BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN PALESTINE IN THE LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES*

The article is devoted to the economic aspects of British policy in Palestine in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: how interested were the British ruling circles in pursuing a policy in the Holy Land, or was this step caused by purely political and geostrategic considerations. The article analyzes the UK's involvement in railway construction in the Holy Land and in the modernization of Palestinian ports.

Keywords: Palestine, economy of Palestine, British Empire, politics of the British Empire.

Traditionally, European and North American researchers believe that the British policy towards Palestine was formed in 1917 after the publication of the Balfour Declaration, and economic policy was carried out only from 1922, when the Holy Land was officially transferred to the British mandate. In this connection, the question of the existence of British economic interests in Palestine prior to 1917 remains open: how much British ruling and business circles were interested in pursuing an economic policy in the Holy Land, or whether this step was caused solely by political and geostrategic considerations.

To answer these questions, let us turn to the definition of the territorial borders of Palestine in the late 19th century and early 20th century. There was no such territorial unit in the Ottoman Empire. Until 1873, Palestine was part of the Syrian Governorate-General, which in 1867 was transformed into a vilayet1. In 1873, an administrative and territorial reform was carried out in the Ottoman Empire, during which a new administrative unit was formed-mutesarriflik. It was a sanjak of an ordinary vilayet, subordinate not to the Vali administration, but to the Turkish Ministry of the Interior. Since 1873, the Jerusalem Sanjak has also become such a mutesarriflik. It was bordered to the north by the Beirut Vilayet, to the east by the Jordan River by the Ma'an Sanjak of the Syrian Vilayet and the Dead Sea, and to the southwest by the line of fortifications of Qal'at el-Arish (modern El-Arish is the administrative center of the North Sinai Governorate in Egypt) on the Mediterranean Sea and Cal'at el-Aqaba in the Gulf of Aqaba, in the west, the border ran along the Mediterranean Sea [Syria..., 1903, p. 1]. Jerusalem mutesarriflik on

* This article was prepared as part of a grant from the Russian Foundation for Science and Science under the 2013-2014 Young Scientists Support Program No. 13-31-01256 - "The Palestinian Factor of British Foreign Policy in the first third of the 20th century".

1 Vilayet-province, the main administrative-territorial unit in the Ottoman Empire since 1866.. The vilayet was headed by a vali (governor) appointed by the Government. Sanjak is a district that is part of the vilayet. Kaza is a sanjak district.

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It covered an area of approximately 22,000 square kilometers and included four major cities: Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza, and Hebron. In 1906, the district of Nazareth was added to the Jerusalem mutesarriflik. The rest of biblical Palestine was part of the sanjaks of the Beirut Vilayet. Thus, the Europeans, speaking about Palestine (including in official British reports) at the end of the XIX-beginning of the XX century, meant by it only the territory of the Jerusalem mutesarriflik.

Economically, Palestine was an agricultural country at the end of the nineteenth century. Describing the most profitable and promising areas of capital investment in Palestine, Sovremennik wrote::

"The first large enterprises in Syria and Palestine that began to attract European capital are transport enterprises, railways, highways, trams, ports. Large agricultural, irrigation, industrial or mining enterprises, which the country needs so much, were not allocated capital, despite the fact that these businesses themselves are quite profitable "(Gordon, 1906, p. 4).

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, railway construction became one of the leading areas of investment in Palestine. In general, the British were the first to develop railways in the Ottoman Empire. Back in 1856, the British company received a concession for the construction of the Izmir-Aydin railway, and then Izmir-Kasaba. At the beginning of the 20th century, the main British railway project remained the West Asian Beirut-Bai. The British tried to get concessions for the construction of a railway between Aleppo and Alexandretta, which caused serious concern to the French and eventually transferred almost all construction contracts to the latter [Gorbunova, 2012, p.33].

The English railway project in Palestine turned out to be the Haifa-Deraa road (to Damascus). Pilling, an Englishman, and Josef Elias, a Turkish engineer, received a 99-year concession for the construction of this road in 1891. They sold their rights to the British "Syrian Ottoman Railway Company" with an estimated capital of 600,000 pounds. st. It was planned that out of this amount 50,000 pounds. st.were to go to improve the port in Acre or Haifa. Technically, it was originally planned to create a single-track line, which could later be converted into a two-track one [Gordon, 1906, p. 9].

Under the terms of the concession, the work had to be completed in four years, and after 30 years of operation, the Turkish government received the right to buy this road. The "Syrian Ottoman Railway Company" also received the right to exploit mineral resources for 20 km on both sides of the road, arrange a steamship service on Lake Tiberias under the Ottoman flag,and engage in fishing within the lake. Other lines competing with this company were banned and the right to establish other large enterprises in the area was given priority. The British got a chance to become monopolists in the railway construction in Palestine.

Work on the construction of the Haifa-Damascus railway began in December 1892, simultaneously with a competing project - the construction of the Beirut-Damascus road by the French. But after the British quickly built the first 8 km of the road, work stopped. The bond issue that the company's owners had been hoping for has completely failed in London. The Turkish government extended the construction period of the road for another 3 years, but work never resumed, in 1896 the project was finally curtailed, and the first 8 km of the road was destroyed and looted [Gordon, 1906, p. 10]. The opening of the Turkish Hejaz railway, one of the branches of which the Ottoman government connected Haifa with Deraa (a city in modern Syria), finally buried plans for the creation of the only British railway in Palestine.

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Against the background of the failure of this project of English entrepreneurs, French and German railway companies became more active. As mentioned above, in 1892 the French company received the right to build the Beirut-Damascus railway. In the same year, a French road opened connecting the port of Jaffa with Jerusalem. In 1893, the French obtained a concession for the construction of the Ryan-Homs-Hama-Aleppo-Berjik road. In 1894, the Hauran (French) railway was put into operation, connecting Damascus and Hauran. Finally, in 1898, the French company Vitalis received a concession for the construction of all planned railways in Syria and Palestine.

At the same time, German influence in Turkey grew rapidly, culminating in the construction of the Baghdad Railway. Due to personal pressure on the Ottoman Sultan Kaiser Wilhelm II, a preliminary concession agreement was signed for the construction and operation of the main line of the Baghdad Railway - from Konya through Baghdad to the Persian Gulf.

As a result, investments in the railways of the Ottoman Empire in 1909-1912 amounted to: France-23.7 million Turkish liras; Germany-22.7 million liras; England-5.8 million liras; other countries -1.1 million liras. By the First World War, railways in Turkey (with the exception of the Hejaz Railway) belonged to: Germany-49%, France-39%, England-only 11.4% [Vneshneekonomicheskie..., 1989, p. 192].

The railways in Palestine and Syria brought almost no profit to their owners. Thus, the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, which seemed to be successful in all respects, was close to bankruptcy first in 1894, and then in 1897. Only additional financial injections saved this railway company from ruin [Syria..., 1903, p. 24]. Even in 1901, when the main crop of Palestinian producers was transported by rail due to mud and impassability, the company's cash register lacked 208,570 francs in cash to cover current expenses and obligations [Syria..., 1903, p.25].

The low profitability of railways in Palestine consisted of two reasons, the first of which was the low speed of trains, ranging from 12.5 to 28 km / h, on the Jaffa-Jerusalem road-22 km / h. This slow movement was explained by the difference in heights, but which passed the railway line. On 87 km of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, there were 76 bridges, including 7 railway bridges. Increasing the speed of the train would require a different design of the line, which significantly increased the cost of the railway. The second reason was low freight traffic. Between Jaffa and Jerusalem, as well as Haifa and Damascus, passenger trains ran twice a day at the beginning of the XX century, and freight trains ran once [Vneshneekonomicheskie..., 1989, p. 194]. Thus, difficult geographical conditions, low train speeds, and limited freight and passenger traffic made the Palestine railway lines economically unprofitable throughout the 1890s.

Other possible infrastructure investments in the Holy Land were Palestinian harbors and ports. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there were two main operating ports on the Palestinian Mediterranean: Jaffa and Gaza, which served both the whole of Palestine and Transjordan.

The Port of Jaffa at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. It remained the largest and most important trading post in Palestine, due to three factors. The first of these factors was the launch of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, which opened access to the sea for cargo from the central Sanjak regions. Thus, the number of tons of cargo capacity of vessels visiting the harbor (including coasters) before the construction of the railway in 1890 was 453,301 tons, and in 1894 - 554,231 tons, i.e. 100,930 tons more [Syria..., 1903, p. 32]. The second factor was the active construction of Jewish settlement colonies in the Jaffa area, which quickly became one of the main suppliers of agricultural products, especially oranges, to European markets.

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Finally, Jaffa, thanks to its geographical location and railway, served as a transit point for the growing number of pilgrims and tourists heading to the Holy Places since the second half of the 19th century. The presence of these factors allowed the British Consul Edward Blech to conclude in a 1907 trade report:"...it is unlikely that Jaffa will ever lose its position as the main port for Jerusalem and the surrounding areas" [Diplomatic..., 1908, p.15]. But despite the growth in trade turnover, the condition of the port of Jaffa itself left much to be desired. In particular, the description given in the official British trade report of 1897 by the consulate employee Haim Amzalak almost coincided with the description published nine years later. Gordon in Odessa:

"The port of Jaffa is small and shallow, closed by a line of rocks that leave only a narrow passage. Vessels with deep draught can not land, as only at a distance of 500 meters on the other side of the rocks find a depth of 5 meters. Large steamers usually drop anchor 700 meters from the shore. Thus, the unloading of goods and disembarkation of passengers takes place on an open roadstead with the help of Arab barques. But in winter, strong westerly winds raise large waves, steamers are unable to anchor and are forced to seek cover in Haifa, Beirut or Port Said. The Jaffa raid was considered dangerous in the old days, going to Jaffa was considered a dangerous undertaking, and the pilgrims wrote their wills beforehand. But even in recent years, accidents have occurred when driving between rocks in stormy weather" [Gordon, 1906, p. 20].

The Gaza port was located in southeastern Palestine about 0.12 miles north of the Turkish-Egyptian border. Being the main commercial and administrative center of the southern part of mutesarriflik, Gaza was not particularly convenient and safe...the coast is shallow, only barges with a shallow draft can approach close, Steamers come specifically for the harvest and only in good weather, they are always ready to weigh anchor and sail away from this inhospitable coast" [Gordon, 1906, p.24]. As in Jaffa, accidents often occurred in Gaza, and in the autumn of 1906 the captain of one of the British steamships drowned [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 12].

In this regard, the issue of modernizing Palestinian ports, which could potentially become the object of British investment, remained relevant. Priority harbors included Jaffa and Haifa.

Attempts to obtain a concession for the port of Jaffa were made repeatedly. Thus, in 1897, Joseph Yvon submitted an application for the construction of a new harbor in Jaffa [Diplomatic..., 1898, p.7]. But in practice, neither this nor other applications were implemented. Although almost all the British consuls in Jerusalem (1896-1907) pointed out the need to modernize Jaffa in their reports, they also made a reservation that the construction of the new port was more likely to save the lives of sailors and passengers than to generate revenue. An employee of the British Consulate H. Amzalak summed up:

"...unfortunately, given [Jaffa's] unfavorable location, such a venture would be extremely costly, even if the revenue generated by the venture would not be so small as to be out of proportion to the costs and limited scale of commerce in the country. These are the reasons that have so far prevented people from taking any serious steps to obtain a concession for the construction of a port" [Diplomatic..., 1898, p. 8]. As a result, the construction of a port in Jaffa seemed unprofitable to British entrepreneurs.

Haifa harbor had excellent protection from south and west winds, but was poorly protected from north and northeast winds. However, the final failure of the construction of the British Haifa-Damascus railway in 1896 removed it from the list of possible concessions for the British.

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Thus, if the British ruling circles and entrepreneurs at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries were able to create their own sphere of influence on the coast of Palestine by investing in the modernization of the Jaffa or Haifa ports, they did not make any efforts to do so. As a result, concessions to modernize Palestinian and Syrian ports ended up in the hands of the French, and then the Germans. Back in 1895, the French completed the construction of the port in Beirut and, together with the French Railway Society, brought the Beirut-Damascus-Hauran railway to the new port, thereby making Beirut the main port of Greater Syria. In contrast, German companies began to develop the Palestinian city of Haifa, which in the future was to be connected to the Turkish Hejaz railway (Damascus-Mecca) and become the main port of central Palestine. And from 1908, the Deutsche Levante Linie steamship line in Gaza was supposed to be operational [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 10].

Great Britain was one of the first countries to open steamship lines in the Eastern Mediterranean. Before the 1880s. Great Britain carried on its ships up to 40% of all Turkish imports and exports [Vneshneekonomicheskie..., 1989, p. 145]. But already in 1884, the first German steamship line Hamburg-Istanbul appeared, and by 1910, Germany ranked third in terms of tonnage of ships entering Ottoman ports. Britain began to lose ground in the Black Sea trade and Black Sea ports. In 1908, 13 British ships with a total tonnage of 16,783 tons entered the Black Sea port of Trabzon, and only 11 with a tonnage of 12,462 tons entered the port of Samsun. Britain ranked 8th, behind not only Germany (Trabzon - 33 (57,094), Samsun-59 (102,296)), but also Greece, Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, and Turkey [Ditmar, 1911, p. 184]. This was facilitated by the reorientation of English ship campaigns to long-distance transatlantic flights.

Against this background, the British presence in Palestinian ports looked more confident. During 1895-1907. Great Britain increased the number and tonnage of its ships in Jaffa. If in 1895 Britain (74,590) ranked fourth in terms of tonnage in the Port of Jaffa, behind Austria-Hungary (115,245), Egypt (105,658) and France (104,780), then by 1907 the British were in the lead - 202,349 [Diplomatic..., 1908, p.21]. In the port of Gaza, Great Britain remained almost the only foreign trading Power until 1907. At the same time, the port of Jaffa was not the leading port for Britain on the great Syrian coast. The navigation data of the port of Beirut clearly demonstrate its predominance: for example, in 1905 it included 285 British ships with a total tonnage of 338,128 tons against 170 ships (242,734 tons) in the port of Jaffa [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 21].

Several British steamship lines passed through Palestinian ports. The Prince Line Company's maintained a freight service between England and the Levant and specialized in the orange trade, with ships arriving in Palestine once a week. Westcott and Laurance Company ships came to the ports of Palestine once a month. Bell's Asia Minor Steamship Company operated cargo and passengers along the coast between Egypt and Syrian ports from Alexandria to Alexandretta. The Anglo-Egyptian line "Khedivial Mail" supported regular passenger, freight and postal services between Egypt, Syria and Palestine [Diplomatic..., 1904, p. 9]. Since 1899, "Khedivial Mail", like almost all Egyptian ships, began to fly the British flag.

The main English rivals in Middle Eastern shipping were not the Germans, although in 1895-1907 they were not the Germans. they were able to increase the total tonnage of ships arriving in Jaffa by almost 4 times - from 8,446 to 33,137 tons. But in fact, the volume of their tonnage in 1907 was 6 times less than the British one. As in the entire territory of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the XX century, the main competitor of Great Britain in shipping was Austria-Hungary. In 1907, 115 Austro-Hungarian ships with a tonnage of 199,419 tons entered the port of Jaffa [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 21].

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The leading position of British shipping companies in Palestine determined Britain's strong position in the trade turnover of the Holy Land. In 1897, Great Britain accounted for 19.2% of exports from Palestine, second only to Turkey proper - 20.2, France accounted for 16.8, and Germany - 2%. In 1907, 36% of exports of goods (3% of them to the colonies) went to Great Britain, the share of Germany increased to 10.3%, France and Turkey, on the contrary, reduced the volumes to 6.1 and 10.5%, respectively. In absolute terms, the British were able to increase the volume of exported goods from 59.5 thousand pounds in 1897 to 160 thousand pounds in 1907 [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 20]

Exports to England were mainly agricultural products: oranges, wine, durro (bread sorghum), beans, coloquinte (pumpkin plant) and barley. Barley was mainly exported to English breweries [Diplomatic..., 1900, p. 8]. The main export product during 1896-1907 was oranges. In 1896, oranges were exported from Palestine in the amount of 72.6 thousand pounds, in 1899 - 77 thousand pounds, in 1903-93,435 pounds, and in 1907-179,185 pounds. The volume of exports of oranges for 10 years increased 2.5 times, the lion's share of it went to to Liverpool [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 20]. Another promising export product from Palestine was wine. British officials recommended sending a special commission of experts to Palestine to study the products of local winemakers, mostly Jewish immigrants, in order to establish possible supplies to England.

In the import of products, the position of the British was more modest. In 1897, Great Britain ranked second in terms of product imports to Palestine (10.5%), significantly behind France (17.2%), and only slightly ahead of Germany (9.4%). In the 10 years to 1907, Britain in absolute terms increased its imports from 32.4 thousand pounds to 74 thousand pounds (9.1% - the mother country and 5.3% - the colonies), ahead of its traditional competitors: France - 50 thousand pounds (6.1%), and Germany - 54 thousand pounds. f. st. (6.6%). However, British goods still failed to reach the 1st place: since 1902, the share of Austria-Hungary in the Palestinian market has significantly increased, which in 1907 already accounted for 15.9% of imports (129 thousand pounds) [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 19].

Imports of English goods were dominated by cotton fabrics, iron and iron products, tin, zinc, copper, coal and briquettes, oil paints, canned goods and sweets, kitchen utensils, rice (from India), tea, caustic soda, ready-made dresses, jute, gas engines.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the import of goods to Palestine increased: if in 1897 it was about 306 thousand pounds, then in 1907 it increased to 809 thousand pounds. The development of the market was determined by railway construction, Jewish immigration and an increase in the number of pilgrims. Overall, the capacity of the Palestinian market remained extremely low due to the virtually negligible purchasing power of the local population.

Active railway construction during the 1890s led to an increase in the import of iron and iron products. If in 1883 Palestine consumed 650 tons of iron and 50 tons of nails [Palestina..., 1884, p. 106], then in 1896 the volume of iron products consumed increased to 895 tons, in 1897 - 1200 tons, in 1899 - 3950 tons [Diplomatic..., 1899, p. 4]. The main British producers were: Belgium was a competitor for this type of product. Belgian iron was much cheaper, which attracted such large iron customers as construction and railway companies. British material was mostly used for the manufacture of horseshoes and agricultural implements, where consumption volumes are lower than in construction [Diplomatic..., 1899, p. 5].

Another important Palestinian import from Britain was coal. The volume of its consumption in mutesarriflik in 1896-1907 grew slightly and remained approximately at the same level. In 1896, 2,890 tons of coal were imported to Palestine via Jaffa, in 1902 - 4,450 tons, in 1905-4,050 tons, and in 1907 even a drop in its consumption was recorded - 3134 tons. To increase the supply of coal to Palestine pre --

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The traditional nature of the Palestinian economy has been enhanced. In mutesarriflik, neither gas nor electric light was used for lighting. Olive wood was used for heating the premises, and firewood could be purchased at a lower price than coal. The only facilities where coal was used were the railway and several mills near Jaffa. At the same time, the growing shortage of wood for fuel due to active logging raised hopes among British officials for the prospect of a growing coal market in the Holy Land in the near future. On average, out of 3,500 tons of coal imported per year to mutesarriflik, in 1893-1903, 1,500 tons came from Belgium, 1,400 tons from Britain, and 600 tons from Turkey [Diplomatic..., 1904, p.4]. However, since 1903, the import of Belgian coal has virtually ceased, and Turkish coal, although imported duty-free, was of poor quality, which opened the way for British coal to the Palestinian market.

The most important product of British imports to Palestine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was cotton and cotton fabrics from Manchester, which, as a contemporary wrote, " conquered the entire eastern market and accounted for nine-tenths of all English imports "(Gordon, 1906, p. 14). In 1883, cotton, wool and silk fabrics were imported to Palestine for a total amount of 58 thousand pounds. st., for comparison, the entire import of coal amounted to 1100 pounds. st., and iron and iron products-7200 pounds. st. [Palestine..., 1884, p. 106]. In 1896, cotton imports accounted for 23% of the total volume of imports in Palestine, in 1902-28%, and in 1907-33% [Diplomatic..., 1897, p. 8]. Until 1907, Britain rightfully considered the trade in cotton and cotton fabrics its property. But as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, reports from British officials suggested that German, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian suppliers were becoming more active.

The success of Britain's competitors was determined by three factors. First, the Germans, Austrians, and Italians began to use traveling sales intermediaries - traveling salesmen who actually worked from door to door and could provide a whole range of benefits and discounts to customers according to the situation. Secondly, Italian and Austrian cotton pieces were somewhat cheaper than British ones. Finally, German firms partially solved the low purchasing power of the local population by providing loans for the purchase of goods from 3 to 6 months [Diplomatic..., 1904, p. 9]. Already in a 1907 report, the British Consul E. Blech was forced to state that "Germany is a serious competitor to Britain in the supply of cotton and cotton products to Palestine" [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 7]. Moreover, the consul sent home samples of German and Italian goods to analyze their competitive advantages.

Employees of the British Consulate in Jerusalem, concerned about the growth of foreign competition with goods of traditional imports of Great Britain, suggested in turn that British entrepreneurs reconsider their approaches to the list of goods supplied. The low purchasing power of the Palestinians, the growing number of Jewish immigrants who had to create their own way of life in the Holy Land from scratch, the creation of new agricultural settlements specializing in fruit production, should have made adjustments to the lists of imported goods and opened up new niches for British industry.

In the list of potential goods, British consular officials included woollen products, for which there was a constant demand due to rapid wear and tear; agricultural implements and machines; lamps, kitchen utensils, stationery, earthenware, glass, pipes, stove grilles, tools, locks, keys, jewelry, buckles, whips, brushes and many others. other goods that at that time were supplied almost exclusively from Germany [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 7].

The competition between British and German imports of oil and gas engines was significant in this regard. Oil and gas engines are used for-

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They were used to pump water from wells, in an irrigation system that is so necessary in the arid Palestinian climate. Initially, the gas engines that appeared in Jerusalem and Jaffa were German-made. English cars began to compete with them. In total, the British and Germans imported 64 such engines to Palestine in 1902, 42 in 1903, and 39 in 1904 [Diplomatic..., 1908, p.19]. Despite the decrease in the number of products, the price of engines increased every year. With roughly the same sales volumes, the British, however, could not displace the Germans from the market. Consular officer Edward Freeman attributed the success of selling German engines not to the cheapness of the latter (prices were approximately equal), but to the use of mechanical engineers by the Germans in promoting goods, who not only demonstrated engines and talked about their proper use, but also provided a one-year warranty for operation and service [Diplomatic..., 1907, p. 4].

In this regard, in order to promote British goods on the Palestinian market, officials recommended using the services of traveling salesmen and opening credit lines for buyers of English goods in English banks in Palestine (Diplomatic..., 1908, p.8). By this time, the Jewish Colonial Trust and its branches, the Anglo - Palestinian Bank (1902) and the Levantine Bank (1907), were registered in London. The Anglo-Palestinian Bank had branches in Jerusalem, Haifa and other cities. Consular officers suggested setting up purposeful work on collecting samples of foreign goods to analyze their competitive advantages [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 7]. A separate place among their proposals was occupied by the idea of creating a universal store (similar ones have already been opened in Constantinople and Smyrna), which was supposed to sell food and household goods. The store was intended primarily for foreigners, pilgrims, and Jewish immigrants [Diplomatic..., 1908, p. 8].

Overall, in the Palestinian market by 1907, British entrepreneurs began to feel increased competition from other foreign Powers, which required them to take deliberate retaliatory steps. Otherwise, Britain could very soon lose the advantages it gained in the nineteenth-century Palestinian trade. At the same time, British entrepreneurs wanted to see the reasons for the failure to promote British goods in the Holy Land, as well as the failure to obtain railway construction concessions, on a political plane. As the Russian citizen S. Gordon wrote, "a major role was played by the political influence of foreign powers in their rivalry among themselves for the seizure of the Levant railways of political significance" [Gordon, 1906, p. 4].

The British Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Turkey has been inundated with complaints against Her Majesty's Government and the Embassy. Entrepreneurs have criticized the government for its inaction in defending British economic interests in the Ottoman Empire, particularly in Palestine (Platt, 1968, p. 187).

On August 2, 1900, the representative of Sheffield in the House of Commons, Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett, expressed concern about the increased political activity of Germany in the issue of granting a tender for the re-equipment of the Turkish navy and granting railway construction concessions. The deputy was indignant:

"The British proposals were much more lucrative than the German proposals, but due to the great political pressure that was applied, British firms were completely forced out of this area, as a result of which Germany received the concession" [Parliamentary..., 1900, col. 463-464].

In 1903 ,The Economist reported that the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry was calling for a series of resolutions to more vigorously support and encourage British entrepreneurship. Greater official support, as the House unanimously decided, will undoubtedly eliminate the belief that British subjects do not need railway, mining and other concessions in Turkey [cit. by: Platt, 1968, p. 187].

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In response, Her Majesty's government had to make comments and even justify itself: Sultan Abdul Hamid II, in exchange for granting concessions to European powers, demanded unconditional recognition of his regime, silence about the massacre of Armenians, non-interference in the affairs of Macedonia, and support and protection of the interests of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The British government, as the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Gray, said many years later, could not pay such a price:

The British protest against the murder of Armenians has made us hate, but not fear... Public opinion in Britain demanded statements of protest from us, we did, but the cost was losses in material interests in Turkey. The whole irony was that almost nothing or nothing good came of it... " [cit. by: Platt, 1968, p. 186].

As a result, relations between Turkey and Britain were no more than tolerant. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 did not change the balance of power, and Britain was losing ground in trade and railway construction in the Ottoman Empire. Germany, on the other hand, had significantly strengthened its position by 1914.

Based on this, contemporaries might have had the impression that the failures of British economic policy in Palestine, as in the entire Ottoman Empire, were entirely on the shoulders of Her Majesty's government, but this was not the case. In Palestine, economic motives were crucial to the failure of British policy. The low profitability of the railways and the lack of visible prospects for returning investments in the modernization of Palestinian ports not only did not motivate British entrepreneurs to apply for concessions, but also convinced them to refuse even the received ones.

In terms of trade, Palestine was of rather limited interest to Britain. In export terms, the mutesarriflik producers could offer the British nothing but barrels of wine and several hundred thousand cases of oranges. Imports of British goods were limited to the Palestinian market, which was also subject to fierce competition between European States. The British, who were more accustomed to price competition, were not ready for a qualitatively new competition when competitors opened credit lines, actively used the services of salesmen, consulting engineers, and provided discounts and guarantees on the goods offered. Even though Palestine was almost the only territory in the Ottoman Empire where England not only did not lose momentum from trade, but on the contrary increased sales rates, the growth of this market was too insignificant for the Holy Land to enter the list of the most economically attractive territories for the British Empire. Only a small group of people involved in the supply and export of certain types of goods had trading interests in mutesarriflik.

Therefore, realizing the economic unprofitability of economic relations with Palestine, the British government did not take serious political steps to promote its entrepreneurs in the Holy Land at the end of the XIX-beginning of the XX century. In political terms, Britain chose other priority Ottoman territories: Egypt, the Suez region, Mesopotamia, Southern Iran, the Persian Gulf zone, with the help of which Britain received a direct and short route to India. Palestine was not included in the transport chain from India to Britain, nor in the list of strategically important and economically developed territories.

list of literature

Foreign economic relations of the Ottoman Empire in modern times: the end of the XVIII-beginning of the XX century. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1989.

Gorbunova N. M. Syria and Lebanon in the XIX-early XX centuries: the first steps of modernization "from above" (the end). Vostochny archiv, 2012, no 2 (26).

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Gordon S. Essays on the economic situation of Palestine. Odessa, Palestine, 1906.

Ditmar N. F. Export abroad of products of the mining and mining industry in the South of Russia. Kharkiv, 1911. Issue 2.

Palestine, its geographical position, climate, flora, fauna and economic situation / / Palestine. A collection of articles and information about Jewish settlements in the Holy Land. St. Petersburg, 1884.

Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Issue No.5. Jerusalem Mutssarriflik, St. Petersburg: IPPO, 1903.

Diplomatic and Consular reports. № 2050 Annual scries. Turkey. Report for the year 1897 on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular district of Jerusalem. London: HSMO, April 1898.

Diplomatic and Consular reports. № 2217 Annual scries. Turkey. Report for the year 1898 on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular district of Jerusalem. London: HSMO, April 1899.

Diplomatic and Consular reports. № 2405 Annual scries. Turkey. Report for the year 1899 on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine. London: HSMO, April 1900.

Diplomatic and Consular reports. № 3223 Annual scries. Turkey. Report for the year 1903 on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine. London: HSMO, July 1904.

Diplomatic and Consular reports. № 3771 Annual scries. Turkey. Report for the year 1906 on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine. London: HSMO, May 1907.

Diplomatic and Consular reports. № 3974 Annual scries. Turkey. Report for the year 1907 on the Trade of Palestine. L.: HSMO, April 1908.

Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons; House of Lords: Fourth scries. Session 1900 (2 august 1900).

Platt DC. M. Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

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