The arrest of ex-President of Mongolia N. Enkhbayar in 2012, on the eve of the parliamentary elections, stirred up the whole country and became one of the main events in the political life of the Mongolian state. Estimates of this event were divided. Some see it as a clear example of the fight against corruption, showing that Mongolia is confidently moving along a democratic path of development. Others believe that the country is sliding into authoritarianism. The author shows that Mongolia, which has become a vivid example of successful democratization in the post-socialist space in Asia over the past twenty years, is at risk. The country's focus on the extraction and sale of mineral resources, the pressure of neighboring states and the interests of multinational companies can lead to an aggravation of the internal political struggle, an increase in corruption and the degradation of the state apparatus, which can lead to the coming to power of an authoritarian leader and a change in the trajectory of Mongolia's political development.

Keywords: Mongolia, democracy, democratization, Enkhbayar, resources, politics, authoritarianism.

On April 13, 2012, the former President of Mongolia and leader of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)was arrested on corruption charges Намбарын Энхбаяр. The very fact of the arrest, the irregularities in its conduct, as well as the fact that the arrest took place shortly before the elections to the Mongolian parliament, caused a heated discussion in Mongolian society and caused a serious international outcry. Two main versions of what happened were announced. According to the first one, the ex-president was arrested quite rightly, since the scale of corruption during his rule reached unprecedented proportions, the abuses of which he was accused actually took place, and the very fact of his arrest is a clear indication that Mongolia is confidently moving along the path of democratic development (for more information, see [Jargal, 2012]).. The second version, which was mainly defended by supporters of the ex-president, was that the case was clearly ordered and the main purpose of Enkhbayar's arrest was to prevent him from participating in the parliamentary elections [Enerel, 2012; Jargal, 2012].

The situation that has developed since the arrest is of considerable interest from a research point of view. The fact is that Mongolia has long been held up as an example in Western literature and the press as a country that is successfully moving along the democratic path of development. Elections are held here without significant violations, parliaments and presidents are replaced peacefully. Against the background of the authoritarian regimes of neighboring Central Asia, Mongolia really looks like a democratic state. However, the arrest of the ex-president and the discussion that unfolded around it raised a number of questions: what kind of democracy is this, do the Mongolian authorities really follow democratic principles or only use democratic rhetoric to achieve their goals, including cracking down on political competitors? Before trying to answer these questions, let's look at how the arrest itself went, what preceded it, and how it ended.

ARREST OF THE "GODFATHER OF CORRUPTION" OR CRACKDOWN ON A POLITICAL COMPETITOR?

Nambaryn Enkhbayar (born 1958), a graduate of the Moscow Literary Institute and the University of Leeds (Great Britain), was President of Mongolia in 2005-2009. He started his career as a translator, served as General Secretary and Vice-President of the Russian Federation.-

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dent of the Writers ' Union of Mongolia. After the beginning of democratic reforms, he was appointed Minister of Culture (1992-1996). In 2000, he became Prime Minister of Mongolia, and in 2004-Speaker of the Parliament-the Great State Hural (VGH). In 2005, he won the presidential election in Mongolia.

Until 2010, N. Enkhbayar was a member of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. However, after it was decided to return to the former name of the party that existed before 1924 - the Mongolian People's Party (MPRP), N. Enkhbayar left it in protest and, together with other dissatisfied people, founded a new party with the former name - the MPRP. Thanks to its well-known and popular leader, the party quickly gained political weight. In the run-up to the 2012 parliamentary elections, the political struggle escalated.

At a press conference on April 12, 2012, N. Enkhbayar released a classified transcript of the protocol on declaring a state of emergency, dated July 3, 2008. The transcript is a recording of conversations between the current President of Mongolia Ts. Elbegdorj, Prime Minister S. Bayar, as well as other high-ranking officials. They discussed the situation following the introduction of a state of emergency in response to the riots that began in Ulaanbaatar after the announcement of the results of the 2008 parliamentary elections.According to official data, the MPRP won them (45 seats out of 76), but opposition representatives claimed fraud, after which protests began on the streets of the Mongolian capital. Soon they turned into riots, the MPRP headquarters was set on fire, five people were killed and many were injured. Subsequently, a trial began, in which, in particular, N. Enkhbayar was also involved. At the same time, the ex-president insisted on holding an open trial, inviting the current President Ts. Elbegdorj, who headed the opposition Democratic Party in 2008, as well as the publication of a secret transcript [Jan, 2012 (1)]. The latter, he said, would allow him to explain to judges and ordinary citizens what he was guided by during the riots. It is also important that N. Enkhbayar accused the current president of Ts. Elbegdorj's accusation is that it was his fault that the riots started after his statement about election fraud [Pearly, 2012], which, in his opinion, was confirmed by the published transcript [Jan, 2012(2)].

In the evening of the same day, on April 12, the first attempt was made to detain N. Enkhbayar. Police officers and the Independent Anti-Corruption Service of Mongolia surrounded Enkhbayar's car, smashed the windows and tried to pull him out of the car at gunpoint. However, the ex-president's guards managed to repel him, after which they took refuge on the territory of the Academy of Management. Soon after, Enkhbayar's supporters began arriving at the building where he was staying, including VGH deputies, as well as relatives who formed a "human shield". Police officers began to converge on the building, which, together with the special unit of the anti-corruption service, laid siege to it. On the morning of April 13, at 06.05, Mongolian special forces broke through the ring of supporters of the ex-president, broke into the building and carried N. Enkhbayar literally on his hands, barefoot and with a bag on his head.

Immediately afterwards, Enkhbayar's supporters accused the authorities of illegally arresting a person under State protection. In addition, several parliamentarians who were with the ex-president during the arrest stated that they were beaten and that the law on parliamentary immunity was violated. The ex-president himself was taken to the temporary detention center of the Central Aimag, where he soon began a dry hunger strike. In the capital and other regions of Mongolia, N. Enkhbayar's supporters began to take part in protest actions, some outraged deputies left the ranks of the MHP, while at the same time the ranks of the MPRP began to be replenished [Foreign Diplomats..., 2012]. Diplomats and representatives of foreign organizations expressed their concern about what is happening.

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The Independent Anti-Corruption Service explained the arrest by saying that N. Enkhbayar was repeatedly summoned for questioning in connection with the investigation of the deaths of people during the 2008 unrest, but he ignored the summons [Irintseyeva, 2012]. The question remains, why didn't they attract him sooner? However, it was later announced that the ex-president was arrested in connection with corruption charges.

From April 13 to May 6, N. Enkhbayar was detained in the Central Aimag. On April 26, the Ulaanbaatar District Court ordered that he be held in custody for two months [Former President..., 2012]. N. Enkhbayar himself stated that his persecution is political in nature in order to prevent him from participating in the elections [Cimeg, 2012]. In his arrest and prosecution, he accused President Ts. Elbegdorj, Prime Minister S. Batbold, Minister of Justice Ts. Nyamdorj and the Prosecutor General of Mongolia D. Dorligzhava [N. Энхбаяр..., 2012].

As a result of the hunger strike, the health of N. Enkhbayar's condition quickly worsened and he was transferred to a prison hospital and released on bail on May 14. The international community's close attention also contributed to easing the conditions of detention - in particular, the human rights organization Amnesty International, UN Secretary-General Park Ki-moon expressed their concern (I personally called President Ts. Elbegdorj) [N. Enkhbayar is released..., 2012]; the arrest of the ex-president was discussed in the US Senate [Feinstein Statement..., 2012], it was written about by leading world publications.

From the moment of his arrest, the question remained open: will Enkhbayar be able to participate in the parliamentary elections? The response was received on June 8, when the Main Election Committee of Mongolia refused to register N. Enkhbayar as a candidate for the 2012 elections, referring to the demands of the prosecutor and the court [Mongolia ex-president..., 2012]. In addition, the committee referred to article 27.5.2 of the Electoral Law, which states that candidates must show that they have sufficient knowledge, education and experience to represent the interests of other citizens [Humber, 2012]. N. Enkhbayar's son, E. Batshugar, was also denied registration because he did not complete compulsory military service. A refusal under the pretext of incompetence to a person who has held the highest state posts for many years, including the presidential one, does not look convincing. It is obvious that the Mongolian authorities tried to find any excuse to prevent N. Enkhbayar from participating in the elections.

The trial was postponed several times and only started at the end of July, after the elections. Apparently, the sentencing before the election was fraught with consequences. N. Enkhbayar's conviction could trigger a new wave of protests and increase the popularity of the MPRP, while uncertainty left room for maneuver. After a three-day trial, Enkhbayar was charged with three counts on August 2. First, he was accused of illegally privatizing the hotel in 2007, as a result of which the state suffered damage in the amount of 137 million tugriks (about 100 thousand US dollars). Secondly, he was found guilty of fraud with the Ulaanbaatar Times publishing house, as a result of which N. Enkhbayar's younger sister, Enkhtuya, allegedly received 49% of the shares. Finally, the third charge related to the events of 2000, when Enkhbayar was the leader of the MPRP faction in the Supreme Soviet. Then he received a gift from Japan of television equipment worth 113 thousand dollars, which was intended for the Buddhist monastery of Gandan. However, it was used for the development of the TV9 channel, which was owned by N. Enkhbayar. In addition, the former leader of Mongolia was accused of illegally supplying steel to the Erdenet Corporation, as a result of which the latter suffered losses of 930 million tugriks. He was accused of importing books into the country without paying a fee, but this charge was dropped after the trial [Solyanskaya, 2012].

As a result, N. Enkhbayar was found guilty of corruption and abuse of office and sentenced to four years in prison and partial imprisonment.-

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property confiscation in order to compensate for the damage caused to the Erdenet combine and the Gandan Monastery [Mongolia ex-leader..., 2012]. In December 2012, the sentence was reviewed and the sentence was reduced to 2.5 years. At the same time, N. Enkhbayar spent several months in the hospital due to a deteriorating state of health.

However, the investigation did not stop there: a joint working group of employees of the Main Investigation Department and the Anti-Corruption Service continued to check former members of Parliament and some officials. N. Enkhbayar's younger sister, N. Enkhtuya, was put on the international wanted list [Wanted by Interiol..., 2012]. At the same time, his son E. Batshugar received a high position of vice-president of Mongol Bank, which can be considered as a kind of concession on the part of the authorities in order to mitigate the situation. The fact is that according to the results of the June parliamentary elections, the Democratic Party (DP) won, but with an insufficient margin (31 seats), so it was forced to enter into a coalition with other parties. The Mongolian People's Party, which came second in the election (28 seats), is the PD's main political rival, and an alliance with it would be negatively perceived by voters. Therefore, the Democrats decided to form a coalition with the MPRP, which was in third place in the election results. However, due to the opposition of the leaders of these parties - Ts. Elbegdorj and N. Enkhbayar - and the arrest of the latter, the coalition in the first months after the elections was in danger of collapse. MPRP members tried to improve Enkhbayar's position by periodically blackmailing the Democrats and threatening to withdraw from the coalition. Therefore, the appointment of N. Enkhbayar's son to a high post can be considered as an attempt to stabilize the situation.

With. Luvsandandev, director of the Sant Maral Foundation, which focuses on public opinion polls, said that N. Enkhbayar was under investigation for quite a long time, but he was arrested only on the eve of the elections, which is hardly a coincidence [Pearly, 2012]. The fact that the arrest took place after the release of a secret transcript may suggest that the authorities were afraid of further revelations, especially on the eve of the elections, and moved to decisive action. At the same time, the editor-in-chief of the Undestniy Toym magazine, D. Batbayar, expressed the opinion that N. Enkhbayar, having learned about the impending arrest, deliberately released the transcript in order to politicize the process [Batbayar, 2012].

The trial of N. Enkhbayar raised a number of questions. Of course, the accusations of corruption are not without foundation (N. Enkhbayar was often called the "godfather of corruption" in Mongolian newspapers), but he is not the only corrupt official in the Mongolian government. Corruption is generally one of the key problems of modern Mongolia: the country ranks 120th out of 183 countries in Transparency International's annual estimates [Areddy, 2012]. Much suggests that corruption is not the only reason for the attention of the judicial authorities to the figure of the ex-president. Being a major influential politician with extensive experience and support among the population, N. Enkhbayar could seriously compete with the current President of Ts. Elbegdorj. A public opinion poll in March-April 2012 showed that N. Enkhbayar's popularity is higher than that of the president and Prime Minister [Politbarometer 10 (43), 2012]. It is important to understand that it was not just about the personal ambitions of politicians, but about who will manage the significant revenues from mining (coal, copper, uranium, gold, etc.), which are expected to begin to flow in the coming years. According to various surveys (up to 2004However, the quality of public administration in Mongolia has been declining, especially in the areas of governance efficiency and anti-corruption [Fritz, 2007]. Attention to these issues and their relevance have increased in recent years due to the fact that revenues from mining and their distribution in society are at stake.

In addition, this is not only and, perhaps, not so much a confrontation with Ts. Elbegdorj and N. Enkhbayar, how many MPRPS and DP, as well as MPRPS and MNPs, in other words,

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Mongolian elites and the forces behind them. According to the American researcher D. Reeves, the arrest of N. Enkhbayar only looks like a fight against corruption, but in reality it is not so [Reeves, 2012]. According to the scientist, in reality, the patronage of old friends is behind this, and the judicial system depends on who is in power. Institutions that are supposed to be independent are actually used in the political interests of one of the parties, in particular for organizing politically motivated cases [ibid.].

In the case of N. Enkhbayar's arrest, the situation really looks as the American scientist described it. Perhaps the authorities decided to kill two birds with one stone-to deal with a political competitor and punish the criminal. But can this arrest and the related events be considered as a sign of really serious changes in Mongolian society? And if so, what are these changes, and where do they lead? It seems that to answer these questions, it is worth looking at the last twenty years of Mongolian history and its political development.

ATYPICAL DEMOCRACY

The collapse of the socialist bloc and the fall of a number of authoritarian, totalitarian and communist regimes at the end of the 20th century were received with great enthusiasm by the world community. Researchers started talking about the" third wave " of global democratization. It seemed that all state regimes would eventually come to "gradually build a consolidated liberal-type democracy" (Melville, 2007). However, the reality turned out to be more complex and diverse than this simple linear concept-just look at the entire spectrum of political regimes in the modern post-Soviet space. It became obvious that the changes are of a multi-vector nature, therefore, new ideas and concepts are needed for an adequate analysis of what is happening.

In Mongolia, in contrast to countries where the initial push for democratization was given from above, by representatives of the ruling elite or a part of it, power was replaced under the pressure of the masses, we can say - in a democratic way [Graivoronsky, 1996, p.93]. None of the main parties or coalitions (MPRP, MVP, DP) advocated a return to the old ideology, for the restoration of the old order.

Of the five Central Asian States, all eventually developed diverse authoritarian regimes. Mongolia managed not only to avoid falling into authoritarianism, but also, on the contrary, to move forward on the path of democratization. According to Freedom House research in 1999-2000, Mongolia was the only post-communist country in Asia that met the criteria of free polity [Fish, 2001, p. 324].

Mongolia is an extremely atypical case of democratization. Having lost Soviet aid, the country found itself in a crisis situation in the early 1990s. The economic situation in the country has sharply deteriorated, while one of the factors of democratization is a fairly high level of economic development. In addition, Mongolia is quite far from other democratic states, which excludes any external influence on the situation in the country, as was the case in Eastern Europe. Of course, in the 1990s, Western countries and organizations that provided humanitarian and financial assistance to Mongolia influenced the country's domestic policy (see below), but here we are talking about the neighborhood of democratic states. In the latter case, close political, economic, and other ties may favor internal transformation.

Finally, the country has no tradition of democracy. Although some researchers (see, for example, [Sabloff, 2001]) find the features of proto-democracy in the features of the political structure of nomadic societies, where the degree of control of the khan over his subjects-

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It was far from absolute, since the latter could always migrate away in case of discontent. However, it is hardly correct to explain the democratic transformations of modern Mongolia by referring to the realities of antiquity and the Middle Ages. The example of nomadic neighbors-Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan-does not confirm this thesis. Why is it that a country that at the time of the collapse of the USSR was about equal in terms of economic development and literacy to such republics as Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, embarked on the path of democratic development, while in these republics democracy failed?

Sometimes a small population is singled out as a factor in the democratization of society - in small societies, the elites are small and more inclined to negotiate than to use force and repression against political opponents. However, the example of the United Arab Emirates calls this hypothesis into question. It turns out that democratization in Mongolia is not conditioned by any economic, geographical, or historical features; cultural, religious, and ethnic factors can be called favorable, but not decisive [Fritz, 2002, p.95-96].

According to the Italian researcher Verena Fritz, based on the existing it systems in the early 2000s. According to some theories, it is difficult to explain Mongolia's democratization convincingly; moreover, it was unlikely and certainly could not have been successful [Fritz, 2002, p. 80].

According to A. Przeworski, democracy is a system of governance that combines freedom, uncertainty of election results and certainty of procedures. Freedom implies free elections, i.e. the freedom of parties and candidates to participate in elections, free access to the media, etc. [Przeworski, 1991, p. 10-14]. Uncertainty of results means the possibility of choice and, consequently, the presence of different political forces.

Mongolia is generally ranked as a free country in terms of freedom, including freedom of the press [Fritz, 2002, p. 81]. Freedom of assembly and multiparty membership are respected. Of the factors mentioned above, perhaps the most problematic was the certainty of procedures, since the rules and laws here changed quite often.

According to X. Linz and A. Stepan, the consolidation of democracy can be considered when democracy is accepted and understood as the only possible variant of the political structure of society [Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 6]. No significant public or political group in the opposition should attempt to change the democratic rules of the game. Those in power must follow the constitutional rules, and citizens must support democracy even in the face of an economic or political crisis. In Mongolia, existing parties do not challenge or hinder the observance of democratic procedures, the Government and the president try to follow the constitution, and the population supports the "existing political system". According to a survey conducted by the Site Maral Foundation in 2012, despite serious problems (unemployment, low living standards, inflation) and the inability of the government to solve them (63.8% of Mongols believe that the measures taken by the government to solve them end in failure), the overwhelming number of respondents (a total of 1,000 participated in the survey people) support democratic values [Politbarometer 11 (44), 2012]. More than half of the respondents are satisfied to some extent with democracy and the existing political system [ibid.]. Therefore, according to the above criteria, Mongolia is a consolidated democracy.

What factors and reasons caused this? Some researchers point out the extremely rapid formation and strengthening of the party system [Fritz, 2002, p. 84]. Indeed, unlike many other post-Soviet countries, where it is more democratic-

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The Mongolian Democratic forces were mired in mutual squabbles, splits and were pushed to the periphery of political life. In 2000, the Mongolian Democrats managed to unite into a viable party that could compete with the MPRP. The first democrats represented the younger generation of the Mongolian elite, being minor officials, representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia. They managed to initiate changes while avoiding bloodshed and clashes. This was made possible by the fact that the Mongol elite was concentrated mainly in Ulaanbaatar, and due to the overall small number, all were closely interconnected with each other. It was easier and more profitable for the country's leaders to compromise. In addition, there was no one to exert external pressure to make decisions on the forcible suppression of demonstrations. Finally, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, there was not a single authoritarian leader who wanted to retain power at all costs (for more information on political transformations in Mongolia, see [Yaskina, 1995]).

According to M. Fish, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Mongolia was not perceived by world powers as an important strategic partner, so no one supported any particular Mongolian politician, which contributed to democratization [Fish, 2001, p.326]. In contrast to Mongolia, US support for A. Akayev in Kyrgyzstan, and Russia's support for N. Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan and A. Lukashenko in Belarus contributed to the strengthening of authoritarian regimes in these countries [Fish, 2001, p. 328]. Further developments also contributed to the country's democratization: Mongolia's rapprochement with the United States, and George W. Bush's visit in 2005.

Mongolia has been receiving foreign humanitarian aid since 1990, which helped avoid serious unrest. The 1990 elections were a failure for the democratic forces; in fact, the MPRP managed to outwit its opponents and return to power, while reducing the protest mood within the country. However, the changes have already begun. Having returned power to its own hands, the MPRP decided to share it with some representatives of the opposition, wanting both to attract "new blood" and to share responsibility with them in case of failure.

The next important step was the adoption of a new Constitution in 1992, which proclaimed Mongolia a parliamentary-presidential republic. According to researchers, this had important consequences for the further democratization of the country, as it weakened authoritarian tendencies in the government [Fritz, 2002, p. 88]. A certain role was played by the personalities of the country's leaders who came to power during the transition period: J. Batmunkh and P. Ochirbat. The former, as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP, personally insisted on the resignation of the Central Committee in response to the demands of the reformers, in order to prevent bloodshed. The second was twice elected president, but, apparently, did not have serious power ambitions. At the time of the transformation, Mongolia, unlike its neighboring countries, did not have a single charismatic leader, who later, using the accumulated authority, would accumulate power around him and "tighten the screws".

In general, Mongolia refutes the fairly common view that authoritarian power appears as a result of the weakness of the state in the context of regime change [Fish, 2001, p. 334]. In the early 1990s, the Mongolian economy and state institutions were in a state of deep crisis, but this did not lead to the emergence of a strong president designed to solve the problems of the transition period. However, this point of view of M. Fish is not so convincing. The country was heavily dependent on foreign aid, and democratization was one of the conditions (not necessarily stipulated in the treaties) for receiving it. The country did not have any significant internal resources that a potential authoritarian leader could begin to control and redistribute. In fact, the weak state followed the instructions of international organizations and donor countries, which in some ways replaced local authoritarian power. As the Mongolian researcher L. Munkh-Erdene writes, " ... politics

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and the recommendations of global governance institutions, such as the IMF, have left the Government with little or no policy choice... Mongolia has established a regime of "transnational governmentality" (Munkh-Erdene, 2012, p. 64-65).

The victory of the democratic forces in 1990 was short-lived: the MPRP returned to power as a result of the now democratic elections. The MPRP's position was still strong, while the Democrats were divided and disoriented. At this stage, as V. Fritz notes, a key role was played by foreign foundations and organizations that supported the Mongolian Democrats [Fritz, 2002, p. 89]. Thus, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) helped form a coalition between the National Democratic and Social Democratic parties on the eve of the 1996 elections. With the financial support of the American International Republican Institute (International Republican Institute) was formulated and printed (350 thousand copies). copies) "Contract with a Mongolian voter" [ibid.]. This aid, as well as Mongol dissatisfaction with the MPRP's policies and economic situation in the country, contributed to the victory of the Democrats (50 seats out of 76) in the 1996 parliamentary elections.

Thus, the main role here was played by Mongolia's serious dependence on external support and the country's geopolitical position - being squeezed between two giants-Russia and China, Mongolia sought support for its independence from other countries (the so-called third neighbor). The support of foreign funds has worked largely due to the small population of Mongolia. While external organizations were not very interested in Mongolia and did not allocate too much money per capita, their assistance was substantial [Fritz, 2002, p. 92].

Overall, external factors and influences have played a significant role in Mongolia's democratization. First, the reform process itself became possible as a result of the weakening and collapse of the USSR. Second, during the transition period, capitalist donor countries, primarily the United States, Japan, and Germany, provided a great deal of assistance.

Further events developed as follows: the" shock therapy " conducted by the Democrats caused dissatisfaction among the Mongols, and internal disagreements led to the collapse of the coalition [Rossabi, 2005, p.94-96]. But the Mongolian Democrats managed to rally again in 2000 and win the 2012 elections. They got a chance to get away from dependence on external assistance at the expense of income from the sale of minerals. Here, however, the question of dependence on external influences - this time from mining companies and China, the main consumer of Mongolian resources - has re-emerged.

In the 2000s, the country's natural resources attracted great interest from various States and organizations. Russia, China, Canada, the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia have expressed their desire to participate in their production. We talked about significant investments and subsequent income. At the same time, protest sentiments began to grow among the population, which demands that part of the income from the sale of resources fall into the hands of ordinary people. A growing number of people are dissatisfied with the fact that mining operations are destroying the ecology and habitual places of nomads, generally accompanied by serious changes in the lives of ordinary Mongols. Increasingly, there are accusations that the country's resources have been completely taken over by China or the situation is close to this, which threatens to lose Mongolia's independence [Awehali, 2011; Jackson, 2012; Snow, 2010].

In these circumstances, the government is forced to maneuver between compliance with previous agreements and obligations to foreign companies and the interests of the population (i.e., voters), which leads to an increase in political tension and struggle within the country. At the same time, foreign investors and companies are dissatisfied with the Mongolian government's attempts to revise the agreements adopted and with the fact that the coming to power of new forces often entails changes in legislation that affect the interests of these companies. Currently, the largest investment projects with

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The participation of foreigners must be approved by the Parliament, the Government and the Security Council headed by the President, which significantly delays decision-making. Therefore, if an authoritarian leader appears in the country, aspiring to power and at the same time ready to cooperate with mining companies on favorable terms, the latter can support him. In this sense, the statement of one of the Western investors in an interview with Vlast magazine is significant: "We very much hoped that during the current campaign (i.e., the parliamentary elections), one leading political force would appear in the country. It doesn't matter if it's the PDM or the MNE. The main thing is that they should be people who would control the situation" [Gabuev, 2012].

As shown above, the relative success of democratization in Mongolia can be attributed to the development of a favorable political and economic context. However, now that the Mongols are relying on natural resources, this context has begun to change. The question is whether this will lead to major changes in the country's political life.

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN MONGOLIA

The American researcher M. Fish, in his article on democracy in Mongolia, puts the availability of natural resources in the first place among the five factors that are harmful for democratization [Fish, 2001, p. 335]. The article was published in 2001, when the issue of mining in the country was not as acute as it is now. According to the scientist, the excess of mineral resources often reduces politics to a struggle for control over the extraction and sale of these resources, increases the level of corruption and negatively affects the state apparatus. In particular, the examples of Mongolia's neighbors-Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan — show this.

Examples of neighboring countries, as well as the post-Soviet space as a whole, also show how changeable and difficult to predict the trajectories of political development of states can be. In the first years of independence, Kyrgyzstan was often described as an"island of democracy." The victory of the "orange revolution" in Ukraine, which inspired supporters of democratization in neighboring countries, ended with the return of V. Yanukovich and a prison sentence for Yu. Tymoshenko, with the case of which the case of N. Enkhbayar is also compared. Of course, as mentioned above, Mongolia can be considered a consolidated democracy, i.e. the transition process is completed there, which means that there is less likelihood of a tilt towards authoritarianism. But Mongolia's growing ties with China, which has enjoyed considerable economic success under authoritarian rule, are not conducive to the development of democratic institutions.

Here, however, the generally negative attitude of the Mongols towards their southern neighbor may play a role - anti-Chinese sentiments will prevent the adoption of authoritarian political models. There is also an internal political struggle, which escalates with the increase in rates. In addition, foreign mining companies are interested in ensuring that the laws in the field of environmental management, as well as the terms of agreements, are fixed and do not change depending on which party wins the parliament. The situation may develop in such a way that if the prerequisites for authoritarianism appear in Mongolia, Western players will support a strong leader, with whom it will be easier to negotiate.

It can be said that the arrest of N. Enkhbayar revealed the contradictions and weaknesses of Mongolian democracy. Outwardly, it is a vivid example of fighting corruption and following the law, but at the same time it has shown that democratic institutions and democratic rhetoric can be used in the political struggle to crack down on opponents. Here it is not so important what exactly the motives of the Mongolian authorities were guided by. It is important that the arrest, while demonstrating the triumph of democracy in Mongolia, demonstrated its vulnerability, showed that freedom and pluralism can lead to political instability, from which authoritarianism can become a way out.

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