots and help them achieve the desired status, also agree with this. And illegal migrants themselves are far from passive victims of circumstances: hunger strikes and riots in offshore immigration centers as a means of attracting the attention of the world community have become commonplace [The Age, 2012, November 2, p. 10; November 1, p. 8; November 14, p. 3; October 29, p. 4]. This, of course, does not contribute to national harmony in Australia and hinders the ability of its politicians to successfully solve the problem of building good-neighborly relations with Indonesia.

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Meanwhile, many politicians in Canberra consider this area to be extremely important. After the next change of leader in the ALP, K. K., who returned to the post of Prime Minister at the end of June 2013, returned to the post of Prime Minister. Rudd planned his first visit to Indonesia to discuss controversial issues, especially the problem of illegal refugees. He sharply criticized opposition Leader Tony Abbott, saying that his tough stance on "boat people" only provokes new conflicts with Indonesia (Henderson, 2013).

In order to somehow ease the internal political tensions, AU Foreign Minister B. Carr suggested that the issue of granting refugee status to illegal migrants should be brought before the UN special tribunal [Ibid.]. The Indonesian side, seeing this controversy as an" election skirmish "in the AU, did not hide its rejection of the opposition's demands to "return the boats back" and "return the boats back". She continued to accuse her neighbors of shifting responsibility to Indonesia, as well as of their failure to comply with international obligations [Indonesian Foreign..., 2013].

In addition to problems with refugees, the warming of Australian-Indonesian relations was hindered by the decision taken at the end of 2011 to deploy an American naval contingent in Darwin. The increased US military presence near Indonesia's borders has alarmed its authorities. In addition, they are dissatisfied with the participation of Australians in the separatist movement in the province of West Papua (Irian Jaya). This fact is denied by the AU Government, but information about the involvement of citizens of the country in opposition activities in the Indonesian part of New Guinea is regularly published in the press [The Straits Times, December 23, 2011, p. B8; The Age, 2012, December 7, p. 3; May 15, p. 4].

RELATIONS WITH China

Foreign policy twists and turns in the Asian direction are not limited for the AU to its closest "northern neighbor". In recent decades, serious problems have accompanied the development of Australian-Chinese contacts. The formation of bilateral economic relations also determined the political course of the ALP towards the PRC. Shipments of iron ore and coal to China have enriched Australian suppliers and made China one of Australia's main trading partners. At the highest level, the activities of Huawei, one of the largest Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturing companies, were discussed in the AU. If in 2004 its Australian branch had only 20 employees, in 2013 it already employed 700 people, 85% of whom were residents of the AU [Rybachek, 2013].

Chinese visits to the AU bring considerable profits to the country's travel companies. In 2012]. In terms of the number of visitors, Chinese citizens came in second place after New Zealanders: 573 thousand people brought 3.5 billion Australian dollars to the AU. United States dollars. In total, in 2010-2011, the tourism industry's revenues amounted to 5% of GDP (73 billion Australian dollars). As a result, an additional 900,000 people (8% of the employed) were employed [The Financial Times, December 6, 2012].

According to official data, Chinese investment in the AU doubled between 2011 and 2012. Chinese entrepreneurs are not afraid of many risks that stop their potential competitors. Petrochaina, the largest oil and gas supplier in Asia, plans to expand its presence in the AU by purchasing a stake in the development of one of the natural gas fields in Western Australia from the Australian corporation BP Billiton. Chinese corporations readily acquire rights to participate in the development of gas, shale and other deposits in the territory of the AU, signing multibillion-dollar deals with Australian partners [The Straits Times, March 12, 2013, p. A17].

However, the penetration of Chinese capital into the leading sectors of the AU economy is not always welcomed by ordinary Australians. In 2012, the big rezo-

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nans was triggered by the Gillard government's support for a Chinese corporation to buy the largest wheat and cotton farm in Queensland. The deal was opposed by agricultural producers and their representatives in parliament, who called the sale of land to foreigners a "farce" directed against national interests. However, some Australian politicians considered these protests a manifestation of xenophobia and racism and tried to calm public opinion by saying that whoever owns real estate in their country, they will obey local laws and pay taxes to the treasury of the country [The Age, September 3, 2012, p. 5; The Straits Times, September 10, 2012, p. A16].

But difficulties arise not only in the economic sphere. In 2012, on the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and China, Song Xiaoyan, a senior Chinese defense strategist, said that the AU could not endlessly balance between China and the United States and "should choose a 'godfather' who would protect it." The Chinese military sees military contacts between the United States and the AU and the deployment of an additional contingent of American troops in Darwin at the end of 2011 as a return to the Cold War. In their opinion, since economic ties with the PRC "feed" the AU, political relations should also be developed [The Age, May 16, 2012, p. 1].

Such statements made by Chinese officials indicate large-scale changes in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole and in its southern part in particular. Most Australian politicians understand the risks of a stronger Chinese presence in this part of the world: in the South Pacific region (SWR), Chinese representatives have become the "most important VIP". Thus, the loans provided by China to the Kingdom of Tonga as "soft loans" account for 60% of the external debt of this state and 40% of its GDP. The dependence of the South Pacific island countries on Chinese aid and the increase in their debts is a reality. Experts from the AU and the United States are concerned about the growing Chinese influence, but they still avoid openly admitting that the PRC is trying to displace them from leading positions in the region, and diplomatically declare that this country is just an "interesting new regional player" (Brissenden, 2013).

YTR is by no means the only place where the interests of the Australian and Chinese government and business circles objectively collide. In July 2013, Afghanistan launched the first commercial oil production project in the country's history, which will be implemented by the China National Petroleum Corporation. Afghanistan's mineral reserves (oil, gas, iron ore, gold, and copper) are estimated at $ 3 trillion. The country is unstable and dangerous for Western investors; corruption is rife among officials, but Australian entrepreneurs are willing to take risks by participating in tenders for the development of Afghanistan's mineral resources. But here, in addition to the Chinese, they can compete with Indians, businessmen of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Kuwait [Lannin, 2013].

FINDING A BALANCED POSITION

In short, the reality is that Australia has to maneuver between a traditional ally and a new economic partner. Therefore, as US Foreign Minister Carr stated in October 2012, his country's immediate goal is "to expand relations with China in a direction that will mark a new milestone in diplomatic priorities, raising ties with Beijing to the level of relations with the United States, Japan and Indonesia" [The Straits Times, October 9, 2012, p. A2]. At the end of 2011, the first Chinese space object tracking station was opened in the state of Western Australia near Perth. The Chinese side regarded this as a landmark step for their country. At the same time, in 2012, the Australian government agreed with the US administration to install powerful radar stations in the same state.

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installations and a telescope that will allow you to monitor outer space, including Chinese rocket launches.

In doing so, the AU has shown that the United States remains its main political ally. During Gillard's visit to Washington in 2011, she called the Australian-American relationship "an anchor of stability, security and prosperity in the world." In turn, Secretary of State X. Clinton, during a visit to the AU in November 2012, stressed that close cooperation between the two countries is a guarantee that "China's rise will be peaceful" and that China will "respect international rules and standards" [The Straits Times, November 26, 2011, p. A41; The Age, November 15, 2012, p. 7]. The United States is helping Australia in the military field, and American businesses are interested in investing in the AU's mining industry.

At the same time, the new foreign policy line of the Australian government is also obvious, aimed at achieving a balance in relations with the United States and China in such a way as to preserve its own interests as much as possible: "We want Asia to continue to grow and Australia to participate in this growth. We also want America to remain involved in Asian affairs to prevent Chinese dominance, but not to the extent that it forces us to choose between them or inhibits Asian economic growth " [The Straits Times, November 26, 2011, p. A41].

At the bilateral economic forum in Beijing (April 2013), Gillard proposed a program of cooperation between the AU and the PRC, which provided for holding trilateral military exercises with the participation of the United States, the AU and China; comprehensive cooperation in the field of clean energy and greenhouse gas emissions trading; switching to direct currency trading "yuan-Australian dollar" bypassing the currency US$. Thus, not only is there a growing interest in China, but there is also a desire to become a kind of intermediary between China and the United States.

In a farewell speech to the press on June 26, 2013, outgoing Prime Minister Gillard credited her cabinet with establishing a certain balance in relations with the United States, China and India. Under Rudd's new team, Australia's Asian policy remained the same, but the result of the September 7, 2013 election prevented Labor from taking further steps in this direction. They were won by the opposition parties, and the post of Prime Minister was taken by the leader of the LPA Tony Abbott. It can be assumed that the foreign policy course of his predecessors will not be radically revised, because it is objectively determined by the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and the place of the AU in regional structures. However, a correction of the previous policy is quite likely, especially in connection with the ambiguous attitude of ordinary Australians to many of the processes mentioned above.

Perception of the 21st century how the "Asian centenary" became a kind of incentive for the Australian political elite. But the current response to the Asian challenge is somewhat similar to the deja vu syndrome: the same declarations and proposals and almost the same balance of power in the world community that was observed in the last decades of the twentieth century. The calls to "turn to Asia" are most resonant among businessmen who make huge profits from deals with their neighbors, and among intellectuals, especially those who share leftist views or are closely associated, for example,with an education system that is focused on attracting foreign students and is aimed at generating the same profits. Thus, the strongest incentive for developing close ties with Asia is the economic and financial interests of Australians.

In the field of foreign policy, the situation is more complicated. The geopolitical situation for the AU does not look easy: the closest neighbors do not seek peaceful coexistence and continue to arm themselves. Since our own armed forces

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The AU is unlikely to be able to fully ensure the security of the continent, and the United States has never been a dedicated ally, Australia is forced to maneuver between the growing military power of the PRC and the claims of India and Pakistan to develop the nuclear industry. Of course, America remains the main military and political ally of the AU, but pressure from Asian neighbors can no longer be ignored - China's military facilities in Western Australia have become a kind of symbol of concessions or a subtle game of "both ours and yours".

It is in the field of foreign policy and defense that the most serious changes are being observed. In fact, a new national security doctrine is being developed here, which implies a transition from the fight against terrorism to the prevention of armed conflicts between Asian countries and the preservation of political stability in the region. In this regard, the measures currently being taken to withdraw the Australian military contingent from Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands are indicative. At the same time, the Australian concept of Asian policy includes the definition of a new object of interest - the Indo-Pacific region as a "single strategic arc". In matters of international cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, the AU seeks to preserve all its partners, not relying only on China or India and acting as a mediator in solving local problems.

The lack of consensus on a number of foreign policy issues in Australian society means the need to further develop and clarify the foreign policy course, the responsibility for which currently falls on the shoulders of the new leadership of the country. One thing is clear: behind the beautiful facade of the AU integration strategy, serious problems of its practical application are hidden.

list of literature

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Slansvskaya N. M. Integration policy of Australia in the Asia-Pacific region in the 90s of the XX century. St. Petersburg, 2001.

Timoshenko V. N. South Pacific region on the threshold of the XXI century: problems of foreign policy and security. Khabarovsk, 2009.

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DWP - Defense White Paper 2013. Chap. 2. Canberra, 2013 // www.defensc.gov.au/whitc paper 2013.

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Henderson A. Kevin Rudd Outlines Key Policy Ideas, Warns Abbott's Asylum Policy Could Risk Conflict with Indonesia // http://www.abc.nct.au/ncws/2013-06-28/rudd-extends-dcadline-for-school-funding-reforms/4787724.

Indonesian Foreign Affairs Spokesman Says Rudd's Conflict Suggestion an Australian Political Matter //http:// www.abc.nct.au/ncws/2013-06-29/indoncsia-wont-bc-drawn-on-rudds-conflict-commcnt/4789162.

Indonesians Impatient on Asylum Seeker Backlog. July 14, 2012 // http://www.thcagc.com.au/national/ indonesians-impatient-on-asylum-seeker-backlog-20120713-221jw.html.

Is Australia a Part of Asia? // Backgrounder. Canberra, 19 October 1990.

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Julia Gillard Tells of 'Privilege' of being First Female PM // http://www.abc.nct.au/ncws/2013-06-26/julia-gillard-spcaks-about-dcfcat/4783950.

Kevin Rudd to Discuss Asylum Seeker Issue with Indonesian President Next Week // http://www.abc.nct.au/ ncws/2013-06-29/rudd-to-discuss-asylum-scckcr-issuc-with-indoncsia-ncxt-wcck/4789404.

Labor Left Fears Uranium Backflip Will Fuel Arms Race. Sat Nov 19, 2011 // http://www.abc.nct.au/news/2011 - 11-19/labor-left-fcars-uranium-backflip-will-fucl-arms-racc/3681338.

Labor's Left Plans Uranium Showdown. Nov 17, 2011 //http://www.abc.nct.au/ncws/2011-ll-16/labors-lcft-plans-uranium-showdown/3673706.

Lannin S. Afghanistan to Begin First Commercial Oil Production // http://www.abc.nct.au/ncws/2013-05-18/ australia-backs-afghan27s-struggling-mincrs/4698082.

Livestock Cruelty Allegation Forces Exports Probe. September 7, 2012 // http://www.thcagc.com.au/opinion/ political-ncws/livcstock-cruclty-allcgation-forccs-cxports-probc-20120906-25hca.html.

Ludwig Defends Sheep Exports in Face of Slaughter Claims. September 28, 2012 // http://www.thcagc.com.au/ opinion/political-ncws/ludwig-dcfcnds-shccp-cxport.s-in-facc-of-slaughtcr-claims-20120927-26o4m.html.

Offshore Centers Must Be Closed as Asylum Policy Continues to Harm // http://grccns.org.au/contcnt/off-shorc-ccntrcs-must-bc-closcd-asylum-policy-continucs-harm. 5 April 2013.

Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement // http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/prcss-officc/fact-shccts/2011/novcmbcr/outlincs-trans-pacific-partncrship-agrccmcnt.

Stalemate as Parlies Still at War over Asylum Policy. July 25, 2012 // http://www.thcagc.com.au/opinion/ political-ncws/stalcmatc-as-partics-still-at-war-ovcr-asylum-policy-20120724-22nkb.html.

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White H. Is Australia Ready for Asia's New Strategic Realities? // The Straits Times, May 22, 2013.

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